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ABSTRACT 
 
This doctoral thesis in law seeks to understand, and begin to remedy, the immense 
and avoidable poverty that disenfranchises at least 30 percent of the world’s most 
populous region. Defining South Asia as Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the study analyses the multidimensional 
nature, historical origins and modern dynamics of both this material poverty and 
poverties of human rights, democracy and development. Both critical analysis and 
creative response are framed within legal history, human rights jurisprudence, 
constitutional and administrative law, comparative law and public international 
law, but the author draws extensively on political economy and history, and 
partially on philosophy, and cultural studies. 
 
Chapter 1 traces the Western evolution of the universal human rights regime, first 
“globalized” in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also traces 
South Asian sociopolitical and religious articulations of human dignity and 
limitations on legitimate power through the ages. Mostly contrary to culturally 
relativist claims, South Asia’s human rights needs are found to be well served by 
a genuinely universalist regime including justiciable economic, social and cultural 
rights as inseparable from civil and political. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 survey the historical “globalizations” that have impacted on 
South Asia. Although globalization is shown to be a neutral phenomenon, the 
author identifies the insidious contemporary propagation of a particular neo-
liberal ideology as being globalization’s inevitable and optimal form. The study 
analyses this propagation by the International Financial Institutions the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund, acting through Structural Adjustment 
Policies and only partially corrective Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Neo-
liberalism supposedly unshackles benign market forces from distorting 
governmental rules to create spontaneous growth that trickles down to the poor; in 
fact it employs its own rules to privilege the already wealthy, especially Western 
capital and transnational corporations (TNCs). 
 
The thesis urges South Asia to “govern globalization” pro-actively, seeking the 
virtuous circle of human rights, plural democracy and equitable development. 
 iii 
Positive signs have already included national membership in, and constitutional 
enshrinement of, universal human rights norms, and certain efforts of civil society 
and non-governmental organizations, fostered at times by activist judiciaries.  
 
Chapter 4 nevertheless catalogues overriding failures to internalize plural 
democracy and the rule of law, leaving rights nominal and democratic structures 
hollow. Governments have been obsequious to neo-liberal hegemony, insouciant 
to their underclasses and exploitative of religious schisms in appeal to tyrannous 
majoritarianism. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation is 
shown as an inadequate response to the region’s multidimensional poverties. 
 
Adapting instead the best practices of the Council of Europe, the Organization of 
American States, the African Union, and the British Commonwealth from Chapter 
5, Chapter 6 details a “South Asian Union for Human Rights Development and 
Democracy” to replace SAARC. This new regional response complements global 
human rights norms and offers South Asia solidarity in confronting neo-
liberalism, and holding TNCs, IFIs and especially their own governments 
accountable to the rule of law, equitable development, deep democracy, wide 
human rights, and “larger freedom” in peace and security.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Among the most painful manifestations of social injustice in India is the abject  
poverty of a large number of its people. A significant proportion of our citizens do not get 
enough to eat, do not have a secure roof over their heads or enough  
clothes to cover their bodies with.[…] Their self  respect, their dignity, their rights – all 
become subservient to the predominant need for survival. But this great Indian poverty is 
not a poverty among shortages, it is a poverty among plenty. 
India’s great poverty, is therefore, not a poverty of resources. 
It is a poverty of justice.”1 
 
 
This is an empirical study of a region2 that is dominated by irreverence to 
pluralism, lackadaisical democratic governance, unequal development patterns, 
denial of human rights and imprudent policy formulation. Kothari’s observation 
of the poverty of justice is applicable not only to India but to the whole South 
Asian region. With 30.8 per cent of the population living below the poverty line 
of US$1 a day, South Asia subjects its people to the worst kind of human 
deprivation.3 Misplaced priorities of economic growth have segmented the people 
of South Asia, with the poorest being disenfranchised from the political and 
economic spheres, in violation of their civil and political rights as well as their 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
The multidimensional quality of poverty is widely acknowledged.4  In particular, 
Sen5 has articulated that poverty can no longer be perceived as a purely economic 
phenomenon, but that inequitable and avoidable lack of opportunities, assets, and 
entitlements which results in the reduction of a person’s basic human capability is 
equally a form of poverty; to reprise Kothari’s phrase, it is a poverty of justice in 
the widest sense, and a poverty among plenty.  
                                                 
1 Rajni Kothari Growing Amnesia (Viking, India, 1993) 145. 
2 This study will focus on the founding member states of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Corporation (SAARC), namely (in alphabetical order) Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan, became the eighth member of the SAARC only in 
April 2007 and therefore is excluded from the ambit of this study. However it is envisaged that 
Afghanistan would be a member of the new regional praxis advocated in Chapter 6 of this study. 
3 Appendix A.  
4 François Bourguignon and Satya R Chakravarty “The Measurement of Multidimensional 
Poverty” (2003) 1 Journal of Economic Inequality 25–49.  
5 Amartya Sen “Human Rights and Capabilities” (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 151–
166; Amartya Sen Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). Sen’s 
notion of “capabilities” underpins the United Nations Development Programme’s articulation of 
“human development” where the human development index measures poverty through life 
expectancy at birth, levels of education and income. See Amartya Sen Development as Freedom 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). 
 xv 
The ubiquitous wealth at hand in South Asia in terms of manpower, natural 
resources, established (albeit dysfunctioning) structures of democracy, and a 
civilizational heritage with complex and advanced knowledge systems, has not 
been exploited positively to eradicate poverty or foster human-centred 
development. The culture of dependence, an inherited trait from a colonial past, 
has instead made the South Asian subcontinent reliant on the developed world for 
intellectual guidance and stimulation. Reliance on International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) for policy formulation and direction for the region’s 
development drive is a manifestation of that dependence. 
 
The contemporary developmental trajectory of the region has been underpinned 
since the late 1970s by neo-liberal globalization. A scrutiny of the impact of neo-
liberal globalization in South Asia and a proposed solution through a new regional 
praxis that addresses issues of governance of globalization, development, 
democracy and human rights — precisely towards remedying the poverties 
identified above in all these areas — is the central focus of this thesis. This study 
acknowledges the positive contributions of globalization as it offers new avenues 
for global integration and interaction, an exchange of knowledge and ideas, and 
opportunities for growth. However, the obsequiousness displayed by the South 
Asian states towards the IFIs and their policy formulation based on neo-liberal 
tenets has emasculated the capacity of South Asia to determine its own terms of 
engagement with globalization.  
 
This study explores a situation that must compel the South Asian region to 
grapple with poverty, dysfunctional democracy, and a lack of respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. Through this exploration the study advocates a 
functional praxis that would address the dilemmas that contemporary South Asia 
continues to encounter.  
 
Chapter 1 of this study surveys the historical evolution of the notion of human 
rights and the development of the contemporary universal human rights paradigm. 
This thesis advocates the hypothesis that the idea of rights is not an untranslatable 
“Western” construct and that comparable or at least compatible notions of justice, 
fairness, human dignity, compassion for human frailty and respect for the inherent 
worth of human beings were present in both ancient Western and Eastern 
 xvi 
philosophical and religious articulations. Chapter 1 also discusses the role of the 
state and the individual, both essential ingredients of the contemporary 
mainstream discourse on human rights, and examines the impact of globalization 
on the capacity of the nation state to protect and promote human rights.  
 
Chapter 1 also scrutinizes the legitimacy of the assertion of cultural relativism by, 
in particular, the East Asian states, and the relevance of that concept to South 
Asia. The reliance on what can justifiably be called the “spirit of human rights” by 
the independence movements in South Asia, and the utility of that spirit as a 
weapon to fight against dehumanizing cultural and social practices, granted the 
human rights paradigm a special moral authority within South Asia. The 
legitimacy of this paradigm was further reinforced by the inclusion of human 
rights charters into the letter of constitutional structures of the newly independent 
states in South Asia. This chapter, however, reiterates the existence of a wide 
chasm between the theory of human rights and its practical implementation in 
South Asia. It examines how the international treaty obligations relating to human 
rights and the constitutional guarantees thereof have been compromised due to 
economic, political and social exigencies, which this study identifies as a direct 
corollary of neo-liberal globalization. Chapter 1 identifies Social Action 
Litigation (SAL) as a phenomenon that has emerged as a response to the impotent 
mechanisms that are in place to protect human rights in South Asia. The chapter 
acknowledges the resourcefulness of this response and its considerable, though 
uneven, contribution towards compensating for that impotence, but the study also 
notes that SAL cannot be a substitutive means of human rights adjudication, nor 
should it have to. Its promise would be more fully realized in synergy with the 
new regional mechanism proposed in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 2 follows the historical evolution of globalization and the concept’s 
ramifications in a historical context, particularly its negative impact during the 
British Raj. Also discussed are contemporary theoretical analyses of globalization, 
stripping it back to lay bare its essentially neutral and negotiable character, but 
analysing how the concept’s contemporary articulations and hard-sells have 
nevertheless indicated a definite skewing towards the neo-liberal brand. The 
chapter acknowledges that globalization has created irretrievable interdependent 
global financial and communication networks, and power relations whereby the 
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developing world has felt compelled to integrate globally on terms determined by 
those skewed neo-liberal dictates.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the evolution of the nation state in South Asia and the way in 
which globalization has mutated its orthodoxy. The chapter acknowledges the 
emerging resentment towards the iniquitous packaging of globalization, 
particularly its hard selling as a non-negotiable neo-liberal unit. In this context, it 
traces the evolution of the anti-globalization movement and interrogates its 
capability to evolve an alternative vision based on equity and justice. The chapter 
concludes with the need for South Asia to determine its own terms of engagement 
with globalization in order to obtain the stripped-back concept’s inherent potential 
benefits.   
 
Chapter 3 observes that South Asia’s desire for “development” is not new but has 
assumed several characteristics within the last six decades, contemporary 
globalization being another milestone of that journey. The chapter also identifies 
the main catalysts of globalization as the major IFIs: the World Bank (WB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and slightly more peripherally the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are identified as 
the prime beneficiaries of contemporary globalization and this chapter discusses 
their considerable exploitation of influence and power over the developing world.   
 
The enormous human cost of the neo-liberal brand of globalization implemented 
through the instrument of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the only 
partially corrective Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that followed 
them are the central focus of Chapter 3. This chapter discusses numerous 
empirical examples of how structures of poverty and marginalization became 
entrenched as a direct consequence of policies that accorded primacy to economic 
growth rather than human wellbeing. The chapter examines how SAPs and PRSPs 
have eroded state sovereignty, rendering the state impotent to formulate people-
centred developmental policies, and how these same instruments instead make 
states accountable to the IFIs. The rejection of these peoples’ wishes and 
aspirations at the policy formulation stage by mainstream neo-liberal globalization 
has challenged the fundamental tenets of universal human rights and rendered 
meaningless the elaborate structures in place nationally to promote and protect 
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human rights and democracy. However, quite paradoxically, the donor-driven 
aspect of neo-liberal globalization has benefited civil societal mobilization and the 
drive for good governance within South Asia. These positive manifestations will 
be among the tools utilized in the proposal of a regional praxis for South Asia in 
Chapter 6. 
 
A distinct aspect of the debate concerning marginalization and endemic poverty in 
South Asia is the region’s democratic deficit and poor governance. Chapter 4 
explores the cyclic effect of neo-liberal globalization as it discusses the 
dysfunctional democratic governance, the militarization of the region, and the 
nexus to economic deprivation and marginalization. Increased state-sponsored 
violence will be put forward as an expression of the sense of insecurity of the 
state, which has lost its legitimacy to govern amidst the negative repercussions of 
neo-liberal globalization. This study reiterates that such violence also 
compromises civil and political rights.  
 
The increasing crisis of legitimacy to govern in the region, due to deteriorating 
democracy and human rights standards, prompts this study to explore alternative 
arrangements that would re-establish functional democracy, foster human rights 
and offer alternative mechanisms to determine developmental policy formulation 
in South Asia. The purpose of scrutinizing the role and function of the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the second half of 
Chapter 4 is to establish whether the SAARC offers a viable alternative vision of 
standard-setting and governance. The chapter concludes that the SAARC cannot 
infuse member states with genuine commitment to human rights, the rule of law, 
democracy and sagacious, human-centred policy formulation.  
 
Chapter 5 turns to the search for alternative visions to ameliorate South Asia’s 
sociopolitical and economic dilemmas. The author focuses on regional and 
transnational innovations and structures that have reduced poverty and fostered 
economic, social and cultural rights, democratic governance and human-centred 
development: the regional arrangements in Europe, the Americas and Africa; and 
the Commonwealth Organization’s promotion of democratic governance. The 
chapter concludes that a South Asian solution must be both tailored and 
autochthonous.  
 xix 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study by advocating such an autochthonous praxis to 
replace the dysfunctional and outdated SAARC. The proposed South Asian Union 
on Development, Democracy and Human Rights (SAU) will contain regional 
mechanisms to ensure democratic governance nationally. The SAU will address 
inequitable policy formulations impinging upon the rights of the people through a 
legal regime promoting and protecting human rights in the region, which would in 
turn enhance both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the universal human rights 
regime. In this regard it will revitalize existing, yet ineffectual and dysfunctional, 
national human rights commissions and create new commissions in states yet to 
establish them. Through the Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption, the 
SAU will also promote accountable governance and initiate strategies to end the 
culture of corruption pervading South Asia.   
 
This study reiterates that human rights, development and democracy are 
synergistically intertwined in a symbiotic relationship, which Sen envisions as 
“development as freedom”:6 
 
Development can be seen……as a process of expanding the real freedoms that 
people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of 
development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national 
product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or with 
technological advance, or with social modernization. 
 
The enormous human cost of poor policy formulation that focussed on the 
“narrower views of development” and irresponsible governance of globalization 
in South Asia are highlighted through the poverties of democracy, human rights 
and democratic governance. The proposed praxis of regional collaboration is 
aimed at creating normative standards relating to human rights, democratic 
governance and development, which in turn will foster peace, stability and 
prosperity in South Asia, thus squarely addressing the region’s poverties in their 
largest sense.  
 
                                                 
6 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (Alfred A. Knopf Incorporated, Westminster, MD, USA, 
1999) 3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Among the most painful manifestations of social injustice in India is the abject  
poverty of a large number of its people. A significant proportion of our citizens do not get 
enough to eat, do not have a secure roof over their heads or enough  
clothes to cover their bodies with.[…] Their self  respect, their dignity, their rights – all 
become subservient to the predominant need for survival. But this great Indian poverty is 
not a poverty among shortages, it is a poverty among plenty. 
India’s great poverty, is therefore, not a poverty of resources. 
It is a poverty of justice.”1 
 
 
This is an empirical study of a region2 that is dominated by irreverence to 
pluralism, lackadaisical democratic governance, unequal development patterns, 
denial of human rights and imprudent policy formulation. Kothari’s observation 
of the poverty of justice is applicable not only to India but to the whole South 
Asian region. With 30.8 per cent of the population living below the poverty line 
of US$1 a day, South Asia subjects its people to the worst kind of human 
deprivation.3 Misplaced priorities of economic growth have segmented the people 
of South Asia, with the poorest being disenfranchised from the political and 
economic spheres, in violation of their civil and political rights as well as their 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
The multidimensional quality of poverty is widely acknowledged.4  In particular, 
Sen5 has articulated that poverty can no longer be perceived as a purely economic 
phenomenon, but that inequitable and avoidable lack of opportunities, assets, and 
entitlements which results in the reduction of a person’s basic human capability is 
equally a form of poverty; to reprise Kothari’s phrase, it is a poverty of justice in 
the widest sense, and a poverty among plenty.  
                                                 
1 Rajni Kothari Growing Amnesia (Viking, India, 1993) 145. 
2 This study will focus on the founding member states of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Corporation (SAARC), namely (in alphabetical order) Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan, became the eighth member of the SAARC only in 
April 2007 and therefore is excluded from the ambit of this study. However it is envisaged that 
Afghanistan would be a member of the new regional praxis advocated in Chapter 6 of this study. 
3 Appendix A.  
4 François Bourguignon and Satya R Chakravarty “The Measurement of Multidimensional 
Poverty” (2003) 1 Journal of Economic Inequality 25–49.  
5 Amartya Sen “Human Rights and Capabilities” (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 151–
166; Amartya Sen Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). Sen’s 
notion of “capabilities” underpins the United Nations Development Programme’s articulation of 
“human development” where the human development index measures poverty through life 
expectancy at birth, levels of education and income. See Amartya Sen Development as Freedom 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). 
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The ubiquitous wealth at hand in South Asia in terms of manpower, natural 
resources, established (albeit dysfunctioning) structures of democracy, and a 
civilizational heritage with complex and advanced knowledge systems, has not 
been exploited positively to eradicate poverty or foster human-centred 
development. The culture of dependence, an inherited trait from a colonial past, 
has instead made the South Asian subcontinent reliant on the developed world for 
intellectual guidance and stimulation. Reliance on International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) for policy formulation and direction for the region’s 
development drive is a manifestation of that dependence. 
 
The contemporary developmental trajectory of the region has been underpinned 
since the late 1970s by neo-liberal globalization. A scrutiny of the impact of neo-
liberal globalization in South Asia and a proposed solution through a new regional 
praxis that addresses issues of governance of globalization, development, 
democracy and human rights — precisely towards remedying the poverties 
identified above in all these areas — is the central focus of this thesis. This study 
acknowledges the positive contributions of globalization as it offers new avenues 
for global integration and interaction, an exchange of knowledge and ideas, and 
opportunities for growth. However, the obsequiousness displayed by the South 
Asian states towards the IFIs and their policy formulation based on neo-liberal 
tenets has emasculated the capacity of South Asia to determine its own terms of 
engagement with globalization.  
 
This study explores a situation that must compel the South Asian region to 
grapple with poverty, dysfunctional democracy, and a lack of respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. Through this exploration the study advocates a 
functional praxis that would address the dilemmas that contemporary South Asia 
continues to encounter.  
 
Chapter 1 of this study surveys the historical evolution of the notion of human 
rights and the development of the contemporary universal human rights paradigm. 
This thesis advocates the hypothesis that the idea of rights is not an untranslatable 
“Western” construct and that comparable or at least compatible notions of justice, 
fairness, human dignity, compassion for human frailty and respect for the inherent 
worth of human beings were present in both ancient Western and Eastern 
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philosophical and religious articulations. Chapter 1 also discusses the role of the 
state and the individual, both essential ingredients of the contemporary 
mainstream discourse on human rights, and examines the impact of globalization 
on the capacity of the nation state to protect and promote human rights.  
 
Chapter 1 also scrutinizes the legitimacy of the assertion of cultural relativism by, 
in particular, the East Asian states, and the relevance of that concept to South 
Asia. The reliance on what can justifiably be called the “spirit of human rights” by 
the independence movements in South Asia, and the utility of that spirit as a 
weapon to fight against dehumanizing cultural and social practices, granted the 
human rights paradigm a special moral authority within South Asia. The 
legitimacy of this paradigm was further reinforced by the inclusion of human 
rights charters into the letter of constitutional structures of the newly independent 
states in South Asia. This chapter, however, reiterates the existence of a wide 
chasm between the theory of human rights and its practical implementation in 
South Asia. It examines how the international treaty obligations relating to human 
rights and the constitutional guarantees thereof have been compromised due to 
economic, political and social exigencies, which this study identifies as a direct 
corollary of neo-liberal globalization. Chapter 1 identifies Social Action 
Litigation (SAL) as a phenomenon that has emerged as a response to the impotent 
mechanisms that are in place to protect human rights in South Asia. The chapter 
acknowledges the resourcefulness of this response and its considerable, though 
uneven, contribution towards compensating for that impotence, but the study also 
notes that SAL cannot be a substitutive means of human rights adjudication, nor 
should it have to. Its promise would be more fully realized in synergy with the 
new regional mechanism proposed in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 2 follows the historical evolution of globalization and the concept’s 
ramifications in a historical context, particularly its negative impact during the 
British Raj. Also discussed are contemporary theoretical analyses of globalization, 
stripping it back to lay bare its essentially neutral and negotiable character, but 
analysing how the concept’s contemporary articulations and hard-sells have 
nevertheless indicated a definite skewing towards the neo-liberal brand. The 
chapter acknowledges that globalization has created irretrievable interdependent 
global financial and communication networks, and power relations whereby the 
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developing world has felt compelled to integrate globally on terms determined by 
those skewed neo-liberal dictates.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the evolution of the nation state in South Asia and the way in 
which globalization has mutated its orthodoxy. The chapter acknowledges the 
emerging resentment towards the iniquitous packaging of globalization, 
particularly its hard selling as a non-negotiable neo-liberal unit. In this context, it 
traces the evolution of the anti-globalization movement and interrogates its 
capability to evolve an alternative vision based on equity and justice. The chapter 
concludes with the need for South Asia to determine its own terms of engagement 
with globalization in order to obtain the stripped-back concept’s inherent potential 
benefits.   
 
Chapter 3 observes that South Asia’s desire for “development” is not new but has 
assumed several characteristics within the last six decades, contemporary 
globalization being another milestone of that journey. The chapter also identifies 
the main catalysts of globalization as the major IFIs: the World Bank (WB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and slightly more peripherally the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are identified as 
the prime beneficiaries of contemporary globalization and this chapter discusses 
their considerable exploitation of influence and power over the developing world.   
 
The enormous human cost of the neo-liberal brand of globalization implemented 
through the instrument of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the only 
partially corrective Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that followed 
them are the central focus of Chapter 3. This chapter discusses numerous 
empirical examples of how structures of poverty and marginalization became 
entrenched as a direct consequence of policies that accorded primacy to economic 
growth rather than human wellbeing. The chapter examines how SAPs and PRSPs 
have eroded state sovereignty, rendering the state impotent to formulate people-
centred developmental policies, and how these same instruments instead make 
states accountable to the IFIs. The rejection of these peoples’ wishes and 
aspirations at the policy formulation stage by mainstream neo-liberal globalization 
has challenged the fundamental tenets of universal human rights and rendered 
meaningless the elaborate structures in place nationally to promote and protect 
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human rights and democracy. However, quite paradoxically, the donor-driven 
aspect of neo-liberal globalization has benefited civil societal mobilization and the 
drive for good governance within South Asia. These positive manifestations will 
be among the tools utilized in the proposal of a regional praxis for South Asia in 
Chapter 6. 
 
A distinct aspect of the debate concerning marginalization and endemic poverty in 
South Asia is the region’s democratic deficit and poor governance. Chapter 4 
explores the cyclic effect of neo-liberal globalization as it discusses the 
dysfunctional democratic governance, the militarization of the region, and the 
nexus to economic deprivation and marginalization. Increased state-sponsored 
violence will be put forward as an expression of the sense of insecurity of the 
state, which has lost its legitimacy to govern amidst the negative repercussions of 
neo-liberal globalization. This study reiterates that such violence also 
compromises civil and political rights.  
 
The increasing crisis of legitimacy to govern in the region, due to deteriorating 
democracy and human rights standards, prompts this study to explore alternative 
arrangements that would re-establish functional democracy, foster human rights 
and offer alternative mechanisms to determine developmental policy formulation 
in South Asia. The purpose of scrutinizing the role and function of the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the second half of 
Chapter 4 is to establish whether the SAARC offers a viable alternative vision of 
standard-setting and governance. The chapter concludes that the SAARC cannot 
infuse member states with genuine commitment to human rights, the rule of law, 
democracy and sagacious, human-centred policy formulation.  
 
Chapter 5 turns to the search for alternative visions to ameliorate South Asia’s 
sociopolitical and economic dilemmas. The author focuses on regional and 
transnational innovations and structures that have reduced poverty and fostered 
economic, social and cultural rights, democratic governance and human-centred 
development: the regional arrangements in Europe, the Americas and Africa; and 
the Commonwealth Organization’s promotion of democratic governance. The 
chapter concludes that a South Asian solution must be both tailored and 
autochthonous.  
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Chapter 6 concludes the study by advocating such an autochthonous praxis to 
replace the dysfunctional and outdated SAARC. The proposed South Asian Union 
on Development, Democracy and Human Rights (SAU) will contain regional 
mechanisms to ensure democratic governance nationally. The SAU will address 
inequitable policy formulations impinging upon the rights of the people through a 
legal regime promoting and protecting human rights in the region, which would in 
turn enhance both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the universal human rights 
regime. In this regard it will revitalize existing, yet ineffectual and dysfunctional, 
national human rights commissions and create new commissions in states yet to 
establish them. Through the Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption, the 
SAU will also promote accountable governance and initiate strategies to end the 
culture of corruption pervading South Asia.   
 
This study reiterates that human rights, development and democracy are 
synergistically intertwined in a symbiotic relationship, which Sen envisions as 
“development as freedom”:6 
 
Development can be seen……as a process of expanding the real freedoms that 
people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of 
development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national 
product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or with 
technological advance, or with social modernization. 
 
The enormous human cost of poor policy formulation that focussed on the 
“narrower views of development” and irresponsible governance of globalization 
in South Asia are highlighted through the poverties of democracy, human rights 
and democratic governance. The proposed praxis of regional collaboration is 
aimed at creating normative standards relating to human rights, democratic 
governance and development, which in turn will foster peace, stability and 
prosperity in South Asia, thus squarely addressing the region’s poverties in their 
largest sense.  
                                                 
6 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (Alfred A. Knopf Incorporated, Westminster, MD, USA, 
1999) 3. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE DISCOURSES AND REGIMES OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THEIR GEO-HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
“The agenda of human rights still in the making, such as the human rights of indigenous 
people, the human right to sexual orientation and conduct, and the human rights of  people 
with disability, more than fifty years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
testifies to some originary practices of exclusion in the very production of international,  
regional, and national human rights norms and standards. The politics of exclusion  
in the making of human rights cuts deeper than the exigencies of politics of  
intergovernmental desire in the making of human rights may suggest.”1 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The Introduction to this thesis noted the abject poverty in much of South Asia and its 
intimate link to the denial of human rights. It also highlighted how contemporary 
globalization has offered opportunities for worldwide trade and financial integration. 
Globalization, moreover, has created new patterns of interaction between people and 
their states. Globalization promised unprecedented material progress for all, yet has 
delivered compounded economic marginalization and poverty. Legal and political 
structures in South Asia aimed at protecting and enhancing human rights, particularly 
socioeconomic rights, and eradicating all species of poverty, appear inadequate for 
several reasons. It is against this complex scenario that an examination will be made 
of the mainstream discourse on human rights in South Asia and of the human rights 
regimes operating in the region. The study will investigate the geo-historical 
background of those regimes, particularly in the West, and the legitimacy and 
efficacy of their current incarnations. 
 
The present chapter therefore traces the evolution and eventual confluence of rights 
from both ancient Western and Asian political and religious thought. Contemporary 
“human rights” are commonly regarded as a construct of Western political and 
                                                 
1 Upendra Baxi “Politics of reading Human Rights: Inclusion and Exclusion within the production of 
human rights” Saladin Meckled-García and Basak Çali (eds) The Legalization of Human Rights 
Multidisciplinary perspectives of human rights and human rights law (Routledge, Oxford, 2006) 182. 
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religious ideology which gained universal currency after World War II.2 However, 
the tributaries of reasoning that fed into that mainstream, such as the notions of 
justice, fairness, human dignity, compassion for human frailty and respect for the 
inherent worth of human beings, flowed from both ancient Western and Eastern 
philosophical and religious thought, and the first part of this chapter maps that 
progression.    
 
In discussing the roles of the state and the individual — both essential ingredients of 
the contemporary mainstream discourse on human rights — this chapter assesses the 
viability of those roles in South Asia in the context of globalization. It also queries 
assertions of cultural relativism within the human rights discourse highlighted by 
mainly the East Asian states and that concept’s legitimacy in South Asia. Despite the 
allegations of Western cultural imperialism levelled against the international regime 
of human rights, the reliance on the “spirit” of human rights by the African 
Americans in their struggle for equality,3 by those who fought for independence from 
colonial rule, and, more recently, in the fight against apartheid in South Africa,4 has 
created a universal legitimacy for the idea of human rights transcending cultural and 
ethnoreligious boundaries. This position is further reinforced by the inclusion of 
human rights charters into the constitutional structures of many states including in 
South Asia, as a corollary of the colonial legacy and of the assertion of a new, post-
colonial identity. 
 
Empirical evidence nevertheless shows a wide chasm between the accepted 
theoretical legitimacy of human rights and the reality of their practical 
implementation in South Asia. In the last sections of this chapter an examination of 
the international human rights obligations of the South Asian states and the efficacy 
of the national human rights structures that are in place to realize those obligations 
will be made. The discussion highlights the essential dichotomy between the 
                                                 
2 This thesis employs the word “contemporary”, with respect both to human rights and to economic 
globalization, specifically to refer to the period since World War II. 
3 Carol Anderson Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for 
Human Rights, 1944–1955 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
4 RL Abel Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980–1994 (Routledge, 
London, 1995). 
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universal regime and its manifestation in South Asia’s peculiar socioeconomic and 
political milieu. 
 
 
1.2  Concepts of Human Rights as Evolving from Religions 
 
The idea that human beings deserve humane, just and fair treatment that preserves 
and enhances their dignity traces back to the origin of most civilizational histories 
and all major religions of the world.5 Khushlani asserts that, “the concept of human 
rights can be traced to the origin of the human race itself.”6 However, civic 
documentation of human rights applicable to all human beings because of their 
inalienable or ethical qualities, with legal applications actionable against society and 
its rulers, was by no means common at all times to all major pre-modern Western and 
non-Western societies.7 The idea of human rights in its contemporary multifaceted 
package — described as civil and political rights; social, economic, and cultural 
rights; individual rights; group rights; and inter-generational rights — is indeed a 
construct of the post-World War II human rights regime.8 
 
All major religions of the world — Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Taoism, Islam, and others — have pervasive, cogent moral codes. All promote the 
inherent dignity of humankind, common humanity, the sanctity of human life, justice, 
                                                 
5 PG Lauren The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, 1998) (Lauren); Amartya Sen “Human Rights and Asian Values” (1997) 33 The 
New Republic 14; P Morgan and C Lawton (eds) Ethical Issues in Six Religious Traditions (Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 1996); Damien Keown “Are There ‘Human Rights’ in Buddhism?” 
(1995) 2 Journal of Buddhist Ethics; Micheline Ishay The History of Human Rights: From Ancient 
Times to the Globalization Era (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2004). 
6 Yougindra Khushlani “Human Rights in Asia and Africa” (1984) 4 Human Rights Law Journal 403-
442. 
7 For the legal code of the ancient Sumerian King Ur-Nammu, circa 2065 BC, see Peter N Stearns (ed) 
The Encyclopedia of World History (6th ed, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 2001) and Daniel C 
Snell (ed) A Companion to the Ancient Near East (Blackwell,, Oxford, 2004). Another codification of 
rights was Persia’s Cyrus Cylinder. circa 539 BC: see Ilya Gershevitch The Cambridge History of Iran 
Vol. 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) and 
Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg “Darius I and the Persian Empire” in Jack M Sasson (ed) Civilizations of 
the Ancient Near East  (Scribners, New York, 1995) 1035–1050. 
8 Leszek Kolakowski “Modernity on Endless Trial” in Stefan Czerniawski, Wolfgang Freis and 
Agnieszka Kolakowska (tr.) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990) cited in MJ Perry The Idea 
of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
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equality, and compassion, and all stipulate duties and obligations towards fellow 
humans as well as to God or a higher being or ideal.9 In Europe, however, these 
religious codes (based on a preoccupation with a good life after death) entered the 
political and civic arena only in the 17th century. As this study later elaborates, in 
South Asia such religious values of non-violence, respect, justice and notions of 
equality had sporadically infiltrated into governing practices centuries earlier.10   
 
 
1.3  Concepts of Human Rights in the West: An Overview from Antiquity till 
the 20th Century 
 
1.3.1  From Classical European Antiquity Until the 16th Century 
The contemporary international human rights regime is epitomized by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),11 which was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The UDHR is regarded by many as 
essentially a representation of ideas through the context of the European liberal 
political ideology,12 while others subscribe to a more inclusive position on the basis 
that the Human Rights Commissioners, the core drafters of the UDHR, were drawn 
from diverse ethno religious backgrounds but worked in unison to create a 
Declaration that was truly representative of all major philosophical and religious 
traditions.13 However, in structure and ideological content, the contemporary 
                                                 
9 Lauren, above n 5, 5–10. Lauren asserts that these common moral values are evident in all religious 
philosophies; JM Peek “Buddhism, Human Rights and the Japanese State” (1997) 17 HRQ 527; LC 
Green “Judaic Contribution to Human Rights” [1990] Canadian Year Book of Human Rights Law; 
Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and 
International Law (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 
1996). 
10 See below, text to n 133, the Edicts of Emperor Ashoka and the influence of Buddhism; William A 
Edmundson An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 3–15. 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (accessed 18 Feb 2006). 
12  Donnelly argues that the notion of human rights is essentially rooted in the West. See J Donnelly 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989); Prem Kirpal 
Human Rights: “The Contemporary  Situation – new orientations in education – looking ahead” in  
Philosophical Foundations of Human Right, (UNESCO 1986); RJ Vincent Human Rights and 
International Relations (Cambridge Press, 1986). 
13 “In their search for a new universal ethics, the commission members affirmed that the history of the 
philosophic tradition of human rights extended beyond the ‘narrow limits of the Western tradition and 
[that] its beginning in the West as well as in the East coincides with the beginning of philosophy.” 
Micheline Ishay History of Human Rights from Ancient Times to Globalization Era (University of 
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international human rights regime does appear to have evolved around religious, 
political and social phenomena of European origin whose normative and ethical 
lineage derives from classical Greek philosophy of the Athenian era14 and the Stoic 
stimulus in Roman jurisprudence.15  
 
Philosophers such as Aristotle16 were the first to articulate notions of entitlements in 
philosophical discourse, despite apparently accepting the institution of slavery and 
the disenfranchisement of women.17 In Roman philosophy the evolution of the theory 
of equality and altruism centred on the articulations of nature made by the Stoics.18 
The Stoics held that nature governed all things both physical and ethical, and they 
premised humans as equal members of the (universal) Roman Society.19 
 
The Stoic influence is evident in the work of Roman jurists such as Ulpian and 
Gaius.20 It contributed to the evolution of the distinction between jus gentium, 
connoting righteousness and justice, and the jus civile, based on a positive political 
order. The basis of jus gentium was jus naturae, and it was at this point that the ideas 
of natural law first began making contributions to the development of legal 
philosophy based on Stoic influences.21 In both Greek and Roman philosophies the 
notions of equality were drawn from nature and thus laid the foundation for the future 
development of the theory of natural law. Subsequent articulations of morality, 
                                                 
California Press, Berkeley, 2004) 17 (Ishay); see also L Chun “Human Rights and Democracy: the 
case for decoupling” (2001) 5 International Journal of Human Rights 19–44. 
14 AH Robertson, JG Merrills Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the 
International Protection of Human Rightz, (Manchester University Press, 1996).  
15 Ishay, above n 13.  
16Aristotle (350 BC) Politics Ernest Barker (tr) revised with an introduction and notes by RF Stalley 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995); see also F Miller Jr Nature, Justice and the Rights in 
Aristotle’s Politics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995). 
17  RK Sinclair Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1988). 
18 L Edelstein The Meaning of Stoicism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1966). 
19 Roman philosophers Cicero, Seneca the Younger, Marcus Aurelius and Cato the Younger 
subscribed to the theoretical assertions of stoicism; see Brad Inwood (ed) The Cambridge Companion 
to The Stoics (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
20 Marcia L Colish The Stoic Tradition From Antiquity To The Early Middle Ages: I. Stoicism in 
Classical Latin Literature (Brill, 1985); Karsten Friis Johansen A History of Ancient Philosophy: From 
the Beginnings to Augustine (Routledge, 1998). 
21 Melvin Rader Ethics and the Human Community (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966) 20; 
see also S Buckle Natural Law A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993). 
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natural law and the inherent dignity of mankind, particularly from the 17th century 
onwards, drew inspiration from the philosophical reasoning of the earlier era.22 
 
In medieval Europe natural law became embroiled in a new theological and religious 
discourse. Thus, natural law was redefined as the will and the command of God, and 
all humans were to be subjected to the authority of both God and the King under 
feudalism.23 The most important philosopher of this era, Thomas Aquinas (circa 
1225–1274), fused Aristotelian philosophical teachings and Catholic theology in 
Summa de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Gentiles (Summa Contra Gentiles) 
(1259–1264) and Summa Theologica (incomplete) (1265–1273). These works 
included his perceptions on the nature of God, means of proving God's existence and 
the relation to natural law. He was of the opinion that just positive law was derived 
from natural law and was achieved through logical deduction or through deliberative 
human choice.24 
 
A massive medieval influence on the subsequent rights discourse was the Magna 
Carta (1215).25 The Magna Carta articulated the idea of certainty of legal entitlements 
to (nominally) the people26 and decreed that monarchical power be exercized in 
accordance with the law. Its significance is not that it is the first legal document to 
curtail the powers of a King, but that it substantially endured from the 13th century 
and has now become the spiritual, and to some extent literal or positive, basis of the 
rule of law, rights,27 due process28 and constitutionalism in Western political and 
legal thought.  
                                                 
22 R Tuck Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979). 
23 D Herlihy (ed) The History of Feudalism (McMillan, New York, 1970). 
24 R George “Natural Law and International Order” in DR Maple and T Nardin (eds) International 
Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998) ch 3. 
25 JC Holt  Magna Carta (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992). 
26  Ibid. The Magna Carta was specifically designed to alleviate the grievances of the Pope and the 
Barons against the use of arbitrary power by the King.  
27 Roshwald asserts that the Magna Carta was in fact a legal document that referred to “rights” which 
contained legal entitlements.Ssee R Roshwald “The Concept of Human Rights” ( 1959) 19 Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 354-397, 362 (Roshwald). 
28 The inclusion of the clause “No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law” in the American Bill of Rights, which enumerates rights of the people and restrictions 
on the exercise of government power, has direct resonance to the Magna Carta. See HD Hazeltine 
“The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development” (1917) 17 Columbia Law 
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1.3.2  The 17th Century: The Age of Enlightenment 
 
The evidence of an embryonic evolution of the rights discourse in the mainstream 
political theory of Western Europe can be witnessed in retrospect during the English 
Revolution of 1640. The endorsement of the rights of the people, such as the right to 
political participation, the freedom of religion, and rights against tyrannical 
government, was the basis of this revolution.29 The subsequent disintegration of the 
Civil Administration of Oliver Cromwell can also be attributed in spirit to the notion 
of people’s rights against autocratic rulers. The fervour of the revolution of 1640 
continued through to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which led to the restoration of 
a much more curtailed monarchy and the formulation of the English Bill of Rights in 
1689.30 
 
By the 17th century, the status of rights theory— to the effect that the rights 
articulated could be vindicated against the rulers — and the related ideas of limited 
government were well established in mainstream political discourse in what was to 
become the United Kingdom. The Bill of Rights of 168931 addressed the fundamental 
political concerns felt not only in 17th century England but elsewhere in Europe. It 
made the King subject to the rule of law, like all other inhabitants of the realm, and 
the notion that the King ruled by divine right and was the sole source of law, and 
therefore above it, was rejected. The King was compelled to respect the wishes of the 
elected members of Parliament, who now controlled the state's money and property. 
The Bill of Rights also advocated some basic rights to justice, stipulating that there be 
no excessive bail or fines, cruel and unusual punishments or unfair trials, and 
guaranteeing juries, impartial courts and independent judges. It repeated some of the 
commitments made by King John in the Magna Carta to curtail the exercise of royal 
power.    
 
                                                 
Review 1–33. 
29 C Hill The English Revolution 1640 (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1940) 111. 
30 Jonathan I Israel (ed) The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World 
Impact  (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
31  The English Bill of Rights <http://www.constitution.org/bor/eng_bor.htm> (accessed 15 May 
2006). 
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The drawback of both these Charters was that they benefited the privileged segments 
of society and had no universal application. However, as Lauterpatcht has observed, 
the evolution of the idea of rights is a long and gradual process and “the vindication 
of human liberties does not begin with their complete and triumphant assertion at the 
very outset; it commences with their recognition in some matters, to some extent, for 
some people, against some organ of the state.”32  
 
Tracing the evolution of natural rights, Freeman observes that the natural rights 
theorist Hugo Grotius was a crucial figure in “transforming medieval ideas into the 
modern concept of rights”.33 Grotius is credited with separating natural law from 
divine law in theoretical reasoning, a departure from the Calvinist position that all 
ethical values stem from God.34 Although his position on Christianity is not always 
easy to determine, for his idea of ethics appears to be based on Christian values, he 
wrote that, “[t]he law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an 
act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of 
moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either 
forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.”35 In the evolution of rights 
discourse, Grotius is notable for maintaining that the theory of natural law was not 
premised on the belief in God, thus becoming the first philosopher to articulate the 
theory of natural rights based on secularism.36   
 
Thomas Hobbes’ The Leviathan of 1651 lends particularly graphic empirical support 
to the position of the present writer that the evolution of rights discourses everywhere 
is influenced by the sociopolitical issues of the time and place. This work advocates 
for a social contract between the people and the sovereign.37 Hobbes, who survived 
the three English Civil Wars between the Parliamentaries and the Royalists (1642–
                                                 
32 H Lauterpatcht International Law and Human Rights (Anchor Books, 1968) 131. 
33 Michael Freeman Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Polity, Cambridge, 2002) 18. 
34 Grotius' De Jure Praedae (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
(On the Law of War and Peace) are regarded as his contribution to the development of the conception 
of natural law. 
35 Grotius On the Law of War and Peace (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1925) 38–39. 
36 B Tierney “Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts, and Contexts 1150–1250” (1989) 10 History 
of Political Thought 617. 
37 Thomas Hobbes The Leviathan (Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish MT, 2004). 
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1651),38 had witnessed the sociopolitical devastation that ensued. He equated war 
with the “state of nature” which created insecurity, and said that this state must be 
prevented by a social contract with a strong government. Founded on the premise that 
the social contract existed between the people and the sovereign, and that by it the 
people surrendered some of their liberties for the “peace and defence” of the realm, 
Hobbes’ theory maintained that the contract would be ended if and when the 
Leviathan became incapable of protecting the people, at which point man would 
return to the state of nature.39  
 
 
1.3.3  John Locke: 1632–1704 
 
A particularly significant philosopher of the Age of Enlightenment, whose writings 
have considerably influenced the creation of the rights doctrine and qualified Hobbes’ 
pessimism about man’s need to surrender to even an arbitrary sovereign, is John 
Locke.40 In the evolution of human rights, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are the three 
key, early advocates of contractarianism. Drawing inspiration from the just-
concluded Glorious Revolution, Locke advocated the idea of natural rights in his 
1689 work, Second Treatise of Government.41 Of relevance to the current narrative, 
Locke embarks on his (convoluted) political theory on the premise that in a pre-social 
state of nature all humans have natural and equal rights to their lives, liberties, and 
estates. In the absence of government, he claims, these rights have no means of 
vindication and therefore lie dormant with little or no value. Such a society has no 
apparatus created for the fortification of these rights, and individual vindication of 
rights is a potential ground for conflict. Therefore, he claims, human beings created 
social groups or societies and through societies governments are formed that in turn 
are vested with the duty to protect and enhance an individual’s natural rights. 
                                                 
38 Jane Ohlmeyer “The Wars of the Three Kingdoms The British and Irish Civil Wars” in  John 
Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds) The British and Irish Civil Wars — A Military History of Scotland, 
Ireland and England 1638–1660 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
39 R Tuck Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979) 126–131. 
40 Roshwald, above ibid n 27, 370–371. 
41 John Locke Second Treatise of Government — Chapter II: Of the State of Nature 
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1690locke-sel.html> (accessed 15 Jan 2006). 
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The legitimacy of a government, asserted Locke, is based on a social contract in the 
form of an opaque voluntary social union between the rulers and the ruled. Members 
of the society are obligated to obey the government only if the government in turn 
upholds their human rights, which are held over and above the claims and interests of 
the government. According to Locke’s theory, the validity of the government is thus 
conditional upon the systematic protection and enhancement of the human rights of 
its citizens.42 Building on the thinking of Hobbes as well as modifying it, Locke 
relentlessly championed the supremacy of Parliament and justified the 1688 
Revolution through his theory of rights.43 It was his writings that inspired Thomas 
Jefferson to write of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” in the Declaration of 
Independence in the infant United States of America nearly a century later.44 
 
However, Locke’s ideas were not without criticism — his notion of natural rights was 
initially associated with the middle classes.45 It was the rising bourgeoisie of early 
modern Europe who made political claims based on Locke’s theoretical reasoning of 
natural human equality and inalienable natural rights, and did so as a means of 
overcoming their lack of privileged birth and old money. This political revolution had 
a fundamental limitation because, despite Locke’s claim of universalism in the 
language of natural rights, he had actually developed a political theory for the 
protection of the rights of landed gentry.  
Locke’s idea of rights was also essentially individualistic as he repeatedly referred to 
“lives, liberties and estates” of the individual members of a privileged segment of 
                                                 
42 Hector Gros Espiell “The Evolving Concept of Human Rights:  Western, Socialist and Third World 
Approaches”  in BG Ramcharan (ed) Human Rights:  Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration. 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979) 41–67. 
43 Locke writes: “The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to 
be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The 
liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the 
commonwealth....” see “Concerning Civil Government” 1690 in Second Treatise of Government — 
Chapter II: Of the State of Nature<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1690locke-sel.html> 
(accessed 15 Jan 2006). 
44 US Declaration of Independence of the 13 American colonies on 4th July 1776; see Bernard Bailyn 
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1992). 
45 Donnelly traces the evolution of the contemporary human rights doctrine to the philosophical 
enunciations of 17th century Britain and particularly to Locke’s Second Treatise Of Government, but 
concedes that his work represents a “bourgeois political revolution”. Jack Donnelly Universal Human 
Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989) 104–105. 
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society. Roshwald observes: “This individualistic-atomistic conception of society 
becomes the foundation stone of the democratic-liberal trend in political 
philosophy.”46 Roshwald reiterates that it is at this time that the “concept of ‘human 
rights’ took shape and became a principle of decisive importance in the political 
conceptions of people” and she continues that further articulation of the idea of rights 
in the 18th century was essentially an application of the philosophy of Locke to real 
political life.47  
 
By the conclusion of the 17th century, the natural law theory and its outgrowths 
described above were becoming well established in the legal, political and moral 
ethos of Western Europe. This liberal intellectual trend had a significant impact on 
the political thinking of the whole of the Western world. Philosophers such as 
Grotius, Hobbes and Locke worked in consonance with the expanding theory of 
natural law to create the doctrine of individual rights that is evident today. Their work 
concentrated on the prominent political concerns of that era, such as the liberation of 
the individual from absolute political tyranny and the emancipation of human reason 
from religious and social dogma.48  
 
 
1.3.4     18th and 19th Century Europe  
 
The Industrial Revolution in Europe simultaneously acted as a catalyst to the 
culmination of feudal social structures and the genesis of industry-based capitalism. 
During the 18th century, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau49 were the 
predominant philosophers who fine-tuned the notion of rights through their theories 
based on rationalism. It is in their hands that the idea of natural rights metamorphosed 
into political liberalism, of which the focal point was the theory of individualism. 
 
                                                 
46 Roshwald,  above n 27, 371. 
47 Roshwald, above n 27. 
48 Earnest Cassirer The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1979).  
49 Maurice W Cranston Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754–1762 (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1999). 
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Rousseau’s seminal work, The Social Contract50 (1762) describes a man’s 
relationship with society in a more modern and conditional contractarian idiom than 
Hobbes in particular, but also Locke, had done a century earlier across the English 
Channel. Rousseau contended that the institutions of law and codes of morals were 
prerequisites in societies, for in the absence of law society will degenerate into a state 
of chaos. Rousseau, though an ardent follower of the natural law school, articulated 
rights in terms of the “general will” of the society. Rousseau's perspective on 
legislation mirrored many other philosophers throughout history, contending that the 
quest for common good might not always be the best resolution for all concerned. 
Rousseau relentlessly queried the postulate that the will of the majority — the 
common good — is always the accurate one, and he contended that the objective of 
government should be to assure freedom, equality, and justice for all within the state, 
despite the will of the majority. Rousseau endeavoured to make his readers 
comprehend that when people are compelled to obey, they might do so; but when the 
people are free of this compulsion to conform and are able do so voluntarily, they 
become true to themselves under the rights of liberty, and they obey even moreso. 
Rousseau maintained that social order is a sacred right that stands as the basis of all 
other rights, explaining that this right does not come from nature but must be founded 
upon conventions.51 
 
The philosophical writings about, and the ideas of, the social contract, which 
restrained the powers of government on the basis of the morally prior rights of the 
governed who alone could surrender their sovereignty, inspired the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) That Declaration entoned: “[W]e hold these 
truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.”52 This revolutionary fervour had its impact in Europe. The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France on 26 August 1789 
spoke in the same idiom of rights when it proclaimed: “Men are born and remain free 
                                                 
50 Jean-Jacques Rousseau “The Social Contract” and Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
51 Dave Robinson and Judy Groves Introducing Political Philosophy (Icon Books, 2003). 
52 The complete text of the Declaration of Independence can be found at 
<http://www.americanrevolution.com/DeclarationofIndependence.htm> (accessed 16 May 2006) 
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and equal in rights….”53 The influence of the idea of a social contract between the 
people and the state was so deep-rooted that the Declaration of Independence 
proclaimed that, “to secure these rights [Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness], 
the Governments are instituted among Men” and the French Declaration contained 
the words: “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it 
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.”54   
 
The violence of the French Revolution and the anxiety amongst conservative 
elements in the Old World that the ideas of natural rights were “too egalitarian and 
subversive”55 resulted in these ideas being viewed with scepticism in Britain by the 
end of the 18th century. This general discontent was manifested by the universal 
rejection of natural law principles by British legal scholars. Philosophers such as 
David Hume (1711–1776),56 and later Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)57 and John 
Austin (1790–1859), claimed that strict adherence to those principles would lead to 
social upheavals, and these thinkers sought to explore alternatives to the natural rights 
theory. According to Freeman, Bentham found the theory of natural rights to be 
defective in many respects. 58 Natural rights theory did not clearly specify the ambit 
of a specific right, and the claim that everyone was bestowed with equal rights was 
not tenable, for the natural rights theory itself did not recognize the rights of women, 
blacks and the poor. Bentham maintained that rights could only be derived from 
                                                 
53 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen Article 1 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm> (accessed 16 May 2006). 
54 M Sparhr Readings in Recent Political Philosophy (McMillan, New York, 1935), reprint of 1949 
quoted in Roshwald, above n 27, 372. 
55 Michael Freeman Human Rights: an Interdisciplinary Approach (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002) 
25–27 (Freeman). 
56 Hume did not openly reject the ideas of natural law or the social contract that had gained 
considerable political currency. However, Hume's  A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to 
introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739–1740), which articulated 
the ideas of “utility”, later was relied on by Jeremy Bentham in his elaboration of the concept of 
utilitarianism. See also Dave Robinson and Judy Groves Introducing Political Philosophy (Icon 
Books, 2003). 
57 Best known for his ideas on utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham took the position that laws must be 
created on the basis of rationality. He rejected the ambiguity of natural law. Bentham advocated for 
individual and economic freedom, freedom of expression, gender rights, and the abolition of slavery 
and corporal punishment for all. His theory of law and rights was located in the social and moral 
dilemas of 19th century England and this is reflected by his advocacy for the right to divorce and for 
free trade, and by his encouragement of the idea of the separation of church and state. See J Waldren 
(ed) Nonsense upon stilts:Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen, London, 1987) 
35–40.  
58 Freeman, above n 56, 28. 
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positive law, and the content and that the ambit of a right should be defined in 
accordance with the principle of utility.59 As a result, the general incompatibility of 
the natural law theory with the sociopolitical exigencies of the 18th century caused its 
relegation to secondary position against the theory of utilitarianism during the 
political reforms of both Britain and France.  
 
The rapid industrialization of Europe in the 18th and 19th century created new political 
and social issues, such as urban poverty and the issue of the rights of the industrial 
labour force, which the natural law theory did not address. Karl Marx, writing from 
the 1840s onward, critiqued the theory of natural rights on the distinct basis that “the 
so-called rights of man ... are only the rights of the member of civil society, that is, of 
egoistic man, man separated from other men and from the community.”60 Marx 
continued that, “[t]his bourgeois conception of rights ignored the fundamental 
importance of labour, production and wealth to human wellbeing.”61 Therefore, to 
Marx, the bourgeois system represented a process that alienated man from nature, 
from himself and his own active functioning and stripped him of “his human 
essence”. Marx asserted that Communism is the “actual phase necessary for the next 
stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and 
recovery”.62 As much as Marx denounced the so-called bourgeois concept of rights, 
however, he had no alternative theory to substitute, a fact which remained a highly 
significant shortcoming in his political theory, especially in the context of the 
subsequent abuse of power by the Communist states at the cost of their citizens.63 
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1.3.5 Further Evolution, Export and Internationalization of Western Human 
Rights into the 20th Century  
 
Sociopolitical issues which today would be classified as human rights issues 
continued to trouble both Western Europe and elsewhere throughout the latter part of 
the 19th century and the 20th century. Chief among them was the institution of slavery, 
whose abolition was attempted through two international treaties of 1890 and 1892.64 
Though not explicitly citing a violation of human rights, the anti-slavery movement 
drew inspiration from natural rights discourse and eventually was naturally 
incorporated into the discourse of human rights through the UDHR in 1948.65 The 
negative social impacts of the rapid industrialization of Europe were emerging during 
the latter part of the 19th century, and the labour unions advocated for better working 
conditions, laws that guaranteed the right to strike, and regulations that controlled the 
use of child labour. It was against this background that the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)66 was founded in 1919 with a mandate to create a code of 
international labour standards. Originally as an affiliated institution of the League of 
Nations, and now as a part of the United Nations, the ILO has worked with 
governments, employees and management for better work conditions and 
employment relations. Many of the issues handled by the ILO, such as negotiation of 
better workers’ rights, higher wages, more favourable working conditions, trade 
union rights, health and safety standards, safeguards on female and child labour, and 
social security have strong human right connotations and draw inspiration from the 
rights–of–man discourse of the 18th and 19th centuries.  
 
                                                 
64 In 1926 the Slavery Convention was formulated under the aegis of the League of Nations and over 
30 states ratified it. The Convention stipulated that the signatory states would work towards 
eliminating all forms of slavery. David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International Abolishing Slavery 
and its Contemporary Forms (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2002) 
<http://www.antislavery.org/homepage/resources/Weissbrodt%20report%20final%20edition%202003.
pdf> (accessed 16 May 2006). 
65 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; 
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms” (Art. 4). 
<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (accessed 17 Mar 2006). 
66 For an historical account see <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm> (accessed 10 
May 2006). 
 22 
The above analysis further supports the position that the evolution of the theory of 
rights in Western history was at each stage moulded by the sociopolitical and 
religious concerns of the time. The theories of reformulation of the political and 
social structures of the Western world were a direct result of the sociopolitical 
turmoil and failure of feudal rulers to respect the principles of liberty, equality and 
human dignity. The fear of tyrannical rule formed the foundation for the ideas of the 
rights of individuals against the excesses of state power. Significant milestones, such 
as the Magna Carta accepting the idea of the rights of “the people” vis-à-vis the ruler, 
were a covert means of legitimizing the rule of the feudal power-holders. The 
maturing of these ideas through the centuries in particular historical, cultural, political 
and social contexts, imbued them with certain inalienable characteristics, which were 
compatible with the ethical and moral values of Western civilization. 
 
The idea of rights, which constituted the core of the 18th and 19th century struggles 
against political absolutism in Europe and North America, was revived in another 
context by the nascent struggles for independence from colonial rule in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa. The most significant among them in this context was the 
Quit India Movement67 — the struggle for Purna Swaraj (independence) by the 
Indian National Congress under the leadership of M K Gandhi commencing in 
1918.68 The struggle was fuelled by the disenchantment of the Indians with the 
colonial rule and its systematic violation of civil liberties and political rights.69   
 
International efforts to create normative standards that enhance human rights and 
preserve human dignity in the early 20th century can be traced in a different 
articulation to the League of Nations. Article 22 of the League’s Covenant, relating to 
the people of the colonies and territories that had lost their sovereignty due to the war, 
stipulated that colonial rulers must honour “the principle that the well-being and 
                                                 
67 The Quit India Movement was officially launched on 9 August 1942 and was charaterized by the 
definitive organized movement of civil disobedience for the immediate independence from Britain. 
However, the agitation for independence had a longer history. B Chandra India's Struggle for 
Independence 1857–1947 (Penguin Books, India, 1989). 
68 Jawaharlal Nehru Discovery of India ((Meridian Books Ltd, New Delhi, 1951). 
69 Anil Seal The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968). 
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development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.”70 With little success, 
an effort to protect the rights of minorities was also undertaken during the 1920s by 
the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations.71 A result of the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919, the League of Nations’ mandate was the prevention of 
war through collective security, pacific settlement of disputes between states through 
negotiation, and the promotion of global welfare.72 However, its constituting 
documents made no reference to rights and were concerned exclusively with inter-
state relations.  
 
 
1.4 Antecedents and Alternatives to Human Rights Discourse in Ancient 
South Asia: An Overview 
 
The following section traces the conceptual evolution of notions of humanism, justice 
and equity in South Asia. As in the West, early articulations of political philosophy 
were intrinsically interwoven with religious values in the Indian subcontinent.73 
While the above analysis indicates that the rights doctrine evolved in Western Europe 
as a tool against absolutist rulers, the parallel conceptual thinking in Asian political 
and religious philosophy was articulated more in terms of humanism, munificence 
and a sense of duty of protection by the rulers towards the people.74  
 
The evolution of a concise political theory based on the sense of duty of the ruler 
towards the ruled, the refinement of the ideas of humanism in governance, or a theory 
of rights based on South Asia’s own cultural or religious identities, did not arrive at 
its logical culmination in Asia, owing to the interruption from colonialism. Several 
centuries of external political domination instead bequeathed the legacy of liberal 
democracy that had evolved in a different sociopolitical and cultural context, which is 
                                                 
70 League of Nations Covenant Article 22 available at 
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partially imbued into the sociopolitical mores of the subcontinent.75 In contrast, 
Western political philosophy’s exposition of the rights doctrine enjoyed “much 
greater opportunities … to receive fuller consideration, articulation, and eventual 
implementation”,76 and the contemporary human rights regime worldwide is the 
culmination of that process. 
 
 
1.4.1 The Influence of Major Subcontinental Religions  
 
As the following paragraphs elaborate, in ancient India religion performed a 
legitimizing function in state affairs, for “[t]he imagination, the minds, and the hearts 
of the people of the subcontinent were profoundly shaped by religion … so it was 
natural that any traditional ruler in search of legitimizing credentials would turn to 
religion.”77 The Hindu Vedas, the hymns and prayers of circa 1200 BC, defined 
social relations between the King and the people. It was during the Vedic period that 
the complex social organization based on caste evolved in India. The Brahmins were 
at the apex of the social structure, followed by the kshastriya  (warriors). The vaishya  
(traders) occupied the middle social strata, followed by the sudras (the dalits, or 
untouchables). Malhotra explains the reasons as to why social or political “equality 
could not develop at the empirical level” during the Vedic period:78 
 
… the ancient Indians could not develop the concept of social and political equality 
because of their faith in the doctrine of karma, the caste system and the variations of 
the spiritual level of different persons. The doctrine of karma implies that whatever 
the status an individual holds in society is the result of past deeds, and so he must 
ungrudgingly accept his station in life and play his part accordingly, since the 
spiritual merit lies not in the nature of work performed but in the spirit in which it is 
performed.  
 
Therefore early religious manifestations during the Vedic period did not promote 
ideas of social equality but advocated concepts of humanism and human dignity 
                                                 
75 The problems that stem from this partial internalization are discussed in this chapter. 
76  Lauren above n 5, 6.  
77 Ralph Buultjens “India: Religion, Political Legitimacy, and the Secular State” (1986) 483 Annals of 
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within the constraints of the social strata, similar to the ideas of “separate but equal” 
policies of racially divided America in the 20th century. Baxter et al. observe that, 
“[d]espite repeated attacks on the caste system by subsequent reform oriented social 
and religious movements, it still exists in India and has a strong impact on socio 
political behaviour of Hindus.”79 This is primarily due to the religious sanction 
extended to the social organization during the Vedic period and subsequently in 
Hinduism. As ideas of constitutional structures and popular democratic mandates had 
not evolved, the “[r]eligious sanction was probably the only credential widely agreed 
upon by everyone in society”.80  
 
 
1.4.1.1 Hinduism 
 
Indian religious history provides numerous examples to support the premise that the 
subcontinent had a rich culture of honouring humanist values and human dignity and 
accommodating cultural diversity and pluralism within governance. Before the 
delineation of the main subcontinental religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, 
Sikhism and Islam, which all expound tolerance and compassion, the Indian epics of 
Mahabaratha81 and Ramayana82 elaborated on the ideas of human dignity, justice and 
fairness.  
 
Both epics depict the intellectual articulations of the ancient Indian religious, 
philosophical and ethical thinking and contain commentaries on issues that would 
today be considered as prerequisites of governance. For instance, Ramayana 2.67.31 
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states, “[n]o soul is peaceful in a state without a ruler. In such a state men exploit one 
another like fish who swallow each other.” The epics describe the primary protector 
of the social organization of ancient India as kshatriya the warrior who protected 
people from kshat or unhappiness. The essential characteristics of a ruler, according 
to Mahabaratha, were bravery, courage, vigilance, charity, and the ability to display 
prowess and not retreat from battle (Mahabaratha 6.42.43). A legitimate ruler was 
invested with the duty to protect all beings (Mahabaratha 12.120.3) and had to foster 
the righteous and destroy those who were cruel (Mahabaratha 12.14.16).83 These 
ethical guidelines extracted from the two epics denote the existence of acceptable 
standards of conduct for persons who wielded political power, which in turn 
demarcated the existence of the idea of a social contract, albeit in embryonic form, 
between the people and the ruler in ancient Indian political discourse.  
 
Hinduism,84 the main religion of the subcontinent, evolved from the Vedic traditions 
and advocates the concepts of Ahimsa (non-violence) and respect for all forms of life 
—both human and animal— as well as piety, prayer and the notion of personal 
sacrifice.85 Hinduism was inherently devoid of egalitarian qualities for it sanctioned 
the process of social demarcation based on birth (the caste system), but paradoxically 
it advocated tolerance of other religious traditions and faiths as a fundamental tenet. 
For instance, Rig Veda asserts, “ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti”: “Truth is One, 
but sages call it by many names.”86 The early expositions of human dignity and 
freedom are also to be found in the Vedas.87 The concept of rita (supreme order) cited 
in the Vedas is similar to the notion of natural law and denotes freedom and human 
rights, for it represents “both the satya or the truth of things, as well as dharma or the 
law of evolution.”88 Rita in this sense denotes “the law that governs the universe, the 
                                                 
83 Mahabharata (Kamala Subramaniam (tr),Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1982). 
84 Hinduism, the oldest religion in the world and with 900 million adherents, evolved around 1000–700 
BC. <http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html> (accessed 19 Jan 2007). 
85 AL Balsham The Wonder that was India (Grove Press, New York, 1954) 341. 
86 Rig Veda 1:164:46. <http://www.astrojyoti.com/scripturesindex.htm> (accessed 12 May 2006). 
87 The Vedas are an ancient Hindu – Aryan religious literature consisting of hymns, chants and prayers 
dating from 1,500–500 BC. See JC Chatterji Wisdom of the Vedas (Quest Books, India,1992). 
88 S Radhakrishnan The Hindu View of Life (Unwin Books, England, 1963) 56. 
 27 
law that operates in ritual and sacrifice and the law that, with equal impartiality, 
regulates the conduct of human beings.”89  
 
Similarly to Buddhism, the superiority of dharma forms the basis of Hinduism, and is 
defined as “implying enjoyment of particular rights or fulfilment of certain 
obligations, individual and collective, with a moral and a spiritual sense of duty 
towards others or towards the society in general. To dharma, both the King and the 
people owed allegiance. It was a powerful motive for restraining the wilful exercise 
of sovereign authority by the King. In fact, the Hindu-Buddhist political theory vests 
sovereignty on dharma.”90 The notion of dharma being superior to the edicts of the 
King parallels the notion of natural law in Western tradition as articulated by Locke.  
 
In terms of the individual, dharma stipulated that individuals were entrusted with 
certain duties regarding others within the social organization and had to follow the 
stipulations of dharma in their actions, which would result in a better life. The 
concept of dharma permeates both public and private life for it “gives coherence and 
direction to different activities of life … It is the complete rule of life, the harmony of 
the whole man who finds a right and just law of his living. Each man and group, each 
activity of soul, mind, life and body, has its dharma.”91 This South Asian value of 
social behaviour can be equated to the notion of duty as opposed to rights. Nehru 
explained: “If a man did his duty and was ethically right in his actions, the right 
consequences would always follow. Rights as such were not emphasized — this 
outlook stands out in marked contrast with the modern assertion of rights — rights of 
individuals, of groups and of nations.”92   
 
Values of tolerance of plurality, compassion and non-violence formed the basis of 
dharma, which is nevertheless compatible with the discourse of contemporary human 
rights, and were the fundamental tenets that fashioned the subcontinent’s political and 
                                                 
89 Lal-dhoj Deosa Rai “Human Rights Development in Ancient Nepal” (1981) 3 HQR 37–46.   
90 Ibid. 
91 S Radhakrishnan Eastern Religion and Western Thought (London, 1939) 353. 
92 J Nehru The Discovery of India (Meridian Books Ltd, New Delhi, 1951) 70. 
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cultural tradition.93 These values were not limited to the realms of religion or to 
individual conduct alone but rather were frequently utilized to elaborate on the 
fundamentals of good governance by the Kings (rajadharma).94 “The King was far 
more than merely the political head of the State,”95 for he was entrusted with the 
well-being of the entire kingdom and its people. This implied that the kingdom was 
held in trust by the kings for the benefit of the people.96 It has also been observed that 
in this context revolt or rebellion against tyrannical or oppressive kingship was 
justified.97 
 
In this sense, the Hindu sociopolitical culture that governs the lives of the people is 
founded on an amalgamation of notions of freedom, pluralism, common good (in 
contrast to the values of utilitarianism) and good conscience (the multifaceted notion 
of dharma). Corti elaborates on the disjuncture between rights and freedoms, and 
dharma, thus: “The peoples of Asia neither understand nor desire freedom in our 
sense of the word, as we understand it. Truth, humanity and liberty belong 
inseparably together. We ourselves must constantly bear this interdependence in 
mind.”98 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Arvind Sharma Hinduism and Human Rights: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
94 Rajadharma is a concept of governance drawn from Vedic literature (Rig Veda and Atharva Veda) 
which is based on the duties of the King towards the welfare of the people. The essence of the concept 
was the duties of the King to maintain social order, protect the people and administer justice. 
Governance is therefore expressed essentially in terms of the duties of the rulers.See Michael (ed) The 
Concept of Rajadharma (Sundeep Prakashan, New Delhi, 2005). 
95 John W Spellman Political Theory of Ancient India: A Study of Kingship from earliest times to circa 
300 AD (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964) 221. 
96 “The birds that fly in the air and the wild animals that dwell in the jungles have the same rights as 
you, O great King, to live wherever they wish or to roam wherever they will. The land belongs to the 
people of the country and to all other beings that inhabit it, while you are only its guardian” Arahat 
Mahinda, son of Ashoka the Mauryan Emperor to King Devanampiyatissa of Sri Lanka c 250–210 BC 
found on a rock inscription in Pollonnaruwa, as quoted in Nihal Jayawickram The Judicial Application 
of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2002) v. 
97 The Mahabaratha  provides that the people can revolt against tyrannical political leaders. See Lal-
dhoj Deosa Rai “Human Rights Development in Ancient Nepal” (1981) 3 HRQ 37–46. 
98 WR Corti “The role of the individual in the Ideological Struggle of out Time” in Tony Hagen (ed) 
Nepal (Oxford and IBM Publicity Co, New York, 1961) 25. 
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1.4.1.2 Buddhism 
 
Like Hinduism, Buddhism99 evolved from a common spiritual and philosophical 
heritage through dhamma.100 Buddhism promotes the idea of controlling the mind to 
overcome actions that are violent and evil.101 Buddhist philosophy exalts the virtues 
of non-violence and the sanctity of life.102 The essence of Buddhism is to lead a 
virtuous, restrained and peaceful life based on the madyama prathipadhawa103 
(middle way) with the aim of ending all suffering in life and attaining the ultimate 
liberation, termed nibbhana.104 The flourishing of Buddhism amidst the orthodox 
Hindu political and religious culture circa 585 BC is seen by some as a response to 
the social injustices that prevailed in Indian society at that time, particularly the 
oppressive caste system and the low status accorded to women.105 Buddhism, in 
contrast, articulated respect for all living beings, which included women106 and 
                                                 
99 Religious philosophy of Gautama Buddha circa 5th century BC.  
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(accessed 17 Jan 2008) 
104 Peter Harvey An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
105 Nalin Swaris Buddhism, Human Rights and Social Renewal (Asian Human Rights Commission, 
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animals, and Buddhist philosophy sought social reform through attempts at social 
assimilation of the marginalized lower castes and through the granting of equal 
recognition to women within the sanga (Buddhist priesthood).107 Gender equality was 
a basic tenet of Buddhism as, “[t]he Buddha saw the spiritual potential of both men 
and women and founded, after considerable hesitation, the Order of Bhikkhunis or 
Nuns, one of the earliest organizations for women. The Sasana, or Church, consisted 
of the Bhikkhus (Monks), Bhikkhunis (Nuns), laymen and laywomen so that the 
women were not left out of any sphere of religious activity.”108  
 
Buddha’s teachings were not restricted to the spiritual well-being of individuals, 
according to Walpola Rahula Thero, for Buddhist scriptures articulated duties of 
Kingship which maintained that a just King would be liberal, generous and charitable. 
The qualities of a King also included the practice of non-violence and the ability to 
sacrifice one’s self for the benefit of the community.109 Several analogies between 
Buddhist teachings and contemporary rights discourse can be drawn.110 
Jayawickrama observes that Buddha encouraged the idea of travel amongst his 
disciples so that the word of the Buddha could bring welfare and happiness to many; 
intrinsic in this is the idea that Buddha promoted freedom of movement.111 Citing 
another similarity with rights discourse, Jayawickrama observes that 
Mahaparinibbanasutta (a Buddhist sermon) states that the people must assemble 
frequently and peacefully and transact business peacefully.112   
 
Buddhism was advocated as a way of life that had universal validity. Norms 
advocated in the Buddhist philosophy were based on rationality and the followers 
were encouraged to follow the Buddhist way of life only after rational deliberation. 
                                                 
107 “To this day the egalitarian ethos of Buddhism appeals to the marginalized communities in India. 
Buddhism's appeal for low-caste Hindus” Monday, 5 November 2001, 
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108 LS Dewaraja The Position of Women in Buddhism (The Wheel Publication No. 280, Buddhist 
Publication Society, Kandy, 1981) 16. 
109 The ten duties of a King (dasa raja dharma) in Walpola Rahula Thero What the Buddha taught 
(Gorden Fraser Gallery, Bedford, 1967) 85.  
110 Perera demonstrates the connectivity between Buddhist principles and the Universal Declaration of 
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Such requirements would be regarded in the contemporary human rights discourse as 
respect for the right to freedom of thought and expression.113  
 
 
1.4.1.3 Islam 
 
Islam, as a religious force that impacted on the political and cultural ethos of India, 
commenced with the Delhi Sultanate, circa 1211 AD, before the formal establishment 
of the Mogul Empire in 1526 AD.114 Owing to Arabian traders, relations between 
Arabia and the Asian subcontinent were long-established even before the advent of 
Islam. The initial Islamic rule of the subcontinent was violent and repressive for it 
was essentially an invasion to plunder and control.115 The Muslim rule was based on 
the laws of the Qur'an and on Sharia116 (Islamic law) but the humanist qualities that 
are the essence of Islamic law were not evident at these initial stages in South Asia. 
Because of repeated invasions by the Arabs, the notion that Islam was a destructive 
and violent force was fairly well-embedded in the Hindu psyche, as illustrated by the 
observation by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister: “The impact of the 
invaders from the north-west and of Islam on India had been considerable. It had 
pointed out and shone up the abuses that had crept into Hindu society — the 
petrification of caste, untouchability, and exclusiveness carried to fantastic 
lengths.”117  
 
The establishment of the Mogul Empire by Babur in 1526 brought a systematic 
administration to the occupied territory based on Islamic traditions and law.118 Both 
the Qur’an and Sharia laws spring from the desire to create a society based on the 
type of moral responsibility and justice that would enhance human dignity.119 Malik 
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further asserts that the “Muslim jurists regarded human rights as an integral part of 
faith,”120 and therefore during the Mogul Empire, especially during the reign of 
Akbar,121 religious tolerance and the freedom to follow one’s own religion was 
vigorously advocated. Akbar’s reign was marked by this general ethos of equality and 
tolerance, which resulted in a revival of Hindu literature and arts as well as 
philosophical debates between Islam, Hinduism and Jainism.122    
 
Similar to the Hindu and Buddhist philosophical ethos, “[j]ust — and accountable — 
government has long been considered a desideratum in Islamic political and religious 
thought. The Qur'an states that the righteous ‘inherit the earth’, righteous in this case 
referring to the morally upright rather than the members of any privileged 
confessional community. A righteous and just leader ruling by at least the tacit 
consent of the people and liable to being deposed for unrighteous conduct remained  
the ideal for most Muslims through much of the Middle Ages …”123 
 
The early Islamic concept of shura refers to public consultation, which can include 
matters of governance, and to public affairs, and it is similar to the concepts of 
democratic governance that evolved centuries later in Western Europe. However, the 
emergence of political absolutism in the Arab region stifled the evolution of shura 
into a sustained political ideology. Asserting values of religious pluralism, Qur’anic 
teachings indicate that a person’s faith is a matter between himself and God and that 
all persons have the freedom to choose their faith.124 Several comparable notions 
between Islam and contemporary human rights discourse can be discerned. The 
Qur’an contains values of equality between people and equality before the law, 
freedom of religion, the right to hold property, freedom of the person and freedom of 
expression. These humanistic and tolerant facets, which were inherent in early 
manifestations of Islam, held a special attraction to the socially marginalized 
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communities (untouchables) in India, which helps explain the religion’s rapid 
establishment in the region. 
 
 
1.4.2 Human Rights and Early South Asian Political Philosophy 
 
The earliest articulations of justice, equity and good governance in Indian political 
philosophy are found in the Arthashastra125 or the Science of Economics, compiled 
by Kautilya, a Minister in the Court of the Mauryan Emperor Chandragupta circa 321 
BC. It is often alleged that his work exalts stringency in governance and intolerance, 
but Sen draws attention to another aspect less often highlighted. Sen explains, “First, 
Kautilya is a consequentialist of quite a narrow kind. While the objectives of 
promoting the happiness of the subjects and the order in the kingdom are strongly 
backed up by detailed policy advice, the King is seen as a benevolent autocrat, whose 
power, albeit to do good, is to be maximized through proper organization.”126 His 
treatise on the essence of effective governance included issues such as the 
impartiality of judges similar to a contemporary code of conduct for the judiciary, 
saying, “judges and magistrates shall not impose a fine when it is not prescribed, 
impose a fine which is higher or lower that the prescribed one, award physical 
punishment when it is not prescribed.”127  
 
The Arthashastra presents ideas and suggestions on such practical subjects as famine 
prevention and administrative effectiveness that remain relevant even today — and 
“at the same time advises the King about how to get his way, if necessary through the 
violation of the freedom of his adversaries.”128 Despite the essential non-egalitarian 
flavour in his treatise, he emphasizes that the duty of the King is to “provide the 
orphans, the aged, the infirm, the afflicted, and the helpless with maintenance,” along 
with providing “subsistence to helpless women when they are carrying and also to the 
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[newborn] children they give birth to.”129 Kautilya’s observations that the King has a 
duty to serve the people and foster social welfare are illustrated by the following 
excerpt: “In the happiness of subjects lies his happiness; in their welfare his welfare; 
what ever pleases him he shall not consider as good, but what ever pleases his 
subjects he shall consider good.”130 This also encapsulates the intrinsic relationship 
between the governor and the governed in ancient Indian politics especially the 
notion that kingship denotes the idea of a “trustee” of the peoples’ well-being rather 
than a ruler. 
 
Sen observes that in the Arthashastra the “tolerance of heterodoxy” is absent and in 
that sense Kautilya’s writings do not reflect the values of freedom and charity.131 In 
this context, Baxter et al. assert: “There was little of the theoretical basis of politics 
and political institutions in Hindu India. Unlike the ancient Greeks, the ancient 
Hindus did not develop a formal political philosophy.”132 Paradoxically, Kautilya’s 
Arthashastra was not meant to be an exposition on the virtues of freedom, or a 
treatise on rights, nor was it concerned with theoretical issues of political philosophy. 
It was rather a manual for effective governance or state-craft, and traces of it are 
echoed in the modern concept of good governance.  
 
The earliest expressions of values of dignity, non-violence and equality in the 
subcontinent are found in the emperor Ashoka’s Edicts in the third century BC. These 
Edicts were essentially based on Buddhist strictures to which Ashoka converted after 
realizing the futility of war.133 Emperor Ashoka modelled himself on the notion of the 
“righteous king” on the basis of Buddhist dharma.134 His Edicts, erected in the four 
corners of his empire such as at Erragudi, contain the teachings of Buddha that 
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exalted the virtues of ahimsa, upeksha, mettha, muditha, and karuna (non-violence, 
kindness, tolerance, empathy and compassion).135 Edict XII at Erragudi states:136  
… a man must not do reverence to his own sect or disparage that of another man 
without reason. Deprecation should be for specific reason only, because the sects of 
other people all deserve reverence for one reason or another. By thus acting, a man 
exalts his own sect, and at the same time does service to the sects of other people. By 
acting contrariwise, a man hurts his own sect, and does disservice to the sects of 
other people. For he who does reverence to his own sect while disparaging the sects 
of others wholly from attachment to his own, with intent to enhance the splendour of 
his own sect, in reality by such conduct inflicts the severest injury on his own sect. 
 
Sen provides other examples from the Edicts137 relating to marginalized communities 
such as the forest dwellers, tribal people and the peasantry which support the premise 
that Ashoka’s theory of governance based on dharma was inspired by the religious 
teachings of the time. Ashoka’s rule was based on values of “non-injury, restraint, 
impartiality, and mild behaviour,” which were applicable to all within his empire.138 
He abolished the death penalty139 and was committed to religious pluralism as “[t]he 
best traditions of both Buddhism and Indian kingship coincided in Ashoka’s declared 
support for all religions. This support went far beyond passive toleration: he 
dedicated caves to non-Buddhist ascetics, repeatedly said that Brahmins and 
renouncers (śramaa) all deserved respect, and told people never to denigrate other 
sects but to inform themselves about them.”140  
 
The influence of Buddhism had fundamentally altered Ashoka’s world view. Justice, 
equality and humanism formed the core of his political philosophy, which has been 
described by Romila Thapar thus: “Buddhism of [Emperor Ashoka's] age was not 
merely a religious belief; it was in addition a social and intellectual movement at 
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many levels, influencing many aspects of society.”141 The Emperor and his Ministers 
would make tours of the land every five years to check on the welfare of the subjects. 
Ashoka had appointed plenipotentiary supervisors termed dharma-mahamatra 
(ministers of morality) who would regulate the welfare funds, charities and religious 
affairs.142 Such sociopolitical organization during the Ashokan era not only denotes 
governance based on dhamma but also the existence of a highly evolved concept of 
duty towards the people by the rulers, which is the converse of the rights discourse 
that evolved in Western Europe; both were essentially mechanisms to rein in the 
absolutism of the rulers. 
 
Notions of fairness and equity were familiar concepts to the rulers of other parts of 
the subcontinent as well. The Mahawamsa143 recites the story of King Erala fixing a 
bell at his palace to be rung by his subjects in the event there was a need for justice to 
be administered by the King. This is perhaps one of the earliest recorded instances 
where the King ensured universal access to justice.   
 
Mechanisms to control monarchical power also existed in South Asia, as Sheth and 
Nandy observe:144    
… rulers, although they did not often depend on the direct consent of the subject populations, 
sought to retain legitimacy of their rule through a multi-layered structure of authority that 
accommodated various interests and identities in the society. The ruler, while representing 
power as sanctified authority, presided over a system of multiple governances in the society.  
 
Such governance, though not based on the democratic governing mechanisms as in 
the West, nevertheless sought legitimacy through the various institutions of the 
society such as councils of ministers.145 These councils appear to have wielded 
considerable power and some are attributed with having the powers of electing the 
King. Sharma describes the Vedic councils, sabha and samithi, of which the sabha 
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“was a comparatively small council chiefly composed of the most influential 
members of the community whereas the samithi was a bigger assembly consisting of 
the Heads of the Families of the Tribes.”146 The councils wielded considerable 
political power within the kingdom where decision-making was done on the basis of 
consultation and consensus.147 
 
While these structures were perhaps not comparable to the democratic systems of 
governance that emerged later in Western Europe, the ideas of consensual and 
republican governance did exist in the subcontinent as early as 200 AD. The Licchavi 
Kings148 ruled their kingdom (present day Nepal) from 200 AD to 900 AD through a 
system of governance that resembles a contemporary republican system. At the apex 
of the power structure was a Maharaja who in theory commanded absolute power, 
but in reality had little impact on the daily lives of the people. The Maharaja was 
aided by the Amsuvarman (the Prime Minister) and other officials. Though not a 
theocracy, the Licchavi rule was governed by the values of Hindhu-Buddhist 
principles of dharma. Dharma, which can be equated to collective good and the rule 
of law among other things, “was considered to be superior to the King”149 and formed 
the fundamental tenet of the “entire range of Indian thought.”150   
 
The rituals of governance during the Licchavi rule included purohitas (advisers), 
which again symbolizes governance by consultation and consensus.151 The Licchavi 
rule was also significant for the use of people’s organizations of Panchalis, Gosthis, 
and the Sangas. These organizations curtailed absolutism, and equally functioned as 
institutions of the collective will of the people. They were responsible for the 
formulation and direction of educational, health and religious affairs of the kingdom. 
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The continued existence of some of these institutions in modern Nepal,152 against the 
backdrop of the incessant quest for modern democracy, suggests the nexus and the 
compatibility between these institutions and the idea of human rights and freedom, 
which will be elaborated in Chapter 4 of the present study. 
 
 
1.4.3 Recent History of Human Rights in South Asia, from the 18th to the 20th 
Century 
 
The recent history of the subcontinent has been dominated by struggles for 
independence from the British as well as a struggle within against the repressive 
features of subcontinental culture. Agitators for independence, such as Swami 
Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore and Nehru, drew both inspiration and 
legitimation from the ancient Hindu philosophical teachings as well as 18th century 
Enlightenment rights rhetoric. Social reformers like BR Ambedkar and Ram Mohan 
Roy likewise relied on egalitarian religious traditions such as both Buddhism and 
Hinduism.153 Roy, the “Hindu Unitarian”, synthesized other religions including 
Christianity and Islam into his vision.154 Roy is also regarded as a pioneer of the 
revival of the Vedantic philosophy in the 19th century, for he claimed that, 
“monotheism, as expounded in the Upanishads, represented the true religion of the 
Hindus. For him it not only constituted India’s national religion but furnished the 
basis for a universal religion that embraced all worshippers of God irrespective of 
national and denominational peculiarities.”155 He condemned idol worship, 
polygamy, and the immolation of widows, and, like Tagore, he advocated equal 
educational opportunities. As Buultjens observes, “[t]he great Indian nationalists of 
the nineteenth century were not only political figures, but also religious revivalists or 
reformers. Most of them saw the liberation of India in both political and religious 
terms. Their close association with religion helped to legitimize their nationalist 
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aspirations in the public mind.”156 The bells of social equality and non-discrimination 
that had tolled in Western Europe and America were echoed in the comprehensive 
rights charter in the Independent Constitution of India. 
 
Article 17 of the Constitution, abolishing untouchability, perhaps epitomizes reform 
of Indian social structures through advocacy of equal human rights.157 The architect 
of the Article, and Chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, himself a 
dalit, was BR Ambedkar.158 Ambedkar’s education in America and England exposed 
him to egalitarian rights discourse. He also revived the egalitarian features of the 
Indian socioreligious culture, particularly Buddhism, after centuries of Hindu 
domination. This religious aspect was no mere add-on, for Ambedkar realized 
Constitutional stipulation alone would not alter deep-rooted religious and cultural 
biases.159  
 
The author Tagore160 viewed himself as made up of “a confluence of three cultures: 
Hindu, Mohammedan, and British.”161 His writings were non-sectarian and liberal, 
and his political outlook reflected a similar universalist approach: British imperialism 
was not a primary evil, but a “political symptom of our social disease.” [emphasis 
added]162 Tagore bravely defied nationalism’s violent overtones that engulfed India in 
the guise of the freedom struggle in the late 19th century and, in the words of Isaiah 
Berlin, he “condemned romantic over-attachment to the past, what he called the tying 
of India to the past ‘like a sacrificial goat tethered to a post’.”163 His own words in, 
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157 “Article 17 Abolition of Untouchability – ‘Untouchability’ is abolished and its practice in any form 
is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of ‘Untouchability’ shall be an offence 
punishable in accordance with law.” <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/India994-15.htm> 
(accessed 2 Jun 2006). 
158 C Gautam Life of Babasaheb Ambedkar (2nd ed, Ambedkar Memorial Trust, London, 2000). 
159 BR Ambedkar Untouchables or The Children of India's Ghetto 
<http://www.ambedkar.org/ambcd/> (accessed 29 May 2006) (Ambedkar). 
160 Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), as a son of a leader of the Brahmo Samaj, was exposed to the 
ideas of nationalism and freedom struggle at an early age. His interests in social reform, liberal ideas of 
freedom and the sense of humanism are represented in his writings. 
161 Rabindranath Tagore The Religion of Man (2nd ed, Unwin, London, 1931, 1961) 105 quoted in 
Amartya Sen “Tagore and His India” 
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/articles/sen/index.html> (accessed 14 Feb 2005) (Sen). 
162 K Dutta and A Robinson (eds) Rabindranath Tagore: An Anthology (St Martin's Press, 1997) 239–
240. 
163 Isaiah Berlin “Rabindranath Tagore and the Consciousness of Nationality” in The Sense of Reality: 
 40 
for instance, the poem Githanjali, emphasized the need for self-help and the 
intellectual uplift of the masses through education, on the basis that true freedom 
could be achieved only through a social transformation of India:164 
 
Where the mind is without fear  
and the head is held high 
Where knowledge is free 
Where the world has not been 
broken up into fragments 
by narrow domestic walls 
Where the clear stream of reason 
has not lost its way into the 
dreary desert sand of dead habit 
Into that heaven of freedom 
my Father, let my country awake. 
 
Tagore’s vision of “openness” to the best of educational, cultural and technological 
integration between the West and the East is nevertheless especially pertinent in the 
contemporary globalization context. Significantly, he discerned the values of 
freedom, respect for the rule of law and notions of equity that were an integral part of 
the British political philosophy, from the repressive manifestation of British colonial 
rule. Tagore’s 1941 speech “The Crisis in Civilization” acknowledged positive liberal 
legacies of Britain, but he later commented that what “was truly best in their own 
civilization, the upholding of dignity of human relationships, has no place in the 
British administration of this country.”165 After the massacre in Amritsar,166 Tagore 
wrote to the Viceroy of India requesting to be relieved of his knighthood.167  
 
Indian philosophy emphasizes “unity in diversity”, and the ethnoreligious pluralism 
in South Asia is a living example of this notion. Gandhi, through his activism for 
purnaswaraj, synthesized the ancient religious and philosophical teachings of non-
violence, tolerance and the search for truth and oneness as an effective means of 
advocating for national freedom, equality, freedom from exploitation, and for a 
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change in the inequitable social order based on caste. Despite a dislike for “rights-
talk”, Gandhi expressed his struggle at least once in the idiom of rights when he said, 
“I wish I could persuade everybody that civil disobedience is the inherent right of a 
citizen ... Civil disobedience ... becomes a sacred duty when the State has become 
lawless, or ... corrupt ... [The right to civil disobedience] is a birthright that cannot be 
surrendered without surrender of one’s self-respect.”168 The salient feature of his 
political and philosophical doctrine was the pursuit of common good (sarvoyada) 
through non-violent and truthful means (satyagraha).169 In the longer view, of course, 
Gandhi was by no means the first to merge the pursuit of peace or virtue with 
political activism. Aristotle, Plato and Thomas Aquinas, to name but a few, had all 
espoused wisdom, truth and justice in political theory, though not non-violent protest. 
 
To Gandhi, politics and dharma were intimately linked. Moreover, the Mahatma said, 
“those who want to be passive resisters for the service of the country have to observe 
chastity, adopt poverty, follow truth and cultivate fearlessness.”170 Each of these 
qualities has special resonance with early Indian philosophical teachings and was 
compatible with Gandhi’s ideas of swaraj, which denoted ideological and political 
independence from colonial rule; while Raychaudhuri observed that, “Underlying 
Gandhi’s statements on the superior worth of India’s civilization one can detect his 
attachment to a pattern of social interaction which did not privilege the individual or 
emphasize achievement over other objects of human aspiration.”171 
 
Although Gandhi’s philosophy was never applied globally to remedy injustice, his 
theory of non-violent civic protest did gain legitimacy as a moral and political 
force.172 Ghandhi’s philosophy has inspired many struggles of liberation across the 
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globe, such as the fight against apartheid, the protests for democracy in Tian’anmen 
Square, and the struggle for democracy in Myanmar, as well as the mass protests 
against globalization in places such as Cancun, Davos, Quebec, Geneva, Port Algiers 
and Melbourne.  
 
 
South Asia has a rich tradition drawn from both political philosophy and religious 
teachings that celebrates notions of human dignity, cultural diversity and human 
freedoms, which together comprise the spirit of the UDHR. However, the 
fundamental distinction between Western and South Asian expositions of rights is 
that the South Asian theoretical reasoning did not use the idiom of rights itself. The 
idea of rights and its spirit is evident in the religious, cultural and political 
articulations but seldom expressed in rights terms. Gewirth distinguishes between 
“having or using a concept and the clear or explicit recognition and elucidation of it 
... Thus persons might have and use the concept of a right without explicitly having a 
single word for it.”173 
 
Values of tolerance, non-violence and the quest for justice and equity were prevalent 
in the ancient philosophies of the subcontinent but they were not articulated in the 
language of rights as Locke, Rousseau or Hobbes articulated them in Europe in the 
Age of Enlightenment. It bears repeating that the contemporary mainstream human 
rights discourse emphasizes “individual rights vindicated against the liberal 
democratic state,” and this is essentially a construction of post-War international 
politics. Similar end results of safety from tyrannical rule were achieved in Asia 
through different conceptual articulations. Cmiel succinctly elaborates this point174 
when he observes that “Mohandas Gandhi, for one, is mentioned in several of the 
books discussed here as a friend of human rights. Yet Gandhi generally disliked 
‘rights-talk’ of all kinds, associating it with the self-indulgence of the modern age.”175 
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Gandhi emphasized the importance of obligation not only as a basis of, but as prior 
to, rights: “I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved 
and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us 
only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world. From this one fundamental 
statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of Man and Woman and 
correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other 
right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.”176  
 
Thus what is articulated as a right of the individual against society and the state in the 
Western philosophical discourse was traditionally voiced in South Asian political 
philosophy as one of its reciprocals, namely a duty of the society or the ruler towards 
the individual or the ruled.177 Those who spearheaded independence in the 
subcontinent synthesized the European rights discourse and the fundamental tenets of 
South Asian philosophy: humanism, non-violence and dharma. It is this synthesis 
that formed the foundation of the constitutions of South Asia and their charters of 
fundamental rights. These charters conform to the structure of the Western liberal 
constitutional model but represent a synthesis of ancient Indian and Enlightenment 
European discourse. 
 
 
1.5 The “Globalization” of Human Rights 
 
Historians compete to locate the point of re-emergence of rights discourse onto the 
global stage in its modern form. Burgers points to Roosevelt’s State of the Union 
address of 1941, just months before Pearl Harbour brought America actively into the 
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world’s most global ever war.178 The President defined liberty in rights terms: 
“Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere.” By the end of that year 
the newly reinforced Allied Powers had incorporated as one of their war aims “to 
preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands.”179 
Lauterpatcht, however, observes that constitutional protection of human rights had 
emerged in the 19th century and many constitutions in Europe including those of 
Scandinavian states had included charters of fundamental rights into their national 
constitutions.180 
 
Ironically, the world had to be plunged, again, into the truly global conflict of World 
War II, and be shocked by the unprecedented scale and publicization of that conflict's 
associated atrocities, before a truly global consciousness could emerge for the need 
for global human rights protection. German and Japanese genocide and persecution of 
vulnerable minorities, and the culmination of it all with the devastation at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, became the catalyst  for the founding of the contemporary international 
human rights regime.181 Before the Holocaust, atrocities such as the Russian pogroms 
and the Turkish massacre of Armenians drew little attention from the international 
community, for the concepts of state sovereignty and the sanctity of internal matters 
were ardently protected. According to Jayawickrama, those twin concepts were the 
most significant “obstacle to the development of the international law of human 
rights” in the first half of the 20th century.182  
 
 
1.5.1 The United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The modern narrative of human rights instruments begins with the Charter of the 
United Nations, which was the eventual successor to the League of Nations The 
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unpardonable actions of the Nazis made the international community realize that 
there was a lacuna in its legal and political machinery to condemn and to punish the 
German Government, as, “[a]ccording to the strict doctrine of state sovereignty, any 
foreign criticism of the domestic laws that authorized these atrocities was 
illegitimate; according to the theory of legal positivism, it was also meaningless.”183 
The atrocities of World War II, however, highlighted the need to define parameters 
for state behaviour in relation to warfare and human rights; and, aided by the 
lobbying of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the final draft of the UN’s 
Charter adopted as a basic principle and a legal obligation upon member states the 
promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  
 
The sense of urgency in the creation of a human rights regime was viewed with 
cynicism by some who observed that the post-war leaders “either displayed a moral 
reaction to fascist atrocities, or they believed that states engaging in gross violations 
of human rights were also likely to violate the law against aggressive war.”184 On the 
other hand, “[h]earing about and experiencing the horrors of the war convinced the 
drafters of the rightness of what they were doing. The moral outrage thus created 
gave them a common platform from which to operate and do the drafting.”185  This 
concern was translated into the UDHR adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1948.  
 
The number and nature of rights since declared by the UN have evolved from the 
UDHR following several interlinked trends . The first trend is from purely moral 
aspirations to more politically and even legally binding guarantees. The second is the 
gaining by the UDHR rights and later coinages of universal legitimacy as at least a 
benchmark of aspiration. The third is a trend from few rights to many and from less 
to more specific, but with a division between, on the one hand, civil and political 
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rights, essentially enjoyed as individuals; and, on the other hand, economic social and 
cultural rights, more often associated (correctly or incorrectly) with groups. 
 
The most fundamental contribution of the UDHR was the contribution it made 
towards the development of the international legalistic character of human rights. The 
creation of several treaties to safeguard individual rights had the result of 
transforming the individual from an “object of international compassion” to a subject 
of international law who has recourse to international remedies to protect their 
fundamental rights.186 According to Eleanor Roosevelt, at inception the UDHR did 
“not purport to be a statement of [even] basic principles of law or legal obligation”.187 
Morsink confirms this: “The view that the Declaration had no legal and only moral 
force was nearly a unanimous view of the delegations involved in the drafting.”188 
However, neither Roosevelt nor Morsink believed this made the Declaration 
toothless. Roosevelt hoped that by being freely adopted by the General Assembly, the 
rights in the UDHR would serve as “a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples of all nations”189. History has largely borne out this hope; looking back, 
Morsink reflects that there was indeed “tremendous philosophical and moral power in 
this position [moral rather than legal status] and it explains why the Declaration has 
become a moral beacon in the affairs of individuals as well as of states.”190 
 
As well as becoming part of international law, rights become entrenched through 
incorporation into domestic constitutional laws either as a ratification and adoption of 
the UDHR or later instruments, or as a mirroring of those instruments in member 
states’ creation of their own charters. The United Kingdom is a recent example, its 
1998 Human Rights Act reflecting the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which in turn reflected the UDHR.191  
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The evolution of a comprehensive human rights body with specialized treaty regimes 
within the span of three to four decades is a considerable achievement.192 The 
creation of legally formulated documents enshrining specific rights has helped the 
idea of rights to emancipate from the realms of ethics and moral stipulations into 
enforceable law.193 A significant impediment in the evolution of human rights from a 
moral ideal to a legal regime is the differentiation of civil or political from economic, 
social and cultural rights. The two key UN instruments building on the UDHR, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)194 and the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),195 which came into 
effect in 1976, have evolved separately of each other, claiming legitimacy from two 
different political ideologies that dominated world politics in the post-World War II 
era. The fundamental civil rights that were the kernel of the political struggles of the 
17th-19th century in Europe emerged in the UDHR in the form of civil and political 
rights and were converted into legal obligations under the ICCPR. The economic, 
social and cultural rights reflecting a more socialist ideology were incorporated into a 
second covenant and remained in the realms of “progressive realization” on the basis 
of available resources.   
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Meanwhile, rights have also been strengthened from top down to some extent through 
the UN itself by the creation of monitoring, reporting, enforcement and some 
adjudicative bodies.196 However, these mechanisms have lagged behind the coining 
of new treaties. Tony Evans observes that, “the international community has not 
matched its enthusiasm for setting human rights standards with similar enthusiasm for 
creating necessary machinery to implement those standards. Although the 
Commission on Human Rights has developed monitoring procedures and advisory 
programmes for implementing state obligations under international law, the 
commentators generally agree that these are weak.”197 A comprehensive international 
legal framework for the implementation of human rights, through which a state’s 
obligations to ensure human rights domestically can be legally challenged, is yet to be 
achieved. This is predominantly due to a lack of effective mechanisms at 
international level to make states adhere to, and comply with, the legal obligations 
they undertake as treaties.198 
 
The division between the ICCPR and the ICESCR points up another, more arguable 
distinction. Because human rights were regarded as a quintessential weapon of the 
individual against the state, some view the notion that human rights can be associated 
with social groups, communities, tribes, castes, races or any other collective entities 
with a degree of scepticism.199 Others consider the dichotomy between individual 
rights and group rights can be resolved by perceiving that ”group rights” also serve 
the interests of the individual.200 However, the adoption of several international 
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human rights treaties concerning the issue of group rights has transformed the narrow 
conceptualization of human rights which equated human rights to individual rights.201  
 
It is in the form of a “common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations” 
as Eleanor Roosevelt hoped that the UDHR has gained prominence and legitimacy 
today. The Declaration contains a universally acknowledged set of norms and 
standards dictating all perspectives of our relations as individuals and as collective 
members of groups, within communities and among the states.  
 
The UDHR is a comprehensive moral code, which created a political consensus on 
the idea of rights that is a unique creation at a time when there was no articulation of 
human rights in the international arena. However, the UDHR has set the precedent for 
the creation of standards and not the creation of implementation mechanisms. The 
ICCPR, the ICESCR and the corresponding Protocols, which were envisaged to be 
the enforceable mechanism, fell short of that expectation due to political bickering 
and insecurities related to the Cold War. The long list of subsequent conventions and 
resolutions identified specific areas of human rights that needed to be addressed, but, 
as the culture of abstract standard setting was well established, little effort was made 
to proceed with enforcing those rights in an international or national context. One 
reason for the lack of vigour in implementation, according to Shale Horowitz and 
Albrecht Schnabel, is the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states, a principle that has great prominence in the UN Charter.202  
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1.5.2 Accusations of Cultural Imperialism Levelled against the Universal 
Rights Regime, and a Preview of Cultural Relativism  
 
Despite the imperfections of the implementation strategies, the UDHR and the two 
Covenants of 1976 represent the mainstream human rights discourse that has 
established itself as the universal standard of human rights. However, this assertion of 
universal relevance and legitimacy has exposed the UDHR to accusations of cultural 
imperialism.203 These challenges, arising mainly from the non-Western developing 
world, raise important queries as to whether the contemporary human rights norms 
warrant the predominance they have attained, whether their claims to universality are 
legitimate, and whether such claims of universality are realistic given the 
contemporary political, cultural, economic and social ethos of the Third World, and 
the fact that the UDHR was formulated at a time when most of the developing world 
was under colonial rule.204 
 
For instance, questions regarding the relevance of the rights enshrined had been made 
by the Islamic states at the drafting stages of the UDHR. In 1947, the Saudi Arabian 
delegation queried the legitimacy of Article 16 (free marriage choice), and Article 18 
(freedom of religion). Regarding Article 16, the Saudi delegation complained to the 
drafting committee that the draft UDHR had considered only Western sociocultural 
practices and disregarded more ancient civilizations that had passed the experimental 
stage with institutions such as marriage and evolved their own rules and values 
regarding it. The Saudi delegates further asserted that it was not for the Committee to 
proclaim the superiority of one civilization over all others or to establish uniform 
standards for all the countries.205  
 
The Saudi delegation’s206 query was a defence of the Islamic faith and patriarchal 
authority, for an essential manifestation of the Islamic culture was deemed to be 
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undermined by the values in the UDHR. From a Western liberal and gender-
egalitarian perspective, it is easy to dismiss the Saudi argument as a self-interested 
attempt to perpetuate the indefensible restriction of female choice in marriage that 
was central to intolerable patriarchal property relations in Islam. Yet the Saudi 
argument still raises tensions of principle that are at least prima facie problematic, 
and the ensuing paragraphs of the present chapter query the legitimacy of such 
cultural relativist contentions. 
 
This ideological incongruity continues to raise questions about the validity and the 
relevance of the universal regime of human rights.207 However, suffice it to say for 
now that such cynicism as surely underlay the Saudi case and will be noted in certain 
other protestations of “relativism” against alleged “cultural imperialism” does not 
detract from what the present writer agrees with the consensus of commentators to be 
the very real value and the legitimacy of the UDHR. Indeed, that consensus has if 
anything actually grown, to the point where we even risk forgetting that some such 
objections were ever seriously raised. As Steiner reiterates: “[h]owever self evident it 
may appear today, the Declaration bore a more radical message that many of its 
framers perhaps recognized. It proceeded to work its subversive path through many 
rooted doctrines of international law, forever changing the discourse of international 
relations on issues vital to human decency and peace.”208 
 
 
1.6 Contemporary Human Rights in South Asia: Underlying Principles and 
Problems 
 
The success of a universal regime of human rights depends ultimately on individual 
states implementing the obligations they have undertaken to guarantee for the benefit 
of individuals at national level. Some commentators believe that there has been 
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“amazing progress in guaranteeing human rights”209 since the UDHR. However, the 
empirical reality of South Asia is that there is a disjuncture between the international 
human rights regime, the constitutional prescriptions and the actual implementation 
of the rights at national level. The comprehensive charters enshrined in many of the 
South Asian constitutions prescribe legal remedies for violations. In reality, many of 
the laws and institutional practices in place for the protection of human rights prove 
to be insufficient or unworkable and the “rights regimes” articulated in the national 
constitutions are rendered powerless due to lack of resources and infrastructure for 
effective implementation. Therefore, despite the apparent universal subscription to 
the “idea” of human rights, its effective implementation in the particular 
sociopolitical context of South Asia is questionable.210  
 
British colonial rule has significantly influenced the governing structure and the 
political ethos of modern South Asia.211 The British managed to consolidate their rule 
over the entire Indian subcontinent by acquiring Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1815 and 
India in 1858 with the result that, “[a]dministratively, India became one — an 
achievement unparalleled in the political history of India.”212 The result of such 
territorial integration was the supposed establishment of a British system of 
centralized administration based on principles of the rule of law, respect for personal 
liberty, and equal treatment for all colonial people without caste-based or religious 
distinction.213  
 
Adoptions of Bills of Rights in former colonial territories have been either as a 
recommendation of the colonial power; an initiative of the post-independence 
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constitutional councils; or the result of a revolutionary process.214 The request to 
include charters of human rights into the constitutional structures of the countries in 
South Asia was made by their political leaders, especially India’s, long before 
independence in 1947. Years of exposure to Western education had molded a new 
class of political elite who were familiar with the concepts of constitutional liberalism 
and the rights theory that was articulated in Western Europe. The need to include the 
newly flourishing norms of equality, social justice and standards of human rights into 
the constitutional structures was justified on the basis that it would remedy the 
inherent social inequalities that existed in the traditional Indian political culture.215 
The relentless quest to establish a liberal constitutional structure in India by the 
political elite in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was described by Field as one 
where “Indians struggled against Englishmen for the right to run a British system in 
India.”216  
 
India, during its struggle for independence from the British Raj, demanded the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights into its Constitution. The Simon Commission was 
entrusted with the formulation of the Indian Constitution but rejected this request on 
the basis that: “Experience however, has not shown [such constitutional 
enshrinements] to be of any great practical value. Abstract declarations are useless, 
unless there exists the will and the means to make them effective.”217 
 
Jayawickrama observes, however, that the will to make the Bill of Rights work did 
exist amongst the Indian political elite, such as Jawahalal and Motilal Nehru, 
Chittaranjan Das, and Subhas Chandra Bose, who were all exposed to English 
education in the early years of the 20th century and were familiar with the Western 
European political struggles and quests for human rights.218 In situations where the 
British did not recommend the inclusion of a Bill of Rights into the Constitution of a 
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colony, it was justified on the basis of their own circumstances. Britain, until 
recently, had no domestic regime of human rights219 and placed reliance on common 
law to offer protection for human rights violations. Sir Ivor Jennings, essentially 
taking the same view as the Simon Commission, explained the position of Britain in 
1958 by saying, “in Britain we have no Bill of Rights; we merely have liberty 
according to law; and we think – truly, I believe – that we do the job better than any 
country which has a Bill of Rights or a Declaration of the Rights of Man.”220 
 
Contrary to the position in India, when constitutional preparations were made to grant 
independence to Ceylon, the British government requested that the Council of 
Ministers submit a proposal of a Bill of Rights to the Constitutional Commission. 
Though a draft proposal of a rights charter was formulated, Sir Ivor encouraged its 
exclusion on the basis that such a Charter was not required in the context of the 
unitary constitution fashioned on the Westminster model.221 As there was also no 
request from the minority communal parties for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, the 
Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946 (the Soulbury Constitution) was 
formulated without a Bill of Rights. The nearest to a Bill of Rights in the Ceylon 
Constitution of 1946 was Article 29 (2). 222 It was the belief of the drafters of the 
Constitution “that the customs and the conventions of the British parliamentary 
practice and British judicial precedent would fill the gaps.”223 Some hailed the 
enactment of Article 29 as a comprehensive mechanism and claimed that the 
Soulbury Constitution “entrenched in it all the protective provisions for minorities 
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that the wit of man could devise.”224 Subsequent communal strife in Ceylon, 
however, made even Sir Ivor alter his views on including a Bill of Rights into the 
Constitution. In a BBC interview in the early 1960s he conceded that if he had had an 
intimation of the political troubles that would emanate in heterogeneous societies 
such as Ceylon he would have insisted on the inclusion of a comprehensive Bill of 
Rights into the Soulbury Constitution.225 
 
The second attempt at creating a charter of fundamental rights, which was for India in 
1949, was more successful. The 1949 Independent Constitution, which remains in 
force, contained an elaborate Charter of Fundamental Rights, soon followed by 
Pakistan establishing one in 1956. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka followed suit in 1972. 
However, the Bill of Rights in the 1972 First Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka 
was “hamstrung by an ideological debate on the relative supremacy of a Bill of 
Rights and parliament.”226 The result was an impotent Bill of Rights secondary to the 
legislature, the latter being the “supreme instrument of state power.”227 The Second 
Republican Constitution of 1978 contained an entrenched comprehensive Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which specified enforcement procedures of rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution.228  
 
The Fundamental Rights Charter enshrined in Part III of the 1949 Indian Constitution 
guarantees the basic fundamental rights of equality, non-discrimination, religious 
freedom, freedom from exploitation, freedom of speech and expression and other 
analogous civil and political rights. The Constitution also guarantees the means of 
vindicating these rights following applications made to the Supreme Court or the 
High Courts of India. This fundamental “rights charter” was designed to be a tool of 
social transformation for it was “set to make a confluence of human rights and social 
welfare by evolving a concept of social justice”.229 Therefore, constitutional 
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provisions abolishing untouchability (as already mentioned) and forced labour, and 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of ethnic, religious, caste and gender identities, 
were included.230  
 
 
1.7 Social Action Litigation 
 
In the context of human rights jurisprudence of the subcontinent the most significant 
development has been the judicial activism through the Social Action Litigation that 
was first initiated in India.231 With the intention of promoting social justice and 
enhancing access to the judicial process, the Indian judiciary have expanded the 
interpretations of Articles 14232 and 21233 of the Indian Constitution to include due 
process. The result has been the initiation of class action suits and writ petitions from, 
or on behalf of, the marginalized segments of Indian society, who under normal 
circumstances would have been excluded from the judicial process due to lack of 
resources or sociopolitical acumen.234   
 
This brief discussion on Social Action Litigation is directed towards the possible 
expansion of SAL across the region and to establishing common regional procedures 
in relation to protecting economic, social and cultural rights, which do not have the 
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same constitutional protection as civil and political rights in South Asia, but are rather 
claimed to be protected and promoted through public policy and ordinary 
legislation.235  
 
Commonly perceived to be a judicial innovation rooted in the repressive regime of 
Indira Gandhi, the liberalization processes that induced economic hardship on the 
poor also fuelled SAL in India. The ubiquitous inequitable power relations that 
dominated the Indian legal system saw the economically and the politically powerless 
being discriminated against, negating the effectiveness of the rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. The empathy of the judiciary towards the marginalized segments of 
society resulted in creative judicial activism which challenged the “received notions 
of the judiciary.”236 This was evidenced in the case Bihar Legal Support Society v. 
Chief Justice of India, when the Court observed:237  
 
[t]he concern shown [by the law] to the poor and the disadvantaged is much greater 
than that shown to the rich and well-to-do because the latter can, on account of their 
dominant social and economic position and large material resources, resist aggression 
on their rights where the poor and the deprived just do not have the capacity or the 
will to resist and fight. 
 
In the same case Bhagwati, CJ, who ardently justified the concept of Social Action 
Litigation, described it as an obligation of the judiciary towards the marginalized:238   
 
The weaker sections of Indian humanity have been deprived of justice for long years; 
they have had no access to justice on account of their poverty, ignorance and 
illiteracy. They are not aware of the rights and benefits conferred upon them by the 
constitution and the law. On account of their socially and economically 
disadvantaged position they lack the capacity to assert their rights, and they do not 
have the material resources with which to enforce their social and economic 
entitlements and combat exploitation and injustice.  
 
The most innovative aspect of SAL was the relaxation of the rules relating to 
standing. The Indian Supreme Court invited the public, provided they were acting 
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bona fide, to initiate judicial proceedings on behalf of another in situations where the 
legal rights of a person were being denied, through the relaxation of the locus standi 
rules.239 As Bhagwati J observed:240   
 
[i]t may now be taken as well settled that Article 32 does not merely confer power on 
this Court to issue direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights 
but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental 
rights of the people and for that purpose this court has all incidental and ancillary 
powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies 
designed to enforce the fundamental rights.  
 
Therefore, the Court declared that an injured party could invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court through Article 32 and the High Court through Article 226, and that 
in the event that the person whose rights were violated could not invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court any member of the public could do so on their behalf.241 
 
The judgment in S. P. Gupta v. Union of India paved the way to “epistolary 
jurisdiction” and displayed the proactive role of the judiciary in creating room for 
grievances to be brought before the courts by people without locus standi, through 
letters and even news items.242 A reduction in the conventional procedural formalities 
further enhanced SAL as a tool of empowerment to those whose grievances against 
the executive and the legal system had always been ignored.243 The Supreme Court 
also took the initiative to provide schemes of legal aid to litigants for whom legal 
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costs were often prohibitive further dismantling the debacles to invoke its 
jurisdiction.244 
 
SAL in the Indian context created a pathway to litigate the rights enshrined in Part IV 
of the Indian Constitution — the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). These 
include a myriad of social, economic and cultural rights, such as the right to 
education, the right to livelihood and the right to health and housing, but which are 
deemed non-justiciable, unlike the rights which are enshrined in Part III of the 
Constitution and which are declared fundamental rights.245 The conceptualization of 
SAL was based on the premise that there was no distinction between Parts III and IV 
of the Indian Constitution and that they supplemented each other in achieving the 
common end of creating a society where rights and entitlements were ensured by the 
Constitution.246 To this end Justice Reddy declared: “The provisions of Part III and 
IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and not exclusionary of each 
other and […] the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in 
Part IV.”247 Judicial innovation was creatively utilized to enforce the DPSPs through 
Article 21 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to life.248 The concept of 
SAL has since been utilized in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, with 
varying degrees of success, to expand access to the judicial system.249 Litigation 
relating to access to basic social and economic rights, environmental rights, consumer 
protection and tribal rights has taken place in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
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Nepal.250 The impetus to promote and safeguard human rights through SAL in other 
states in South Asia emanates largely from the media and the NGO community, 
which agitates for greater accountability in political governance in South Asia, with 
less enthusiasm from the judiciary.  
 
The influence of SAL is that the subcontinent goes beyond a narrow focus of the 
constitutions’ rights and instead gives teeth to the otherwise impotent constitutional 
provisions assuring socioeconomic and cultural rights. SAL has assumed a vibrant 
character that agitates for restoration and the continuance of democratic governance 
where that is broken,251 and for social justice, both of which are pivotal to the 
sustenance of human rights in South Asia as explained by Mehta:252 
 
The PIL [Public Interest Litigation] movement has allowed all kinds of public-
interest matters to be heard, and given hundreds of poor people a route by which to 
approach the Court. While PIL cases to date have had mixed success at shrinking 
poverty or correcting injustices, the provision of a forum to which citizens 
marginalised by the corruptions of routine politics can turn has arguably given 
serious moral and psychological reinforcement to the legitimacy of the democratic 
system.  
 
However, in general the commitment to SAL that has been displayed by the Indian 
judiciary is not reflected in other jurisdictions across the subcontinent and this has 
limited its success. Observing the operation of SAL in an Indian context, Peiris in 
1991 commented:253 
 
… the novelty and vigour of the judicial initiative, which has disturbed 
assumptions relating to the judicial function and cast judicial policy adrift on 
uncharted waters, have been the precursor of intractable dilemmas. These 
involve core elements of the relationship between the judiciary and other 
organs of government, each discharging its constitutional responsibility. At 
the heart of the problem is the political accountability of the courts, and the 
legitimacy, if not the practicality, of their leadership role in the formulation 
and implementation of broad social policy, often impinging on matters of 
acute controversy.  
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The long term viability of SAL as an innovative concept for social transformation has 
been queried also by Baxi, who observes that judicial activism can never be a 
substitute for “political action” in the battle against impoverishment. He observes that 
“[c]ourts are, at the end of the day, never an instrument of total social revolution; they 
are, at best, in the images of Roscoe Pound and Karl Popper, instruments of 
piecemeal social engineering”.254 Although conceptually appealing, it has since met 
with hurdles with regard to the courts’ inability to resolve issues relating to disputed 
accounts of fact, and with regard also to providing effective remedies and effective 
means to implement those remedies.255 To ensure the success of SAL litigation the 
Supreme Court has established specialized commissions to establish the facts of a 
particular litigation.256 The Commissions are vested with the responsibility of finding 
data and facts relating to fundamental rights violations.257 The Court also appointed 
an Ombudsman to ensure the implementation of its orders in the case of People’s 
Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, which concerned the implementation 
of the labour laws by the city contactors and the Delhi City Council.258 In Sheela 
Berse v. State of Maharashtra,259 a female judicial officer was appointed to supervize 
the implementation of the Court’s order relating to the treatment of prisoners.  
 
The effectiveness of SAL remedies firstly depends on the extent to which the 
judiciary is going to expand the constitutional mandate relating to socioeconomic 
rights, as illustrated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which has been 
especially successful in guaranteeing socioeconomic rights. Secondly SAL must be 
regarded as just one of the several mechanisms that are or can be established to 
eradicate poverty and ensure social justice. 
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Post-apartheid South Africa, with its endemic social and economic inequalities that 
were accentuated by the neo-liberal macroeconomic policies,260 has incorporated 
justiciable social and economic rights into its Constitution.261 The Constitution, which 
enshrines the right to have access to health services, food, water and social security 
and guarantees the right to education, nevertheless has a restriction clause to the 
effect that “[t]he State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.”262 The 
recognition of these rights was a reaction to the endemic material deprivation and the 
moral obligation to provide access to land, healthcare, housing and public services to 
a nation that has endured apartheid policies. The combined effect of poverty and 
social marginalization justified the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the South 
African Constitution.263  
 
The South African Constitutional Court, in several instances, has been able to utilize 
the Constitutional mandate relating to social and economic rights creatively. In the 
case of South Africa v. Grootboom Justice Yacoob observed, “I am conscious that it 
is an extremely difficult task for the State to meet these obligations in the conditions 
that prevail in our country. This is recognized by the Constitution, which expressly 
provides that the State is not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize 
these rights immediately. I stress however, that despite all these qualifications, these 
are rights, and the Constitution obliges the State to give effect to them. This is an 
obligation that Courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce.”264  
Therefore, the Constitutional Court directed the state to “devise a comprehensive and 
                                                 
260 J Daniel, A Habib and R Southall (eds) State of the Nation  South Africa 2003-2004 (HRSC Press, 
Johannesburg, 2003). 
261 Cass R Sunstein “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” May 2001 U of 
Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 12 
<http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/resources/12.CRS.pdf.> (accessed 11 Jan 2007). 
262 Article 27(2). 
263 For an account of the ongoing struggle for socioeconomic equity in post-Apartheid South Africa see 
A Desai We are the Poor: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 2003). 
264 Government of the Republic of South Africa & Ors v. Grootboom & Ors 2000 ICHRL 72 4 October 
2000. 
 63 
workable plan to meet the needs of people in desperate need.”265 The relevance of 
SAL goes beyond the outcome in the courtroom, as Schultz and Gottlieb observe 
when they say, “the most important aspect of judicial influence [is] the power of 
courts to redefine structures and expectations.”266 As the best possible outcome not 
only will the judgment be implemented but the repercussions can be wider with 
possible legislative or policy changes. It also creates opportunities of public debate on 
issues of social concern that were denied public and institutional attention before.267 
In the context of South Asia, as much as the role of SAL is a means of affirming 
social and economic rights as justiciable human rights, it is also evolving into an 
avenue for defining social policy. Judicial deliberation on social policy is a means of 
scrutinizing policy and this is significant in a climate where other avenues of public 
and parliamentary debate are defunct or dysfunctional and results of elections may 
not be a true reflection of public opinion. 
 
The rich jurisprudence emanating from the SAL process in South Asia indicates that 
it has immense capacity to vindicate socioeconomic rights of the poor in the South 
Asian region particularly as a tool to audit policy formulation in relation to 
socioeconomic development and poverty eradication.  
 
 
1.8 Disjunction between Normative Obligations and Political Reality  
 
The sustained success of a charter of rights depends on other sociopolitical 
circumstances of the state and the legal infrastructure that sustains it, as explained by 
Read:268 
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The new states emerged often hurriedly from authoritarian colonialism with 
dominant nationalist movements but essentially weak political systems, with 
vulnerable political parties and institutions like the judiciary, the press and the 
professions too weak to exert effective pressures on the government, with poor and 
poorly educated populations and struggling economies — rocky soil for the nurture 
of human rights. 
 
In terms of content the South Asian states have gone to extreme lengths to create 
extensive charters of human rights reflecting the UDHR but these rights are often 
restricted on the basis of national security or emergency.269 For instance, India, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, the Maldives and Bangladesh have comprehensive charters 
of fundamental rights and directive principles in their constitutions and provide 
judicial mechanisms for partial adjudication.270 However, few of the countries in the 
region have institutionalized a durable system to achieve the rights enumerated in the 
constitutions. Protection of human rights cannot be restricted to the creation of 
intricate mechanisms but requires political will and commitment, which for reasons 
articulated in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study are lacking within the governments of 
South Asia. Furthermore the commitment to pluralist democracy based on respect for 
the rule of law and true constitutionalism with effective systems of checks and 
balances is absent within the governance structures of states in South Asia..271 
Pakistan and Bangladesh have both been under military rule and Nepal has had a long 
history of struggle against monarchical power.272 Free media and an impartial 
judiciary, integral features that should help sustain human rights and lend legitimacy 
to the democratic regime, are absent in many of the countries in South Asia.273  
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The South Asian states are signatories to several international covenants on human 
rights but the international obligations undertaken through the treaties are rarely 
converted into domestic legal obligations.274 Though ratification of human rights 
treaties denotes acceptance of international human rights standards, inaction in the 
domestic sphere indicates that the states are not committed to honouring the treaty 
obligations.275 Few states have initiated programmes that give effect to their treaty 
obligations nationally, as all of the South Asian states have a “dualist approach” in 
relation to the applicability of international treaty obligations nationally. There is an 
urgent need to create a system that encourages South Asian states to systematically 
realize the human rights obligations the states accept at an international level through 
the initiation of legislation nationally.  
 
The dire need to synchronize the international human rights obligations of South 
Asian states with domestic laws is well illustrated by the recent Supreme Court case 
of Nallaratnam Singarasa vs AG.276 In this case the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka 
determined that Sri Lanka’s becoming a party to the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR 
was ultra vires Article 4 (c) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, for it bestowed “a 
judicial power” upon the Human Rights Committee at Geneva.277 Based on this 
judgment the government of Sri Lanka claimed:278 
 
The government of Sri Lanka was unable to respond to the Human Rights Committee 
by submitting its observations, owing to the Supreme Court judgment in Nallaratnam 
Sinharasa’s Case. While the government of Sri Lanka is conscious of its obligations 
in Treaties, Conventions and Protocols, it is also imperative that the Government 
of Sri Lanka respects the judgments of its domestic courts. 
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This is a strange position for the government to adopt as a previous ruling of the 
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka had maintained per Fernando J:279 
 
A person deprived of personal liberty has a right of access to the judiciary, and that 
right is now internationally entrenched, to the extent that a detainee who is denied 
that right may even complain to the Human Rights Committee. 
 
Should this Court have regard to the provisions of the Covenant? I think it must. 
Article 27(15) requires the State to "endeavour to foster respect for international law 
and treaty obligations in dealings among nations". That implies that the State must 
likewise respect international law and treaty obligations in its dealings with its own 
citizens, particularly when their liberty is involved. The State must afford to them the 
benefit of the safeguards which international law recognises. 
 
Hathaway in her extensive study of state compliance with international human rights 
treaties observes that “because human rights treaties are generally only minimally 
monitored and enforced, there is little incentive for ratifying countries to make the 
costly changes in actual policy that would be necessary to meet their treaty 
commitments.”280 She continues that domestic implementation of international human 
rights norms may be more successful in a regional context “because regional political 
and economic interdependence generates greater external pressure on countries to 
exhibit a commitment to human rights norms.”281  
 
Hathaway’s final observation is that:282 
 
the strongest democracies may be more likely to adhere to their treaty obligations 
because the existence of internal monitors makes it more difficult for such countries 
to conceal a dissonance between their expressive and actual behavior or because 
liberal democracies have a true normative commitment to the aspirations embedded 
in the human rights treaties.  
 
This appears anomalous, as some states in the region such as India and Sri Lanka do 
have a long tradition of democratic governance and international co-operation. 
However, even in states like India and Sri Lanka, which have done better than many 
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others in the region in terms of adhering to orthodox liberal democratic constitutional 
structures and practices and have reached certain goals implicit in the mainstream 
ideology of human rights, there appear to be human rights violations of epidemic 
proportions.283 Chapters 3 and 4 of this study examine the reasons for these 
incongruent patterns of near-perfect formal structures and the horrific empirical 
evidence of human rights abuses particularly in sociocultural and economic spheres.  
 
The issues discussed above highlight the dilemmas relating to the scope and the 
validity of the universal regime of human rights, the substantive human rights within 
the domestic sphere, and the methodology of protecting human rights. A Human 
Rights Watch report illustrates the empirical dilemmas of implementing human rights 
amidst poverty and insecurity in South Asia in the following manner:284 
 
Poverty contributes to bonded child labor, but it is not the only cause. A lack of 
access to credit and lack of a concerted social welfare scheme to safeguard against 
hunger and illness; inaccessible, low quality, and discriminatory schools; the lack of 
employment and living wages for adults; corruption and apathy among government 
officials; and historical economic relationships based on the hierarchy of caste are 
other key elements. Moreover, bonded children are likely destined for poverty as 
adults, and likely to bond their own children in order to survive. Fourteen-year-old 
Ashish M. told Human Rights Watch that he could not leave his loom owner because 
he was paying off an advance, which in two years he had reduced from Rs. 2,500 
(U.S.$52) to Rs. 475 ($9.90). ‘The owner pays but deducts for the advance,’ he said. 
‘He deducts but won't write off the whole advance. . . . We only make enough to 
eat.’285  
 
With wages too low to survive, workers are forced to keep borrowing from their 
employers, ensuring that they never pay off all of their debts, even though their labor 
has, in fact, paid them many times over. And as NHRC Special Rapporteur Chaman 
Lal explained, ‘poverty is one of the causes of child labor but also one of the 
consequences - because it is so cheap it causes adult unemployment and wage 
suppression. 
  
The reason for the high incidence of child labour in India is perceived by the above 
Report to be primarily economic. The Report also acknowledges another significant 
contributory factor —views among Indians about the social order, notions concerning 
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the respective roles of upper and lower social strata and the tacit belief in the role of 
education as a tool to maintain differences among social classes. These sociocultural 
notions premised on the caste system and the deep cleavages between ethnic and 
religious groups dominate the list of obstacles to the realization of human rights in 
South Asia. The violent manifestation of these diversities, often fuelled by political 
and economic considerations, is contrary to the humanistic and tolerant image that 
South Asia presents through its philosophical articulations.286 
 
As discussed later in Chapter 4 of this study, manipulation of the political system, 
state- sponsored or sanctioned abuse of human rights, and the increasing incidence of 
social inequity has resulted in internal political instability within the states in South 
Asia. These incidents have undermined the confidence amongst the people in 
traditional judicial institutions and orthodox structures in place for the remedying of 
human rights violations. The situation also raises fundamental questions about the 
“utility value” of the human rights structures within the countries that have a 
penchant for authoritarianism rooted in their history, and about the viability of a 
genuine human rights culture reflecting the international normative standards.  
 
The norms of human rights enshrined within the constitutional structures were 
regarded as the formal goals designed to realize the hopes and aspirations of the 
people who live within the state. However, given the complex economic, social and 
political matrix of the states in South Asia, these goals were not materialized and 
have been relegated to the side as some romantic idealism of the first generation of 
political leaders after independence from colonial rule. In essence, while the 
institutional frameworks to entrench liberal democratic political processes and reflect 
international human rights norms have been perfected, the implementation has 
consistently ignored de facto the recognition of the rights and freedoms of 
individuals. This has resulted in the escalation of ethnic, religious and political 
violence that threatens the very foundation of these states.287  
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In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this study, the neo-liberal obsession with 
economic development has also been deemed a sufficient justification to restrict 
certain fundamental rights and liberties.288 The states that followed a socialist 
political ideology often justified the limitation of civil and political rights with the 
assertion that economic and social rights must take precedence over others. As in the 
rest of the Third World, in South Asia too, the existing human rights norms are 
questioned in economic terms. Successive governments have argued that the 
emphasis should be on economic progress rather than on human rights, negating the 
identity of the individual against a common aspiration of economic prosperity.289 This 
position reflects the viewpoint that development is a collective process precipitated 
by state agencies and that human rights can be set aside for this common good. 
Workers’ rights and other related rights are conceived as less important than 
economic development and if these rights are infringed upon it is regarded as a 
consequence of the development process to which the state has attributed 
precedence.290  There is no promise that once a satisfactory development stage is 
realized there would be an automatic extension of rights. Leaving human rights aside 
until economic progress is achieved assumes a trade-off between basic needs and 
luxuries, but with human rights classified as luxuries.291  
 
The validity of the argument of a trade-off between human rights and the collective 
good appears to be entrenched in the political and legal jurisprudence of the states in 
the region. The following is the view of a Supreme Court judge of Sri Lanka:292 
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We must recognize both the fact that fundamental individual freedom needs to be 
modified in application having regard to the common good and the fact that the rights 
of the individual recognized and declared by the people as being fundamental are, 
therefore, important and cannot be arbitrarily interfered with by the state. Attempting 
to achieve a balance between the rights of the individual and the obligation of the 
state and the community is not an easy matter. However, in the last analysis 
individual rights must be weighed against the interests of the community as a whole.  
That is why every nation and groups of nations recognise the right to derogate from 
guarantees and assurances to individuals of fundamental rights where wider interests 
are at peril.  
 
This almost Bentham-like postulate relying on the principle of utilitarianism has 
created a hierarchy of state obligations in which human rights rate a low score. 
 
It is in this circumstance that a sense of scepticism arises regarding the contemporary 
norms of human rights and their implementation in South Asia. Despite the formal 
excellence of mechanisms in place to adhere to and maintain international human 
rights norms, the universal norms become have become an unrealistic aspiration 
because of intervening socioeconomic circumstances and because they are wilfully 
ignored for political expediency. In the context of ineffectual human rights regimes 
within South Asia the following paragraphs explore the legitimacy of the arguments 
of the alleged Western liberal political bias within the universal rights paradigm.  
 
 
1.8.1 The Western Liberal Political Tradition 
 
The following analysis highlights different aspects of the debate regarding the 
“legitimacy” of universal human rights regimes in the context of globalization and the 
dilemmas that this debate poses to the South Asian states. A fuller conceptual 
analysis of globalization and its impacts on human rights, on the state and on 
governance is contained in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The brief discussion 
below is intended to be a prelude to the detailed discussion in the ensuing chapters, 
which underline the need to explore alternative methods of protecting human rights in 
South Asia. 
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The contemporary culture of human rights has been seen to have its roots in the 
liberal political tradition that the West espouses. Therefore, for such a culture of 
human rights to be successful one must not only accept it but also adopt a Western 
liberal political tradition that facilitates and fosters a theory of human rights from a 
characteristically individualistic stand-point. The requirement of adopting the liberal 
political state is emphasized by Howard and Donnelly, when they contend that:293  
 
[i]t is often argued that internationally recognized human rights are common to all 
cultural traditions and adaptable to a great variety of social structures and political 
regimes. Such arguments confuse human rights with human dignity. All societies 
possess conceptions of human dignity but the conception of human dignity 
underlying international human rights standards requires a particular type of ‘liberal’ 
regime. This conclusion is reached through a comparison of social structures of ideal 
type of liberal, minimal, traditional, communist, corporatist and developmental 
regimes and their impact on autonomy, equality, privacy, social conflict and the 
definition of societal membership. 
 
The present writer agrees that any claims294 of equal compatibility between human 
rights and other political regimes are thus a result of confusing human rights with 
human dignity.295  
 
The classical tenets of liberalism, which propound individualism to act as a constraint 
on the excessive use of power by the state, are clearly visible in the international 
documents that constitute the international regime of human rights.296 The dignity and 
the autonomy of the individual, equal protection before the law, and equal 
opportunities for all form the cardinal values of political liberalism. The liberal state 
stems from the consent of the people that constitutes the state. This consent, 
expressed in terms of the social contract, is manifested through representative 
government and periodic elections. The international regime of human rights has 
recognized these liberal tenets and has legitimized them.297 However, many of the 
                                                 
293 RE Howard and Jack Donnelly “Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes” (1986) 80 
American Political Science Review 801. 
294 Lakshman Marasinghe “Traditional Human Rights Conceptions in Africa” in CE Welch Jr & RI 
Meltzer (eds) Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany State University, New York Press, 
1984); A Pollis “Liberal, Socialist and Third World Perspectives on Human Rights” in A Pollis and P 
Schwab (eds) Towards a Human Rights Framework (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982). 
295Pollis ibid. 
296 ICCPR see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (accessed 17 Oct 2006). 
297   Article 21 of the UDHR – “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
 72 
states in the developing world, particularly in South Asia, do not enjoy the luxury of 
de facto liberal democracy, which creates problems for the effective implementation 
of the liberal democratic construct of human rights.  
 
 
1.8.2 The Individualist Premise  
 
In South Asia, individuals conceptualize themselves in terms of the kinship system, 
the clan, the caste, the tribe, the village — regardless of the underlying diverse 
ethnoreligious and cultural manifestations of the society. Despite encounters with the 
West which reiterate the advantages of secularism, and in spite also of the anti-
hierarchical currents within the society, people still perceive themselves to be 
members of a society based on varna (caste), particularly the Hindus, who form 64 
per cent of the region’s population.298 The rights and duties of an individual in the 
traditional Hindu society are determined by their position within the hierarchical 
caste-based system and therefore one is never perceived as an autonomous individual 
with specific rights detached from one’s communal life. From such a stand-point, 
Chiriyankandath argues that “the duty of any Hindu [state] ruler is to recognize and 
maintain the caste system ... and consequently reject the primacy accorded to 
individual rights and to the idea of human equality.”299 
 
However, the juridical character of human rights in the liberal legal system is given 
effect through areas of law, such as constitutional law, administrative law and 
international law. As a part of the region’s colonial heritage, this individual bias in 
the international regime is reflected in all of the charters of rights in domestic 
constitutions whereby human rights are exclusively vested in individuals and not in 
social groups, communities, tribes, castes or other such entities. Socialist thinkers 
critiqued this overwhelming obsession with the notion of individualism in human 
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rights theory long before Third World countries raised their objections. This chapter 
has already considered (at text to footnote 61 above) Marx’s critique of the rights of 
man as being “nothing but … the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other 
men and from the community.”300  
 
Commenting on this individualist premise, Legesse asserts that a person’s individual 
worth, “his personal autonomy and property”, is not the conception of human rights 
for every person in this world.301 He continues, “If Africans were the sole authors of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they might have ranked the rights of the 
communities above those of individuals.” This individual-centred philosophical 
premise of the Western liberal human rights concept is also criticized by Yamani. He 
argues that “[Western society] is overzealous in its defence of individual freedom, 
rights and dignity so that it overlooks the acts of some individuals in exercizing such 
rights in a way that jeopardizes the community”.302 In contrast to the individualist 
approach of the West, the African or the Asian approach to society is essentially 
communitarian. The argument is brought out forcefully by James Hsiung when he 
asserts that, “pressing for one’s own interests without regard for the interests of others 
is seen as no more than the pursuit of individual self-interest not the pursuit of human 
rights defined as rights of fellow humans.”303 Legesse therefore argues that any 
system that claims to be universal must contain elements in it that are definitely of 
African, Asian, Latin American or Arabic derivation and that the regime must be 
representative of community or group rights as well as individual rights.304  
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1.8.3 The Role of the State  
 
Just as the dominant discourse of rights conceives of rights-holders primarily as 
individual citizens of a nation, so it conceives of the reciprocal duty-bearers as being 
those citizens’ respective nation states. A huge proportion of the Third World consists 
of colonial territories. Many have inherited territorial segments as independent states 
devoid of a politically constituted “nation”. Under a universal human rights regime, 
states are primarily responsible for the realization as well as the protection of human 
rights. But in situations where the very notion of the state is still uncertain, and at 
times in actual jeopardy due to competing issues of warfare for self-determination, it 
is difficult to presume that the state as an entity is capable of ensuring the rights of 
those it seeks to govern.305 This issue is particularly pertinent to the situation in 
Jammu Kashmir and to the Tamils in Sri Lanka where the identity of the “state” is 
vehemently contested.306 
 
A significant aspect of the idea of individual rights in the Western notion of rights is 
thus precisely the empowerment of the individual with the corresponding 
disempowerment, or subjection to obligations, of the state and its executive organs. 
The philosophical premise of human rights is that the individual must be bestowed 
with rights to be exercized against the state, for the very evolution of the dominant 
discourse on human rights was based on the protection of the individual against 
absolutism by the state. A literal interpretation of this position poses a dilemma to 
most developing countries that wish to subscribe to the universalist approach to 
human rights. As Baxi succinctly argues:307 
 
The notion of disempowerment makes sense. But should it go all the way? Obviously 
not. Activists ask that new laws may be made addressing the worst forms of 
violations of human rights in the Civil Society usually associated with the most 
regressive forms of social behavior associated with the revival of religion, culture 
and ethnicity. Should there not be strict laws and state action for example on sati, 
dowry murders, sex selective abortions through the abuse of amniocentesis 
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techniques, nutritional sex discrimination, which creates new forms of differed 
female infanticide, child abuse, familial violence against women, atrocities against 
dalits, exploitation of bonded, migrant and contract labour? The answer is yes. The 
difficulty with this answer is that it empowers the state. 
 
Baxi’s contention is a dilemma for India as well as other developing countries where 
there is an appeal for group or peoples’ rights to be recognized and safeguarded 
through the positive intervention of the state over individual rights. Such schemes of 
social engineering do not always rest comfortably with the idea of classical liberal 
rights.  
 
The imposition of the liberal democratic political structures by the political leaders 
who assumed power from the colonial rulers can also be viewed through this prism. 
For example, the agnostic Jawahalal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister and the chief 
architect of the Indian Constitution, was a progressive political leader who sought 
relentlessly to sever the ties with, as he saw it, absurd Hindu traditionalism and to 
modernize the popular psyche of India.308 He oversaw the introduction of the 
Independent Constitution of India that was fashioned on a liberal democratic model. 
This secular constitution imposes legal obligations to secure the rights enshrined in 
the UDHR and could be regarded as a huge state-sponsored project towards 
developing a secular state.  
 
Traditionally, under the universal regime states are primarily responsible for the 
realization of human rights as well as their protection. International human rights 
instruments also constitute among other things inter-state obligations in protecting 
human rights. The methods of protection available to state parties such as monitoring, 
reporting and holding state-parties accountable for non-compliance, take into account 
and operate within the concept of state sovereignty. However, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that the international control and compliance mechanisms based 
on the state system and the very idea of a sovereign state are fast being rendered 
impotent with the supervention of contemporary globalization. As Chapters 2 and 3 
indicate, the view that the international system is dominated by sovereign states is 
                                                 
308 WJ Morris-Jones “From Beyond the Ganges: A letter from Jawahalal Nehru” in DL Sheth and 
Ashis Nandy (eds) Multiverse of Democracy (Sage Publications, New Delhi,1996) 200. 
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also fast becoming obsolete. The Westphalian system of absolute state sovereignty, 
which has been the cornerstone of international relations since the Thirty Years’ War, 
is now diminishing, and a complex novel system of international institutions and 
transnational corporations is dominating the international scene, beyond the power 
and the will of national governments to control.  
 
As Chapters 2 and 3 also illustrate, globalization assaults the traditional concepts of 
nation state and sovereignty. These concepts have undergone a metamorphosis 
resulting in the erosion of the authority of the state. Diluted state structures and the 
narrowed range of sovereignty have resulted in individual states being impotent to 
control the flow of ideas (good, bad or ugly), money, drugs, and crime across their 
borders. The reduction of state sovereignty has also resulted in an inability to hold 
together its people who belong to diverse sociocultural heritages. Thus state 
sovereignty is diminished from both outside and within: by agglomerative and 
homogenizing globalization on the one hand, and by bitterly fragmentative struggles 
for independent identity by those sociocultural subsets of the state, sometimes to the 
point of civil war.  
 
If state structures are permeable and facing the danger of fragmentation, and if state 
sovereignty is dwindling, how credible is it to presume that a regime of human rights 
founded on nation states will be successful in protecting those very rights? If the state 
has experienced a transmutation crippling it from executing the responsibilities of the 
contemporary international human rights regime, which is founded on the basis of 
nation states, an alternative regional normative framework on a consensual basis may 
be more realistic to promote and protect human rights. It would also complement and 
enhance the universal regime and make it more compatible with contemporary global 
trends. 
 
The impediments and the obstacles to implementing the universal normative human 
rights regime in Asia have been articulated on the basis of cultural relativism by 
several East Asian states. The following section explores the idea of cultural 
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relativism and inquires into the legitimacy of the relativist approach to human rights 
implementation. 
 
 
1.9 The Legitimacy of the Debate on Cultural Relativism   
 
The claim of the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that it has 
universal validity and does not underpin any particular cultural tradition has been 
challenged by many on the basis of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is defined 
as an “assertion that human values, far from being universal, vary a great deal 
according to different cultural perspectives. Some would apply this relativism to … 
human rights. In other words, according to this view, human rights are culturally 
relative rather than universal.”309 Those who subscribe to this viewpoint premise their 
articulations on the idea that normative values derive authority from context and that 
a particular society does not have the moral authority or the legitimacy to judge the 
political and social practices of another society.  
 
Huntingdon, observing the contemporary debates surrounding cultural relativism, 
comments: “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human 
rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of 
church and state often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, 
Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce 
instead a reaction against ‘human rights imperialism’ and a reaffirmation of 
indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism …”.310 
The critics of the universal validity claim, particularly in East Asia and Western Asia, 
view the contemporary regime of human rights as a hegemonic thrust of the Western 
powers. Secondly they argue that different societies have different moral standards 
and therefore the moral claims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have no 
legitimacy outside the Western cultural context. Thirdly the critics claim that the 
                                                 
309 Diana Ayton-Shenker, “The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Relativism” 
<www.un.org/right/dpil1627e.htm>  (accessed 17 Feb 2008). 
310 Samuel P Huntington  ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ (1993) Foreign Affairs 72  
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1993/3.html (accessed 10 Dec 2005). 
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sociopolitical and economic reality of their societies demand a different approach to 
human rights, which they claim the mainstream paradigm does not take into 
account.311  
 
The most recent reiteration of the universal validity of human rights is the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, where the states reaffirmed that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “constitutes a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations” and that the, “universal nature of these 
rights and freedoms is beyond question.”312  
 
While asserting the quintessential universal legitimacy of human rights, the 
participant states acknowledged quite contradictorily that human rights must also be 
regarded in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-
creating, taking into consideration the regional and national particularities and the 
varied historical, cultural and political backgrounds. Therefore, the Vienna 
Declaration on Human Rights provides:313  
 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter related … 
while the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
However, the same Conference became a forum where the validity of the assertion of 
the universal quality of human rights was queried as the statement of the Foreign 
Minister of Singapore indicated. His contention was that the “universal recognition of 
the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the 
reality of diversity.”314  
                                                 
311 This aspect of asserting a “social and economic relativism” was discussed in subsection 1.8 of this 
chapter. 
312 Vienna Declaration And Programme Of Action, World Conference On Human Rights, Vienna, 14–
25 June 1993 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument > 
(accessed 10 Dec 2005). 
313 Ibid Sec.1, para 5. 
314 Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng of Singapore “Real World of Human Rights” at the World 
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 16 June 1993 in James H.Tang (ed) Human Rights and 
International Relations in the Asia Pacific Region (Pinter, London and New York, 1995) 242. 
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The Chinese Delegation to the Vienna Conference also reiterated the notion of 
cultural relativism, stating:315   
 
The concept of human rights is a product of historical development. It is closely 
associated with specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific 
history, culture and values of a particular country. Different historical development 
stages have different human right requirements. Countries at different development 
stages have different human right requirements.  Countries at different development 
stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have 
different understanding and practices of human rights.  Thus one should not and 
cannot think of the human rights standards and models of certain countries as the 
only proper ones and demand that all countries comply with them. 
 
The above statement follows the trend of arguments that allege that the contemporary 
regime of international human rights representing the mainstream paradigm of human 
rights lacks universal legitimacy because of the particular cultural, political and 
religious foundations it represents.316 The proponents of the relativist position 
claimed that the UDHR and the two Covenants that reflect the existing regime of 
international human rights are alien, disruptive and insensitive to non-“Western” 
cultures and political structures, particularly to East Asian cultures which do not 
conform to the Western model. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia was 
an ardent proponent of this stand-point. He claims that so-called universal values 
enshrined in the mainstream paradigm of human rights are in fact of Western origin 
and therefore not compatible with the East Asian sociopolitical ethos.317  
 
This particular perspective of Asian Values was further elaborated by the proponents 
of the Singapore School318 of thought headed by Lee Kwan Yew, Senior Minister of 
Singapore. Explaining their position, Singapore’s representative to the United 
                                                 
315 Speech of Liu Huaqiu Head of the Chinese delegation to the Vienna Conference on Human Rights.   
Vienna 15 June 1993 in James TH Hang Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific 
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318 The original members of that “School” were Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Affairs 
Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan, Ambassador to the United States, Chan Heng Chee, and 
Professor Tommy Koh of the Institute of Policy Studies in Singapore. 
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Nations, Kishore Mahbubani, elaborated that, “it is necessary for a developing society 
to first succeed in economic development before it can attain the social and political 
freedoms found in developed societies.”319 The essence of the argument of the 
Singapore School is that it is necessary to create a hierarchy of human rights where 
economics take precedence over civil and political rights, for there is a need for 
economic development for the effective realization of the economic and social rights 
of the Asian community.320 The representative of the Chinese government at the 
World Conference further explained the rationale for this stand-point on Human 
Rights. The Chinese representative, Liu Huaqiu, stated, “when poverty and lack of 
adequate food and clothing are commonplace and people's basic needs are not 
guaranteed, priority should be given to economic development.”321 The South East 
Asian leaders also claimed that the emerging nation states in the region that were 
accommodating sociocultural pluralism needed specific political and legal 
arrangements that were not acceptable to Western liberal democracies. The very 
stringent laws curbing political rights such as freedom of speech and political 
association in Singapore and Malaysia were justified on this basis.  
 
Those seeking cultural specificity in human rights, particularly from Western Asia, 
also attempted to reiterate exclusion of Asian cultural leanings and beliefs from the 
mainstream discourse. It is along these lines that the Iranian Foreign Minister 
explained,322  
 
… [t]o enhance the universality of human rights and relevant instruments it is 
imperative to be cognizant of the cultural diversity of the human family and respect 
the values of various cultures.  This would not only contribute to the richness of 
human rights norms, but also provide the best guarantee for their universal 
                                                 
319 Kishore Mahbubani “An Asian Perspective on Human Rights and Freedom of the Press” in Kishore 
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observance.  The political predominance of one group of countries in international 
relations, which is temporary by nature and history, cannot provide a licence for the 
imposition of a set of guidelines and norms for the behaviour of the entire 
international community, especially since these States do not present an ideal, 
feasible or practical model in theory or practice …  
 
The international regime of human rights is a construct of the post-World War II 
international framework. However, as this study indicated above, the notions of 
human dignity that the regime enshrines are common to all civilizational histories 
from time immemorial. It is this aspect of human dignity that the international regime 
of human rights seeks to protect on the basis of universal validity. The respect for 
human dignity is also affirmed by the peremptory norms of international law or jus 
cogens which all states regard as universally binding. The non-derogable principles of 
international law include the right to life, freedom from slavery, torture, prohibition 
of genocide and racial discrimination323 rights that are replicated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights creating a normative framework of human rights by 
which all states must abide. Relativism rejects this position, claiming instead that 
particular cultures can be exempted from this normative framework and external 
critique on the basis “each state should espouse its own conception of what human 
rights entail as a social institution based upon its cultural preferences and political 
ideology.”324  
 
Not all believe in the cultural and political distinctiveness of Asia that fails to 
accommodate the human rights standards set by the international human rights 
documents.325 Yash Ghai refutes the various premises upon which the Asian 
governments refuse to acknowledge the standards imposed by the international 
human rights treaties.326 He rejects the Asian political leaders’ assertion that there is a 
distinct Asian approach to human rights and that it is based on perspectives that 
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emerge from Asian culture, religion or Asian realities. Thakur, who supports Ghai’s 
position, claims that, “…[r]elativism is often the first refuge of repressive 
governments. The false dichotomy between development and human rights is usually 
a smoke screen for corruption and cronyism.”327 In these circumstances cultural 
relativism is an instrument of political or economic manipulation not an aspiration of 
higher values or a quest to protect human rights.  
 
Ghai sees no foundation to the contention that the individual bias in the international 
regime of human rights, the problems of fragmented nationalism and fragile 
statehood, and economic underdevelopment render the political and civil rights 
irrelevant to Asia. He claims that it is indeed almost impossible to discern one 
particular Asian perspective since neither Asian cultural professions nor cultural 
realities are homogenous throughout the continent. As the religions and political 
ideologies differ in the region, so too do the economic conditions; therefore he 
asserts:328  
 
perceptions of human rights are reflective of social and class positions in society. 
What conveys an apparent picture of a uniform Asian perspective on human rights is 
that it is the perspective of a particular group, that of the ruling elites, which gets 
international attention ... the political systems they represent are not open or 
democratic, and their publicly expressed views on human rights are an emanation of 
these systems, of the need to justify the authoritarianism and occasional repression. 
 
Jack Donnelly endorses Ghai’s view that cultural relativism is often used as a tool for 
political gain. “Arguments of cultural relativism are far too often made by economic 
and political elites that have long since left traditional culture behind …. Leaders sing 
the praises of traditional communities — while they wield arbitrary power antithetical 
to traditional values, pursue development policies that systematically undermine 
traditional communities, and replace traditional leaders with corrupt cronies and party 
hacks. Such cynical manipulation of tradition occurs everywhere.”329 Therefore, 
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according to Donnelly, the claims of cultural relativism often themselves mask 
schemes of insidious governance that imperil the rights of its citizens.330 The 
legitimacy of the narrow debate on “Asian values” per se remains questionable. 
Political leaders such as Mahatir Mohamed and Lee Kwan Yew, who began to 
command considerable power due to the success of the Asian Tiger economies in the 
1980s and 1990s, were the chief proponents of this view. The credibility of their 
arguments dwindled rapidly with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the 
enormous socioeconomic burdens that ensued.  
 
Despite the lack of legitimacy of the Asian Values discourse as expounded by the 
East Asian states, their discontent and skepticism highlights the fact that although 
there is universal validity for the value of human dignity, the means of expressing 
that value in rights terms and the structures and mechanisms that protect the rights do 
not have unquestioned universal validity.  
 
Many states outside the Western world have included chapters of fundamental rights 
in their constitutions. Each of these states has diverse socio-cultural and political 
landscapes and they will not take on homogeneous means to resolve issues in relation 
to human rights. Many of these states utilized the language of rights as a weapon 
against colonialism and will rely upon it heavily to assert rights to development and a 
more equitable global financial order. The Asian debate on relativism highlights the 
inadequacy of the mainstream paradigm to accommodate concerns relating to social 
justice and an equitable global financial order, which compels the developing world 
to devise new strategies to maintain and expand human rights protection nationally.  
 
The rationale for the notion of universal rights to prevail, and the need to work on the 
existing structures to improve and enhance them, are pointed out by Higgins: 331   
 
It is sometimes suggested that there can be no fully universal concept of human 
rights, if it is necessary to take into account the diverse cultures and political systems 
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of the world.  In my view this is a point advanced mostly by States, and by liberal 
scholars anxious not to impose the western view of things on others. It is rarely 
advanced by the oppressed, who are only too anxious to benefit from perceived 
universal standards.  The non universal, relativist view of human rights is in fact a 
very state centred view and loses sight of the fact that human rights are human rights 
and not dependent on states, or groupings of states… I believe, profoundly, in the 
universality of human spirit.  Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: 
to have sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practice their own 
religion … to know that they would not be tortured, or detained without charge… . I 
believe that there is nothing in these aspirations that is dependent upon culture, or 
religion or stage of development.  They are as keenly felt by the African tribesman as 
by the European city dweller, by the inhabitant of the Latin American shanty-town as 
by the resident of a Manhattan apartment.  
 
The present study agrees with Higgins and asserts that the quest for qualifications on 
the application of the existing universal human rights standards on the basis of 
cultural relativism is, in the great majority of cases, unsubstantiated. The universal 
human rights culture that evolved through the Declaration and the two covenants not 
only is, but deserves to be, an integral part of the global sociocultural and economic 
mores. The greatest relevance of relativism to the present study, where such 
relativism is advanced in good faith and not used as a stalking horse, is to keep the 
language of rights living, breathing and adaptable, dynamic and dialectical, receptive 
and responsive to the genuine best of all cultures’ contributions. At the same time, 
paradoxically, it also teaches us to remain realistic and to some extent pragmatic: it 
teaches us to use normative standards creatively to realize social justice, taking into 
account the genuine economic, social and political needs and limitations that 
presently exist in South Asia. This study endeavours to do exactly that. 
 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter first traced the trajectory of the concept of human rights from a 
“Western” perspective. Though ideas of natural law and natural rights, quintessential 
articulations of Western liberal political thought, significantly influenced the 
contemporary discourse on human rights, the idea of human rights nevertheless did 
not derive from a single cultural tradition. Notions of human dignity, tolerance, 
communal obligations, governmental responsibility and social justice were articulated 
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through the religious and philosophical history of South Asia before the advent of the 
colonial powers in the region. As the analysis indicated, the late 19th and early 20th 
century struggles of national liberation and social transformation in the subcontinent 
drew inspiration from the philosophical and political traditions of the West as well as 
from South Asia.  
 
The discussion also traced the incorporation of human rights charters into the national 
constitutions of the South Asian states and the efficacy of those charters. The study 
identified specific issues relating to the state and individual that create difficulties for 
the effective implementation of human rights. Globalization and dysfunctional 
democracy are specific issues that hinder the efficacy of the human rights charters, as 
will be discussed further in ensuing chapters.  
 
This chapter identified the debate on cultural relativism, as advanced for instance by 
certain voices from South East Asia, as a means of demonstrating that the dominant 
paradigm of human rights is certainly not without its critics. Perhaps the most 
defensible argument made in the name of relativism is that the mainstream rights 
discourse must of necessity take into account the concerns of the periphery if it is to 
be sustained. The need to accommodate issues such as group rights and the right to 
development, for instance, quite legitimately opens doors for a broad-based approach 
to the existing normative structure of human rights.   
 
The relativist argument has value to the extent that it demonstrates the need for 
flexibility within the dominant discourse to accommodate the concerns of, in 
particular, the developing world, and at the same time the need for the developed 
world to examine both whether it is sincerely pursuing the concepts of rights it claims 
to put forward, and whether there is ever mere self-interest in those very choices of 
concept. Such flexibility will ensure the legitimacy of the universal paradigm of 
human rights within the developing world. The refusal to grant legitimacy to the 
voices from the Third World within the dominant ideology would imply that it is 
designed to serve the interests of a neo-liberal world order which contemporary 
economic globalization promotes as discussed in Chapter 2 below.  
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Kothari and Seth observe the universal paradigm remains as yet not a statement of 
reality, but “an ever expanding set of objectives waiting to be actualized. And their 
realization is possible only through a process of constant struggle.”332 The authors go 
on to say that such a struggle will lead to the evolution of a social praxis which will 
help realize the needs of the most oppressed communities by the rights guaranteed 
through the universal human rights regime. The present study endorses that viewpoint 
and acknowledges the need to use the established normative structures of the UN 
system and make the existing human rights network more meaningful to the people of 
South Asia.   
 
Each culture or social system could claim a moral superiority as expressed by the 
states that endorse cultural relativism in human rights. This study asserts that the 
universal regime of human rights envisaged by the Declaration of 1948 advocates 
cultural egalitarianism and that this regime is no longer regarded by the community 
of states as a mere invitation to strive towards a common standard of achievement, 
but as a norm that each state must give priority to in the name of humanity. Unless 
human rights are regarded as a normative concept that overrides the cultural and 
ideological differences, the oppression that is created by their denial will continue.  
 
The idea and the scope of human rights is subject to continuous metamorphosis as a 
result of diverse influences particularly globalization. To maintain its legitimacy and 
effectiveness new frameworks of thinking particularly in relation to human rights, 
poverty and development are emerging. The emerging paradigm of human rights is 
focusing on enhancing human capability, human-centred development and 
democratic governance, aspects that will be elaborated in later chapters of this study. 
South Asia’s endeavour must be to take into consideration the anomalies in relation 
to human rights implementation in the region and create a system that will 
complement and enrich the universal regime.  
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Andrey Sakharov once wrote from his internal exile in the Soviet Union:333 
The ideology of human rights is probably the only one which can be combined with 
such diverse ideologies as communism, social democracy, religion, technocracy and 
those ideologies which may be described as national and indigenous. It can also serve 
as a foothold for those . . . who have tired of the abundance of ideologies, none of 
which have brought . . . simple human happiness. The defense of human rights is a 
clear path toward the unification of people in our turbulent world, and a path toward 
the relief of suffering.  
 
It is important to reiterate that there do exist different paths towards the relief of 
suffering and that South Asia does need to rely on the inspiration which the universal 
normative regime of human rights, and the sincere and serious relativists, provide in 
order to be creative in evolving new and living mechanisms to realize human rights. 
Other states have created effective systems of realizing and enhancing human rights 
through mechanisms founded on geographical proximity, as Chapter 5 of this study 
illustrates, and Chapter 6 will bring that same approach to bear on South Asia. 
 
Moreover, as Maritain observed, “No declaration of human rights will ever be 
exhaustive and final. It will ever go hand in hand with the state of moral 
consciousness and civilization at a given moment in history.  And it is for that reason 
that even after the major victory achieved at the end of the eighteenth century by the 
first written statement of those rights, it remained thereafter a principal interest of 
humanity that such declarations should be renewed from century to century.”334  
 
The next chapter will discuss the origins and history of the phenomenon of (largely 
economic) globalization and its relevance to South Asia. It will trace the evolution of 
the concept of globalization through colonial history, identify its salient 
characteristics in the colonial setting, and draw parallels with the phenomenon’s 
contemporary manifestations. The chapter will discuss the impact of contemporary 
globalization on the notion of nation state and governance in South Asia.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SOUTH ASIA’S TRYSTS WITH GLOBALIZATION: HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY  
 
“Economic globalization has become a war against nature and the poor. But the rules of 
globalization are not god-given. They can be changed…..Since Seattle, a frequently used  
phrase has been the need for a rule-based system. Globalization is the rule of  
commerce and it has elevated Wall Street to be the only source of value, and as a result  
things that should have high worth — nature, culture, the future — are being devalued  
and destroyed. The rules of globalization are undermining the rules of justice and  
sustainability, of compassion and sharing.”1 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter traced the evolution of the idea of human rights in Western 
and South Asian history. The study indicated that in a broad sense the values 
which human rights are seeking to protect were present in both civilizational 
histories though they were articulated in different idioms. Human rights in a 
recognizably modern legal formulation were traced back to various national 
jurisdictions in the West beginning in the late 18th century. Their progressive 
articulation was tracked from there into the new universalist moral, political, and 
finally legal norms of international law after World War Two. In South Asia, 
legislated human rights norms followed the wave of independence from the 
British. The rights discourse was introduced into the political and social ethos of 
South Asia by the (often European-educated) political elite, as a means of fighting 
against colonialism. The idea of rights was also utilized to fight the repressive and 
iniquitous traits of the subcontinent’s own sociopolitical culture. 
 
Chapter 1 also traced the evolution of the rights mechanism within the 
constitutional structures of South Asia and the efficacy of the international human 
rights regime in South Asia. The discussion identified the greatest challenges to 
the contemporary safeguards of human rights as those which emanate from the 
sociopolitical ramifications of globalization.  
 
                                                 
1 Vandana Shiva “Globalization and Poverty” (2000) 202 Resurgence 
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The often glorified, overused, abused and rightly contested phenomenon of 
globalization which impacts every aspect of contemporary society is the central 
focus of this chapter. However, this study is restricted to the specific research 
question relating to the quest, specifically in South Asia, for a trajectory of 
specifically human-centred development which above all honours human rights. 
Therefore the study concentrates on the implications for that quest which flow 
from globalization and its current ideological counterpart, neo-liberalism.2 With 
this end in mind, Chapter 2 traces the progression of historical globalization and 
discusses the contemporary (post-World War II) theorization of the concept. The 
historical account of globalization will culminate in analysis of how international 
trade and colonial rule have affected the societal and economic arrangements of 
the South Asian subcontinent.  
 
The study acknowledges that contemporary globalization has influenced the 
region’s interdependent global, regional and local financial and trade relations and 
political structures. Perusal of the corollaries that emanate from the globalization 
process indicates that globalization unleashes forces that have immense potential 
to create environments for human growth and advancement if those forces are 
managed wisely. A paradox already becomes apparent between the hugely 
constructive (and literally reconstructive) global human rights regime set up after 
World War II as described in Chapter 1, and what have turned out to be 
increasingly destructive forces of more economically based and often self-
interested globalization as will be described in the present chapter. In a theme that 
is to be developed and returned to, the latter is at odds with and undermines the 
former. The chapter will also focus on the impact of contemporary globalization 
on the structures of the nation state in South Asia. As the ensuing examination 
indicates, the potential benefits of integration into the world economy through 
trade liberalization and deregulation are compromised by globalization’s neo-
liberal thrust and the   mismanagement of globalization by the South Asian states. 
 
The chasm between the included and the excluded created during the decades of 
exposure to globalization in the subcontinent has resulted in two worlds — one of 
inclusion into the globalized world economy dominated by burgeoning trade 
                                                 
2 For sociological implications of globalization see Malcolm Waters Modern Sociological Theory 
(Sage Publishers, London, 1994) and for impact of globalization on culture see Michael 
Featherstone (ed) Global Culture (Sage Publishers, London, 1990). 
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deals, transnational corporations, digital technology and improved standards of 
living; and the other a world of total exclusion dominated by poverty, deprivation 
and social outsiderness.3 In this context the chapter will analyse the relevance of 
the burgeoning anti-globalization movement and its capacity to help evolve a 
praxis which would infuse a sense of equity and justice into the concept of 
globalization.  
 
 
2.2 Tracing the Evolution of Contemporary Globalization through Some 
of its Historical Antecedents  
 
Despite the intense focus on the concept of globalization over the past two 
decades, many analysts observe that it is a fallacy to claim that globalization is a 
peculiarly modern phenomenon of the last fifty years.4 Instead, they agree to 
varying extents that the phenomenon has had a longer history, spanning many 
centuries.5 Hopkins usefully argues that globalization can be seen as a continuing 
concept which historically has taken different forms that he calls, in order, 
“archaic, proto, modern and post colonial”.6 It is to be noted that the present thesis 
uses the term “contemporary globalization” to mean what Hopkins calls its “post-
colonial” version.  
 
As early as 300 BC people in the Asian continent had created links with disparate 
locations forming an extensive system of communication, migration, and trade.7 
This formation of interaction and interconnectedness between the global, the 
                                                 
3 Joseph E Stiglitz Globalization and Its Discontents (W.W. Norton, New York, 2002) (Stiglitz); 
Human Development in South Asia 2001: Globalisation and Human Development: The Mahbub ul 
Haq Human Development Centre (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
4 Waters claims that the words globalisation, globalized and globalizing did not emerge into 
common usage until 1960. Malcolm Waters Globalisation (Routledge, London, 2000) 2. See also 
Roland Robertson Globalization Social Theory and Global Culture (Sage, London, 1994).   
5 Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K Gills (eds) The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five 
Thousand? (Routledge, London, New York, 1996). 
6 AG Hopkins (ed) Globalization in World History (Pimlico, London, 2002) 3 (Hopkins).  
7 See generally Chandra Mauli Mani A Journey through India's Past: From Earliest Times to the 
Last Hindu Emperor (Northern Book Centre, India, 2005); Marie-Françoise and Jean-François 
Salles Athens, Aden, Arikamedu: Essays on the Interrelations between India, Arabia and the 
Eastern Mediterranean  (Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 2005); and Joginder K 
Chawla India's Overland Trade with Central Asia and Persia During the Thirteenth and the 
Fourteenth Centuries (Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 2006). 
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regional, and the local has been a crucial driving force in world history. As Sen 
comments, globalization: 8   
 
… is, in fact, neither new nor necessarily Western; and it is not a curse. Over 
thousands of years, globalisation has contributed to the progress of the world 
through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural influences, and dissemination 
of knowledge and understanding (including that of science and technology). 
These global interrelations have often been very productive in the advancement 
of different countries. They have not necessarily taken the form of increased 
Western influence. Indeed, the active agents of globalisation have often been 
located far from the West.  
 
In 325 BC, Alexander the Great sued for peace with Chandragupta, the Mauryan 
Emperor, at Gerosia. This encounter marked the eastward link among overland 
routes between the Mediterranean, Persia, India, and Central Asia.9 This is the 
first documented encounter whereby religion, trade, economy, and even imperial 
armies of the West and East began the long journey of global dissemination. The 
eastward expansion of this interconnectedness and associated diffusion of 
information and culture is marked with the reach of Buddhism as far as China in 
the 1st century AD with the conversion of the Han dynasty.10 Although it had long 
existed, the Silk Road became significant from the 1st century when it was 
militarily protected under the Hans and as such opened up a region hitherto 
unfamiliar to Central Asia. Cultural links and trade flourished between the two 
civilizations, which previously had developed independently. The influences of 
that cultural exchange are still visible in Asia and China today. Much later, 
throughout the Song Dynasty in China (960–1279 AD), the exchange of trade, 
technologies, culture and religion continued between India, East Asia and China.11 
This exchange in turn created an impetus for the medieval world economy to 
flourish as India had by then linked Europe and China by land and sea across 
Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.12  
 
                                                 
8 Amartya Sen “How to Judge Globalism” (2002) 13 American Prospect 1–14. 
<http://people.cis.ksu.edu/~ab/Miscellany/globalism.html> (accessed 18 Nov 2007). 
9 Burton Stein History of India (Blackwell Publishers, UK, © 1999). 
10 Richard C Foltz Religions of the Silk Road: Overland Trade and Cultural Exchange from 
Antiquity to the Fifteenth Century (St Martins Press, New York, 1999). 
11 Fa-Hsien A Record of the Buddhist Kingdoms  (James Legge tr, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1886) 
reprinted in Mark A Kishlansky (ed) Sources of World History vol 1 (Harper Collins College 
Publishers, New York, 1995) 154–158.  
12 F Hirth China and the Roman Orient: Researches into their Ancient and Mediaeval Relations as 
Represented in Old Chinese Records (Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1885) (scanned and edited by 
Jerome S Arkenberg, Department of History, California State University, Fullerton) 35–96. 
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/eastasia/romchin1.html> (accessed 5 Nov 2005) (Hirth). 
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The expansion of Islam through the western Mediterranean, Central Asia, India 
and eastwards during 650–850 AD marks another milestone in the history of 
globalization.13 Islam brought cultural rituals and ways of life alien to the peoples 
of Asia. The migration of people from the western Mediterranean region to parts 
of Asia particularly for trade was also a significant development of that era. Later, 
the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1300 AD, spanning Europe, North 
Africa, and the Middle East, facilitated this process. The Ottomans established 
political and commercial ties overland with Safavids and dynasties in Central Asia 
and India, creating a vast imperial network of integration that led to an immense 
expansion of trade with Europe.14 
 
By 1450 AD, the trade networks involving movements of people, animals, 
precious minerals, goods and money extended from England to China. Most 
significant among them were the land route across Central Asia, and the sea route 
along the Red Sea across the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca to the 
Chinese coast.15 As early as 1500 AD the Mongols in Central Asia had 
established an efficient political framework for the overland trade network via the 
Silk Road, as recounted by both Ibn Battuta16 and Marco Polo.17 During the same 
period the spread of Islamic trading communities along the numerous ports of the 
Indian Ocean created a world of sea trade in the region parallel to the land 
routes.18 This early exchange of ideas, knowledge and merchandise in the era 
before industrialization and the birth of the nation state is identified by Hopkins as 
archaic globalization,19 which was powered “by great kings and warriors 
searching for wealth and honour in fabulous lands, by religious wanderers and 
                                                 
13 Andre Wink Al-Hind The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, Early Medieval India and the 
Expansion of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries vol 1 & II (Brill, the Netherlands, 2004). 
14 CA Bayly The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 2004). 
15 Ronald Findlay Globalization and the European Economy: Medieval Origins to the Industrial 
Revolution (Discussion Paper #:0102-28, Department of Economics, Columbia University, New 
York, 27 March 2002) <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/discpapr/DP0102-28.pdf> 
(accessed 23 Jun 2006); Ronald Findlay and Kevin H O’Rourke Commodity Market Integration, 
1500–2000 (Discussion Paper #:0102-30, Department of Economics, Columbia University, New 
York, 27 March 2002) <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/discpapr/DP0102-30.pdf 
>(accessed at 23 Jun 2006). 
16 Ross E Dunn The adventures of Ibn Battuta, a Muslim traveller of the fourteenth century 
(Croom Helm, London, 1986). 
17 John Larner Marco Polo and The Discovery of The World (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
Connecticut, 1999). 
18 K Chaudhuri Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of 
Islam to 1750 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985); Hirth, above n 12. 
19 Hopkins, above n 6, 4. 
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pilgrims seeking God in distant realms, and by merchant princes and venturers 
pursuing profit amidst risk across borders and continents.”20 
 
The internationalization of trade and the resultant political developments from 
circa 1600 to 1800 constituted a new phase which Hopkins calls proto-
globalization and which “in structure, scale and geographical reach, […] was a 
departure from its archaic precursor.”21 This trading process, which placed 
reliance on the trading posts in the Mediterranean and Western Asia, created an 
intermediary between Europe and the Far East for trade, a kind of middleman 
raising the cost of trade in the Far East for Europeans. This in turn prompted the 
Europeans, especially the Spanish and the Portuguese, to seek an entirely 
seaborne route, whether westward or eastward, to the Indies and beyond. The 
result was of course the journeys of Columbus and da Gama, who travelled 
westwards and eastwards to the “Indies” in 1492 and 1498 respectively, laying the 
foundation for the European seaborne empires.22 Trading between Asia, the 
Americas and Europe intensified and the Europeans not only bought commodities 
that were available for sale but commenced to commission specific types of goods 
more suitable to the European markets, perhaps creating the very first export 
processing zones in the regions. As trade expanded, banking systems and major 
trading companies became established in the region that were controlled by, or 
had direct links with, Europe.23    
 
By 1700, several European trading companies travelled regularly to Asia on ships 
insured and protected by European companies and governments with goods 
produced for sale in the Asian markets, and generated substantial profits for 
investors in both the ships and their cargo. A century later, the Atlantic and Indian 
Ocean system were connected to one another via the flow of currencies and 
commodities and by the operations of the British, French, and Dutch overseas 
trading companies. The 17th and 18th centuries were classified as the age of 
mercantilism, in which state power in Europe depended directly on the sponsoring 
                                                 
20 Hopkins, above n 6, 4 
21 Hopkins, above n 6, 6. 
22 Oliver J Thatcher (ed) The Library of Original Sources: 9th to 16th Centuries (University 
Research Extension Co., Milwaukee, 1907) vol. V, 26–40 (scanned by JS Arkenberg, Dept of 
History, California State University, Fullerton) 
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1497degama.html> (accessed 23 Jun 2006). 
23 Charles Tilly “The Europe of Columbus and Bayazid” (1992) 178 Middle East Report 2–5. 
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and control of merchant capital.24 As the European imperial expansion shifted into 
Asia, the use of military power by European nation states for the protection of 
their international interests became a standard feature of trade.25 
 
By the beginning of the 18th century the British East India Company monopolized 
all commodities imported into Britain from the what was called the East Indies — 
all land east of Lebanon.26 The company epitomizes a very early version of a 
multi-national corporation. It had consolidated its position with the assistance of 
the British government and in fact, until reined in by legislation in the early 19th 
century, came to rival the British state as a power in itself. It did so much as 
modern multinationals have often done to their parent states, only in their case, as 
shall be shown, it has generally been without such a curtailment.27 
  
The fundamental shift in terms of policy from trading to colonization had become 
established in the region east of Lebanon, including South Asia, under the British 
during this period. The British Empire, which expanded into Asia and then to 
Africa along with the French and Dutch, first evolved as a means of economic 
imperialism rather than territorial domination. This stage of the evolutionary 
process of globalization is termed “modern globalisation” by Hopkins and it is 
dominated by the “rise of the nation state and industrialisation”.28  
 
The political developments taking place in Europe in the 18th century further 
fuelled the expansion of the notion of establishing empires by the European 
nations. In particular, the French Revolution of 1789 eventually paved the way for 
the establishment of strong modern states throughout Europe where military and 
business concerns were now managed by governments elected through democratic 
representation (though democracy still fell far short of today’s connotation of a 
universal franchise). The strong nationalist governments, elected or not, were 
eager to acquire and consolidate assets for economic growth. This in turn led to 
                                                 
24 David Ormrod The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of 
Mercantilism, 1650–1770 (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003).  
25 Ashin Das Gupta and MN Pearson India and the Indian Ocean 1500–1800 (Oxford University 
Press, Delhi, 1987). 
26 Nick Robins “Loot: In search of the East India Company, the world’s first transnational 
corporation” (2002) 14 Environment and Urbanization 79 
<http://eau.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/14/1/79>(accessed 17 Feb 2006). 
27 George P Landow The British East India Company — The Company that Owned a Nation (or 
Two) <http://www.victorianweb.org/history/empire/eic.html> (accessed 4 Feb 2008). 
28 Hopkins, above n 6, 6. 
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more militarized British, Dutch, and French imperial growth in Asia and Africa. 
In the last decades of the 19th century, the colonial expansion of Asia and Africa 
was closely associated with the notion of the so-called white man's burden, which 
perceived colonialism as a noble enterprise.29 This era of modern globalisation 
was signified by the colonial territories of Africa and Asia producing raw 
materials for Europe’s centres of industry, trade, and finance. This era has 
remarkable similarities with what the present thesis calls contemporary 
globalization, which is termed “post colonial globalisation” by Hopkins and dates 
from the 1950s.30 This brings in two vital new players: in the east, Japan, and in 
the west, the USA — the exception of a former colony that had broken off from 
the British Empire while the latter polity continued to grow elsewhere. 
 
Contemporary or post-colonial globalization refers to the more major 
decolonialization of two hundred years after the American Revolution and is 
dominated by “new types of supra–territorial organization and new forms of 
regional integration”.31 It has both continued to build on the foundations of the 
nation state as the basic formal unit of political organization (though in reality the 
discreteness, integrity and sovereign power of such a unit in many ways have 
already been seen in Chapter 1 to be under strain) and added to the ranks of such 
states the newly independent ex-colonial nations. This phenomenon has been 
accompanied by the general consolidation in the older, parent states particularly 
but to some extent also in their newly independent offspring, of a liberal form of 
democracy which accommodates pluralism. As Cook and Kirkpatrick observe, 
international trade in the conventional form became less significant in this era and 
the USA, Europe and Japan established themselves as global economic 
superpowers:32  
 
The internationalization of economic activity is not a new phenomenon ...The 
recent growth in international integration is qualitatively different, however, from 
the earlier expansion of international trade, in that it has been characterized by 
the intensification of economic linkages that transcend national boundaries, often 
at the functional level.  
 
                                                 
29 Mick Hume “Does Africa need these crusaders bearing the White Man's burden?” The Times 
(London, England, 17 June 2005) <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article> (accessed 17 Jun 2005). 
30 Hopkins, above n 6, 8. 
31 Hopkins, above n 6, 8. 
32 P Cook and C Kirkpatrick “Globalization, Regionalization and Third World Development” 
(1997) 31 Regional Studies 55 (Cook and Kirkpatrick). 
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Post-colonial globalization represents “a world order” that is in transition and 
where the “boundaries of the ‘global village’ are fluid; its inhabitants highly 
mobile.”33 Advocates of the post-colonial globalization seek to promote the 
virtues of its particular neo-liberal version as the only panacea for poverty and 
underdevelopment, while its critics “see it as a means of expropriating the 
resources of the poor countries by drawing them into debt, encouraging the use of 
sweated labour and accelerating environmental degradation.”34 
 
The analysis of contemporary globalization, its theoretical foundations and its 
manifestations is the main thrust of this chapter. This analysis will be resumed in 
section 2.4 of this chapter after analysing the impact of (prior) historical 
globalization on the socioeconomic and political structures of colonial South Asia. 
 
 
2.3 Negative Impact of Historical Globalisation on Colonial South Asia  
 
As discussed above, South Asia has been a major — though often passive — 
participant in international trade for many centuries.35 Among their well-known 
interactions were with the Portuguese and then the Dutch who took over the ports 
and maritime areas exposing the people to European religions, customs and even 
legal systems.36 However, the Portuguese and Dutch era had only a marginal 
impact on the domestic economic arrangements and society and had no political 
impact in the region. The self-sufficient economies of South Asia, their crucial 
methods of domestic production, and their patterns of consumption remained 
undisturbed until the region was drawn into the emerging global capitalist system 
as part of the British Empire in the early 19th century.  
 
As much as the contemporary manifestation of globalization with its emphasis on 
economics has had a negative impact on South Asia, the earlier globalization 
                                                 
33 Hopkins, above n 6, 9. 
34 Cook and Kirkpatrick, above n 32, 64. 
35 D Philip Curtin Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
36 The Portuguese were driven by the Dutch out of the Moluccas in the early decades of the 17th 
century; out of Malacca by 1641; and out of Sri Lanka by 1658. The Dutch also drove out the 
British East India company from the Spice Islands but in this sense “did them a favour” because 
the British East India  company went on to concentrate on India very successfully.  See “History 
of the Dutch Empire” 
<http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=aa61> (accessed 21 Jan 
2008). 
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process of the 19th century during the period of the expansion of the British 
Empire also resulted in negative repercussions for the region.37 Military and 
political domination by the British, which was consolidated throughout the 
subcontinent, resulted in brutal repression and exploitation of the local society, 
culture and economy.38 The administration, executed initially through the East 
India Company, exposed South Asia far more pervasively than before to the 
trading of goods and capital transfers with Britain. Before the subcontinent 
succumbed to British rule, the region had a thriving self-sufficient textile industry. 
The import of cheaper textiles from Lancashire and crippling tariffs ruined the 
self-sufficient cottage industry.39 Robins observes that, “it was the Company’s 
plunder that first de-industrialized [India] and then provided the finance that 
fuelled Britain’s own industrial revolution. In essence, the Honourable East India 
Company found India rich and left it poor.”40 The British were also responsible 
for the deforestation and the compulsory acquisition of rural agricultural land for 
coffee and tea plantations, the yields of which were sold in the global commodity 
markets. The rural peasantry who had existed for centuries on subsistence 
agriculture were coerced into growing export crops, making them  directly 
dependent on the fluctuating global markets. This transformation not only had 
profound immediate economic consequences but also created other social and 
political problems that South Asian states are still attempting to solve.41  
 
The rural peasantry were plunged into a state of chronic poverty and exposed to 
famine conditions throughout the period of British rule. Davis claims that the 
colonial authorities aggravated the conditions of famine by denying access to 
                                                 
37 Romesh Chunder Dutt The Economic History of India (Publications Division, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1970) and Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal Modern 
South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (Routledge, London and New York, 1998). 
38 The violence and the degradation suffered by the colonized is illustrated in Rudrangshu 
Mukherjee “Satan Let Loose Upon Earth: The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857” 
(1990) 128 Past and Present 92–116.  Stable URL: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-
2746%28199008%290%3A128%3C92%3A%22LLUET%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2> (accessed 16 Feb 
2006). 
39 Irfan Habib “Studying a Colonial Economy without Perceiving Colonialism” (1984) 12 Social 
Scientist 3-27. Stable URL: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0970- 
0293%28198412%2912%3A12%3C3%3ASACEWP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T> (accessed 16 Feb 
2006); Amiya Kumar Bagchi The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
40 Nick Robins “Loot: in search of the East India Company, the world’s first transnational 
corporation” (2002) 14 Environment and Urbanization 
<http://eau.sagepub.com/cgi/content/14/1/79> (accessed 17 Feb 2006). 
41 For instance, export of cheap Indian labour to Sri Lanka to work on the plantations has resulted 
in the existence of a community of people amidst the plantations with no citizenship rights in Sri 
Lanka or India.     
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grain reserves for starvation as a useful weapon of asserting sovereignty over the 
people.42 During the period 1876–1901, the Indian subcontinent experienced 18 
major famines. Digby, the British economist and a member of the Famine 
Commission in India, estimated that over 30 million Indians, one out of every 10, 
died of starvation under British rule in the 19th century alone.43 The collapse of 
domestic trade and rural industry had forced the migration of artisans into the 
rural economy and agriculture. The victims of the starvation deaths were these 
displaced people belonging to the poorest sections of the society, such as the low 
castes.44  
 
After decolonization the moderate nationalists who came to power throughout the 
region inherited functioning capitalist market economies, though many of the 
market institutions were weak. South Asia had become unretractably a part of the 
global trading system. Many states in the region like Sri Lanka relied heavily on 
their commodity export economies.45 However, by the 1960s, the negative impact 
of the unreliable global economy was felt within the countries. Many erected 
barriers to both international trade and investment and increasingly turned to state 
controls and centralized planning for industrialization and growth. Both balance 
of payments difficulties and ideological commitment to import substitution 
contributed to this policy shift.46 By the mid-1970s, India’s share of world trade, 
for instance, was half that of the 1950s.47 South Asia thus became 
heavily protectionist with the state controlling every aspect of economic activity.  
 
As we shall see, Sri Lanka was the first to undertake a decisive break with this 
protectionist paradigm, embracing liberalization in 1977–1978,48 and the 1980s 
                                                 
42 Mike Davis Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World 
(Verso, 2002). 
43 Appendix E  
44 BM Bhatia Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India with 
Special Reference to Food Problems (Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1985). 
45Henry M Oliver Jr Economic Opinion and Policy in Ceylon (Duke University Press, Durham 
1957). 
46 Smita Mehrotra “Economic Performance of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Evaluation 
1970–1993” in Mohan Lal Sharma et al. (eds) Globalisation, Democracy and Governance in 
South Asia: Issues and Alternatives (Kalinga, Delhi, 2003) 339–350. 
47 DBH Denoon “Cycles in Indian Economic Liberalisation, 1966–1996” (1998) 31 Comparative 
Politics 43–60. 
48 Premachandra Athukoralge and Sarath Rajapatirana Liberalization and Industrial 
Transformation in Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka in International Perspective (Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2000). 
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saw Nepal, Maldives and Pakistan move towards more liberal policies.49 
Bangladesh’s economic policies were exceptional: they had never reflected the 
dirigisme of its neighbour India. Rather, since its creation in 1971, Bangladesh 
had placed heavy reliance on the IFIs for formulation of policy on development 
and aid. India, confronted with a major balance of payments crisis in 1991, finally 
joined the reform process in the early 1990s. Though initially there 
were vehement criticisms about the desirability and consequences of such a 
drastic change in policy, subsequently the dialogue has focussed on the pace and 
scope of reforms rather than their basic direction. Thus the present economic 
liberalization in South Asia at least seems irreversible.    
  
The experience of colonization, or what Hopkins refers to as modern 
globalization, was of political and military domination.50 Yet, this experience 
continues to affect the South Asian psyche even today, as the region wrestles with 
the new wave of contemporary globalization. Some take the view that the opening 
up of the national economies of South Asia to the world economy will once again 
be an opportunity for the West to subjugate and exploit as in the colonial era.51 
This scepticism is a result of the impact of the British rule, which was oppressive 
as it destroyed the pre-existing, prosperously self-sufficient social order, creating 
in its place an economy that was dependent on the global markets, which 
benefited only a small elite segment of the societies.  
 
 
2.4  Contemporary Globalization: A General overview 
 
As mentioned, in this thesis contemporary globalization refers to the world after 
World War II and coincides with what Hopkins calls post-colonial globalization. 
Though contemporary globalization has its roots in the immediate post World 
War II era, we can say that the concept was rejuvenated 40 years later by the end 
of the Cold War. This next geopolitical shift has been claimed by many as 
                                                 
49 Mustapha Kamal Pasha “Liberalization, State Patronage and the ‘New Inequality’ in South 
Asia” in Melinda J Seid and Richard L Harris (eds) Critical Perspectives on Globalization and 
Neoliberalism in The Developing Countries Series: International Studies in Sociology and Social 
Anthropology (Brill Academic Publishers, USA, 2000) 71–79. 
50 Hopkins, above n 6, 8-9. 
51 Mustapha Kamal Pasha “Neo-liberal Recipe and Pakistan” (2004) South Asian Journal. 
<http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/neoliberal_pakistan.htm> (accessed 6 Feb 
2008). 
 100 
marking the commencement of a new world order. The shift heralded the triumph 
of Western liberal democracy over Communism as what Francis Fukuyama, at 
first questioningly and later more assertively, called the “final form of human 
government”;52 and the capitalist ideals promoted by the winners were going to be 
the foundations of the fresh world order.  
 
Capitalism in its current, neo-liberal form, which includes the radical — but still 
selective and unequal — promotion of free markets on a global scale, was hailed 
as the greatest achievement of socioeconomic evolution and a panacea for all 
economic and social ills, and globalization became the medium that promoted 
neo-liberal capitalism worldwide.53 The pro-globalization economists who 
subscribed to this theory claimed that liberalization and integration into global 
markets and privatization of state assets would create an environment that would 
foster economic growth.54 The same philosophy with the added attraction of 
seemingly endless foreign direct investment, rapid industrialization and transfers 
of technology was advocated for the developing countries.55 In theory at least, 
such integration would result in industrial growth and employment opportunities 
for the millions who were unemployed and living in conditions of absolute 
poverty in the Third World. According to Fukuyama, one of the greatest 
advocates of this position, global political and economic homogenization is 
inevitable and liberal democracy and the (supposedly) unregulated market 
economy coupled with globalization is the only option available for global 
prosperity.56 The conceptual explanations of contemporary globalization are so 
                                                 
52 “What we may be witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular 
period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.” Francis Fukuyama “The End of History?” (1989) 16 The National Interest 4. 
Later Fukuyama wrote more confidently of the same concept in his book The End of History and 
the Last Man (Free Press, New York, 1993).  
53 Thomas J Biersteker “The ‘Triumph’ of Liberal Economic Ideas in the Developing World” in 
Barbara Stallings (ed) Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of 
Development (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) 174–198 
54 J Bhagwati “Free Trade: Old and New Challenges” (1994) The Economic Journal 104; Paul 
Krugman Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Non-sense in the Age of Diminished 
Expectations (W.W. Norton, New York, 1994); Ishrat Hussain “Globalization and Liberalization: 
An Opportunity to Reduce Poverty” in UNCTAD Globalization and Liberalization: Effects of 
International Economic Relations on Poverty (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1996). 
55 TN Srinivasan “The Costs of Hesitant and Reluctant Globalization: India” VK Ramaswami 
Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Delhi School of Economics on 21 March 2003 
<http://www.econ.yale.edu/~srinivas/> (accessed 26 Nov 2006). 
56 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, New York, 1993). See 
also Samuel Huntington Clash of the Civilizations (1993)  72/3 Foreign Affairs, and Simon and 
Schuster Remaking of the World Order (New York, 1996).  
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intermingled with neo-liberal economic terminology that globalization is often 
defined in terms of the key principles of economic liberalization.57 Analysts 
nevertheless concede that as globalization and liberalization are open to such wide 
interpretation, disagreement about precisely when countries may be said to have 
globalized or liberalized is unsurprising.58 In fact, the modern manifestation of the 
idea of globalization is perceived to be a part of the neo-liberal economic agenda. 
Tabb succinctly explains the contemporary articulation of globalization with its 
neo-liberal leanings when he observes that in the era of contemporary 
globalization, “[t]he ideologically hegemonic position has been the neo-liberal 
agenda (widely called the Washington Consensus). It calls for trade and financial 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, openness to foreign direct 
investment, a competitive exchange rate, fiscal discipline, lower taxes and small 
government.”59 
 
 
2.5 Conceptualizing Contemporary Globalization 
 
An in-depth theoretical analysis of the concept of globalization is beyond the 
scope of this study. The purpose of the ensuing discussion is nevertheless to 
highlight what this thesis argues to be a crucial “hijacking" of the concept that has 
then been passed off as a necessary and inevitable corollary of it. That is, although 
globalization as a concept is ideologically neutral and capable of taking on 
different contents, the contemporary trajectory of globalization has assumed a 
particular character because the proponents of the concept within academia and 
policy formulation have relied on the propagation of a particular genre of 
theoretical reasoning for the concept of globalization. This ideological bias in the 
guise of an inherent attribute to which “There Is No Alternative” has been the 
fundamental basis upon which the contemporary theorization of globalization has 
been constructed. 
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A perusal of the mainstream conceptual inquiries indicates that globalization 
eludes precise definition. Academic attempts at theorizing the concept have 
resulted in various descriptions.60 Manders compares the contemporary 
theorization of globalization to the ancient Buddhist parable of six blind scholars’ 
description of an elephant and observes that there exists no general definition of 
the term except broad generalizations such as “increasing global 
interconnectedness”, the “rapid intensification of world wide social relations” or 
“the compression of time and space”.61 Some assert that globalization is an all-
encompassing term utilized to describe the progression of national states into an 
integrated global arena, propelled by transnational actors such as the international 
financial institutions and multinational corporations with the latter taking on 
varying degrees of power, orientations, identities and networks. Others assert that 
modern manifestations of the globalization concept indicate a stretching of social, 
political and economic activities beyond political frontiers, regions and 
continents.62 The idea of contemporary globalization is closely associated with 
deterritorialization and shrinking to the effect that in the globalized world social 
and economic activities take place irrespective of the geographical location of the 
actors.63 For instance, Giddens observes: 64 
 
Globalization can … be defined as the intensification of worldwide social 
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical 
process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from 
the very distanciated [sic] relations that shape them. Local transformation is as 
much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connection across 
time and space. 
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It is the “intensification of global consciousness which is a relatively new 
phenomenon” that delineates the contemporary and sets it apart from previous 
manifestations of globalization.65  
 
Sholtes observes that as a manifestation of the notion of global compression, 
“global events can — via telecommunication, digital computers, audiovisual 
media, rocketry and the like — occur almost simultaneously anywhere and 
everywhere in the world.”66 Exposure to contemporary globalization has resulted 
in a metamorphosis of civic life unparalleled in human history for it creates a 
sense of social interconnectedness through amalgamation of trade, investment, 
finance, migration, culture or any other type of human interaction. The 
“intensification of economic, political and cultural relations across borders” which 
we are witnessing today is considered by some to transcend the political 
organization of the world which is made up of sovereign and independent, self-
determining “nation states” — a form of organization prevailing since the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648.67 Just as the medieval order gave away to the nation states 
system after 1648, it is evident that the states-system is likely to be eclipsed in our 
times by the forces of globalization. In this sense, globalization transforms “the 
organisation of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity 
across regions and continents”68 as cultures and societies have become intimately 
bound through political, financial and technological forces in a hitherto 
unprecedented manner.  
 
The increasing intensity of global intimacy results in a concentrated velocity of 
global interactions and processes, which directly influences the evolution of 
world-wide systems including transport and communication, and results in a rapid 
dispersal of ideas, goods, information, capital, and people.69 In this context, 
globalization is regarded not as an end point, but rather as the beginning for an 
enlarged and protracted process. Giddens, among others, seems to reiterate the 
position that globalization is a constitutive feature of the modern world and that 
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modern history can trace its gradual evolution70 Contemporary globalization is 
also projected as a multidimensional process since it manifests itself in a diverse 
range of areas of social activity such as the economic, the political and the 
cultural.71   
 
Held et al. have analysed the diverse accounts of globalization found in both 
public and academic discourse and discerned three broad accounts of the nature 
and meaning of contemporary globalization. They refer to these as accounts by 
the hyperglobalists, the sceptics, and the transformationalists.72 
Hyperglobalists, according to Held et al., argue that contemporary lives are led in 
an  increasingly global world in which states are experiencing incalculable 
economic and political processes of change. These changes are eroding and 
fragmenting nation states and diminishing the political power of the 
governments.73 In these circumstances, by analogy to the economic terms of 
passive price-takers and active price-makers, states are increasingly the decision-
takers and not the decision-makers. The capacity to govern in the Westphalian 
style is diminishing, resulting in challenges within and beyond the state. The very 
legitimacy of the state is increasingly questioned through globalization. Thomas 
Friedman is an ardent promoter of this view and his theorization of globalization 
holds accordingly that it is the:74 
inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree 
never witnessed before — in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and 
nation-states to reach round the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than 
ever before. 
The sceptics strongly oppose this stand-point and assert, firstly, that current global 
conditions are not unparalleled in the history of civilization. Secondly and 
concomitantly, in their perception, while there has been an intensification of 
international and social activity in recent times, this process has toughened and 
enhanced the role of the state, making it a key player and, in the terms used above, 
a decision-maker in the process rather than mere decision-taker.  
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Immanuel Wallerstein’s theorization of globalization places him within the 
sceptical school. He contends that the present phase is one point of a historical 
process whereby the capitalist world-system extended across the globe — 
globalization is its culmination,75 and he acknowledges that ideological 
celebration of so-called globalization is in reality the swan song of our historical 
system.76 He traces the modern world system as a continuum from circa 1500 
through feudalism, industrialization, colonial trading systems and the growth of 
the market institutions. Wallerstein’s rationalization of globalization is essentially 
Eurocentric in the sense that his theory is based on an analysis of core and 
peripheral states in terms of skilled/unskilled labour, capital-intensive/labour-
intensive production methods, and greater/lesser military strength.77 His analysis 
of globalization therefore peripheralizes the alternative historical trajectory that 
can be traced from the developing world’s perspective. Sceptics also appear to 
subscribe to the position that globalization is not an inevitable process but a 
deliberately engineered ideological project of economic liberalization that forces 
states, systems and individuals into the free market process.78  
The transformationalists contend the whole process has constructed a novel 
political, social and economic ethos, which diaphanously transforms the nature 
and the function of the state within its own geographical boundaries as much as it 
interrelates with other entities in the global arena. There is no certain outcome at 
the culmination of the process but transformationalists claim that the state can no 
longer go back to the pre-globalization era when state sovereignty was regarded 
as sacrosanct and the foundation of all transactions in the global arena.79   
 
From the above brief discussion it is evident that the theorization of globalization 
accepts that the globalization concept marks a complex juncture in the evolution 
of the history of mankind. It concedes that individual, institutional and state 
transactions are undergoing convoluted alterations and profound transformations 
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in the light of globalization. It also concedes that the culmination of the process of 
globalization is still not evident for the process possesses a self-evolving quality. 
However, at this point [not the same juncture just referred to?] it is vital to note 
that regardless of the direction globalization is heading, and what form the process 
may take at its end point, its current practice excludes other rationalizations of 
globalization than the articulation of the mainstream, dominant neo-liberal 
paradigm.   
The multi-dimensional quality of globalization is widely acknowledged and its 
conceptualization is undertaken within several disciplines of the social sciences 
such as economics, sociology, psychology, history, politics and cultural studies. 
However, this conceptualizing of globalization within the context of social 
science paradigms appears faulty, as the conceptualisation is distant from the 
contemporary world reality. Like many other dominant theories of the social 
sciences — such as colonialism, modernism, multiculturalism and liberalism — 
globalisation also suffers from a theoretical rationalisation that takes on a distinct 
Western (northern) perspective while nevertheless claiming universality. The 
major rationalisations of globalization, whether explored in terms of a world-
systems theory, political theory or a cultural perspective, share this defective 
analysis.  
This study is of the view that contemporary theoretical constructions of 
globalization primarily ignore the rudimentary principle that globalization by 
definition should be a diffusion of ideas and other influences from any point of 
the globe to another and not from a core centre to the peripheries. In fact, a major 
theoretical rationalization of globalization recounts the narrative of globalization 
from a Western perspective. Despite the acknowledgement that Globalization is 
not a spread of diffusion of ideas from the West to the rest,80 theories of 
contemporary globalization source the idea of globalization to a series of events, 
including the Enlightenment, the Peace of Westphalia, the Industrial Revolution, 
colonial trading networks, the two World Wars and the creation of the 
supranational institutions that share common Western European genealogical 
roots. These highlights in the mainstream sociopolitical discourse are seen 
through a particular Western perspective that not only ignores but rejects the 
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civilizational accounts of the rest of the world. Such an account’s inevitable 
destination if it is allowed uncontrolled is a concept which celebrates liberalism, 
the “free” market (often subtly rigged for the benefit of the wealthiest players, as 
will be shown in Chapter 3) epitomized by the flow of capital and privatization, 
which has little political, cultural or social resonance outside the Western world.81  
 
Furthermore, the theoretical analysis of contemporary globalization also 
presupposes that its present trajectory from the West to the rest is a natural 
evolution, which precisely is inevitable and cannot be resisted.82 This perspective 
creates the illusion that an alternate trajectory is not possible and cannot be 
conceived within the contemporary global political, social and economic 
dynamics.   
 
 
2.5.1 South Asia Encounters Contemporary Globalization  
 
South Asia has not been insulated from the new wave of contemporary 
globalization, which emerged fully as a recognizable new transnational regime in 
the early years of the 1980s. Its influence has reached every aspect of human 
existence from science and technology to culture and the environment. However, 
the impact of globalization and the reaction to it in South Asia have not been 
uniform. Some have actively promoted the idea of globalization in South Asia83 
and others have viewed it with a range of emotions from a deep sense of 
scepticism to absolute resentment.84 
 
The term globalization is often used in two different contexts particularly in 
relation to the developing world. The term is utilized in a positive sense to 
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describe the process of increased integration into the world economy, and in a 
normative sense to prescribe a strategy for development on the basis of intensified 
global integration.85 The socioeconomic reality of South Asia, as much as 
elsewhere in the developing world, tends to equate the discourse on globalization 
to the intensified global economic relations, greater liberalization, few or no 
boundaries to the power of the IFIs and TNCs and their state sponsors, 
denationalization, and the free transfer of capital and finances, which are the 
fundamental tenets of the neo-liberal economic discourse.86  
  
As stated before in this study, out of the states in South Asia, Sri Lanka embarked 
on a path of liberalization and privatization in 1977 becoming subject to a new 
wave of contemporary globalization. The change of trajectory from a previous 
dirigiste economic policy was prompted by economic expediency and global 
political influences as well as a profound change in political ideology. Bangladesh 
and Maldives have had a longer history of open economic policies. Bangladesh, in 
particular, has been reliant on external financial assistance for most of its short 
existence since 1971. This dependence has allowed Bangladesh’s policy 
formulation to be heavily influenced by international financial institutions and 
international NGOs upon whom Bangladesh has become heavily reliant. 
Pakistan’s exposure to the globalization process in the form of external trade and 
financial relations and the migration of workers to West Asia occurred in the mid 
1980s, predating the exposure to contemporary globalization of India, which 
commenced in earnest as late as 1991. 
 
The Indian experience of the new wave of contemporary globalization thus has a 
shorter history than the rest of South Asia, and the porous border between Nepal 
and India has meant that the liberalization of the Indian economy automatically 
led to the liberalization of the Nepali economy simultaneously.87 Therefore, 
remembering Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan, India and 
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Nepal as being the thesis’s definition of South Asia (but noting that Bhutan, the 
exception, remains economically and politically isolated), South Asia encountered 
the new wave of contemporary globalization gradually. Though the trajectory into 
global integration was broadly similar the impact of globalization was uneven, as 
the following paragraphs of this chapter, and Chapter 3 of this study, will indicate. 
  
There is ardent support for globalization and economic liberalization within 
academic policy circles in the South Asian subcontinent. Most significant among 
the supporters are Jagdish N Bhagwati and TN Srinivasan. Bhagwati has long 
maintained that economic liberalization, global trade and a transfer of resources 
from the developed world to the under-developed world, in the form of capital 
flows through state-to-state grants and private investments, would enhance the 
process of development.88 He has always argued that, “economic globalisation, 
which offers economic prosperity to those who embrace it for the opportunity it 
presents instead of renouncing it due to the peril they fear it poses, is also 
generally speaking a force for advancing several social agendas.”89  
 
Bhagwati’s earlier works, such as India: Planning for Industrialization90 and 
Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India,91 have provided both 
the foundation and the intellectual stimulus to embrace the process of 
globalization that India embarked on in the early 1990s. Convinced of the inherent 
goodness of the globalization process as an apt vehicle and a “force for advancing 
several social agendas”, Bhagwati has continued to argue for the relaxation of 
trade barriers, the liberalization of the economy and the privatization of state-
owned enterprises.92 Despite globalization being attacked from many quarters, 
Bhagwati has maintained that it is a positive force that has a “human face” and he 
rejects the allegation that globalization contributes negatively to global poverty 
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eradication.93 In Stiglitz style he observes that globalization has an enormous 
capacity to be a positive force but its potential as a means of contributing to 
human development has been prevented through poor management of the concept 
by the developing world.  
 
TN Srinivasan is another prominent voice in the South Asian academic circle who 
has relentlessly advocated for greater global integration. He continues to focus on 
the positive nexus between globalization and poverty reduction, asserting that pro-
poor policies will become redundant if the state ensures greater access to markets, 
financial deregulation and more market-friendly insurance.94 Srinivasan also 
identifies the greatest obstacle to smoother global integration and globalization to 
be the states themselves: 95 
 
Globalisation is, in essence, a process that creates opportunities for faster growth 
and more rapid poverty reduction in those poor countries in which the domestic 
economic and political environment is conducive. Countries in which corruption 
is endemic, the legal system is not effective or is corrupt, the financial system 
discourages risktaking, and civil strife and conflicts with neighbors are pervasive 
surely are not fertile grounds for globalisation to yield its fruits. The primary 
challenge for the developing countries who have been left out of the globalization 
process is domestic: how to transform the domestic environment into one that is 
conducive to globalization. 
 
Even Amartya Sen has no qualms with the idea of globalization per se: 96 
Globalization has much to offer; but even as we defend it, we must also, without 
any contradiction, see the legitimacy of many questions that the anti-
globalization protesters ask. There may be a misdiagnosis about where the main 
problems lie (they do not lie in globalization, as such), but the ethical and human 
concerns that yield these questions call for serious reassessments of the adequacy 
of the national and global institutional arrangements that characterize the 
contemporary world and shape globalized economic and social relations. 
 
Academic opinions like these served as catalysts for the liberalization policies that 
emanated out of India in the early 1990s. The current dominant political thought 
in South Asia is pro-globalization. Though during the first years (1980s) the new 
wave of contemporary globalization had tended to promote the neo-liberal version 
                                                 
93 Jagdish N Bhagwati In Defense of Globalization (Oxford University Press Incorporated, Cary, 
North Carolina USA, US, 2004) 265. 
94 TN Srinivasan and Jessica Seddon Wallack “Globalization, Growth, and the Poor” (2004) 152/2 
De Economist, 251–272. 
95 TN Srinivasan Globalization: Is It Good or Bad? (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy 
Research – Policy Brief December, 2002) 
<siepr.stanford.edu/papers/briefs/policybrief_dec02.pdf> (accessed 25 Mar 2005). 
96 Amartya Sen “How to Judge Globalism” (2002) 13 The American Prospect  
<http://people.cis.ksu.edu/~ab/Miscellany/globalism.html> (accessed 18 Nov 2007). 
 111 
of globalization, which advocates ideas of liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation, a quest for a gentler, more human-centred version has been 
articulated within the dominant paradigm in recent years. Despite Manmohan 
Singh being an ardent supporter of the Bhagwati/Srinivasan thesis regarding the 
benefits of intensified globalization, many believe that his tenure in office will act 
as a harbinger for the adoption of a more humane version of globalization.97 
Whether there will be political will and strength to advocate for a humane version 
of globalization is, however, yet to be seen. 
 
2.5.2 A Critique of the Contemporary Manifestation of Globalization in 
South Asia 
 
Held et al. concede that any comprehensive account of globalization must include 
a conceptualization of causation, periodization, impacts and the trajectories of 
globalization.98 However, that analysis does not admit that the discussion should 
be broad-based or diverge from its conventional position within the dominant 
paradigm to encompass a more universal approach. As observed in the previous 
paragraphs of this chapter, globalization is recounted and conceptualized in 
quintessentially Western terms which ignore the possibility of it being recounted 
in a different theoretical context that may inject the concept with different values 
or dimensions.  
 
There is a need to locate the theorization of globalization within the global, and 
not only Western, context to enhance its legitimacy beyond the Western world. As 
Stiglitz observes, “[g]lobalization has enhanced the opportunities for success, but 
it has also posed new risks to developing countries. The rules of the game have 
been designed for the most part by the advanced industrial countries, or more 
accurately, by special interests in those countries, for their own interests, and 
often do not serve well the interests of the developing world, and especially the 
poor.”99 
                                                 
97 Pratap Bhanu Mehta “India’s Kinder and Gentler Globalization”  (2004) 3 Yale Global, 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4315> (accessed 20 Jun 2006). 
98 Held et al., above n 68, 4. 
99 Joseph E Stiglitz “Development Policies In A World Of Globalization” Paper presented at the 
seminar “New International Trends for Economic Development” on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES), Rio de Janeiro, 
12-13 Sep 2002 
 112 
The fundamental human problems witnessed in the contemporary formulation of 
globalization are not unique100 but rather reflect a historical parallel in 
colonization.101 This chapter has already traced how poverty and marginalization 
as by-products of globalization were experienced in the history of South Asia 
particularly during the time of British colonial occupation. However, new 
problems have added to the old, and thus social dislocation, deterioration of the 
self-determination of states, terrorism and environmental degradation are all 
repercussions of contemporary globalization. Globalization has impacted on both 
the states and individuals, and it has transformed the relations between the 
individual, society and state. The following section of this chapter concentrates on 
the impact of globalization on the South Asian state, nationhood, national identity 
and the idea of human rights.  
 
2.5.3 The Impact of Globalization on the Idea of State −  South Asia 
A general definition of the nation state is that it is a political unit in which 
divergent groups of religious affiliation, ethnic groups, culture and nationalities 
have formed a cohesive political entity representing a common set of standards 
and values of governance.102 The contemporary system of sovereign nation states 
has its origins in  
the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The birth of the nation state saw the consequent 
development of international law and international relations based on the notion 
of sovereign equality of states. The current wave of globalization has been the 
single significant force that raised challenges to the Westphalian model and its 
sacrosanct notion of sovereignty in its entire history, rendering the concept “no 
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longer theoretically or empirically serviceable in the face of internationalization 
of economic and social activity.”103  
The notion of a nation state is a relatively new phenomenon to the Indian 
subcontinent, a legacy of colonialism with a history of less than 75 years.104 Pre-
colonial South Asia was largely divided into territorial units with traditional 
administrative systems ranging from feudal monarchies to tribal chiefdoms. These 
units were at times unified into a number of regional republics or hereditary 
monarchies.105 Each territorial unit devised appropriate forms of governance, 
which were complex and drew substance from the unit’s own civilizational past. 
The rulers sought to maintain legitimacy of their rule by relying on a multi-
layered structure of authority that represented the various identities and interests 
of the governed society. As much as the ruler was perceived as the ultimate 
repository of power and authority, the legitimacy of the rule was sought and 
maintained through critical institutional linkages with traditional power bases 
such as village councils. Territorial units of governance often depended on the 
military strength of the ruler and were often delineated on the basis of ethnicity or 
race.106  
 
The quest to carve out Westphalian-model nation states with a common national 
culture and political identity can be seen in the national freedom movements of 
South Asia. The impetus for suppressing the diverse affiliations for the common 
goal of political independence in the middle of the last century provided sufficient 
legitimacy for the creation of nation states.107 In this sense the creation of states in 
the subcontinent was not a result of social contract, as it was in Europe, but an 
artificial creation of the region’s colonial history. The project of nation-building 
after decolonization consisted of submerging a multitude of religious, ethnic and 
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cultural identities to create a common nation with a single political and legal 
system.108 Commenting on the creation of India in 1948, Sudip Kaviraj says, 
“[T]he nation, in India … is a thing without a past. It is radically modern. It can 
only look for subterfuges of antiquity. It fears to face and admit its own terrible 
modernity, because to admit modernity is to make itself vulnerable...”109 Sri 
Lanka, as a unitary state, has an equally short history, since 1815, when the 
British gained control of the whole island. Pre-colonial Sri Lanka was also ruled 
as different territorial units which were unified from time to time under strong 
monarchs.110    
 
The concept of sovereignty is intimately linked to the idea of the nation state. The 
fundamental idea of sovereignty is that a state has the exclusive right to control all 
affairs within its territory.111 Marc Williams further elaborates the concept by 
noting that it contains two features: 1) internally the state has absolute control 
over its territory and subjects; and 2) externally the concept manifests as the 
sovereign equality of all states in that no state or entity is recognized as higher in 
authority than another.112  
 
Within the past two decades the process of globalization has had impacts on the 
notions of both sovereign equality of nation states and internal sovereignty in 
ways that challenge the viability of the nation state paradoxically. On one hand 
globalization encourages global integration and interaction of nation states. On the 
other hand such integration curtails the assertion of sovereignty of individual 
states in both the developed and the developing world. This is particularly 
pertinent in the sphere of economic activities of the states. As Bonvin observes, 
“[t]he autonomy and effectiveness of national economic policy have decreased as 
a direct result of globalization of financial market and financial deregulation.”113 
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In relation to the developing states, the increased influence of the IFIs as global 
policymakers, and the operations of the TNCs that dominate world finance and 
trade,114 have had a negative impact on the sovereignty of the state, for these 
entities have usurped the decision-making and policy-creating powers of the states 
in relation to national economies. From developed states’ perspective, “offshoring 
creates a space economy that goes beyond the regulatory umbrella of the state” 
affecting the “territoriality and sovereignty in the context of a global economy”.115 
In the context of both the developed and the developing world, it is largely true 
that “those tolling sovereignty's death knell have been unable to convince the 
world that the concept is now obsolete.” Yet, globalization has impacted on the 
concepts of sovereignty in respects discussed above.116  
 
Sassen’s observations above support Held et al.’s thesis that globalization’s 
primary actors challenge the sovereignty of nation states.117 Held et al. assert that 
the primary threat to state sovereignty is posed by the global economy, especially 
the dominant role played by the multinational corporations and the global capital 
markets, followed by supranational entities, such as The World Bank, IMF, WTO 
and UN. The remaining forces that offer challenge are international laws and 
hegemonic powers.118 Each of these entities or regimes prescribes and influences 
the manner in which the state conducts its business both internally and in relation 
to integration into the global economy.119 Commenting on this scenario, Ohmae 
says that:120 
 
in recent decades we have watched the free flow of ideas, individuals, 
investments, and industries grow into an organic bond among developed 
economies. Not only are traditionally traded goods and securities freely 
exchanged in the interlinked economy, but so too are such crucial assets as land, 
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companies, software, commercial rights … and expertise. Inevitably, the 
emergence of the interlinked economy brings with it an erosion of national 
sovereignty as the power of information directly touches local communities; 
academic, professional, and social institutions, corporations, and individuals.  
 
This transformation of the state, as Mann has analysed, is yet another stage of 
globalization’s historical development.121 In his study he traces the gradual 
expansion of the character and functions of the nation states through time. Mann 
asserts that prior to the 18th century the actual role of the state (though the concept 
and legal entity of nation states was well-established under the post-Westphalian 
world order) was indeed minimalist and extended little beyond conducting war 
and diplomacy, and internal repression. The state's role was expanded during the 
19th and early 20th centuries with the introduction of citizenship rights and the 
concentration on the economic and social infrastructure. The 20th century 
witnessed the creation and expansion of the welfare state and the state was also 
involved in macro-economic planning activities (in particular the stabilization 
policies referred to in Chapters 3 and 4 of the present study). It was also bestowed 
with specific functions in relation to war and military affairs. Considering these 
historical dynamics, Mann argues that the state is in a sense maturing rather than 
nearing decrepitude. He goes on to assert that certain state functions may have 
grown or receded in significance but the institution itself is healthy. Globalization 
has transformed the character of the state rather than eradicated it. That 
transformation has been into a facilitator of the global trade and financial 
liberalization process. In this sense, if the institution of the state is malleable to 
serve a particular goal it can also be manipulated to serve the interests of the poor 
and marginalized — the primary victims of the globalization process, whose 
plight in South Asia largely motivated the present thesis. 
 
This shift of decision-making power from the state to multilateral institutions, 
which are increasingly vociferous in shaping trade, investment and economic 
policy, is rationalized within the state on the basis of the “There Is No 
Alternative” syndrome (TINA).122 The policy formulators who advocate the 
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merits of global integration portray the neo-liberal economic ideology as the only 
viable option available.123 Yielding to TINA, the South Asian states have 
continued to display an ideological aridity, which manifests itself in the form of 
the tacit embracing of the whims of the multilateral institutions and acquiescing to 
the pressures of transnational corporations at enormous human costs. With 
relentless external pressures contributing to the “erosion of the internal 
sovereignty of the state” there is an urgent need for a “fundamental reconstitution 
of the conventional Westphalian inspired ideas of statehood and sovereignty.”124 
The present thesis advocates the idea of a strong regionalism for South Asia as an 
alternate paradigm in the context of the changing conceptualization of the state, to 
safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South Asia.125 
 
 
2.5.4 The Threats Within the State 
 
As empirical evidence indicates, the process of nation state building in South Asia 
is far from complete and remains fragile. Despite political drives towards 
democratic nation-building through centralized governance schemes and common 
legal systems, a common system of values, and national identity, such endeavours 
have proven to be largely futile with continued demands for self-determination 
and secession by ethnic and religious identities in South Asia.126 Increasing 
poverty and deprivation are the by-products of economic liberalization policies 
and have added momentum to the burgeoning secessionist movements that have 
been increasingly militant during the past two decades.127  
 
In fact, the fledgling nation state consolidation process has not benefited from a 
character change of the state that globalization initiated.128 Increasingly, 
                                                 
123 Stiglitz, above n 3. 
124 Jayasuriya, above  n 102. 
125 See Chapters 4 and 6 of this study. 
126 Greg Alling “Economic Liberalization and Separatist Nationalism: The Cases of Sri Lanka and 
Tibet” (1997) Journal of International Affairs 51; Ishtiaq Ahmed State, Nation and Ethnicity in 
Contemporary South Asia (Pinter, London, New York, 1996). 
127 Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff (eds) Ethnic conflict and secessionism in South and Southeast 
Asia: causes, dynamics, solutions (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2003). 
128 The growing power of the IFIs which imposes restrictions on how the state functions is a 
manifestation of contemporary globalization. See Chapter 3 of this study and also K Ohmae The 
End of the Nation State (Free Press, New York, 1995) where he asserts that state boundaries are 
increasingly porous to the flow of communication, corporations, capital, and currencies, all of 
which affects the traditional notion of sovereignty.  
 118 
governments’ control over parts of their territory and the concept of a unitary state 
have become contested issues. Rajni Kothari, who is deeply apprehensive about 
the influence of globalization, with its homogenizing thrust, asserts that 
globalization will not only jeopardize the process of consolidating the nation state 
but will unleash the fragmentative tendencies that lay latent in the pluralistic 
society within the nation state.129 He goes on to elaborate on his reservations 
about the transformation and comments in a subsequent study, saying that:130 
 
the autonomy of civil society too will decline and with it may also go down the 
modern search for democratic order. The homogenising thrust that is inherent in 
the process of modern globalisation … will only reinforce disintegrative 
tendencies that are already at work, quite opposite of the ‘macro’ integrative 
design of the proponents of the new world order.  
 
In the face of the increasingly iniquitous globalization process, marginalized 
groups defined along the lines of ethnicity, regional or even political orientation 
as in the case of Maoist guerrillas in Nepal and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, 
have experienced a growing sense of disenfranchisement. Their insecurities and 
disenchantment previously lay latent, but these groups have now begun to 
question the mainstream governance process. Their attempts to undermine the 
legitimacy of the existing state structures and national governments often result in 
violent upsurges.131 Punjab and Kashmir are home to rebellious factions that 
demand autonomy from the Indian state, and a quest for a separate homeland by 
the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka is not yet abandoned. Maoist guerrilla 
activism in Bangladesh is a reactionary manifestation of the ubiquitously and 
gruelling economic conditions that have been brought about by the neo-liberal 
economic policies. These fragmentative forces constantly challenge the idea of 
nation-building in the region, though paradoxically the nation-building process 
was consolidated by constitutional and legal structures within states when 
independence was gained from colonial rule. Presently the success of nation-
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building and the extent to which the concept is internalized by the people of the 
region remain uncertain, which makes the need to consolidate the nation-building 
process a priority in the region.  
 
The state, incompetent to cope with these internal challenges to its authority, 
resorts to coercion and violence, which in turn results in the further erosion of its 
authority and legitimacy. Use of authoritarian power by the state in its turn 
consolidates and strengthens the marginalized groups, who thrive on the denial 
(real and perceived) of justice, resulting in a vicious spiral of contention for power 
and authority.132 This scenario is significant for the challenges within the state to 
its authority in contemporary times because the process is either brought about or 
accentuated through globalization. This dynamic yet again reinforces the thesis 
that contemporary globalization unleashes paradoxical forces within everything 
that it comes into contact with. For globalization, despite its homogenizing thrust, 
has accentuated religious and ethnic cleavages within state structures and created 
avenues for the multiple identities within the state to demand autonomy from the 
unitary centre, often through violent means. 
 
While the Westphalian state structure has thus been almost irretrievably altered, 
perhaps it is premature to announce the “end of the state.”133 As Ramesh Babu 
comments, while “the post Cold War world is certainly not state-centric, it is also 
not stateless or a state free dispensation  … [the] state is being sucked in by forces 
of supra-national integration at one end and sub-national disintegration at the 
other end of the spectrum. Furthermore, this simultaneous dual transformation 
varies in extent and depth across issues, time, locale and space.134 The state has 
experienced a transmutation of character in the contemporary globalization phase 
but remains crucial to the economic, political and cultural mores of the global 
arena. It is unlikely to be replaced by another entity or phenomenon in the 
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foreseeable future and any alternate paradigm would still evolve with the state at 
its foundation.  
 
The impact of secessionist movements on democratic governance in South Asia is 
further elaborated in Chapter 4 of this study. It is in this context of the dilution of 
the character of the state with the onslaught of globalization that Chapter 6 of this 
study advocates a regional praxis to govern globalization in South Asia.  
 
 
2.5.6 Globalization Fuels Religious Fundamentalism  
 
In South Asia the survival and the rejuvenation of state-centred politics has been 
sought through the insidious means of flirting with the resentments and 
insecurities of civil society.135 There appears to be a perturbing trend of the state 
shedding its religious secularity at the political centre, which will have a negative 
impact on the fostering of religious equality and tolerance in South Asia.136 As 
elaborated below, due to reasons of political survival and electoral gains, the 
governments appear to pander to majoritarian sentiments and embrace a populist 
stand on issues such as appeasing the tendencies of religious fundamentalism. 
 
In relation to the issue of state patronage of religion in the subcontinent, all states 
in this study have had diverse and tumultuous histories mingled with an 
overarching ethos of general acceptance and tolerance of religious diversity.137 
Since decolonization India has constitutionally committed itself to a secular state, 
while such a commitment was withdrawn by Sri Lanka with its Republican 
Constitution in 1972.138 Mahayana Buddhism is the state religion of Bhutan. The 
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Constitutions of Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh have established Islam as the 
state religion while providing constitutional guarantees for other religions to be 
practised, albeit subject to law, public order and morality. The Constitution of 
Nepal describes it as a Hindu Kingdom but falls short of claiming Hinduism as 
the state’s religion. Thus, in the South Asia region, most of the governments have 
until the past two decades appeared to cherish secular values in relation to religion 
but have been profoundly conscious of the powerful influence that religion can 
exert on domestic and regional politics and have too often yielded to that 
influence.139  
 
In quite paradoxical terms, state patronage of religion, whether on a majoritarian 
basis or otherwise, is also ingrained into the political culture of the 
subcontinent.140 In sociocultural terms the divorce of religion from the state would 
be perceived to be governance without moral or ethical values. It is on this 
fundamental basis that state benefaction of religion is regarded with a sense of 
tolerance, as it is perceived to be imbuing ethical values into governance. The 
term “secularism” therefore appears to have a specific South Asian meaning of 
tolerance of all religions rather than the Western construction of the term, which 
connotes absence of state sponsorship of all religions. So extensive was the 
intermingling of the state with religion that Mahatma Gandhi was prompted to 
retort, “those who say that religion has nothing to do with the state do not know 
what religion means.”141  
 
The onset of the renewed and ongoing waves of the overarching post-World War 
II contemporary globalization — first in the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold 
War — saw the relationship between religion and politics metamorphose into a 
sinister political force in South Asia. State patronage of religion, whether it was 
Hinduism in India, Islam in Pakistan and Bangladesh, or Buddhism in Sri Lanka, 
commenced to mean an inevitable undermining of the pluralistic basis of society. 
The secular worldview of tolerance extended by the state disappeared with the 
government seeking political power by patronizing the majority religion. The 
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devastating effects of globalization on the culturally, ethnically and religiously 
divided societies of the subcontinent were both exploited and to some extent 
distracted from by cynically pandering to selected religious and cultural identities 
within the state. The politicians in power, and those elements aspiring to be in 
power, were acutely aware of the lack of legitimacy and support for their pro-
globalization policies and therefore manipulated the insecurities in society by 
offering patronage to the majoritarian cultural and religious identities, thus 
fuelling fundamentalism.142 These holders of power had no hesitancy in crafting 
and consolidating forces of religious fundamentalism in order to subvert the 
growing dissent of people against their policies. The state had realized that the 
people’s discontent and insecurities could be funnelled into any space, including 
fundamentalism, in an atmosphere that offered little hope via the existing options.  
 
The trend of religious fundamentalism emerging in India had the patronage of the 
then ruling coalition party — the Baratha Janatha Party (BJP) and its affiliated 
organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)143 (“Association 
of National Volunteers”), and the Hindutva movement (Hindu nationalist 
movement).144 BJP rule initiated a process of transforming secular nationalism in 
India into Hindu nationalism, and its political importance was displayed by 
sporadic incidents of violence that erupted in various parts of India. The Gujarati 
massacres of 2002 were blatant displays of the nationalistic jingoism that took 
root during the BJP rule in India. During the Gujarati riots the Chief Minister of 
Gujarat, Narendra Modi, who is a member of the BJP, was accused of facilitating 
the massacres by his inaction during the riots. The aftermath of the riots has been 
grueling for the victims, with the courts unwilling to proceed with the cases and 
the witnesses systematically pressured by the extreme Hindu nationalists to 
refrain from giving evidence.145  
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Confirming the emerging trends of ultra-nationalism, Modi, with explicit support 
from Prime Minister Vajpayee, went on to lead the party in the State of Gujarat 
elections the same year, which resulted in a victory both for him and for the BJP. 
The rising discord between ethnic and religious minorities in various parts of the 
subcontinent, such as Delhi, Rajasthan and Gujarat, and the direct nexus to 
economic policy formulation, raises disquieting questions about the future 
prospects of communal harmony within the subcontinent in the face of 
globalization.146 The allegations that extreme right-wing Hindu groups with 
connections to the then ruling BJP were involved in the attacks on the minority 
community, especially in incidents such as the communal riots in Gujarat, raise 
the issue of governmental patronage of such activities, the human rights aspect 
and the very legitimacy of the elected governments.147  
 
Kamal Mustapha Pasha, commenting on Pakistan’s flirtation with religious 
extremism, writes, “[t]he appeal of Islamisation is closely linked to the 
disconcerting and mixed results of the expansion of capitalism as a social system 
and as a way of life; it is a particular expression of the strains and stresses of a 
society experiencing cultural haemorrhage in a time of structural change.”148 
Religious fundamentalism and intolerance has become rampant in Pakistan, 
making the prospects of consolidation of democratic governance extremely slim 
in the near future.149 The fundamentalist Islamic political parties are striving to 
enhance the already operational shari’a laws, and the effort by the Pakistani 
President Musharraf to curb the drive does not appear to have succeeded.150  
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A similar, familiar trend is occurring in Sri Lanka.151 The Buddhist monks’ 
decision to contest the 2004 April parliamentary elections was a sinister 
development in the religious polarization process in Sri Lanka.152 The monks’ 
newly established political party, Jathika Hela Urumay (JHU),153 claimed that 
Buddhism, despite state patronage and constitutional guarantees, is under threat 
through exposure to various forces brought about through the contemporary 
globalization ethos. The monks promised a righteous state (dharmarajya) if they 
assumed political power. The proportional representation system ensured the 
election of the nine JHU monks from its 260 candidates into Parliament and they 
emerged as the kingmakers of the new legislature. The JHU did not draw support 
from the rural areas, from which it claimed to have a solid vote base; rather it was 
the urban, middle-class voters, disenchanted with the mainstream Sinhalese 
political parties, who cast their vote in JHU’s favour. The voting pattern of the 
2004 elections highlighted a disturbing development, which is that any political 
party offering a militant version of Sinhalese nationalism along with a message of 
moral regeneration seems to have had more appeal to the electorate than the 
moderate mainstream political parties that represent modern secularism. The 
resounding election of the JHU monks from the capital city and the surrounding 
electoral districts is all the more disturbing as it reinforces the hypothesis that 
religious or nationalistic extremism in South Asia has a direct correlation to the 
existing economic conditions. A poll taken a few days before the Sri Lankan 
elections of 2004 indicated that 48.2 per cent of the people declared that the rising 
cost of living was the most important issue of the day, whereas only 18.8 per cent 
were perturbed by the existing civil war with the Tamil militants that had cost 
65,000 lives within the past 20 years.154 
 
The election of the JHU monks into Parliament was the culmination of a series of 
events that firmly established the emerging trend of religious nationalism in Sri 
Lanka. This development followed similar trends elsewhere in the subcontinent. 
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Religious intolerance fuelled by economic considerations has created volatile 
situations in many parts of the subcontinent. State patronage of the campaign is 
sought through the demand for legislation against unethical conversions in Sri 
Lanka and elsewhere in the subcontinent.155 Ironically, in Sri Lanka the demand is 
made not only by the majority Buddhist community but by the Hindus as well. In 
June 2004 the Supreme Court, hearing petitions against two bills presented to 
Parliament seeking legal status for two Christian organizations involved in charity 
work, held in two judgments that while the Sri Lankan Constitution upheld a 
citizen's right to worship and practice his or her religion (Article 9), it did not 
recognize a fundamental right to propagate a religion. Both Buddhist and Hindu 
organizations have long protested against Christian charities’ and missionaries’ 
activities in rural Sri Lanka, alleging that they lure poor people into Christianity 
by offering them food, money, medicine and dry rations. The JHU monks in 
Parliament reiterated that their support of the minority government in power is 
dependent on the enactment of the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill, but, 
facing opposition from moderate political groups, as of this writing in Dec 2007 
the enactment of the Bill appears to be abandoned by the Sri Lankan 
legislature.156  
 
Such developments aptly confirm the argument that globalization, while 
threatening the existing foundations of the human rights discourse within the 
state, also, and in a more sinister vein, opens up new territories in the human 
rights field to be exploited by various forces. It also confirms the case that the 
nexus between economic conditions and human rights is not limited to economic 
and social rights alone but involves civil and political rights as well. 
 
While the reality makes it impossible for national economies to survive in 
isolation from globalized markets, it is crucial to the present study to note that 
national governments are not yet impotent to intervene and create structures that 
would enhance the basic human rights of the people. However, the governments 
appear unable to extend the traditional human rights regimes to include protective 
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measure to protect the country from Christian fundamentalists.   
156 Deegalle, above n 150.  
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mechanisms against the arbitrary actions of multinational corporations or the 
pressures of international financial institutions. This is because the new threats 
that emerge in the discourse of human rights cannot be regarded as violations of 
rights per se for they are not within the traditional rights matrix of state against the 
individual or group. In most instances the state is not directly involved but is a 
passive observer. The perpetrators are obviously liable under common law but the 
legal structures that are in place are inadequate to offer reasonable redress.157 This 
highlights the need for the “rights contract” between the state and the individual 
or group to be renegotiated, with the ultimate onus placed on the state to protect 
basic human rights. This study asserts that the renegotiation of the “rights contact” 
can be best achieved at regional level with the co-operation all states in South 
Asia. 
 
 
2.5.6 Contemporary Globalization: Impact on Human Rights in South Asia 
 
As much as in other spheres of sociopolitical affairs, with human rights too, 
globalization has had a paradoxical impact. Its impact on individual human rights 
is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. The remaining discussion 
in the present chapter will focus on the general impact of globalization on the 
universal rights regime and the states. Contemporary globalization, with its 
influence on culture, media, the economy and technology, has contributed to the 
expansion of the idea of universal human rights while simultaneously creating a 
need to enhance protection mechanisms to safeguard the victims and the 
marginalized of the globalization process, given that the states themselves are 
most often not the direct violators. 
 
The withdrawal of the state from regulating economic activities has created new 
freedoms in relation to the economic activities within and beyond the state, 
enhancing the rights of the people in terms of creating new business and trade 
opportunities, increasing the prospects of capital and resource transfer, and 
liberalizing the decision-making powers of the individuals in relation to economic 
activity. In this context, it appears that the content and the extent of human rights, 
                                                 
157 Maurizio Murru “Bhopal 20 Years On: Globalization and Corporate Responsibility” (2004) 2 
Health Policy and Development 249–254. 
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too, is now determined by market forces, as globalization has restricted the state’s 
role in determining economic policy. Yet again, the paradoxical effect of 
globalization comes into play whereby it reinforces and expands the rights of the 
inclusive or the privileged while the acknowledged human rights of the excluded 
segments of society remain threatened or are rendered impotent by the 
globalization process.   
 
As several academic enquiries into the effects of globalization indicate, the 
phenomenon has had a devastating impact on economic, political and cultural 
rights of the peoples of, in particular, the poorest segments in the poorer states.158 
The most devastating challenge to the contemporary discourse of human rights is 
the endemic poverty that globalization appears to perpetuate. 
 
As Khan and Larik reiterate:159 
 
South Asia is home to 1.4 billion people, about a quarter of the world population, 
but has 43% of the world’s poor and only 2% of world’s GDP… The region is 
characterized by poverty, illiteracy and low life expectancy. It is the most 
malnourished region of the world, with half of its children being under-weight, 
compared with 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is the least gender-sensitive region 
and it has the highest human deprivation, in terms of access to health facilities, safe 
drinking water, sanitation facilities and opportunity for work and leisure. 
 
Poverty by definition is the dearth of opportunity in every aspect of personal life, 
further exacerbated by chronic hunger, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of 
educational opportunities and poor access to healthcare and other basic 
necessities. The sense of social exclusion that is brought about by poverty 
includes the denial of mainstream benefits such as social and economic 
development, non-exposure to either indigenous and/or modern knowledge 
systems and the exclusion from influencing policy formulation.   
 
Since decolonization, South Asian states have systematically failed to adhere to 
correct social engineering schemes that would eliminate inequalities in terms of 
resource and land distribution, infrastructure development, capital, market credit, 
                                                 
158 M Khor Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices (Zed Books, New York, 
1999); Dani Rodrik  Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 1997); Michel Chossudovsky The Globalization Of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and 
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159 Haider A Khan and Zulfiqar Larik Globalization and Regional Co-operation in South Asia: A 
Political and Social Economy Approach (CIRJE Discussion Papers, 2007) <http://www.e.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html> (accessed 5 Dec 2007). 
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and education and information and would thus have paved the way for a different 
outcome rather than the conditions of poverty that exist today. In human rights 
parlance this translates into systematic denial of basic human rights, such as 
education, health, and decent standards of living. Regarding this denial of human 
rights, the developing states have traditionally taken the view that these rights are 
unattainable given the prevailing economic conditions, to which the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission in its recent report has responded: “The 
negative impact on one dimension of human rights, e.g. economic rights, 
necessarily has a domino effect on other rights. This reality reinforces the 
principle enunciated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) 
that human rights are ‘universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’.”160 
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that it is no longer tenable to draw a neat 
distinction between the nature of state obligations with regard to civil and political 
rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other.161 
United Nations human rights mechanisms have debunked the traditional view that 
civil and political rights entail only negative obligations, while economic, social 
and cultural rights give rise to the more complex issue of positive state 
obligations, which require resources to be expended. Gauging development purely 
on the basis of economic indicia is increasingly viewed with scepticism, as it 
often does not reflect the ground realities, especially those relating to disparities in 
income distribution and living standards. Such a position ignores the human 
dimension of development and the important linkage between development, 
human rights and peace. It overlooks the violent social and political forces that 
invariably are unleashed by extreme poverty and the denial of other human rights. 
If the forces of globalization are allowed to operate freely — overlooking the 
central premise of human-centred development — the spectre of massive levels of 
human rights violations resulting in grave social and political upheavals becomes 
a reality. 
                                                 
160 “Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights” Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-second session Item 4 of the provisional 
agenda. Preliminary report submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in accordance 
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nt> (accessed 17 Jul 2005). 
161 See the Vienna Declaration 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En> (accessed 17 Dec 
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Globalization has affected the social and economic structures of communities in a 
manner that throws into question the legitimacy of the existing mechanisms and 
values relating to the contemporary form of governance and policy formulation. A 
good example of such a question is the case of the Adivasi (indigenous forest 
dwellers) in Madhya Pradesh.162 They have continuously fought against the highly 
destructive, so-called “eco-development” policy programmes that were initiated 
under the aegis of the World Bank in their forests. These programmes invariably 
result in the forced eviction of Adivasi from their natural habitat and a prohibition 
of their activities such as rotation cultivation, fishing, extraction of forest produce 
and hunting. It is on these activities that the Adivasi have based their livelihoods 
since time immemorial. Prohibition of life-sustaining practices on the basis of 
their presumed threat to the environmental and ecological balance, combined with 
the idea of forestry conservation as a good business venture, has threatened the 
very existence of these forest people. Therefore, they vigorously demand that their 
rights in relation to their indigenous way of life be protected rather than be 
sacrificed in the cause of globalization and economic growth. The rights that are 
contested here are not limited to the Adivasi in India alone but also apply to 
several other indigenous peoples and rural communities in the region who seek to 
challenge the state in relation to the systematic obliteration of their traditional way 
of life, using the terms of the rights discourse.  
 
Furthermore, this notion of competing rights in development discourse has 
another dimension. The scale to which global competitiveness has condensed the 
economic and political role of the state has directly influenced the government's 
image as protector of citizens’ rights. The decreased role of the state has created 
an authority vacuum in which novel forces emerge in response to individuals’ 
desire for security, welfare and power.163 Sriskandarajah observes that there is a 
strong connection between economic marginalization and the ethnopolitical 
conflict in the context of Sri Lanka. The policy formulation process that has 
ignored minority concerns since Independence aggravated the real and perceived 
                                                 
162 A Gandhi “Developing compliance and resistance: the state, transnational social movements 
and tribal peoples” (2003) 3 Global Networks 481.  
163 Jonathan Spencer Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict (Routledge, London, 1990). 
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grievances that created the current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.164 The state, 
overburdened with the complexities of global economic competition and the 
simultaneous political challenges by the numerous power groups, attempts to 
consolidate its threatened role in society through various insidious means 
including brutality and violence. Similarly, the newly threatened identities attempt 
to play their ethnic, nationalist or religious game depending on the circumstances 
to consolidate their position amongst real and imagined threats to their existence 
from various quarters. Such internal conflicts, whatever the extent, invariably 
result in compromising human rights.165  
 
However, in order to assimilate into the world capitalist system under the aegis of 
the multilateral institutions, almost all the governments in South Asia have 
adopted the rhetoric of liberal democracy and universal human rights in the 
process of good governance along with economic liberalization policies. The 
reality is that the operation of the liberalization policies augurs well only for the 
markets and meanwhile undermines the social, economic and cultural rights of the 
people. In an atmosphere where the market is accorded preference over other 
considerations, it is impossible to ensure functional mechanisms for human rights 
protection, as is detailed by Chapter 3 of this study. 
 
 
2.6 Significant Traits of the Renewed Waves of Contemporary 
Globalization Originating in the Late 1980s  
 
The fundamental flaw of contemporary manifestations of globalization is its 
obsessive focus on economic globalization and its homogenizing thrust. The neo-
liberal ideological thrust that underpins contemporary globalization is portrayed 
as the panacea for all that ails the developing world. It determines the normative 
nature of “development”, international relations and trade. It is nonchalant to the 
possible existence of other systems of knowledge and other paradigms of 
progress. The promoters of this paradigm of globalization portray it to be 
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infallible and imply that all communities must be redesigned according to its 
dictates. 
 
It is this portrayal of the neo-liberal economic ideology through globalization that 
has given the process a negative identity. Many critics have seen through the 
globalization of the neo-liberal political and economic ideology since the early 
1980s and how it has consolidated the values and the interests of the West at the 
expense of the rest. Susan George,166 among many others who passionately 
concur in this critique, claims that in its present manifestation globalization has 
become a “threat to the poor rather than an opportunity for global action to 
eradicate poverty.”167 Contemporary manifestations of globalization do not appear 
to refute its penchant to globalize neo-liberalism at the expense of other 
dimensions such as equitable global human development.168  
 
There is increased empathy for the quest for more “controlled” globalization even 
from the more ardent supporters of the genre of globalization that is personified 
by the Washington Consensus.169 For instance, Bhagwati acknowledges the need 
for appropriate management of globalization especially as to the speed at which 
nations embrace the globalization process, and he refers to the Russian and Asian 
financial crises, which he claims were triggered by “imprudent and hasty freeing 
of capital flows.” Therefore, he asserts, “globalisation must be managed so that its 
fundamentally benign effects are assured and reinforced. Without this wise 
management, it is imperiled and at risk.”170 However, the adherents of the 
Washington Consensus, like Bhagwati, see no inherent fault in this particular 
ideological brand of globalization, which they still maintain contributes to 
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economic growth — the benefits of which will “trickle down” to eliminate 
economic disparities amongst the world’s poor.  
 
Victims of globalization come from diverse walks of life. Poverty, both urban and 
rural, urbanization, deforestation, annihilation of indigenous cultures and ways of 
living, deterioration of democratic processes, increased fragmentation of society 
and the marginalization of the weak and minorities are some of the many sins 
further attributable to the process of globalization which contributes to the many 
poverties of South Asia:171  
 
Gross poverty and inequalities have worsened quite dramatically in the last two 
decades in South Asia. The multiple dimensions of poverty include unequal 
access to assets, markets, and infrastructure and an uneven distribution of skills. 
The disparities in health and education among and within countries, and the 
impediments created by social barriers and norms are also dimensions of ill-
being. To these woes is added the vulnerability to adverse shocks, natural 
disasters, disease, and personal and political violence. Statistics obtained from the 
World Bank data sources indicate that despite recent growth and poverty 
reduction, South Asia still has nearly 400 million poor people (out of a 
population of 1.37 billion). 
 
In fact, exposure to globalization has initiated a chain of events in the Third 
World that is poignantly compared by Pakenham to colonialism generally:172 
 
First came the foreign bankers eager to lend at extortionate rates; then financial 
controllers to see that the interest was paid; then the thousands of foreign advisers 
taking their cut. Finally when the country was bankrupt and helpless, it was time 
for the foreign troops to ‘rescue’ the ruler from his ‘rebellious’ people. One last 
gulp and the country had gone.  
 
A cursory glance at the UNDP 2005 World Development Report illustrates the 
extent to which mass poverty and inequality have become entrenched globally:173  
 
Global integration is forging deeper interconnections between countries. In 
economic terms the space between people and countries is shrinking rapidly, as 
trade, technology and investment link all countries in a web of interdependence. 
In human development terms the space between countries is marked by deep and, 
in some cases, widening inequalities in income and life chances. One-fifth of 
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humanity live in countries where many people think nothing of spending $2 a day 
on a cappuccino. Another fifth of humanity survive on less than $1 a day and live 
in countries where children die for want of a simple anti-mosquito bed net.  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that the assertion that the neo-liberal form of 
globalization is the only viable means of achieving economic growth and 
development is no longer tenable. Alternative visions of human development 
based on different global and regional structures are being articulated both within 
the developed and the developing world. As Cavanagh and Manders observe:174 
 
[A]fter decades of Margaret Thatcher and other globalisation cheerleaders telling 
us there were no alternatives, that fiction has been exposed. There are 
alternatives. Tens of thousands of them. The failing legitimacy of the institutions 
of global corporate rule combined with the political force of an enlivened civil 
society have created an unprecedented moment of opportunity to rethink and 
transform the institutions of economic life, advance the democratic project, and 
realise the ageless human dream of liberty, justice, and prosperity for all. 
 
 
 
 2.7 The Anti-Globalization Movement  
 
The contemporary globalization process claimed to have the potential to produce 
prosperity for all; the reality is its manifestations bring prosperity only to a select 
few, with penury, deprivation and misery for the rest.175 If globalization is not a 
new phenomenon in the evolutionary process of civilizations and has the proven 
potential to unleash unlimited benefits, there is also a place for scepticism, 
defiance and alternative visions to contemporary globalization.176  
 
Defiance to the dominant paradigm of globalization, and a demand for its better 
governance and alternative visions of globalization, are increasingly evident. This 
“[r]esistance is localized, regionalized, and globalized at the same time that 
economic globalisation slices across geopolitical borders.”177 While a single, 
monolithic theory of globalization is unlikely to emerge to displace the dominant 
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position enjoyed by its contemporary version, pockets of sporadic resistance in 
various forms nevertheless are emerging.  
Central to the contemporary globalization paradigm is the process of exclusion. 
The process of global integration through liberalization and deregulation is 
determined by the IFIs and certain powerful states excluding the masses from the 
deliberation and negotiation process of economic reform, for “[g]lobalization 
ultimately fortifies those with privilege. Premised on a market-based order, the 
new global political economy is closed to those who cannot be valorized.”178 This 
process of exclusion of large segments of the society from the globalization 
process is encountering justifiable resistance.179 Visible and violent protests 
against the contemporary trajectory of globalization are an all too familiar sight in 
the media today.180 During the past few years there have been incidents of mass 
public protest against globalization, particularly in London,181 Quebec,182 
Seattle,183 Genoa,184 and South Africa. The overwhelming public support for 
protesters at these events is an indication of the uniform attempt to reprise the 
forces of economic globalization from all quarters. The ferocity and the fervency 
of the protests and the obvious in-egalitarian manifestations of globalization, 
which are no longer denied, have resulted in the acquisition of a certain 
legitimacy by the anti-globalization discourse. However, this movement 
exclusively relates to political resistance to neo-liberal globalization and does not 
focus on alternative, more constructive visions.185  
 
Amidst the anti-globalization protests in various locations around the globe, 
individual defiance at grass-roots level focusing on alternative paradigms is also 
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evident.186 There is a plethora of academic and activists’ opposition documented 
through books,187 reports,188 films189 and street protests that have all contributed to 
the creation of a vast array of alternative thinking on globalization. Some, such as 
Shepard and Hayduk,190 see the creation of a global coalition, a coalescing of 
alternative visions aimed at displacing the dominant world view of globalization 
based on neo-liberalism. Others, such as Held and McGrew,191 analyse the 
contemporary character of globalization and highlight its negative aspects and 
advocate alternative visions, in this case proposing a potential future trajectory 
through cosmopolitan social democracy.  
 
In a similar vein, the report A Fair Globalisation Creating Opportunities for All192 
seeks to alter the character of globalization by infusing a “strong social dimension 
based on universally shared values, and respect for human rights and individual 
dignity; one that is fair, inclusive, democratically governed and provides 
opportunities and tangible benefits for all countries and people.” The report 
recommends that globalization should focus on people, facilitate the creation of 
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democratic and effective states, foster sustainable development, encourage 
productive and equitable markets and promote fairer rules of engagement and the 
creation of a globalization that has greater accountability to people, which it seeks 
to bring about through the strengthening of the United Nations.   
 
The main contention of the protest is that the current process of globalization has 
no room for participation, access, transparency, and accountability at the policy 
formulation stage, although these policies are ultimately prescribed to individual 
states to create iniquitous frameworks that violate not only socioeconomic but civil 
and political rights as well.193 In fact, a positive consequence of globalization has 
been the coalescing of activists on issues as diverse as child labour, the 
environment, anti-capitalism, Third World debt, and human rights, creating an 
international grass-roots movement that strives towards a common agenda for the 
marginalized.194 They have the added advantage of being able to add value to the 
existing debate by stressing issues such as democracy, equity and justice which, 
when articulated by the dominant discourse, are dismissed as mere rhetoric.  
 
This activism, however ardently articulated, emerges from a wide range of 
affected interests, which are not necessarily harmonious or even coherently 
related. This incoherency in anti-globalization politics directly relates to the lack 
of a paradigmatic framework to address the concerns of an alternative paradigm. 
There is an urgent need to work out a pragmatic solution that addresses the 
diverse concerns at ground level. The image that the anti-globalization movement 
presents today appears to focus only on the short-term protest rather than seeking 
a long-term global policy framework through which tangible change could be 
achieved.195 However, the movement has initiated a process in which the global 
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discontent about the nature and content of contemporary globalization can be 
voiced. The inherent potential of the anti-globalization movement is explained by 
Sen:196 
The anti-globalisation protests can be productive not because globalisation is an 
evil in itself. Indeed, far from it. Even the anti-globalisation protests are part of 
the general process of globalisation, from which there is no escape and no great 
reason to seek escape. But there are critically important issues that need to be 
addressed in the mixed world of massive comfort and extreme misery in which 
we live — often far too peacefully and complacently. There is a need to reduce 
the contrast between our universe of remarkable possibilities and the stubborn 
prevalence of relentless deprivation. 
 
At the moment numerous grass-roots movements carry out such work, albeit for a 
common cause. However, a sustained framework of action on a global scale 
would better respond to the adverse impact of policy formulation by multilateral 
institutions and help in the creation of common legal and constitutional structures 
and standards that would address the negative impact of the iniquitous and unjust 
manifestations of globalization.  
 
There are numerous individual efforts by grass-roots movements that comprise 
victims, activists and bureaucrats who have successfully strived for a change in 
terms of policy formulation. The most successful of such endeavours in Sri Lanka 
was perhaps the sustained opposition by environmental activists and bureaucrats 
against the implementation of the US Government Tropical Forest Conservation 
Act of 1998 (TFCA).197 In a measure that was portrayed as an answer to the 
country's unpaid debt problem and a means of preserving natural resources and 
bio-diversity, especially in the tropical forests, the US government introduced a 
new concept. A closer scrutiny of the measures suggested, however, indicated that 
it was a nature swap — in exchange for the debt owed by Sri Lanka to the US, Sri 
Lanka was to implement conservation mechanisms designed and monitored by the 
US to protect tropical forests of Sri Lanka including the Sinharaja forest which is 
declared a world heritage site by the UNICEF.  
 
If the TFCA was implemented, Sri Lanka's most pristine forests — the Sinharaja 
rainforest, Peak Wilderness, Namunukula forest and the Knuckles forest range — 
                                                 
196 Amartya K Sen “Globalization, Inequality and Global Protest” (2002) 45 Development 11–16. 
197 <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/forestry/tfca.html> (accessed 8 Jun 2006). 
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would be managed under the aegis of the US.198 The Act, according to a US 
Embassy press release, would allow developing countries to shed their debt 
burden, while helping them to preserve natural forests. In consultation with the 
US government the debtor country could set up a fund or board consisting of local 
NGO representatives to preserve tropical forests. The value of debt would be 
converted to local currency and programmes initiated by the board would be paid 
in local value. There was so much vehement opposition to this proposition by 
both the environmental NGOs and the state bureaucracy that plans to implement 
the TFCA were abandoned. The success of the All India Insurance Employees 
Association (AIIEA), which is the strongest workers’ union in the financial sector 
and which represents the most unionized industry in India, prevents the insurance 
industry from being completely sold to private and foreign interests and is another 
example of popular resistance to economic globalization forces.199 
 
The constantly vigilant and innovative judiciary of India also resisted the policy 
of privatization by issuing a stay order against the stake sale of Hindustan 
Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd 
(BPCL), two of the largest oil companies in India, creating a major setback to the 
disinvestment drive.200 In its final verdict on a petition challenging the 
disinvestment of the two oil majors, the Supreme Court said that the central 
government should obtain Parliament's approval for selling its stake in the two 
state-run oil companies. The Court went on to elaborate by stating that the central 
government could not go ahead with the disinvestment of HPCL and BPCL 
without amending the Parliamentary Act through which the two companies were 
privatized in the 1970s. The decision indicated that the Supreme Court was wary 
that the government was not adhering to its own avowed policy on privatization, 
which was rationalized on the basis that the government will privatize inefficient 
public enterprises, not efficient ones. 
                                                 
198 “America's pound of tropical flesh”  Sunday Observer 19 August 2001. 
199 <http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99mar03/biz.htm> (accessed at 8 June 2006) and for a 
second phase of resistance see (2001) 18 Frontline Magazine 
<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2106/fl210600.htm> (accessed 7 Mar 2005). 
200 “The government had taken the advice of the Advocate General, who believed that the 
disinvestment of government equity in the two entities did not require parliamentary sanction. The 
government then proceeded to disinvest the two companies. However, this decision to sell the oil 
majors was challenged and Writ petitions were filed in public interest directly before the Supreme 
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.” Supreme Court of India [2003] AIR  SC250. 
See also “A brake on sale of oil majors” (2003) 20 Frontline Magazine 
<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2106/fl210600.htm> (accessed at 7 March 2005). 
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Perhaps one of the most resounding rejections of the neo-liberal globalization 
juggernaut occurred through democratic process in the 2004 General Election of 
India. The ruling nationalist BJP-led alliance dissolved Parliament and went for 
an early election, secure in the knowledge that amid an economic boom and 
promising attempts of peace between Pakistan and India it would be voted back 
into power. However, the election result was an unexpected yet resounding vote 
for the opposition Congress party. The BBC's Adam Mynott, analysing the 
outcome of the elections, observed that the masses ignored by the globalization 
process promoted by the governing BJP had spoken against the iniquitous 
process.201 The results indicated that millions of rural poor marginalized by the 
rapid economic globalization process epitomized by the “India Shining” campaign 
used their democratic right to protest. The result is also seen as a rejection of the 
BJP’s Hindus-first position in favour of the secularism of the Congress party. 
 
 
2.8 Reconceptualizing Globalization   
 
The contemporary South Asian state is being constricted between the twin 
pressures of globalization externally and political and economic challenges 
internally. On the external front the state is constantly urged by the multilateral 
institutions and donor agencies to conform to the neo-liberal model by further 
deregulation and greater integration. Resistance on an individual state basis 
appears to be impossible; at best the developing states can only exercise marginal 
influence over the forces that shape and determine global finance or markets. The 
states that sought integration into the global capitalist system through 
liberalization, financial aid, debt and structural adjustment policies have now 
become subservient to the global markets for their very existence.202 However, an 
intriguing twist to the scenario is the formation of the G 22 –1 at the Cancun 
WTO Foreign Ministerial Summit in Mexico in September 2003. A group of 
developing states (the G-21) has been able to present a coherent stand against 
                                                 
201 Gandhi triumphs in Indian election <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3712201.stm> 
(at 12 Jan 2005). 
202 See Chapter 3 of this study. 
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unfair structures that discriminate against them in world trade.203 It is as yet 
premature to judge the success of Cancun as the viability and the future of the 
coalition are uncertain. However, if effectively consolidated “the emergence of 
state-civil society coalitions, aided by the increasing power of middle-ranking 
countries, may mount a serious challenge to western hegemony over the long-
term.”204 Palley agrees that such a coalition consolidated could be tantamount to a 
crucial challenge to Euro-American hegemony of the world economy and to the 
supremacy of the neo-liberal economic ideology.205 
 
The triumph and the confidence with which the multilateral institutions and the 
proponents of economic globalization have exalted its virtues have waned as the 
gruelling evidence of abject poverty and marginalization, in direct consequence of 
the mismanagement of the globalization process, emerges. The World Bank itself 
has of late adopted a cautious approach whereby in a strategy paper it 
recommends the creation of social protection programmes (safety nets) for those 
rendered vulnerable from the economic development process and its 
downturns.206 Similarly, in its annual World Development Report,207 the World 
Bank acknowledges that it is imprudent to totally withdraw the state from all 
spheres of economic activity or abandon its regulatory function. In an ironic twist 
of positions the World Bank requests that the nation states play an interventionist 
role (actively discouraged in the past) and recreate the welfarist measures, nurture 
social safety nets and rekindle their regulatory functions to provide a bulwark 
against the economic downturns. 
 
This implies that there is a need for a reconceptualization of the policies and 
instruments of international trade, investment and finance, the core ingredients of 
contemporary globalization. Such a reconceptualization must cease treating 
human rights issues as peripheral to the formulation and operation of 
globalization. Concentrating on human rights as the pivotal point in the new 
                                                 
203 Balakrishnan Rajagopal “A New Opportunity in Cancun's Failure Alliance of civil society and 
developing country governments could alter global trade rules” Yale Global 3 December 2003 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2937> (accessed 23 Mar 2005). 
204 Ibid. 
205 Thomas I Palley “After Cancun: Possibilities for a New North-South Grand Bargain on Trade” 
Foreign Policy In Focus (NM: Inter-hemispheric Resource Center, Silver City, 2003). 
206 R Holzmann et al. Social Protection Sector Strategy: From Safety Net to Springboard by World 
Bank (World Bank Publication, 2003). 
207 The World Bank "Attacking Poverty" 2000/01 World Development Report 
<http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2001/overview.htm> (accessed at 3 Mar 2006). 
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reconceptualization process has the advantage of formulating a new regime that is 
not geographic, racial or historically specific. It can focus on humanity 
irrespective of political and economic power structures.  
 
Reforms can include managing the process of globalization through the creation 
of a normative framework, which is equitable in operation. Targets, such as 
ensuring the benefits of international trade, technological and scientific 
advancements are shared equitably by all, are achievable ends in a world that is 
not segmented along economic, political or social lines. In so far as the traditional 
system of rights is inadequate to deal with the new demands made by the 
globalization process, mechanisms for the vindication and protection of human 
rights would have to be more broad-based and innovative. The reforms envisaged 
for a new globalization paradigm are neither unrealistic nor unachievable, for, as 
Shiva comments in the quotation that opened this chapter, “economic 
globalization has become a war against nature and the poor. But the rules of 
globalisation are not god-given [and] can be changed ....”208 
 
The quintessential character of neutral phenomena is their pliancy. Therefore, the 
contemporary attributes that have been acquired by globalization are not 
inexorable or inevitable. As much as there is a Washington-Consensus or Anglo-
American (or Euro-American, or Japanese-Euro-American, or Western) definition 
of globalization there is the potential to define the character of globalization 
taking into consideration the core values of whichever region is under 
consideration.  
 
There exist other examples of different methods in which the states, particularly in 
East Asia, have handled globalization. From the onset, East Asian states 
attempted to control the terms on which they engaged with the global economy. 
Their growth was based on taking advantage of the global market for exports and 
on closing the technology gap with the developed world. Perceiving that it was 
not merely the disparities in capital and other resources that separated the 
developed from the less-developed countries, but also differences in technological 
knowledge, East Asia took advantage of the globalization process itself to reduce 
                                                 
208 Vandana Shiva “Globalisation and Poverty” in Veronika Bennhodlt-Thomson and Nicholas 
Faraclas There is an Alternative (Zed Books, London, 2001). 
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this disparity. While some of the countries in the region grew by opening 
themselves up to multinational companies, others, such as Korea and Taiwan, 
grew by creating their own enterprises. Another discerning element of the East 
Asian response to globalization is that the state remained active in the process of 
economic growth using industrial capitalism as a tool. The lack of regulation of 
investments, particularly financial markets, and the disastrous socioeconomic 
consequences, indicate that the terms of engagement relating to economic 
globalization by East Asia were deeply flawed209 but it nevertheless remained a 
unique way of approaching globalization. 
 
Other new approaches to handle and manage globalization are being 
experimented with elsewhere in the world.210 The “Beijing Consensus”, China’s 
initiative towards better management of development, was prompted by the need 
for a more equitable, non-aggressive and more human-centred developmental 
process that questioned the legitimacy of the drives for liberalization, privatization 
and free trade in their contemporary form. Ramo, in his analysis of the initiative, 
hastens to say that it is not a particular doctrine, for the Beijing Consensus does 
not prescribe a solution to every crisis of globalization but projects it more in 
terms of a defensive or reactionary process to contemporary globalization.211 The 
above examples indicate that there are diverse means of approaching 
globalization, determining the pace and content of change, rejecting the basic 
tenets of the Washington Consensus, which argues for a minimalist role for 
government and rapid privatization and liberalization. 
 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
The present chapter defined the contemporary articulations of globalization and 
observed that the concept enjoyed a long history dating back to the early 
civilizations. The study also analysed the impact of globalization on the nation 
                                                 
209 JE Stiglitz “The Insider-What I learned at the world economic crisis” (2000) New Republic 
<http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/Joseph-Stiglitz-IMF17apr00.htm> (accessed 12 Nov 2005). 
210 Joshua Cooper The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power (Foreign 
Policy Centre, Great Britain, 2004). 
211 Joshua Cooper Ramo “The Beijing Consensus” 
<http://time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/washingtonconsensus/beijingconsensusen.pdf> (accessed at 28 
Mar 2006). 
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state and society. The discussion also considered the distinct neo-liberal bias of 
the contemporary globalization and the repercussions it has generated, particularly 
the anti-globalization movement.  
 
This study observes that globalization is a neutral concept with the capacity to 
promote a variety of values and ideologies. To condemn globalization as 
Westernization or to equate the globalization paradigm with neo-liberalist 
capitalism is not only futile; it also precludes us from taking advantage of the 
positive benefits that lie latent within the concept. As Amartya Sen asserts:212 
 
… [t]he central issue of contention is not globalisation itself, nor is it the use of 
the market as an institution, but the inequity in the overall balance of institutional 
arrangements — which produces very unequal sharing of the benefits of 
globalisation. The question is not just whether the poor, too, gain something from 
globalisation, but whether they get a fair share and a fair opportunity. There is an 
urgent need for reforming institutional arrangements — in addition to national 
ones — in order to overcome both the errors of omission and those of 
commission that tend to give the poor across the world such limited 
opportunities. Globalisation deserves a reasoned defence, but it also needs 
reform. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this study will discuss the devastating manifestations of 
contemporary globalization with its neo-liberal bias in South Asia. The increased 
dissatisfaction with the contemporary globalization process and the backlash 
against the governmental liberalization and privatization policies, which 
progressively assume sinister forms, will be the focus of these chapters.  
 
The Indian subcontinent has a long civilizational history founded on tolerance and 
a strong sense of humanism.213 Its societies are founded on values such as equity, 
pluralism, self-reliance, and non-violence. The region has long cherished its 
subsistence economies and the consumerist culture that the West promotes is 
viewed with a degree of scepticism. The South Asian region with its unique and 
complex ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions cannot simply ape models and 
solutions formulated in other regions to manage globalization and envisage their 
successful implementation. The region has the capacity to design its own direction 
of economic and social development preserving its core values and its identity and 
                                                 
212 Amartya Sen “How to Judge Globalism” (2002) 13 The American Prospect 1–14.   
<http://people.cis.ksu.edu/~ab/Miscellany/globalism.html> (accessed at 18 Nov 2007). 
213 See Chapter 1 of this study. 
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not be coerced to accept the iniquitous and the non-egalitarian facets of 
contemporary globalization. 
 
The new regional praxis that is advocated in Chapter 6 of this study promotes a 
conceptual framework to manage globalization, according precedence to regional 
concerns that include the need for accountable governance, respect for human 
rights and human development rather than unmitigated global market demands.          
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 AGENTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY 
GLOBALIZATION  
 
“Those who eat their fill speak to the hungry of the wonderful times to come. Those who 
lead the country to the abyss call ruling too difficult for ordinary men.”1 
 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
The previous chapter traced the trajectory of globalization and South Asia’s trysts 
with its various incarnations. It drew attention to what this study calls generically 
the “contemporary” phase of globalization — which coincides closely with 
Hopkins’ “post-colonial” phase, and which took real shape after World War II. 
This whole contemporary phase spanning 60 years coincided not only with a new 
wave of independence struggles by the colonies as noted by Hopkins, but also 
with the very first truly global wave of human rights regimes, whose international 
agents (from the UN down) and international instruments (from the UDHR 
onwards) arose, like the seminal agents discussed in this chapter (the World Bank 
and IMF), out of the ashes of the same global conflagration: World War II. Thus, 
the trajectory of economic globalization traced in Chapter 2 can be seen to have 
run parallel to the trajectory of internationalized — one could say “globalized” — 
human rights regimes traced in Chapter 1. However, as the ensuing discussion 
illustrates, the relationship between these two phenomena is extremely 
unbalanced.  
 
Chapter 2 also discussed the impact of contemporary globalization on the state, 
nationhood and human rights in South Asia. Of sharpest concern was the impact 
of the neo-liberal genus of the broader “contemporary” species of globalization, 
which has gained ascendancy in that species during the last 30 years. The chapter 
concluded that if South Asia is to avoid being a victim of, specifically, this neo-
liberal version of contemporary globalization then the region must determine its 
own terms of engagement with the process.  
                                                 
1 Bertolt Brecht “From A German War Primer” in Poems 1913–1956 (Methuen Limited, Great 
Britain, 1976). 
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This chapter focuses on several related issues. Firstly, it traces the roots of the 
drive for development in the former colonies; it observes the varied forms 
“development” has adopted, and the role of the IFIs as the initiators and policy-
setting, rule-making, public agents of contemporary globalization ever since 
Bretton Woods. The term IFIs is widely understood, and is used here, to mean the 
IMF and the World Bank. This chapter further identifies the TNCs as the private 
agents that have been the biggest commercial players and the primary 
beneficiaries of all contemporary globalization, but especially its neo-liberal form. 
The chapter traces the manner in which the TNCs consolidated their operations on 
a global scale and were assisted in doing so by the conducive economic 
environment and skewed rules of the economic game under-pinned by neo-
liberalism promoted by the IFIs and also the WTO.  
 
The present chapter describes the historical circumstances of the economic crisis 
that precipitated the rise of specifically neo-liberal development policies that is 
synonymous with that subset of contemporary globalization that predominated 
under the Washington Consensus from the late 1970s. The key instruments of that 
process will be identified as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) of that 
period, followed eventually by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
that aimed to rectify the incongruity of the SAPs. The chapter considers the 
manner in which developmental policy formulation that was left in the hands of 
the IFIs has enhanced the agenda of the mainstream which, since the late 1970s, 
continues to be  based on the ideals of neo-liberalism.2 This acquired ideological 
bias of the World Bank and the IMF prescribes policies aimed at “reorienting the 
economic structures and policies of indebted and impoverished Third World 
societies, [but which,] far from being designed to make the world order equitable, 
are addressed to the overall good of the world’s hegemonic economies, in all their 
complexity and contradiction” at the cost of the developing world.3 The 
                                                 
2 Noam Chomsky Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (Seven Stories Press, New 
York, 1998). 
3 Upendra Baxi “Voices of suffering and the future of Human Rights” (1988) 8 Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems 167. 
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socioeconomic costs of the neo-liberal policy formulations are discussed in the 
context of South Asia.4  
 
Returning to the parallel but unbalanced trajectories identified in Chapters 1 and 2 
of the internationalization human rights and economic globalization, this 
Chapter’s analysis of the repercussions of SAPs and PRSPs will highlight how 
economic globalization has challenged the cocooned existences of both human 
rights and economic development regimes. The contemporary international 
economic and human rights regimes, two parallel post-World War II 
developments, have evolved to cater to the global requirements in their respective 
fields. These parallel developments have strived for efficient and optimal systems 
for the enhancement of international human rights and international economic 
development. International development was supposedly meant in a disingenuous 
aggregation, to benefit “the whole globe”, as much as human rights also were.  
However, the rights regime and the economic development regime were not 
synthesized or given any kind of equal footing; rather, as has been seen, they were 
conveniently separated, causing a dysfunctional and highly asymmetric 
relationship between them. 
 
Chapter 3, nevertheless, also underlines the positive outcomes of the donor-driven 
developmental process, particularly issues such as the capacity for mobilization of 
civil society and the articulation of good governance, both a by-product of the 
PRSPs. This chapter concludes with the observation that the present isolation of 
the human rights regime from the development regime adversely affects millions 
of people across, specifically, South Asia. The analysis emphasizes the need to 
focus on human-centred development and economic growth, separating them 
from neo-liberal ideological foundations, and to seek a just and workable 
rationalization between the two disciplines and trajectories of human rights and 
development.  
 
 
3.2 Objects of Early Global Development Initiatives (1930s–1970s)  
                                                 
4 The discussion of the IFIs’ policy formulation and their impact is limited to South Asia, though 
relevant research from other developing regions has been relied upon on occasion to enhance the 
discussion. 
 148 
 
The idea of development and the need to provide assistance and aid to the “under- 
developed” former colonial territories gained global currency simultaneously with 
the initiatives to provide financial assistance and policy guidance to rehabilitate 
war-torn Europe in the early 1950s. The encouragement to pursue a particular 
trajectory of development was contained in the inaugural congressional speech of 
President Truman in January 1949.5 Truman noted that the majority of the world 
still lived in “underdeveloped areas” and that a central mission of his presidency 
was to transform the world because “[t]heir poverty is a handicap and a threat 
both to them and to more prosperous areas.”6 Therefore Sachs observes that, 
“[c]lothing self-interest in generosity, Truman outlined a program of technical 
assistance designed to ‘relieve the suffering of these peoples’ through ‘industrial 
activities’ and promote ‘a higher standard of living’.”7 
 
Truman’s pledge in fact also ensured allegiance to the West and to capitalism, in 
the context of the Cold War.8 Since then “development” has been both sought by 
the decolonized world and imposed on it by the United States of America and the 
UN, its allied agencies and other international developmental agencies, which 
form the core of the mainstream developmental drive. Since the Programme of 
Action of the first UN Developmental Decade of 1960–1970 pronounced that the 
“problem with the underdeveloped countries is not just growth, but 
development,”9 various attempts were made to integrate economic growth with 
specific aspects of development, such as environmental concerns, rural 
development and gender issues. The development rhetoric expanded the 
conceptual analysis from “another development” as conceptualized by the Dag 
Hammarskjold Foundation in 197510 to a “basic needs approach” by the ILO in 
                                                 
5 David Simon and Klaus Dodds “Introduction: Rethinking Geographies of North-South 
Development” (1998) 19 Third World Quarterly 595–606; G John Ikenberry “The Myth of Post-
Cold War Chaos” 1996 Foreign Affairs 71–96. 
6 <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030> (accessed  13 Jan 2006) 
7 Wolfgang Sachs “Development: A guide to the ruins” [1992] New Internationalist 232.  
8 Wolfgang Sachs (ed) Development Dictionary, A guide to Knowledge as Power (Zed Books, 
London, 1997) 2–3. 
9 UN Development Decade – Programme of Action (UN Dept of Economics and Social Affairs, 
New York, 1962). 
10 “What now? Dag Hammarskjöld report on development and international cooperation 
Development and International Cooperation” (1975) 1/2 Development Dialogue 1−128. 
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197611 and then to “integrated development” from UNESCO in 1977.12 Crucially, 
the IFIs’ assumption of their role as chief protagonists of the development agenda 
was another natural milestone. The IFIs continued with the mainstream 
intellectual assumptions relating to development with greater emphasis on global 
financial streamlining and multilateral management. 
 
 
3.3 The Genesis of Globalization’s Key Public Agents, the International 
Financial Institutions 
 
This section briefly surveys the genesis of the IFIs, the rationale for their 
establishment, and policy frameworks that are in place for the promotion of global 
economic growth.13 Their contemporary role in the global economy will be 
discussed later in relation to the SAPs and PRSPs.14  
 
The foundations of the contemporary global economic order pre-date the 
conclusion of World War II. The financial crisis of the 1930s highlighted the 
absence of a mechanism to monitor global financial relations, and the idea of a 
multilateral mechanism was mooted with vigour during the aftermath of the Great 
Depression.15 World War II and the resultant economic devastation required a 
systematic restructuring of the Western European economic order. It is in this 
context that the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 explored the idea of an 
international regulatory mechanism with limited supra-national authority to 
supervize and direct the global monetary regime and the economic reconstruction. 
 
An institution for international monetary regulation (the IMF) and a multilateral 
entity for the channelling of capital for economic reconstruction (the World Bank) 
were conceptually innovative, as capital transfers had been the exclusive domain 
                                                 
11 Ajit Singh “The Basic Needs Approach to Development vs. The New International Economic 
Order: The Significance of Third World Industrialization” (1979) 7 World Development 586. 
12 Gustavo Esteva “Development” in Wolfgang Sachs (ed) Development Dictionary, A guide to 
Knowledge as Power (Zed Books, London, 1997) 10–18. 
13 The discussion will focus on the IMF and the World Bank, although identical policies were 
implemented by other multilateral development banks (MDBs), bilateral aid agencies and donor 
countries as loan and aid conditionalities. 
14 For the organizational structure of the IFIs and their main functions, refer Appendix D.   
15 Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M Taylor “The Great Depression as a Watershed: International 
Capital Mobility over the Long Run” (1997) NBER Working Paper No. W5960. 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w5960.pdf > (accessed 27 Sep 2006). 
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of private markets or bilateral agreements.16 The planning for post-war monetary 
reconstruction and the ideas for a global institutionalized financial regulatory 
mechanism came largely from the Treasuries of the UK and USA. Although 40 
allied countries and one neutral member (Argentina) participated in the Bretton 
Woods Conference, its proceedings were dominated by Harry Dexter White from 
the USA and John Maynard Keynes from the UK. These two countries most 
shaped the new international economic order, though more so the USA17, 
reflecting its greater economic power. 18 
 
The IMF and the World Bank were significant creations of the Bretton Woods 
Conference in three respects. The Conference created the first global financial 
regulatory mechanism that administered rules relating to currency values and 
conversions. Secondly, the system provided capital transfers for economic 
reconstruction and development, and assistance for countries with balance of 
payments issues, by injecting capital to manage such crises on a short-term basis. 
Thirdly, the system was a source of intellectual inspiration and institutional 
support on issues of monetary co-operation and capital liquidity, while respecting 
the principle of national sovereignty. The original proposal for the WTO’s 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), also dates to 
the Bretton Woods Conference.19 
 
 
3.3.1 Key Private Agents: Transnational Corporations as Epiphytes of the 
International Financial Institutions 
 
This section focuses on the nature and social impact of TNCs, which have 
benefited immensely from the IFIs’ neo-liberal economic philosophy manifested 
in the form of the two main instruments to be discussed below: the SAPs and the 
                                                 
16 Michael Gavin and Dani Rodrik “The World Bank in Historical Perspective”  (1995) 85 The 
American Economic Review 329–334.  
17 Richard N Gardner Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: the origins and prospects of our International 
Economic Order (McGraw-Hill, USA, 1969) (Gardner). 
18 “In Washington Lord Halifax once whispered to Lord Keynes: / It's true they have the money 
bags /But we have all the brains.” Quoted in Gardner  above n 17, 21.  
19 Peter Van den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005) 79–80. 
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subsequent PRSPs.20 TNCs, opportunistic profit-seekers, flourished naturally on 
the back of the IFIs and in this sense can be called their epiphytes.  
 
TNCs are “legally discrete entities (i.e. companies) established in several 
countries, forming a single economic unit (enterprise) which engages in 
operations transcending national borders under the direction of a sole decision-
making centre.”21 The ten  largest TNCs in the world have their headquarters in 
the USA and the UK and their shareholders are drawn from Europe and North 
America.22 TNCs can relocate their operations anywhere to maximize profit. Thus 
fiscal incentives, cheap labour, flexible legal regimes, lax health and safety 
regulations and poor environmental protection conditionalities are corollaries 
through which countries in the developing world compete against each other to 
attract TNCs.23  
 
The crucial role that the TNCs play in global finance is illustrated by the volume 
and diversity of their activities.24 According to the World Investment Report of 
2003, 7,000 TNCs in 1970 had multiplied into 64,000, with 870,000 global 
affiliates that controlled nearly 30 per cent of world GDP.25 The World 
Development Report of the World Bank 2001 data indicate that less than 60 states 
have GNPs of US$ 20 billion in contrast to the estimation of Fortune Global 500 
list of TNCs in 2001 which indicated that 245 of them had annual revenues of 
more than UD$ 20 billion.26 Kinley and Tadaki call them the “driving agents of 
the global economy” with “considerable political leverage in both domestic and 
                                                 
20 Noreena Hertz The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of 
Democracy (Free Press, New York, 2002). 
21 A Fatouros “Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility” in Richard B Lillich 
(ed) International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, 1983) 362. 
22 General Electric (US), Exxon Mobil (US), Microsoft (US), Pfizer (US), Citigroup (US), Wal-
Mart Stores (US), BP (UK), American International Group (US), Bank of America (US), Royal 
Dutch/Shell (Netherlands/UK), The World’s 100 Largest Public Companies, as determined by The 
Wall Street Journal Market Data Group 31 Aug 2004. 
23 Cristina Baez et al. “Multinational Enterprises and Human Right” (1999/2000) 8 University of 
Miami Int’l & Comp L Rev 244–246.  
24  Strachan claims that of the world’s biggest 100 economies only 49 are countries and 51 are 
corporations: Graham Strachan 2001 “Stopping the rot about globalisation” 
<http://www.overflow.net.au/~bizbrief/article_1.htm> (accessed 17 May 2006). 
25 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report 2003 (United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2003) 14. 
26 Leslie Sklair “Competing Conceptions of Globalization” in Christopher K Chase-Dunn and 
Salvatore J Babones (eds) Global Social Change: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (John 
Hopkins University Press, USA, 2006) 61. 
 152 
international spheres.”27 The TNCs operate within national economies in several 
ways. They can directly invest and be in charge of the operations or conduct 
business through outsourcing. In the case of South Asia, many of the TNCs 
operate through outsourcing as this is the most profitable and least responsible 
way of operating.28  
 
TNCs are a valued source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for the developing 
world and their sphere of operations extends beyond the traditional Export-
Processing Zone (EPZ). The deregularization process under SAPs has enabled the 
TNCs to penetrate into areas beyond industry and production.29 TNCs are now 
involved as service providers in healthcare, education, infrastructure 
construction.30 Not only do their activities transform the urban industrial sector, 
but their sphere of influence permeates into the rural society as they become 
active in domestic markets such as food, agricultural products, medicine and 
textiles. Operating under the neo-liberal economic agenda, TNCs are primarily 
motivated by profit. The wider issues of equitable economic growth, development 
and social justice have not entered into their realms of consideration until 
recently.31 The concerns over the operations of the TNCs range from their global 
financial role to the impact on global environment, their accent on profits above 
social goals and individual states’ impotency to regulate their activities.  
 
 
3.3.2 New strategies of global development: restructuring the “Third 
World” from the late 1970s onward  
 
Although the freedom of policy formulation for global economics was vested with 
the WB and the IMF at inception, neither institution did much to manipulate or 
                                                 
27 David Kinley and Junko Tadaki “From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law” (2003–2004) 44 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 931–1024. 
28 Jedrzej George Frynas “The Transnational Garment Industry in South and South East Asia: A 
Focus on Labour Rights” in Jedrzej George Frynas and Scott Pegg (eds) Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights (Palgrave McMillan, Hampshire, New York, 2003).   
29 P Athukorala and S Rajapatirana  Liberalization and Industrial Transformation: Sri Lanka in 
International Perspective  (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New Delhi, 2000). 
30 Feyza Bhatti and Shazra Murad “Health Conditions and Service Delivery in South Asia” [2006] 
South Asian Journal 14. 
<http://www.southasianmedia.net/magazine/Journal/previousissues14.htm> (accessed 17 Jun 
2007). 
31 This aspect of their operations is discussed later in this chapter. 
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reformulate the economic policies of individual states in the developing world 
until the late 1970s. Intervention became inevitable with the poor performance of 
the heavily debt-ridden economies and when debt repayment snowballed into a 
global financial crisis during that decade.  
 
The shift of focus of the IFIs from being still partly on the European economies 
devastated during World War II to more exclusively the poverty-stricken and/or 
Communism-prone poor states, grew gradually from the global financial disasters 
between 1970 and 1980.32 The USA, Western Europe and their dependent 
economies during the 1970s experienced two recessions largely due to rising oil 
prices that fuelled inflation and interest rises. The demand of these states for 
commodity exports from developing countries consequently fell, while the prices 
of goods manufactured in the industrial world conversely increased.33  
 
The origin of the debt crisis, though commonly attributed to the above, was also 
the result of two further factors. The first is the poor financial policy formulation 
of the IMF and the lackadaisical monitoring of loan repayments by the World 
Bank in the 1970s. The transfer of what were known as petrodollars, in terms of 
loans from the oil producing countries to low/middle-income countries in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, was perceived to be potentially lucrative. This scheme 
was initiated by Western commercial banks under the aegis of the World Bank. 
The transfer of funds was done with no risk assessments and the entire process 
was poorly managed. 
 
The second cause for crisis is the financial mismanagement by the debtor states.34 
During the Cold War loan allocation was often based on political affiliation 
without prior risk assessments. Loans were rarely utilized for the intended 
purposes such as infrastructure development projects or income generating 
projects, but were often misused or misappropriated. The donors conditioned 
                                                 
32 Peter Korner et al. The IMF and the Debt Crisis: A Guide to the Third World’s Dilemma (Zed 
Books Ltd, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1986) 5–73, 128–187. 
33 P Krugman “External shocks and domestic policy responses” in R Dornbusch and FLCH 
Helmers (eds) The Open Economy: Tools for policy makers in developing economies (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1988) 54–108. 
34 Oluwole Akanle Rescheduling of The External Debt (London Club, Article Reference: 
Document No.1, Chapter 3, February 1992) 
<http://www.unitar.org/dfm/Resource_Center/Document_Series/Document1/C_Akanle.htm> 
(accessed 8 Feb 2008).  
 154 
aid/financial assistance on establishing democratic governing processes, but these 
conditions were often ignored for political expediency.35 As ideas such as 
transparency, accountability and good governance had not gained the political 
currency they have today, sporadic condemnation did not have a lasting impact or 
change governmental practice.36  
 
At the initial stages the receiving countries were not perturbed by the prospect of 
repayment but welcomed the loans to settle immediate financial crises. With time, 
high rates of inflation and poor economic growth in the developing countries 
made interest payments impossible, for interest rates had risen from an average of 
0.5 per cent to an average of 13.1 per cent.37 This crisis initiated another round of 
borrowing for the purposes of refinancing the loans obtained previously.38 
 
The escalating oil prices, interest rate rises and balance of payment and loan 
repayment issues emphasized the structural weaknesses and policy inadequacies 
of the Bretton Woods institutions to manage the global financial process 
satisfactorily. It had also become apparent that financial contributions alone could 
not resolve the financial troubles of the developing economies, and that correction 
of inappropriate financial and trade policies was also required. 
 
The neo-liberal economic orthodoxy39 came into operation when the crisis point 
was reached with the Mexican Finance Minister declaring that Mexico would 
withhold debt repayments for three months in August 1982.40 The IMF and the 
World Bank, encouraged by the US Treasury, agreed to assist Mexico and 
reschedule the loans. However, conditions of such assistance included 
institutional and economic reforms termed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), 
                                                 
35 JFJ Toye et al. Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending  (Routledge, 
London, 1995). 
36 Patricia Adams Odious Debts (Earthscan, London, 1991); Devesh Kapur and Richard Webb 
Governance-related Conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions 
(UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/6 United Nations Publication, United Nations, © 2000). 
37 For background to debt issues see <http://www.debtireland.org/debt-issues/> (accessed 16 Jun 
2006). 
38 By the early 1980s, Africa's debt crisis was so grave that the ratio of Africa’s foreign debt to its 
export income grew to 500%. See Kevin Watkins et al. The Oxfam Poverty Report (Oxfam 
Publishing, Oxford, 1995) 74; see also  Jan Vandermootele “Are MDGs Affordable?” [2003] 
Development Policy Journal 1–21. 
39 David Harvey A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 29. 
40 Robert A Pastor (ed) Latin American Debt Crisis: Adjusting for the Past or Planning for the 
Future? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1987) 9.  
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which were privatization of state-owned enterprises, cuts in social welfare and 
governmental expenditure, the opening up of the economy and flexible labour 
laws. The prescriptions to Mexico were replicated globally. If the WB and the 
IMF now became more than ever pressed into service as the agents of neo-liberal 
economic globalization, the SAPs (and their successors) were the instruments. 
 
 
3.4 Key instruments: The ideological base and main features of Structural 
Adjustment Policies  
 
The “neo-liberal counter-revolution”41 was supported by orthodox economists 
such as Mandel, Krugman and Bhagwati.42 They all favoured the liberalization 
and integration of global markets as a means of promoting economic growth and 
eradicating poverty. It was also promoted with vigour by the right-wing leaders of 
the USA and the UK, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, in the 1980s.43 In 
contrast to the existing pessimism in the developing world relating to state-centric 
economic policies, the new paradigm which advocated market-driven economic 
growth for poverty eradication and development was burgeoning.44   
 
The World Bank and the IMF epitomized the West’s neo-liberalism45 and 
maintained that financial assistance alone would not stimulate economic growth, 
whereas policies merging domestic and global markets would.46 SAPs — the  
                                                 
41 JFJ Toye, Dilemmas of Development: reflections on the counter-revolution in  development 
economics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993). 
42 J Mandle “The Good Side of Going Global” [1997] Commonweal 
<http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-58400692.html> (accessed 12 Jan 2007); Jagadish N 
Bhagwati “Free Trade: Old and New Challenges” [1994] The Economic Journal 104 ; Paul 
Krugman Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Non-sense in the Age of Diminished 
Expectations (W. W. Norton, New York, 1994) and Ishrat Hussain  “Globalization and 
Liberalization: An Opportunity to Reduce Poverty” in UNCTAD Globalization and 
Liberalization: Effects of International Economic Relations on Poverty (United Nations, New 
York and Geneva, 1996). 
43 Walden Bello Dark Victory: US and Global Poverty  (Institute for Food and Development 
Policy, Oakland, 1994).  
44 J Bhagwati and A Krueger Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Liberalization 
Attempts and Consequences (Ballinger, Cambridge, 1978). 
45 Peter Korner et al. The IMF and the Debt Crisis: A Guide to the Third World’s Dilemma (Zed 
Books, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1986) 5–73 and 128–187. 
46 Vittorio Corbo et al (eds) Adjustment Lending Revisited: Policies to Restore Growth (World 
Bank Publication, 1992). 
 156 
“basic policy instrument of the neo-liberal resurgence”47 and supported by the 
“Washington Consensus”48 of Washington DC based institutions precisely the 
IMF World Bank and the US Treasury Department— catalysed that change and 
were justified by the failures of previous developmental efforts and the alleged 
prodigality of the developing world.49 The IFIs made loans and aid conditional 
upon the successful implementation of the SAPs and encouraged competition, 
price deregulation, and removal of subsidies and devaluations to correct 
imbalances of trade. Recipient countries had to establish monitoring regimes and 
safeguards conducive to foreign and private investment. Legislation promoting 
foreign investment, favourable taxation and labour market deregulation was also 
integral, as was a reduction in governmental size and expenditure — including on 
welfare — to decrease budget deficits and inflation,50 and privatization.51  
 
 
3.4.1 The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies 
 
SAPs differed radically from previous developmental theories in two aspects. 
Firstly, SAPs ensured the transformation of the state from an active participant in 
developmental processes to a passive facilitator of the neo-liberal market 
ideology. Secondly, SAPs were the catalyst that displaced the sacrosanct position 
held by the concept of non-interference in internal affairs of individual countries, 
hitherto strongly supported by the United Nations. 
                                                 
47 Karen Brock, Andrea Cornwall and John Gaventa “Power, Knowledge and Political Spaces in 
the Framing of Poverty Policy” (Working Paper No 143 Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 
Brighton, October 2001) 13. 
48 The Washington Consensus was synonymous with stabilization, liberalization and deregulation 
policies advocated by the IFIs. See J Williamson “What should the World Bank think about the 
Washington Consensus?” (2000) 15 The World Bank Research Observer 2. 
49 Thandika Mkandawire and Charles C. Soludo (eds) Our Continent Our Future. African 
Perspectives on Structural Adjustment (Africa World Press, 2001); Frances Steward Adjustment 
and Poverty: Options and Choices (Routledge, New York, 1995). 
50 Bella Balassa Structural adjustment policies in developing economies (Working Paper no. SWP 
464 1, World Bank Staff, 1981) and J.F.J. Toye Structural Adjustment & Employment Policy: 
Issues & Experience (International Labour Organization, 1995). 
51 Anna Gueorguieva and Katharine Bolt A Critical Review of the Literature on Structural 
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(Environmental Economics Series Research Paper No. 90, The World Bank, 2003). .  
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(accessed 16 Jun 2006); Vittorio Corbo and Stanley Fuscher “Structural Adjustment, Stabilization 
and Policy Reform Domestic and International Finance Development Economics” in J Behrman 
and TN Srinivasan (eds) Handbook of Development Economics Vol III (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
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The influence of the SAPs permeated every layer of the national economies, yet 
ignored the human dimension of growth and development.52 The IFIs manipulated 
domestic financial policy formulation and controlled public expenditure through 
the “Public Expenditure Reviews” (PERs).53 The PERs promoted cost-recovery 
on all public expenditure, causing deliberate extraction of payment for several 
essential public services such as healthcare, education, transport and public 
housing. These “austerity measures in the social sectors …have largely being 
responsible for the collapse of schools, health clinics and hospitals” in the 
developing world consolidating the cycle of poverty and marginalization.54  
 
The SAPs’ authoritarian implementation by the IFIs and their devastating social, 
political and economic impact initiated debates across international fora55, 
academia56 and the developing world. Criticisms focussed on their moral 
legitimacy and the impact on the universal human rights regime and whether the 
IFIs had an obligation to abide by the international human rights treaties. 
Globally, SAPs transferred resources from the South to the North. Loans 
continued to be serviced from funds that the countries could have utilized for 
development work.57 During the period from 1982 to 1989 total debt repayment 
amounted to $615 billion in interest and amortization, while debt to commercial 
banks soared from $493 to $629 billion .58 A great proportion of the loans 
obtained from the WB-IMF were utilized in debt servicing to banks on the basis 
                                                 
52 Paul Streeten “Structural Adjustment: A Survey of the Issues and Opinions” (1987) 15 World 
Development 1462–1482. 
53 S Pradhan A framework for evaluating the level and composition of public expenditures 
(Operations Evaluations Division (OED), World Bank, 1996).  
54This aspect is discussed in section 3.7.5 of this chapter. See also Michael Chossudovsky 
“Structural Adjustment” (1995) 24/25 Notebooks for Study and Research 59; Giles Mohan 
Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts (Routledge, London, 2000). 
55 J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights Preliminary report 
submitted by in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/8 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 
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nt> (accessed 15 Jun 2006); 
56 William Easterly “What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and growth 
with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans” (2005) 76 Journal of Development 
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57 Michel Chossudovsky The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms 
(Third World Network, Penang, 1997) 51. 
58 UNDP Human Development Report 1999 (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999). 
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of structural adjustment lending.59 Toussaint and Comanne identify the true 
benefactors of the SAPs and quote President Mitterand, who observed, “[d]espite 
the considerable sums spent on bilateral and multilateral aid, the flow of capital 
from Africa toward the industrial countries is greater than the flow of capital from 
the industrial countries to the developing countries.”60 An in-depth evaluation of 
these aspects and of the human dimension of IFIs’ policies relating to SAPs 
follows the discussion of SAPs in South Asia later in this chapter. 
 
 
3.4.2 End of the era of Structural Adjustment Policies 
 
As empirical evidence61 of the disastrous consequences of too much emphasis on 
economic growth emerged critics sought a synergy between human development 
and economic growth. Such a synergy has been called for repeatedly by the 
UNDP, which denied the efficacy of the trickle down theory let alone its equity.62  
The obvious question as to why those at the bottom deserve only the benefits that 
trickle down from the neo-liberal adjustment policies was also raised. This 
position is contrary to that of Dollar and Kraay, who argue that the emphasis on 
growth and exposure to global trade has no substantial adverse impact on the poor 
and that policy-induced growth is beneficial to the overall economy as it is to the 
poor.63 Therefore, even though the Bank and the Fund appear to have taken 
cognizance of the human dimension in the developmental paradigm, issues such 
as the eradication of poverty and human development are largely seen through the 
prism of market efficiency rather than through an equitable allocation of 
resources. 
 
                                                 
59 P Krugman & M Obstfed International Economics: Theory and Policy (2nd ed,  Harper Collins, 
New York, 1991) 662. 
60 E Toussaint and D Comanne “Globalization and Debt”  (1995) 24/25 Notebooks for Study and 
Research 10–12. The social cost of the transfer of capital to the developed world will be analysed  
in the section relating to the social effects of SAPs in South Asia.   
61 Poverty in South Asia 2006: Civil Society Concerns. 
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(accessed 5 March 2007); Human Development in South Asia 2005 - Human Security in South 
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62UNDP Human Development Report 1996 – Trends in growth and human development (Oxford 
University Pres, Oxford, 1996) 11. 
63 David Dollar and Aart Kraay Growth Is Good for the Poor (Development Research Group, The 
World Bank, March 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/marapr00/pgs15-16.htm> 
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Many observers have queried whether the IFIs are bound by moral 
responsibilities.64 Others ask why the IFIs are immune from obligations of 
international human rights law.65 Despite these legitimate queries IFIs have 
continued economic policy formulation which creates dysfunctional sovereignty 
within states66 which are unable to formulate and implement strategies of 
development in the interests of the people they govern. For SAPs to succeed, 
concerns such as poverty eradication, responsible governance and human 
development needed to be “internalised into the policies of economic 
development”.67  In reality, years of adjustments dictated by the World Bank and 
IMF68 neither consolidated states’ economic capacity nor ensured acceptable 
standards of living and human development.  
 
 
3.5 The Search for a New Instrument: the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs)  
 
The failure of the SAPs reinforced the message that any developmental strategy 
that ignores the human dimension cannot be considered successful. As Cornia, 
Jolly and Stewart point out, “the call for a more people-sensitive approach to 
adjustment is more than a matter of economic good sense and political 
expediency. It rests on the ethic of human solidarity, of concern for others, of 
human response to human suffering.”69  
 
The growing civil society movement coalescing around issues of international 
debt, inequitable development and poverty began to challenge the supposed 
beneficial role of the IFIs in the global community. Forced to defend their 
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unimpressive track record, the World Bank and IMF have tried to allay criticisms 
of the SAPs. In a number of studies spanning the 1990s the World Bank and the 
IMF have acknowledged the burgeoning issue of world poverty.70 The relentless 
dissent from all quarters and a measure of self-realization provided the 
momentum to seek alternative avenues to consolidate the neo-liberal project. The 
evolution of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) was the result of that 
impetus. 
 
The new development paradigm was unveiled by the Senior Vice-President and 
Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, in 1998.71 Stiglitz 
acknowledged the failures of the previous strategies that had assumed a technical 
approach to development and concluded that participation and ownership are 
essential ingredients of any development strategy. The exclusion of states from 
formulation of development policy was identified as among fundamental reasons 
for the failure of SAPs. As research concluded by the World Bank supported 
Stiglitz’s position, at the Annual General Meetings of the IMF and World Bank in 
1999, the member states decided to adopt the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
approach.72 The PRSPs were designed to be consensus-building and inclusive of 
all the stakeholders of the development process, thus minimizing the risk of 
engendering resistance or a lack of commitment to the development initiative.73 
The PRSPs were to expand consideration to embrace issues relating to governance 
and human development.  
 
PRSPs are designed country-specifically, applying the observation of the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) of the World Bank74 that the 
financial, economic, social, environmental and structural issues of a country must 
                                                 
70 Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy (A co-publication of 
the World Bank and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
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57–93. 
72 Carl Jayarajah and William H Branson World Bank Structural and Sectoral Adjustment – World 
Bank Experience 1980–92 (World Bank Operations Evaluation Study, World Bank, Washington, 
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73 IMF Independent Evaluation Office Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Issues Paper/Terms of Reference, 31 Jan 2003) 
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be dealt with in an integrative approach and that each country must be responsible 
for the successful implementation of its own PRSP. A PRSP is thus designed to be 
a collective, country-driven, long-term endeavour that considers the viewpoints of 
stakeholders such as the elected entities, civil society including the poor, and 
NGOs and involves the coordinated participation of development partners 
bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental, while trying to remain fiscally and 
institutionally feasible.75 The PRSPs prescribed by the IFIs were soon adopted by 
other multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. The UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) identifies six characteristics needed by a 
PRSP: to be a country-driven process, indicating there was broad-based 
participation by civil society and the private sector in all operational steps; to be 
results oriented, and focused on outcomes that would benefit the poor; to be 
comprehensive in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty, but also to 
be a process that prioritizes concerns so that implementation is feasible, in both 
fiscal and institutional terms; to be partnership-oriented, involving the coordinated 
participation of development partners bilateral, multilateral, and non-
governmental; and to be viewed from a  long-term perspective to reduce 
poverty.76 
  
In 2000, states began preparing PRSPs as a prerequisite for World Bank/IMF 
adjustment loans. Each PRSP outlined, after a broad consultative process, a state’s 
poverty-reduction priorities and the economic policies needed to achieve them. 
The PRSPs were to be the base document for all IFI and bilateral donor lending, 
based on five fundamental principles determined by the World Bank: a 
description of the country’s participatory process in the PRSP, identification of 
the poverty areas and achievable goals, indicators and monitoring systems, and a 
definition of priority public actions.77  
 
The PRSP has created a system whereby the responsibility and the obligations of 
successful implementation of development and poverty eradication goals rests 
with individual countries. The previous SAPs were criticized for being forced 
                                                 
75 PRSP Policy paper (UK Department for International Development, Africa Policy Department, 
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76 Ibid. 
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upon unwilling yet helpless states. Failure of the PRSPs can now be attributed to a 
particular state for failure to recognize its own limitations, poor design and 
ineffective implementation.    
 
The World Bank claims that the PRSPs’ increased sense of ownership of the 
government’s poverty alleviation strategies and created avenues for dialogue 
between civil society, governments and the IFIs. Furthermore the Bank claims 
that the PRSPs have made poverty a priority of development policies and 
programmes. The PRSPs have also contributed to the evolving governance culture 
based on transparency, accountability, participation and the rule of law. PRSPs 
can also include human rights targets in their strategies for poverty eradication.78 
The PRSP – I of Bangladesh included strategies such as “pro-poor economic 
growth for increasing income and employment of the poor, human development 
of the poor for raising their capability through education, health, nutrition and 
social interventions, women's advancement and closing of gender gaps in 
development, [and] social safety nets for the poor against anticipated and 
unanticipated income/consumption shocks”.79 
 
Despite the adoption of a new development paradigm by both the World Bank and 
the IMF, allegations abound that the PRSPs are following the same trajectory as 
the SAPs. The limitations of the process, the extent in which they imitate the 
SAPs and the negative repercussions of their application are discussed in 3.7 of 
this chapter. 
3.6 South Asian economic development in the post colonial era- A brief 
overview  
 
The focus of this chapter is the impact of globalization in South Asia. The ensuing 
overview highlights how different economic circumstances have resulted in a 
similar set of symptoms which compelled South Asia to join the reform wave 
advocated by the IFIs in the early 1980s. The following paragraphs evaluate the 
respective economies of South Asia prior to the wave of contemporary 
globalization and its repercussions. 
                                                 
78 Sergio Pereira Leite “Human Rights and the IMF” (2001) 38 Finance and Development 4.   
79 National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction  I PRS (Draft for Discussion, 
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Evaluation of the ramification of both SAPs and PRSPs in South Asia confirms 
that they neither contributed to equitable economic growth nor reduced external 
debt.80  However, the new policy formulations compelled interaction with the 
global market economy, reformulated the role of the state, and introduced new 
regimes of taxation and labour. The initiatives created similar adverse 
repercussions within each state in South Asia.81 
 
 
3.6.1 The post-independence economic trajectory of South Asia  
 
The relationship between the IFIs and South Asia has a long history.82 India 
participated at Bretton Woods. In 1949, India sought World Bank assistance for a 
railway reconstruction and development project.83 Both Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
have approached the Bank with specific requests for infrastructure development 
projects.84 In keeping with the Bank’s mandate and philosophy the Bank in these 
early years was providing funding through loans or grants for specific projects 
such as transportation, power generation and industry.85 However, the Bank’s 
involvement in South Asia was not limited to sporadic loans for infrastructure 
development. The Bank initiated the First Aid Consortium in August 1958 for 
India, on which the foundation for the first five-year plan for India was laid. The 
Aid Consortium was a result of the deteriorating balance of payments, the need 
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for infrastructure and industrial development and poor economic growth in India. 
A similar consortium was followed for Pakistan in 1960.86  
 
At the time of decolonization the economies of the region portrayed similar 
characteristics with liberalized export markets closely linked and dependent on 
the global markets and a self-sufficient rural economy that appeared unhindered 
by the turbulences of the global markets. Since independence they have followed 
different trajectories due to political and ideological differences of the political 
leaders at the time of independence.87 Post-independent economic planning was 
influenced by colonial experiences, such as the disastrous famine in the 
subcontinent in 1943, the partition of India and Pakistan at independence and the 
dependency on external markets.  
 
The South Asian economy since its different states gained independence has been 
dominated by sluggish growth88 referred to in the Indian context disparagingly as 
the “Hindu rate of growth”.89 This sluggishness was directly attributed to the 
dirigiste economic policies90 in place from the time of decolonization. South 
Asian economies during the pre-liberalization era were generally characterized by 
import substitution, protection for domestic industries, large scale state-owned 
operations, bureaucratic inefficiency and lethargy, mismanagement, and 
corruption. 
 
 
3.6.2  “Hindu rate of growth” - India  
 
Pursuing the dream of self-sufficiency, India attempted to rectify all the injustices 
of colonial rule through its economic policy. Based on the ideals of socialism, 
                                                 
86 Anne CM Salda Historical Dictionary of the World Bank  (Scarecrow Publishers, USA, 1996) 
57–58. 
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prepared for the 4th Annual Global Development Conference of the Global Development Network 
on Globalization and Equity. Cairo, Egypt, 19-21 January 2002). 
88 Appendix E  
89 Hindu rate of growth – the sluggish rate of economic growth which was around 3.5% of the post 
independent era until the onset of the liberalization phase of the 1980s. The term was coined by 
the economist Raj Krishna and was often repeated disparagingly. See also Vijay Joshi and IMD 
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India, after independence, opted for a system of economic governance that was 
essentially protective of domestic industries and that was state regulated. The first 
Prime Minister, Nehru, supported policies that enhanced poverty eradication, 
domestic industrial growth and food self-sufficiency.91 However, the system 
became characterized by inefficient government bureaucracy, over-regulation, and 
deep scepticism of external trade and foreign investment, and widespread 
corruption.92 The five-year economic development plans formulated in 
conjunction with the IFIs were soon stymied by droughts, war, poor resource 
allocation (often from agriculture to inefficient industry), population growth and 
adverse global economic conditions, such as the escalation of the oil prices.93 
Industry and production stifled with the operation of the License Raj.  
 
Tentative attempts at economic liberalization commenced during the last tenure of 
Indira Gandhi.94 Under Rajiv Gandhi, India’s liberalization process became 
selective and cautious.95 The policies during this time concentrated on selected 
changes such as the elimination of price controls, the revision of taxation policies, 
and the relaxation of subsidies and quotas.96 A wholesale liberalization process 
was not undertaken until 1991.97 Recurrent balance of payment problems, the 
economic success of liberal policies particularly in South East Asia, political 
pressure for reforms and the ideological leanings of Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh contributed largely to the shift away from the existing paradigm of closed 
door policies.  
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Political Quarterly 719–732. 
93 Francine Frankel India's Political Economy, 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution (Princeton 
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Gandhi was wary of liberalizing the Indian economy on a large scale, aware of the resulting 
socioeconomic backlash which would cost him politically. On the Bofors scandal, see  
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and Prospects (Penguin Books, India, 2004). 
97 Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian From “Hindu Growth” to Productivity Surge: The 
Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition (Working Paper WP/04/77, IMF Research Department, 
May 2004). 
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3.6.3 Emphasis on Social Welfare — Sri Lanka   
 
At independence, the Sri Lankan economy was primarily a commodity export 
market heavily reliant on global markets. Domestic industrial capacity was poor 
and the country was not self-sufficient in food production. British rule had left 
behind a mature administrative system, a multi-party democracy and a healthy 
trade union system,98 which facilitated independent Sri Lanka to implement 
successfully a robust social welfare system with free healthcare, education and 
pension schemes; living standards in the early post-independence era were the 
best in the region.99 The economic strategies of the Indian subcontinent heavily 
influenced the post-independent policy makers of Sri Lanka who opted to pursue 
the socialist ideals, resulting in heavy state regulation.100  
 
State-regulated economic policies, falling prices in the commodity markets, and 
the stagnation of the domestic economy began to take a toll and by 1975–1976 Sri 
Lanka was faced with rising inflation and balance of payments problems. 
Overwhelming state intervention and inefficient bureaucracy had created an ethos 
of corrupt, rent-seeking, inept, unproductive economic governance. The 
government’s response to the growing dissatisfaction of the people was the brutal 
use of state authority and severe austerity measures.101 A stringent rationing 
system of essential items such as bread, rice and clothing was introduced and the 
protests against the escalating cost of living and general political dissent were 
violently suppressed. The social and political crisis created by the stagnant 
economy was evident everywhere and the people were ready to dispense with the 
government that espoused the socialist ideology. At the 1977 General Elections, 
the United National Party (UNP), seeking a mandate to introduce fundamental 
changes in the economic sphere through liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization, as well as a new system of constitutional governance, was elected 
                                                 
98 H Wriggins Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960). 
99 A Sen “Sri Lanka's Achievements: How and When?” in TN Srinivasan and PK Bardhan (eds) 
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into office with a landslide majority, making Sri Lanka the first country to 
liberalize its economy in the region.102  
 
The decision to abandon the inward-oriented economic policies was due to an 
ideological commitment to neo-liberalism as a panacea, and to appease 
international economic and political influences. Sri Lanka under the aegis of the 
IMF and the World Bank followed the familiar trajectory of privatization, 
devaluation of the rupee, reform in taxation policy and the creation of EPZs.103 
The immediate economic benefits of deregulation, privatization and liberalization 
were quickly visible — the stagnant economy revived with inward capital 
transfers into the EPZs, and new infrastructure projects generated employment 
opportunities. The new culture epitomized development through economic growth 
and the benefits were to trickle down to the lower segments of society where 
poverty was “treated as a residual element, i.e., as [being reduced by] the 
acceleration of growth.”104 The policy makers had no qualms about the potential 
hazards of “increased financial volatility, inequality in income distribution, 
decline in commodity prices, growing job and income opportunities, and threat to 
indigenous culture,”105 issues that would cause enormous social and political 
turmoil in later years. 
 
 
3.6.4 Culture of aid dependence — Bangladesh  
 
Bangladesh, the youngest state in the region, has been dependent on IFI assistance 
from the day of its creation. Bangladesh’s economic policies were an exception in 
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the region: they had never reflected the dirigisme of its neighbour India. An early 
embracing of adjustment programmes is an indication of the country’s heavy 
dependence on external financial assistance.106 Bangladesh has not followed 
systematic global economic integration but accession to the neo-liberal ideology 
has been a means of last resort to resolve internal economic debacles.107 The ad 
hoc adoption of the liberalization ideology has created internal financial 
instability, balance of payment problems, external debt and economic recession. 
Poor policy formulation and weak institutional structures have been the major 
cause of Bangladesh’s economic woes.108 
 
 
3.6.5 Indian economic influence — Nepal   
 
Indian influence contributed to Nepal’s liberalization process, which commenced 
in 1986 with a structural adjustment credit by the World Bank.109 The 
fundamental change in its economy was to end its dependence on India as an 
export market and allow it to venture into global markets. Nepal, with its political 
instability and small industrial sector, has been slow to attract capital-intensive 
foreign investment. There has been sporadic private investment in power 
generation, the construction industry and the finance sector, but lack of 
industrialization, a dearth of skilled labour, poor infrastructure, and political 
turmoil have not been conducive to economic growth.110 Therefore, the 
liberalization process, or the attempts at global integration, have not yielded 
effective outcomes.  
 
 
3.6.6 Early neo-liberal leanings — Pakistan  
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Pakistan’s relationship with the IFIs has been long-standing and the country’s 
commitment to neo-liberal ideology was visible from the time of the creation of 
the state in 1947.111 With continuous political turmoil and intermittent military 
rule, Pakistan’s economic woes were no better than its regional neighbours.112 
Pakistan’s economy remained open and it continued in the import/export tradition 
that the British left behind. The chief contributors to the economic grievances of 
Pakistan have been its rulers, both military and the democratically elected. 
Foreign capital borrowings from the IFIs and private banks continued in Pakistan  
throughout its existence since Independence due to high defence spending. The 
five year development plans formulated through the World Bank have never 
succeeded owing to poor governance. Structural Adjustment policies have not 
brought the anticipated economic growth but exacerbated poverty and 
marginalization.113 
 
3.6.7  Small economies in South Asia – The Maldives and Bhutan 
 
The Maldives has maintained a liberalized economy that is heavily reliant on the 
service industry. Despite a healthy economic growth, concerns have been 
expressed with regard to the equitable distribution of wealth and democratic 
governance.114 Bhutan’s deliberate policy of economic isolation and its emphasis 
on the “cultural dimension of development” means it is shielded from the vagaries 
of global markets and their ramifications.115 
 
The panacea advocated by the IFIs for the economic malaise in South Asia was 
identical though the root causes for varied degrees of political stability, economic 
advancement and sociocultural development in each state were vastly different. 
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The only common feature was that all states experienced sluggish economic 
growth, balance of payments problems, a dearth of capital investment, poor global 
market integration and inadequate human development.116 These factors were 
blatantly ignored when introducing the standard adjustment policies, and many 
share Easterly’s view that “[i]f the original objective was ‘adjustment with 
growth’, there is not much evidence that structural adjustment lending generated 
either adjustment or growth.”117 
 
 
3.7 A Critique of the Ideological Leanings of the IFIs and their Impact on 
Policy Formulation in South Asia 
 
This section of the study evaluates the social cost of IFI policy formulation 
relating to SAPs and PRSPs based on the ideals of neo-liberal capitalism in South 
Asia. The speciousness, limitations and the social cost of neo-liberal capitalism 
were revealed by Polanyi in his book The Great Transformation 40 years before 
the first SAP.118 He argued that to promote a market economy excluding other 
organizing principles of the society is to invite economic and social 
destabilization.119 The global financial policy makers ignored his warnings and 
the neo-liberal market fundamentalism predictably resulted in economic and 
social chaos in the developing world at enormous human cost. 
 
The IFIs’ simulacrum of development was globalization based on neo-liberal 
capitalism.120 The ensuing paragraphs illustrate that the institutional structures of 
the IFIs and their ideological standpoints that seek to eradicate poverty and foster 
human development are untenable as they were created to cater for a vastly 
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different circumstance that demanded the fulfilment of distinct objectives: first to 
rehabilitate war-torn Europe and subsequently to facilitate, enhance and 
consolidate international trade and global financial markets. These policies and 
structures founded upon the ideals of neo-liberal capitalism were designed to 
facilitate economic globalization and growth of the developed world precisely at 
the cost of the developing world.   
 
Although the IFIs have developed a persona within the past two decades which 
appears to be sensitive to poverty alleviation and human development, their 
ideological commitment to neo-liberal capitalism is, if anything, renewed:121  
 
…[o]ne major change that has affected the World Bank over its 50 years has been 
the shift to a more ‘pure’ neo-liberal system, advocated by Hayek and Friedman 
among others. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, protesting against government 
intervention in the market, was published in 1944, the same year as Bretton 
Woods; but was not fully taken up until the late 1970s and early 1980s both 
internationally and most particularly nationally by the governments of U.S.A and 
U.K under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. 
 
The revival of capitalism termed the “neo-liberal revolution” by Harvey occurred 
in the early 1980s in the West through democratic means, but through 
undemocratic means and often with brutal force elsewhere.122 It is inevitable that 
an ideology that champions the free market sees the end result in terms of profit. 
Such policies are inherently iniquitous and cannot be expected to contribute 
towards eradicating poverty or promoting human development. The following 
analysis on South Asia illustrates this through empirical examples of the 
iniquitous manifestations of these policies.  
 
The advocates of neo-liberal economic globalization often provide philosophical 
justifications that call for the acceptance of the economic strategy as an inevitable 
process that it must be yielded to with grace because “There Is No Alternative” – 
or the TINA syndrome already discussed.123 The developing states are compelled 
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to feel that they are left with no option but to accept the market-oriented policy 
reforms under which production tends to be export-oriented, rendering the basic 
needs of the people less significant. Both the Bank and the Fund refuse to 
acknowledge that a system founded on the ideals of the free market is inherently 
flawed and does not cater for the needs of the developing world that require a 
different approach.124  
 
 
3.7.1 Human Rights Obligations of the IFIs 
 
The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, 
identified poverty as the worst form of human rights abuse and observed that if 
“human rights were respected, conflict, terrorism and war could be prevented.”125 
Criticism regarding the IFIs’ impact on human rights is demonstrated by the 
massive protests each year at the World Bank Headquarters and WTO Ministerial 
meetings.126 The core argument of protestors is that the IFI activities go beyond 
financial regulation and undermine the interests of the poor compromizing norms 
of international human rights law. The central problem between IFI policy 
formulation and human rights is the lack of an independent arbiter or a 
mechanism to determine whether the policies of the IFIs violate human rights law. 
The presence of an apolitical international mechanism to scrutinize policy 
formulation is urgently needed.  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisages the promotion and 
protection of human rights to be the collective responsibility of both society and 
the state, and asserts that “everyone has duties to the community in which alone 
the free and full development of his personality is possible.”127 Article 29, 
liberally construed, would oblige entities created by states to honour the UDHR. 
But neither the IMF nor the World Bank has been inclined to adopt such a 
construction.   
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As discussed earlier, at their creation the IMF and the World Bank had specific 
mandates related to financial stability and economic growth. Therefore the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, and the Bank’s constitution documents have no 
reference to human development or human rights. However, through a variety of 
theses, many have claimed that IFIs come within the purview of international 
human rights law and therefore the IMF and the World Bank have an obligation to 
respect human rights.128 The rationalization of these authors regarding the legal 
obligations of the IFIs to respect human rights is diametrically opposed to that of 
the IFIs. 
The IFIs, particularly the World Bank, have from time to time adopted policies, 
internal rules and strategies that touch upon human rights issues; on the other 
hand, the Bank refuses, at the same time, to recognize that it is bound by a formal 
obligation to respect human rights. The Bank maintains that the final 
responsibility for the protection of human rights rests with states and claims that 
its development work overtly promotes human rights. Therefore the Bank has 
maintained that human rights play no part in its operational schemes:129 
 [E]xcept in situations where the violation of human rights has created conditions 
hostile to effective implementation of projects or has other adverse economic 
consequences, or where there are international obligations relevant to the Bank, 
such as those mandated by binding decisions of the U.N. Security Council, the 
World Bank does not take into account the political dimensions of human rights 
in its lending decisions….. .  
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Though the Bank acknowledges that economic development endeavours promote 
human rights, it has “never accepted any legal obligations in this sphere.”130 
The Bank’s Articles of Agreement set out its broad scope of activity in economic 
and social development and its limits. In particular, the Articles state that, in all its 
decisions, “only economic considerations shall be relevant.”131 Looking at the 
existing internal rules (Operational Policies or OPs) of the World Bank, de Feyter 
observes that the OPs obligate the Bank to support projects that do not violate 
state obligations on international environmental treaties and “the failure to adopt 
parallel human rights preconditions for the Bank's financing of projects seems to 
be the outcome, not of legal constraints, but of a simple policy choice.”132 Amidst 
numerous calls to address concerns of social responsibility and accountability of 
World Bank operations, a quasi-independent Inspection Panel to investigate 
claims against the Bank was instituted as per the Wapenhans report.133  
 
While the Fund has also adopted policies and strategies that are pro-human rights, 
and   articulated the significance of the human dimension in the development 
process, it continues to reject the proposition that the IMF should come within the 
purview of the international human rights regime. Commenting on the 
applicability of ICECSR, the General Counsel for the IMF observes: 134 
 
for its part, the Covenant is a treaty among States which contains obligations 
addressed to States. Neither by its terms, nor by the terms of the Fund's 
relationship agreement with the United Nations, is it possible to conclude that the 
Covenant is applicable to the Fund. Moreover, the norms contained in the 
Covenant have not attained a status under general international law that would 
make them applicable to the Fund independently of the Covenant.  
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In reality, neither the Bank’s nor the Fund’s activities are confined to the creating 
Articles of Agreement. For instance, the World Bank on its website provides 
information on the Bank’s activities in relation to anti-corruption, poverty 
eradication and disabilities, issues beyond the scope of the original mandate.135 If 
global political and social exigencies demanded this additional focus that are 
beyond the scope of its original mandate, adopting a rights-focussed approach to 
development and incurring obligations under international human rights law can 
also be justified on similar grounds.   
 
The central argument in Darrow’s thesis is that the World Bank and the IMF must 
be subjected to a similar regime as states, in that they must also follow the rules of 
accountability and transparency.136 He also contends that if the IFIs are regarded 
as entities under public international law they must be independently held 
accountable for transgressions of international law, including international human 
rights. He also asserts that it is vital to provide a flexible and dynamic 
interpretation of the IFIs’ Articles of Agreement so as to take on board the issues 
relating to human rights law.  
 
Comparing the Bank and the Fund, Darrow concedes that the Bank is more 
inclined to embroil itself in social development issues as well as explore the 
development agenda through rights discourse. With the IMF’s narrower 
operational parameters, and a special focus on multilateral financial regulation, 
Darrow estimates that the Fund is less likely to integrate human rights issues 
within its agenda. In this light, Darrow admits that “it is difficult to imagine 
human rights penetrating beyond very superficial levels . . . in the short term.”137 
Darrow’s optimism regarding the Bank’s commitment towards human rights is 
not shared by Sigrun Skogly, who asserts that “although willing to take part in a 
dialogue about human rights, the Bank has never accepted any legal obligations in 
this sphere.”138 
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3.7.2 The Weaknesses of IFI Policy Formulation  
 
The unilateral, authoritarian imposition of the SAPs by the IFIs completely 
overhauled macroeconomic policies, resulting in an erosion of legitimacy in the 
governing structures of the developing world.139 This overhaul was particularly 
significant in states that had cherished a strong culture of social democracy or 
socialism.140 Reductions in social welfare and public expenditure, privatization of 
public amenities and labour reforms resulted in increased privation for the poor, 
raising discontentment that paved the way for civil conflict.141 The anti-
government protests, such as those experienced in Sri Lanka 1988–1993 in 
response to the growing discontentment of the people, due to rising living costs, 
and to curtailment of social and workers’ rights, became a common occurrence in 
many developing countries that experienced SAPs. 
 
Another fundamental flaw of the formulation of SAPs was their “one size fits all” 
nature.142 The strengths and weaknesses of individual countries, such as the 
successful welfare programmes in Sri Lanka or Pakistan’s long tradition of liberal 
economic policy being coupled with poor management and corruption, were 
ignored. The need for Nepal to establish a viable local economy before attempting 
to integrate into the global economy was not considered by the World Bank 
before liberalization measures were introduced. No policy directives were issued 
to India, to consider its massive social problems of illiteracy, infant mortality and 
child labour, which are the direct result of under-investment in human capital.  
 
The lack of an investigative study prior to the policy implementation stage saw 
identical policy directives issued by the IFIs to countries in diverse stages of 
development and economic growth. Two decades elapsed before the World Bank 
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141 See Mohan Lal Sharma Olive Peacock and Krishan Gopal (eds) Globalisation, Democracy and 
Governance in South Asia: Issues and Alternatives (Kalinga, Delhi, 2003). This aspect is further 
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142 Joseph Stiglitz Globalization and its Discontents (London, Penguin Books, 2002) 47. 
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admitted the inadequacy of its appraisal process and acknowledged in its 2003 
Annual Review of Development Effectiveness that development was “hampered 
in some cases by inadequate country knowledge, in others by inadequate 
sensitivity to country policy making styles, and in still others by attempts to 
transplant policies and institutions — some of which ‘travel’ more readily than 
others … — without adequate analysis of the context.” 143  
 
After decades of inward-oriented policies, and despite the eagerness to liberalize 
the economy, global integration remains sporadic and partial in South Asia. 
Successful global economic integration requires considerable planning and a 
build-up of institutional, legal and resources infrastructure. The need for 
protracted planning was ignored because the liberalization process was conceived 
and promoted to be a solution to the immediate economic woes. Liberalization in 
Sri Lanka was a political reaction to the previous socialist governing ideology. In 
Pakistan it was a desperate measure to keep the existing economic system that had 
been devastated by decades of poor management floating and in India the shift 
was made as the previous inward-oriented governance was no longer tenable, as it 
was not sufficiently productive to cater to the economic exigencies of India. In 
each economy, despite the policymakers’ decision to integrate into the global 
market, significant imperfections in relation to the infrastructure remained. Rather 
than falling into the dangers of lackadaisical market integration, “it is time for a 
different approach to global integration, whereby living standards of the world’s 
poor are raised rather than jeopardised .”144 
 
 
3.7.3 Reinforcement of Structures of Poverty   
  
                                                 
143 2003 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness The Effectiveness of Bank Support for 
Policy Reform (The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004) < http://www.worldbank.org/oed > 
(accessed at 17 May 2006). 
144 Christian E Weller, Robert E Scott and Adam S Hersh The unremarkable record of liberalized 
trade. “After 20 years of global economic deregulation, poverty and inequality are as pervasive as 
ever” (EPI Briefing Paper, Economic Policy Institute, October 2001). 
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Empirical evidence of how SAPs entrenched endemic poverty and were in fact a 
disincentive for economic growth is readily available.145 At the end of the 
experience with the SAPs, the South Asian region has been described as “[a] 
region divided — divided between the hopes of the rich and the despair of the 
poor,” and where the ramifications of SAPs are still very much evident even 
today.146 On average 433 million people in South Asia (37.7 per cent of the total 
population) live in abject poverty, reinforcing the claim that SAPs contributed to 
the system of apartheid created by capital liberalism.147 Refuting the claims that 
the benefits of economic growth trickle down to reach every echelon of society, 
the SAARC Poverty Profile shows that the richest 10 percent of South Asia earns 
80 percent more than the poorest 10 percent of the population.148 Issues such as 
social justice and equity are not factored into the adjustment policies that focus on 
economic growth, and this contributes to the growing demography of destitute 
and marginalized people.149 The following scenario from India is common to 
other parts of the region:150 
 
Expenditure cuts in the post SAP period have been a reality, which has adversely 
affected the living conditions of a large section of the poor and marginalised 
people of India. Both direct withdrawal of consumption supports to the poor and 
indirect withdrawals through overall cuts in public expenditure on social sectors 
have been quite disturbing in this regard … the rise in prices of essential 
commodities over the period of structural adjustment has been enormous, and 
price increase had, ironically enough, been more for the poor than for the well-
off. Withdrawal of subsidies had been an important reason for the increase in 
prices of essential food items. But no less important has been the role of other 
policies which have made basic needs fulfilment even more difficult for many. 
 
The realization that the adjustment programmes were having a devastating social 
impact was documented by UNICEF as early as 1984 in its State of the World’s 
Children Report.151 A subsequent study titled Adjustment with a Human Face,152 
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which drew upon empirical evidence from 10 country studies, declared that the 
1980s were a “lost decade” for developing countries. The study elaborated the 
means to avoid the negative impacts of SAPs on vulnerable groups, emphasizing 
that strategies that generate employment, maintain basic health and education 
opportunities and support nutrition among children must be integrated into 
national planning when economic restructuring is envisaged. 
 
 
3.7.4  The Cost to Social, Economic and Cultural Welfare   
 
Though overall literacy levels have increased in South Asia within the last decade 
it still remains the most illiterate region in the world, at 55 per cent.153 
Implementation of SAPS resulted in increased inequality in the standard of 
education between poor and rich communities. As a region, South Asia spends the 
least on education and has marked gender disparities in relation to primary school 
enrolment.154 Education cuts increased student-teacher ratios and school fees and 
reduced the number of teachers (due to wage freezes) and teaching standards (due 
to deteriorating facilities).155 Liberalization increased the choice of private schools 
for the wealthy but decreased public enrolments, as the poor chose between 
feeding their children and paying for school uniforms, stationery and school 
fees.156 
 
Due to the cultural bias against a girl child in the region, females are frequently 
denied educational opportunities. The impact of SAPs on women and girls is 
particularly harsh and iniquitous for “[t]he increasing burden of poverty itself 
pushes women and children to find work to sustain them.”157 Decreased 
government subsidies — a hallmark of SAPs — reduced the health and welfare 
services available to the poor. The conditions attached to loans obtained for 
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infrastructure and essential services development often stipulated user fees 
payable to the government for services such as schools, health clinics, electricity 
and clean drinking water. For very poor people, even modest charges for these 
services resulted in the denial of access to life-sustaining services, contributing to 
the decrease in quality of life.158  
 
Typically for the region, Nepal does not provide a systematic social security 
system for the unemployed.159 The peasantry often lack skills and education. 
Their only known means of survival remains subsistence farming on lands for 
which they cannot show legal title. Increasingly, this land is appropriated for 
agribusinesses or for industrial use without prior public consultation and 
deliberation, and the state can ill deal with resulting social and economic 
problems of particularly the displaced rural peasantry.160 Issues such as violations 
of the right to information, the right to welfare and employment were never 
considered at the policy formulation stage. The displacement and the ensuing 
marginalization of people is an indication of poor policy formulation which has 
been reliant on instead “market magic”.  
 
Unemployment, especially in small businesses, stemmed from interest hikes, 
cheap imported competition and inability to access credit. In fact, the 
transformations in relation to credit facilities, mortgages and complex patent 
regimes are poignantly described in the SAAPE India Poverty Report thus: 161 
 
The International Banias [traders and money lenders] are no better than our old 
pot belly fellows who used to take away our means of production: land on 
mortgage which never came back, selling us rotten grain that will make us sick is 
no different from selling us BT crops which will make us sick. The level of 
vigilance needed to deal with these international rules, regulations, technologies 
are [sic] new – but the issues are the same. 
 
                                                 
158 Infant mortality is 84 per 1000 births in Pakistan, 74 in Bhutan and 67 in India: UNDP Human 
Development Report 2002 (University of Oxford Press, New York, 2003). Only Bhutan spends 
over 2% of GDP on public health. The Report criticized the governments in the region for 
disregarding the need to increase investment in “human development” and labelled their fiscal and 
financial policies as “obstacles to the creation of  a proper social environment for a civilized life”. 
159 Patricia Justino Social Security In Developing Countries: Myth Or Necessity? Evidence From 
India (PRUS Working Paper No. 20, Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, Sept 2003). 
<www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/PRU/wps/wp20.pdf >(accessed 7 Nov, 2007). 
160 Sushma Joshi “Nepal in the WTO” Nepal Nation Weekly (10 June 2004).  
161 SAAPE Poverty Report – Sri Lanka 2003 
<http://www.saape.org.np/resources/documents/index.htm>(accessed 7 Nov, 2007). 
 181 
The IMF and World Bank’s core beliefs, such as that elimination of protective 
tariffs would force domestic industries to become more competitive, rarely 
materialized in South Asia. As a consequence of SAPs, domestic manufacturing 
collapsed and imported consumer goods replaced domestic production.162 
 
The disastrous consequences of implementing policies of privatization uniformly, 
even in situations where an injection of private capital was not warranted, saw the 
transfer of several state-owned enterprises into private sector ownership with the 
resulting social issues of high rates of redundancy and an increase in prices for 
goods and services.163 Most state-owned enterprises were heavily overstaffed as 
state sector employment was often based on nepotism and political patronage. 
Privatization caused 40–50 per cent of redundancies, amounting to 120,000 
workers being made redundant in 1991 alone, in Sri Lanka.164 In certain situations 
the capital gained by privatization had to be utilized for payouts for employees 
who were made redundant through restructuring leaving the enterprises with 
cashflow problems like those they experienced before privatization.165 The 
combined effect of the reduction of employment as a result of public sector 
“restructuring”, the withdrawal of governmental subsidies, and cuts to healthcare, 
education and welfare expenditure was severe hardship for the poorest, impacting 
on workers’ rights and socioeconomic and cultural rights.166  
There was an expectation mismatch between the people who experienced the 
operations of the neo-liberal policy overhaul in expectation of “development” and 
the IFIs who spearheaded the programmes that aimed at macroeconomic stability 
and growth. The World Bank applauded Sri Lanka’s performance for “good 
macroeconomic management and progress in trade liberalization, privatisation, 
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and financial sector reform”,167 when the reality was a catastrophe of rising living 
costs, the withdrawal of subsidies for agriculture and domestic industry, a scarcity 
of secure employment, a general decrease in the quality of life and an escalation 
of poverty for the people who were subjected to SAPs. The emphasis on 
economic growth as the end result of the liberalization process had shifted the 
focus from issues of poverty alleviation and human development. During the early 
era of adjustment SAPs were never articulated as a method of poverty eradication 
or human development, such ends being regarded as beneficial by-products of 
economic growth, trickling down to the poor.168 
 
Susan George has accurately summed up the results of the SAPs and globalization 
when she wrote about the “global apartheid economy”. According to George, 169 
  
[t]he Bretton Woods twins have become the managers of a global apartheid 
economy in which the transnational elite from both ‘North’ and ‘South’ play the 
role of the ‘whites’; a shrinking and anxious middle class, the role of the 
‘coloureds’; and finally, at the bottom, the vast sea of wretchedness made up of 
‘blacks’, whatever their literal skin colour. 
 
Nonetheless, South Asia still relies on the IFIs for policy direction, creating a 
culture of dependence on donor-driven policy formulation. No innovative policy 
alternatives have been explored at national level nor were grass-roots level 
alternative strategies ever fostered. The psychology of dependence on donors has 
become ingrained in the psyche of political and bureaucratic decision-makers and 
they remain convinced that without the support of the donor institutes their 
political survival is at stake. For example, President Kumaranatunga’s praise of 
the World Bank’s relationship with Sri Lanka ignores the reality of ill-considered 
policy choices.170 The reverence extended to the IFIs is indicated by the 
International Financial Organization Order (Amendment) Act 2004 of 
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Bangladesh, which has accorded absolute immunity from prosecution to the 
World Bank, IMF and their operations in Bangladesh.171  
 
 
3.8. Familiar Trajectory of Failure: the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers 
 
The PRSPs were designed to conflate two contradictory aims: the need for 
creating a more efficient system that contributed genuinely to economic growth 
and human development and the desire to have development policies that were 
autochthonous and therefore more acceptable to the people. However, the PRSPs 
have failed to achieve either objective.172 A closer scrutiny would confirm that in 
fact the SAPs, which were based on macroeconomic policy overhauls, contributed 
to the greater indebtedness of the developing countries in terms of resources as 
well as ideas. The previous adjustment programmes failed to address the 
structural sources of poverty and yet the PRSPs once again place heavy reliance 
on the macroeconomic policy model of the SAPs, which the IFIs claim to have 
been internalized by the recipient countries through the PRSPs.  
 
 
3.8.1 Lack of a Meaningful Contribution from Stakeholders  
 
Under the tutelage of the World Bank, the larger borrowers of South Asia —
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka — have submitted their PRSPs to the 
IMF, World Bank and the general donor community.173 Despite the rhetoric of 
country ownership and civil society contributions, the countries submitting the 
PRSPs had little to do with the actual conceptualization or drafting of the 
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documents or the policy statements,174 and therefore they still bear the design 
flaws of the previous process, i.e., weak ownership, and emphasis on economic 
growth over and above poverty eradication and other social concerns. The 
alienation of the people from policy design in the era of the SAPs echoes in the 
new mechanism despite the assertion of endogenous strategies of development, 
especially in the respect that there is no visible ideological shift from market 
liberalization. 
 
The ground realities in the countries that prepared PRSPs do not change 
overnight. In South Asia, in the absence of meaningful dialogue between the 
policy framers and civil society, the strength of the civil society to influence 
policy formulation is in its infancy. As Grusky observes,175 
 
[f]irst of all civil society in the borrowing countries needs information and 
transparency about the new process … . Secondly, consultation with civil society 
must go beyond information dissemination, to a genuinely participatory process 
in which recommendations of non-governmental actors can influence policy.  
 
NGOs and other stakeholders from the South Asian region have unanimously 
criticized the process in which the World Bank-initiated PRSP documents have 
been prepared in the region.176 Many claim that the PRSP process has little public 
acceptance and essentially incorporates World Bank-propagated structural 
adjustment policies such as liberalization of tariff regimes and cutbacks in state 
expenditure.177 Critiquing the PRSPs, Tahsin, a Pakistani activist, claims that, 
“[t]hese reforms have no established link with poverty reduction and are nothing 
more than a new manifestation of the Bank-propagated disastrous Structural 
Adjustment Policies.”178 He pointed out that the PRSP, which is defined by the 
World Bank as a country-owned strategy, has hardly come into the public domain 
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for discussion in Pakistan and has been prepared unilaterally by the government 
without public consultation or debate. A closer scrutiny of the PSRPs indicates 
that the documents prepared by each state are generic and fail to address the 
state’s unique problems.  
 
By contrast, in Bangladesh there have been extensive consultative processes, yet 
these have had little impact on the ultimate contents of the PRSP. Bangladesh 
completed drafting an interim PRSP “A National Strategy for Economic Growth, 
Poverty Reduction and Social Development” in 2003, which has been presented to 
the donor community. In this interim paper lofty aspirations of removing “the 
ugly faces of poverty” by eradicating hunger, chronic food- insecurity and 
extreme destitution, reduce the number of people living blow the poverty line by 
50 percent, provision of universal primary education, reduction of infant mortality 
and reduction of maternal mortality by 75 percent was envisaged.179 Meanwhile, 
the People’s Empowerment Trust (PET), a private think-tank, concluded that the 
government’s PRSP would ultimately turn into a donor-driven strategy. The PET 
Chairman, M. M. Akash, said the government’s position on the PRSP was 
positive and focussed on human centred development “[b]ut I doubt whether the 
donors will agree with many of those issues. So ultimately, I fear, we have to 
accept a totally changed strategy.”180 Therefore the required public consultation 
initiatives and the identification of country specific developmental goals are 
regarded empty gestures as the prevalent civil societal perception is that the 
ultimate power to determine the content of the PRSPs would rest with the IFIs.    
 
Although the PRSP process is advocated as a bottom-up solution to development 
and poverty eradication, in reality it is still very much a top-down approach 
comprising a selective group of individuals and NGOs that share similar 
ideological beliefs. For instance, Syed Mohammad Ali reiterates the absence of a 
consultative process in Pakistan.181 The reforms contained in the Sri Lankan 
PRSP imitate the common macroeconomic measures propagated as the panacea 
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for economic growth by the World Bank for at least two decades182. There is 
widespread scepticism about the consultation process that led to the finalization of 
the PRSP by the Sri Lankan government, and more importantly, the ramifications 
of the PRSP have not been widely discussed or understood among the general 
public.183 An analysis of the content of the PRSP for Sri Lanka reveals that its 
relationship to poverty alleviation is rather problematic.184 In terms of policy, the 
PRSP still appears to be engrossed with economic growth with little or no credible 
methodology outlined to redistribute this growth to the poor.185 In this sense, the 
PRSP process appears not so much a poverty reduction strategy as a growth 
strategy and the link between economic growth and the resultant poverty 
reduction is rather tenuous. For instance, the proposals to construct a modern 
expressway with the introduction of mechanized road toll systems to lower the 
transport and marketing costs faced by the poor highlight the dire need to 
prioritize and rationalize poverty eradication goals with available, yet limited, 
resources.  
 
The lack of political space to discuss concerns relating to policy formulation on 
developmental issues and a sense of alienation and detachment by the people from 
the policy making process and its repercussions, is brought out by Whaites’s 
observation:186 
 
Without genuine democratic participation by ordinary people in the development 
of economic policy, no economic policy can be made to stick … no economy can 
be autonomous of the people. It is this ridiculously utopian approach of much 
economic theory that makes it so difficult for IMF economists to come down to 
earth and to integrate civil society participation and poverty reduction into their 
economic templates. Only if economic policies once again become embedded in 
societies and are subordinated to democratic institutions and social relations can 
we expect genuine participation in the development of economic programmes. 
And only then can we hope for economic programmes that will genuinely reduce 
poverty. 
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3.8.2 PRSPs Continue the Ideological Bias towards Neo-liberalism 
 
The ideological bias towards the market-driven mechanisms for development 
which blatantly disregards the social and political consequences is still clearly 
visible in the PRSPs. It is plain that the World Bank and the IMF are yet to evolve 
a development model that synthesizes economic growth, poverty eradication and 
human development. The failure of the Bank and the Fund to think of an 
alternative paradigm for poverty alleviation is once again reinforced through the 
PRSPs. The core of a PRSP still follows the SAP’s mainstream ideology of 
exposure to international trade, and domestic liberalization continues to have little 
impact on economic growth, let alone shared growth with corresponding benefits 
for the poverty-stricken. 
 
Pro-poor strategies of “promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and 
enhancing security”187 are evoked, but these strategies are peripheral to fostering 
economic growth, greater integration with global market forces by encouraging 
foreign direct investment, and extended liberalization and privatization schemes. 
Despite claims that pro-poor and human-centred strategies are integral to the 
PRSPs, they echo the economic growth strategies of SAPs. In the course of 
drafting PRSPs, for instance, Sri Lanka amended the strong worker-biased labour 
laws, ostensibly so as to maintain flexible labour markets that attracted foreign 
investment.188 The Minister of Labour justified the amendment to the Factories 
Act on the basis that a large number of countries had similar practices and that the 
TNC in the garment trade had requested the change in the law.189 
 
The Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) by the Independent 
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Evaluation Office of the IMF acknowledges several limitations of the whole 
process, such as that, “participatory processes were typically not designed to 
strengthen existing domestic institutional processes for policy formulation and 
accountability (e.g., through Parliament)” and that, “the PRS process has had 
limited impact in generating meaningful discussions, outside the narrow official 
circle”.190  The most substantial criticism is that the PRSP approach is ineffective 
in identifying constraints on accelerating growth and making it more pro-poor. 
The approach has so far not contributed significantly to understanding the 
linkages between growth, poverty incidence, and macroeconomic policies 
nationally. These issues present analytical challenges that are not necessarily 
resolved through participation alone.191  
 
The PRSPs have proven that strategies for poverty eradication must look beyond 
the neo-liberal framework. The requirement is not a redefinition of the strategies 
of poverty eradication based on the existing ideological paradigm but an 
alternative vision that controls the neo-liberal quest for economic growth at the 
cost of human development. Development-focussed multilateral agencies must 
overcome the IFIs’ ideological aridity and unwillingness to evolve new pragmatic 
strategies.  
 
State ownership of policy formulation, civil societal participation and new 
dialogue have changed the status quo little. Responsibility, participation, civil 
society, inclusiveness are new terms for the concept of Cabinet responsibility to 
the Parliament, a legacy of the Westminster constitutional tradition which had 
taken root in South Asia, but has lately which has been hijacked by the IFIs in the 
name of economic growth. The contemporary problem is that despite having 
functioning democracies their use has been relegated to the background of 
periodic, flawed elections.192 However, despite the dysfunction, the ideology of 
democracy and representative governance is embedded in the psyche of the 
people of South Asia. If functional democracy is restored it can be an effective 
mechanism to scrutinize developmental policies by the electorate.  
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3.8.3 International Financial Institutions taking hostage the future of South 
Asia 
 
Stephen Gill observes intriguingly that globalization has in fact resulted in the: 
“redefinition of the political in the emerging world order. Part of this redefinition 
involves emergence of a new constitutionalism. New constitutionalism limits 
democratic control over central elements of economic policy and regulation by 
locking in future governments to liberal frameworks of accumulation premised 
on freedom of enterprise.”193  
 
The new constitutionalism therefore redefines the relationship between the 
“political” and the “economic” and creates constitutional structures to prevent  
future governments from retreating from the commitments made to the economy.  
 
The PRSP of the Sri Lankan government put before the IMF and the World Bank 
in June 2002 is an excellent example of “new constitutionalism” in operation. It 
contained the policy proposals of the government in relation to development 
strategies that it would undertake in the ensuing three years. The policy document 
was formulated secretly without other stakeholders in the process such as local 
NGOs, opposition political parties or civil society.194 The PRSP mirrored much of 
the IMF/WB policy recommendations for Sri Lanka. Pursuing the policy 
recommendations the government initiated a substantial revision of the legislation 
relating to land, labour and taxation in July 2002. Subsequent civil societal  
protests against the PRSPs compelled the government to stall the law reform.195 
Labour union pressure obtained an assurance from the government that the new 
laws would not be implemented until an adequate social safety net existed for 
those who lost jobs.196 
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In fact the commitment to the “new constitutionalism” was made almost two 
decades ago when the process of liberalization, the fundamental tenet of 
contemporary globalization, was entrenched into the system with the state 
voluntarily reducing its role in the domestic economy.197 Granting corporations 
total freedom of operation and creating favourable fiscal frameworks for the 
foreign investments were some of the ways in which the entrenchment was 
achieved. Such freedoms were ensured through the Constitutional mechanisms as 
evidenced by Article 157 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka which states 
that:198 
“…any Treaty or Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the 
Government of any foreign State for the promotion and protection of the 
investments in Sri Lanka of such foreign State, its nationals, or of corporations, 
companies and other associations incorporated or constituted under its laws, such 
Treaty or Agreement shall have the force of law in Sri Lanka…  
This mechanism shifted the power from the state to the markets, making state 
regulation of the market activities almost non-existent. 
Another disquieting trend closely associated with the “new constitutionalism” is 
the gradual reduction of the welfare system through legal mechanisms. The 
tradition of governance in the subcontinental region has included at least a 
modicum of welfare support to its people. The strong welfare system in Sri Lanka, 
which includes free education and healthcare, has been pivotal in controlling the 
downward spiral of the living condition of its people. However, when the 
provision of welfare and food subsidies and the state-run, people-centred 
economic ventures prima facie conflicted with market-led globalization, the 
government retreated from these commitments.199 The state is no longer 
considered the benevolent protector of the people.  
These transformations, utterly alien to the centralized state structures of the 
previous decades, were portrayed as justifiable and inevitable as globalization 
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took its contemporary form. Politicians, technocrats, academics and policy 
formulators who contribute to the mainstream globalizing ideology exalt its 
virtues of rapid economic growth intermingled with the rhetoric of democracy, 
transparency, and good governance. It is easy to subvert potential remonstrations 
regarding the increasing social polarization by people who query the rationality 
for denationalization, deregulation and devaluation while the memories of the 
dysfunctional, unproductive governmental enterprises of the pre-liberalization 
period that were riddled with poor management, lethargy, kleptocracy, 
unaccountability and corruption are still fresh in their minds. The reality is that 
the abdication by Government the of the role of provider in terms of welfare to the 
people has exacerbated poverty in the region and resulted in further deterioration 
of education, healthcare and living standards. The ensuing frustration of the 
deprived has evolved into a powerful political force creating new and ominous 
crises within the democratic governing structures in the region. 
 
3.9 Transnational Corporation operation in South Asia  
 
The following paragraphs will focus on TNCs and their impact on individual and 
community economic/cultural sustainability, their actions that lead to the 
compromise of traditional human rights, particularly labour rights, and the TNCs’ 
disregard for social or environmental considerations.200 The impact of the 
involvement of TNCs in the national economies of South Asia is manifold and 
some of the operations violate international human rights.201 Also disquietingly, 
the activities infringe upon traditional ways of life, destroying indigenous 
knowledge bases and life patterns.202 This destruction cannot be described in 
terms of a breach of a generic paradigm of rights; however, such intrusions violate 
cultural identity and the unique relationships within the region, which the 
communities have maintained over generations with the subsistence agricultural 
patterns and the land. TNCs, more than any other entity involved in the economic 
                                                 
200 John Madeley Big Business, Poor Peoples: The Impact of Transnational Corporations on the 
World's Poor (Zed Books Ltd, London, 1999). 
201 For corporate human rights violations see Business and Human Rights Resource Centre website 
at <http://www.business-humanrights.org> (accessed 20 Feb 2007). 
202 David N Fagan “Achieving Restitution: The Potential Unjust Enrichment Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples Against Multinational Corporations” (2001) 76 New York University Law Rev 626, 631–
640. 
 192 
globalization process, can annihilate cultures, obliterate the distinct character of a 
locality, trade or resource and engulf it in the global market where the only 
criterion for existence is profit.  
 
In the overwhelming rush to liberalize, privatization was undiscriminating and 
some profitable public enterprises were privatized.203 Under foreign, often 
monopolistic, control, price increases invariably burdened local consumers. 
Restructurings of the newly privatized state enterprises often cut jobs to raise 
profitability, creating increased economy-wide unemployment and labour market 
insecurity.204 Under relaxed employment regimes companies can make employees 
redundant without adequate compensation. Strict regulations curtail unionization 
of workers’ rights and bargaining powers.205 Unemployment of often unskilled 
labour, without welfare, increases poverty, with gross denial of economic and 
social rights.206  
The havoc created through myopic policy formulation without systematic 
appraisal of social and economic repercussions is amply demonstrated by the 
impact of TNC activity on subsistence agriculture. The mass-scale style of the 
TNCs threatens small-scale subsistence farming and cottage industries, especially 
through limiting land access:207 
Large tracts of land have been bought up by so called agriculture based 
businesses and Multinational Corporations, e.g. one company is said to have 
acquired over 8,850 acres to plant teak trees as a long term investment. Earlier 
agricultural land ceiling law prohibited any person from owning more than 15 
acres. What would have happened to all the small farmers’ families displaced by 
this company? Even more important, what has happened to all the landless 
labourers who would have been employed on this land, which is now covered 
with a plantation which needs a very small workforce. 
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Similarly, in 1998, India conformed to the conditionalities of the World Bank and 
lifted its restrictions on TNCs, such as Monsanto and Cargill, from entering 
agriculture markets.208 Complex new patent laws prevented the traditional usage 
of seedlings from previous crops. The new seedlings required pesticides and 
fertilizers unaffordable to small farmers. Policies based on global trade interests 
and ignoring national interests thus fundamentally altered the life of the peasantry 
farmer across South Asia, as epitomized by the dramatic number of farmer 
suicides.209 Shiva describes the human costs: 210 
1997 witnessed the first emergence of farm suicides in India. A rapid increase in 
indebtedness, was at the root of farmers taking their lives. Debt is a reflection of 
a negative economy, a losing economy. Two factors have transformed the 
positive economy of agriculture into a negative economy for peasants - the rising 
costs of production and the falling prices of farm commodities. Both these factors 
are rooted in the policies of trade liberalisation and corporate globalisation … as 
farming is delinked from the earth, the soil, the biodiversity, and the climate, and 
linked to global corporations and global markets, and the generosity of the earth 
is replaced by the greed of corporations, the viability of small farmers and small 
farms is destroyed. Farmers’ suicides are the most tragic and dramatic symptom 
of the crisis of survival faced by Indian peasants. 
The increased convergence amongst national governments, TNCs and IFIs in 
terms of policy to promote the ideals of the liberal market economy is a 
regrettable outcome of the contemporary globalization paradigm.  
India’s permission of field trials of the controversial genetically-engineered (GE) 
cotton has raised similar social turmoil. Lack of public information and 
inadequate risk assessment appear to be the greatest concerns among activists. 
There is widespread criticism that Monsanto-Mahyco’s Bt-Cotton import process 
bypassed public scrutiny and debate, particularly since the European Union and 
several other countries have banned the planting or import of Bt-Cotton.211 Shiva 
asserts that this is another attempt to introduce monoculture farming in the 
country that has already proven disastrous for tens of thousands of small farmers. 
She maintains that the strength of Indian agriculture lies in its myriad 
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smallholdings and its biodiversity, which will be destroyed through the 
introduction of monolithic farming as a result of acceding to IFI 
conditionalities.212  
Upheaval from TNC activity pervades South Asia, for instance in milk prices in 
Sri Lanka. Before economic liberalization the 400gr milk packet was SLRs 6.00 
(US$ 0.07) but has now risen to more than SLRs.100 (US$1.11), beyond the reach 
of a majority of Sri Lankans.213 A written statement submitted by the Asian Legal 
Resource Centre (ALRC) to the UN Economic and Social Council detailed the 
inimical effect of unrestricted TNC activities within the developing world: 214   
…about 20 years ago fresh, inexpensive milk was widely available.  However, in 
1981 the government — under a policy of liberalisation and privatisation — 
closed the National Milk Board and signed an agreement with Nestlé to develop 
the dairy industry. The dairy industry was consolidated under four companies — 
Nestlé, Anchor, Laksprey and Maliban — all of whom show little sympathy for 
the plight of millions of families who cannot afford their milk products.  
The chairman of Nestlé Lanka has gone so far as to assert that it is improper to 
ask for a reduction in milk prices or bring the issue to the attention of foreign 
diplomats in Sri Lanka, for he argued that the application of pressure to reduce 
milk prices is a violation of free market principles.215 Meanwhile, domestic dairy 
producers able to provide milk for the country prior to 1981 are no longer able to 
do so, and Sri Lanka has become dependent on foreign producers of milk.  
Privatization measures and the unregulated entry of TNCs into milk production in 
Sri Lanka have not only obliterated the small scale domestic producers who could 
not compete with the industry giants but created a price monopoly which the 
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government cannot control. The social cost of the whole operation is a generation 
of malnourished children in Sri Lanka.216 
 
3.9.1 Increased Civic Dissent Against Transnational Corporation Cctivities   
Governments welcoming TNCs rarely stipulate adequate environmental impact 
assessments relating to their operations, and despite the Bhopal tragedy, examples  
of environmental disasters continue217 such as the incident where a license was 
issued to draw water for a Coca-Cola plant in Plachimada, Palghat, Kerala in 
2000. The company electrically extracted ground water in excess of the licence, 
and ground water levels depleted and the residue from the manufacturing process 
began to pollute the soil of surrounding paddy fields, canals and wells. The 
adivasi women in Plachimada commenced a dharna (sit-in) outside the Coca-
Cola factory. The local panchayat filed public interest litigation in the Kerala 
High Court against Coca-Cola.  The Court supported the demands of the women 
and Justice Balakrishnana Nair ordered Coca-Cola to stop pirating Plachimada’s 
water, stating: 218 
The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain 
resources like air, sea waters and the forests have such a great importance 
to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them 
a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, 
they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the 
status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the government to protect the 
resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit 
their use for private ownership or commercial purpose …   
Our legal system — based on English common law — includes the 
public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee 
of all natural resources, which are by nature meant for public use and 
enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the seashore, running 
waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee 
is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources 
meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership ...   
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This judgment indicates that the ownership of underground water rests with the 
public, and the state as trustee has a duty to safeguard natural resources. Failure to 
do so would be tantamount to a violation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, 
guaranteeing the right to life.219 Such extreme action as a dharna from civil 
society indicates that the community is aware of its rights and the corresponding 
responsibilities of the TNCs. 
Similar civic protest is taking place against the plans for the Eppawala phosphate 
mining project by a multinational corporation, IMC Agrico. If the project is 
granted approval not only will there be environmental devastation but a 
flourishing village consisting of 30,000 mainly small scale farmers, paddy fields 
that produce the highest yields of rice in the country, and an ancient but still 
operational irrigation system will be destroyed together with the region’s ecology, 
not to mention heritage areas, including significant archaeological sites which will 
also be destroyed or rendered unapproachable.220 
Such civil mobilization now transforms itself into systematic yet informal 
regulatory authority relating to TNC ventures in the region.221 While this process 
highlights governmental impotency to provide adequate supervision of such 
ventures, as well as the incapacity to formulate suitable policy relating to FDIs, it 
also emphasizes the expectation mismatch in relation to developmental issues 
between civil society and the governments.   
The effect of global market pressure to provide preferential treatment to TNCs 
over and above human rights considerations is best demonstrated through the 
operations of the Export Processing Zones. Hazardous and often arduous working 
conditions, lack of legal protection in terms of work conditions and minimum 
wages within EPZs is common in South Asia. Amendment of labour laws to 
permit compulsory overtime at the request of garment manufactures has been 
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justified by the Labour Minister of Sri Lanka222 and the Chairman of the Board of 
Investment as imperative for Sri Lanka to remain competitive, especially after the 
removal of quotas under the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) of 2005.223 Similar 
scenes abound across the region.224  
The evidence shows increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and presence of 
TNCs have harmed, not benefited, the developmental process and human 
welfare.225 Host countries must stringently control the content of FDIs and the 
manner in which FDIs are introduced. Rules must include issues of technology 
transfers, which consolidate domestic manufacturing capabilities, training of 
skilled labour, infrastructure development and environmental concerns. Policy 
formulation relating to FDIs should also necessarily take into consideration the 
protection of indigenous life systems, knowledge bases and subsistence rural 
agriculture, which is an integral part of any developing nation. The activities of 
the TNCs and their detrimental effects cannot be combated by one country alone. 
It demands a regional effort so that the burdens and benefits of regulation can be 
shared by all.  
3.9.2  Transnational Corporations and Respect for Human Rights  
 
TNCs, traditionally, have not been recognized as subjects of international law and 
therefore exist beyond the legal parameters of the conventional international 
human rights regime.226 The impact of their operations, including human rights 
violations, is ignored by national governments reliant on their financial 
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benevolence. The atrocities the TNCs commit often include complicity in the 
violent suppression of civil dissent against neo-liberal policies, violations of 
labour rights, child labour, suppression of trade union rights, violation of property 
rights that extend to intellectual property rights and infringement of 
environmental rights.227   
Numerous attempts have failed to compel the TNCs to abide by international 
human rights obligations. Attempts through labour and environmental protection 
laws fail due to the legal nature of the entity. Often the TNCs are more powerful 
economically than the host country and wield considerable political clout within 
it. However, economically powerful countries, such as the US, have created legal 
regimes that enable non-nationals to seek remedies in the US courts for breaches 
of human rights both within and outside America.228 Yet, practical limitations, 
such as poor access to legal representation and an inability to travel to the US, 
render such avenues nugatory.   
Quasi-legal regulatory regimes, such as the UN Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations,229 the EU Parliament Resolution on Codes of 
Conduct for Transnational Corporations,230 the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises231 and OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises232 and Global Compact, initiated under the aegis of Secretary General 
Kofi Annan at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in 1999233, 
have all had a limited impact on convincing the TNCs of their human rights 
responsibilities. The latest initiative to compel the TNCs to honour their human 
                                                 
227 David Kinley and Sarah Joseph “Multinational corporations and human rights Questions About 
Their Relationship” (2002) 27 Alternative Law Journal 1.   
228 “Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law: v. Corporate Liability for Violations 
of International Human Rights Law” (2001) 114 HLR 2025. 
229 United Nations Draft International Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (1984) 23 
ILM 626. 
230 Menno Kamminga “Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights 
Abuses: A Challenge for the EC” in Philip Alston (ed) The EU and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000) 565–577. 
231 < http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf. > (accessed 5 
Nov 2006). 
232 <http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html > 
(accessed 5 Nov 2006); Ans Kolk, Rob van Tulder and Carlijn Welters International codes of 
conduct and corporate social responsibility:  can transnational corporations  regulate themselves? 
(1999) 8 Transnational Corporations pp 143-180. 
233 Kofi Annan “The Global Compact” (Address at the World Economic Forum, Davos, UN Doc. 
SG/SM/6448 (1999), 31 Jan 1999; <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/> (accessed 7 Nov 
2007). 
 199 
rights obligations has been promoted by the UN Sub-Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.234 Widely regarded as a 
comprehensive guide to corporate social responsibility, the Code of Conduct 
focuses on issues of labour rights, corruption, consumer protection and 
environmental safety.235  
 
TNCs circumvent even efficient regulatory regimes, particularly in the developing 
world. The only visible mechanism of control which is partially successful is civil 
society vigilance and activism. The activism that followed the Bhopal disaster, 
and Apparel Industry Partnership, which is a result of child labour and the 
sweatshop industry, are examples of such civil mobilization. It is important that 
such activism is channelled and supported through a regional mechanism which 
prescribes normative standards of behaviour to ensure that the TNCs’ operations 
are conducted in a way that they respect human rights and take into consideration 
environmental concerns.  
 
 
3.10 Good Governance  
 
By the late 1990s, after two successive waves of SAPs, many contended that the 
Bank and the Fund’s aggressive yet inept dealings with developing nations, which 
were often ruled by dictatorial regimes, exacerbated the burgeoning economic 
crisis, devastating local ecologies and indigenous communities. The “good 
governance” as an aid conditionality emerged largely due to the need to allay 
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these accusations.236 The purpose of good governance from an IMF perspective 
was elaborated in Michael Camdessus’ address to the UN in 1996:237  
Good governance is important for countries at all stages of development. 
. . . Our approach is to concentrate on those aspects of good governance 
that are most closely related to our surveillance over macroeconomic 
policies —namely, the transparency of government accounts, the 
effectiveness of public resource management, and the stability and 
transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for private 
sector activity.  
Similarly, Paolo Mauro claims to trace the roots of corruption to the pre-
liberalized, state-centred economies, and says policies of liberalization, 
stabilization, deregulation, and privatization can bring about a marked reduction 
in corruption and rent seeking behaviour. Therefore, to him, liberalization of the 
economy is a means of weeding out “policy related sources” of corruption.238 In 
essence, the governance agenda for the IFIs was a means of reinforcing the status 
quo of growth through macroeconomic policies. The governance-related 
conditionalities were also a part of the evolution of the institutions themselves and 
the changes that were taking place within the institutions.239 They were promoted 
to protect the integrity of the IFIs themselves.240  
During their initial stages, IMF Governance Related Conditionalities (GRCs) 
centred on monetary and fiscal issues while the World Bank’s conditionalities 
also had a similar narrow focus, concentrating on micro, sector-specific financial 
issues such as structural adjustment lending. In the late 1980s the scope of the 
GRCs widened embracing the liberalization agenda encapsulated in the 
Washington Consensus. By the end of the 1980s, with increased demands on IFI 
lending and the risks of non-payment escalating, the conditionalities attached to 
loans began to widen.  
                                                 
236 Adrian Leftwich “Governance, the State and the politics of development” (1994) 25 
Development and Change 363–386 provides a detailed account of factors influencing the 
emergence of governance in the development agenda. 
237 Michel Camdessus IMF Managing Director Address to the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council 2 July 1997 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm>  
(accessed 7 Nov 2007). 
238 Paolo Mauro “Why Worry About Corruption?” 1997 International Monetary Fund Economic 
Issues 6 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues6/issue6.pdf. >(accessed 7 Nov 2007). 
239 J Boughton “Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979–1989” (IMF, 
Washington DC, 1999). 
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3.10.1 Assertion of Liberal Democracy and Anti-corruption as 
Conditionalities  
 
Governance based on the liberal democratic model was being thrust into 
prominence with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing need to establish 
democracy within former communist states.241 The promotion of GRCs by IFIs, 
which prior to this were confined to economic issues, thus was considered timely. 
The economic boom of East Asia, where governance had a particular strong and 
interventionist nuance, was asserted by the World Bank to mean governance had a 
particular role to play in economic growth.242  
 
More significantly, the notion of state sovereignty was fast losing its sacrosanct 
position within the international discourse. Globalization had refashioned the 
notion of state sovereignty through subtle changes in international rules and 
norms. The establishment of the International Criminal Court and international 
conventions that allowed crimes against humanity to be tried extra-territorially 
symbolized fundamental change.243 These changes created a conducive 
environment for the IFIs to introduce GRCs as an integral part of wider 
macroeconomic policy formulation. 
 
The prelude to the contemporary GRCs was the policy statement of the Bank in 
September of 1997 that “corruption should be explicitly taken into account in 
country risk analysis, lending decisions and portfolio supervision if it affects 
                                                 
241 Mette Kjoer and Klava Kinnerup “Good Governance: How does it relate to Human Rights?” in 
Hans Otto Sano and Gudmundur Alfredsson (eds) Human Rights and Good Governance — 
Building Bridges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2002) 1–18. 
242 World Bank The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1993). 
243 The notion that state sovereignty is inviolable was dealt severe blows with the indictments of 
both Pinochet in Spain and the UK, and the former Chadian dictator, Hissène Habré in a 
Senegalese court in 2000 for “torture and barbarity”. Encapsulating the mood of the moment the 
United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, declared that it is clear that UN member states can 
no longer hide behind protestations of national sovereignty when they flagrantly violate the rights 
of citizens. He reiterated his point by saying that “nothing in the [United Nations] Charter 
precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders” New York Times (New York, 21 Sep 
1999). 
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project or country performance.”244 The Twelfth Replenishment of the 
International Development Association (IDA), negotiated in 1998, stated: “good 
governance is critical to the development process and to the effectiveness of 
development assistance; this is a key concern of the IDA.”245 The exact nature and 
the scope of the GRCs remained ill-defined at this point.  
 
The IMF also issued a rather tenuously drafted document on Good Governance in 
1997.246 The Fund focused on reiterating that good governance was a necessary 
precondition to infuse and maintain the confidence of the financial sector. In 
keeping with the mandate of the IMF its Good Governance definition included247 
 
“issues such as institutional reforms of the treasury, budget preparation and 
approval procedures, tax administration, accounting and audit mechanisms, 
Central Bank operations, and the official statistics function, ….reforms of market 
mechanisms would focus primarily on the exchange, trade, and price systems, 
and aspects of the financial system. In the regulatory and legal areas, IMF advice 
would focus on taxation, banking sector laws and regulations, and the 
establishment of free and fair market entry.”  
 
The changing reality was quickly felt within the community of states that heavily 
relied on donor assistance. In a meeting of African Ministers of Finance, the 
President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, declared that: 248 
 
“in the face of declining official development assistance, there is a realization and 
acceptance among African countries that individual countries will have to justify 
their case for additional assistance. This must be on the basis of high performance 
on the issues of good governance, observance of the rule of law and zero 
tolerance for corruption.”  
 
This view was further reinforced by the fact that the East Asian financial crisis in 
the late 1990s was largely blamed on corruption, lack of accountability, 
supervision and poor regulation among governments of the region.249   
                                                 
244 Helping Countries Combat Corruption:The Role of the World Bank Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management The World Bank September 1997  
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/coridx.htm >(accessed 8 Feb 
2008). 
245 Additions to IDA Resources: Twelfth Replenishment IDA 12 (1998) (International Development 
Association, World Bank, Washington DC).. 
246 Good Governance: The IMF's Role (International Monetary Fund, 2 July 1997) 
<http://www.imf.htm> (accessed 17 May 2006). 
247 Ibid  paragraph 6. 
248  Development News 1 Sep 1999. 
249 Greg Mills “The Future of Globalization” (1998) 6 South African Journal of International 
Affairs 1, 83. 
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From the perspective of the IMF and the World Bank it was vital that the new 
genre of conditionalities were more effective than the previous ones. In the Fund’s 
case, the new conditionalities were supposed to induce confidence not only in the 
IMF but in allied private creditors as well. To maintain the continuous flow of 
private capital, countries urgently needed to establish credibility in the form of 
acceptable political behaviour that was predictable and legitimate. In defence of 
political conditionality, the insistence on democratic reforms is premised on three 
essential, interdependent elements: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies 
and leaders; 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of 
power by the executive; and 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in 
their daily lives and in acts of political participation.250 
 
Since the early 1990s, Good Governance has been incorporated as a conditionality 
in all of the IFIs’ financial and technical assistance programmes. However, the 
term has not been clearly defined nor specified by the IFIs. Frequently, reliance is 
placed on the IDA 12th Replenishment 1998, which describes the “four pillars” of 
good governance as accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and 
participation. This rather vague definition has great potential. As a principle there 
has been widespread acceptance of the good governance concept within the donor 
communities, the NGOs and the civil society of the borrower countries. It has also 
touched a chord with the deep discontentment and disillusionment within the civil 
societies of developing countries concerning governance, corruption and 
mismanagement of development programmes and external aid and loan 
assistance. 
 
The culture of pervasive corruption and the lack of accountability in governance 
in South Asia, which until now, were never addressed by other stakeholders, apart 
from the oppressed civil society whose only available recourse had been sporadic 
incidents of violence or civic uprising that were in the most part unsuccessful. 
Raising the issue of governance, the IFIs have given voice to a concern that was 
deep-rooted yet rarely articulated — and often in fact denied — by the developing 
                                                 
250 WH Moore and JR Scarritt “IMF Conditionality and Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An 
Exploratory Analysis” [1990] Africa Today 37, 49. 
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nations themselves. However, reservation and scepticism about the 
implementation of good governance and IFIs’ mandate to implement and monitor 
GRCs have been raised. The present study advocates for a regional framework 
that will also be mandated to deal with issues of governance and corruption.251  
 
 
3.10.2  Practical Limitations of Implementing Governance-Related 
conditionalities 
 
In practical terms a government may be requested to implement anti-corruption 
laws as part of donor driven conditionalities but questions of compliance and 
policing the legal regime rarely emerge. Policy formulation through consultation 
and participation remain difficult within immature civil societies such as those in 
South Asia. Transforming good governance from a mere banality into an effective 
conditionality continues to remain a problem that the IFIs are grappling with even 
today. Joseph Stiglitz, the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, recently 
argued that, “There is increasing evidence that [conditionality] was not [effective] 
— good policies cannot be bought, at least in a sustainable way. Equally 
critically, there is a concern that the way the changes were effected undermined 
democratic processes.”252 
 
T.N. Srinivasan, like many others, does not appear to be impressed by the sudden 
infatuation of the IFIs with governance. He comments that the IFI policy makers 
suddenly declared that: 253 
 
“we now see the centrality of issues of governance, both in the public and 
private sector. Pray, what took so long to see this? ‘Governance’, to use 
the buzz-word, is not a new issue — one already knows that rampant 
corruption is deleterious, or for that matter that openness to foreign trade 
and technology, macro-economic stability, investment, etc., are all 
important! 
 
Quite apart from the GRCs serving the interests of the IFIs, good governance has 
also had a positive effect on the political culture of the developing nations. Good 
                                                 
251 See Chapter 6 of this study. 
252 Joseph Stiglitz “World Bank at the Millennium” (1999) 109 The Economic Journal 591. 
253 TN Srinivasan Letters to the editor, Financial Times (London, 24 Sep 1999). 
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governance created an environment where issues of corruption, whether it was 
unaccountability, bribery, money laundering or misuse of public resources for 
private benefit, could be discussed openly within civil society. Media and the 
NGOs that had been hesitant to address issues of corruption began to voice their 
concerns with greater conviction, secure in the knowledge that the issue had a 
resonance within the international community. This open discussion of good 
governance has helped to move the issue away from the prescriptions of the 
World Bank or the IMF and make it a domestic issue like human rights or the rule 
of law.  
 
 
3.10.3 Good Governance comes to South Asia  
 
The evolution of GRCs has certainly helped create a focus on the complex 
relationship that exists in South Asia between corruption, terrorism, money 
laundering and political decay. South Asia’s experience of corruption is well 
documented by Transparency International (TI).254 In TI’s Corruption Perception 
Index255 measuring transparency in about 90 to 100 countries, India ranked 71st 
equal in 2001 and 2002, and 83rd in 2003 in the countries listed where corruption 
was rife.256 In fact, all countries in South Asia rank poorly. Disturbingly, in 2002 
and 2003, Bangladesh was ranked the most corrupt country in the world and, in 
2006, it just managed to creep up a few places past Haiti and Iraq. External 
findings of surveys by the likes of TI are also confirmed by public opinion, media 
and research within South Asian states.257  
 
There is considerable academic analysis on corruption and its impact on poverty 
and development.258 While Guhan and Paul reiterate that the endemic culture of 
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corruption permeates into every aspect of life exacerbating conditions of poverty 
and social marginalization from which there appears little escape, they further 
contend that it has a negative impact on development initiatives, for:259 
 
[t]he adverse effects of corruption on the economy and on public administration 
are manifold. Government expenditures are inflated and wasteful projects and 
programmes are taken up in order to obtain kickbacks. Standards get diluted in 
investments (e.g. dams, roads, bridges and buildings), goods (e.g. drugs) and 
services (e.g. quality of doctors, engineers and teachers) causing hazards to 
safety, life and health. Government revenues get reduced on account of tax 
evasion. Subsidies and incentives are abused. The poor are the worst affected 
since they cannot pay bribes in order to obtain benefits to which they are 
legitimately entitled. Worse, they are denied basic justice in the hands of corrupt 
officials, such as the police and village officials. Corruption aggravates inequality 
in an already unequal society.  
 
South Asia’s high levels of corruption in public life and the private commercial 
sector co-exist with equally high levels of mass poverty, illiteracy, 
underdevelopment and the increasing criminalization of politics. It is public 
knowledge that “corruption is severely undermining development objectives in 
South Asian countries by hindering economic growth, reducing efficiency, acting 
as a disincentive to potential investors, and above all, diverting critical resources 
meant for poverty alleviation,”260 yet the absence of effective mechanisms has 
been the greatest obstacle to elimination.  
 
The general perception that corruption is part and parcel of public office is 
reinforced when it is commonplace to find news items such as: “Public servants to 
take ‘country forward’ in comfort”,261 an account of the officials of an Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) -sponsored development who ordered a fleet of luxury 
cars for their use with the funds, and a report that “corruption in public life is one 
of the most daunting issues facing the country. Things have come to such a pass 
that all politicians evoke public ridicule.”262 On a more pragmatic note, the results 
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of bad governance are documented in the Human Development Reports because 
poor governance and poverty have a direct correlation.263 
 
Although the World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank and other 
national development agencies have contributed immensely to highlighting the 
issue of corruption and contributed to the open discussion of the subject 
nationally, effective regimes of anti-corruption are a long way from evolving both 
domestically and regionally. 
 
In a positive development in November 2001, India signed up to the ADB-OECD 
Anti-Corruption initiative for Asia-Pacific.264 There has been considerable 
internal pressure from an increasingly vocal civil society to establish effective 
mechanisms to curb corruption in all of the South Asian countries. These societies 
persistently agitate for more access to information, particularly relating to policy 
formulation (e.g., preparation of PRSPs), accountability audits,265 and more 
significantly for effective implementation of the existing mechanisms to curb 
corruption. 
 
Despite these concerns the anti-corruption drive has created an atmosphere 
whereby stakeholders are able to demand standards of good governance from the 
power holders and have also been able to initiate measures that would provide 
positive results once the processes are more established. Chief among these 
developments is the growth of civil society networks engaged in anti-corruption 
work. The rise of civil activism has witnessed a corresponding demand for greater 
transparency within government and the structures of power that basically 
translates into agitation for freedom of information legislation. The quest for such 
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legislation has escalated during the past few years with the expansion of 
investigative journalism.266  
 
Good governance has also rekindled concerns relating to election procedures and 
particularly issues related to the funding of political parties. Legal regimes to 
supervize such activities are poorly formulated and implemented in many of the 
South Asian states.267 An outright ban on corporate funding implemented in 1970 
in India merely aggravated the problem as moneys still changed hands on the 
black market.268 
 
The strong nexus between corruption and the collapse of democracy in the region 
is obvious. The intermittent military rule in both Pakistan and Bangladesh has its 
roots in poor governance, allegations of political corruption and economic 
mismanagement. In the indictment of former premier Nawaz Sharif, after the 
military coup of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf pointed specifically to Mr 
Sharif’s record of economic misgovernance as a justification for military rule. 
Therefore “bad governance” not only weakens economic performance but also 
affects the region’s political stability. 
 
Partha Ghosh’s analysis of corruption in India and her suggested remedies take a 
multidimensional approach and are relevant to all South Asia. According to 
Ghosh: 269 
 
To deal with the malaise of corruption there is a need for a mass movement 
attacking all kinds of evil like the caste system, dowry system, communalism, 
criminalization of politics and so on. Mere legal efforts to deal with the proven 
corrupt is not sufficient. It can cure the symptoms from time to time but not the 
disease. Much more investment is needed in India’s human capital than is the 
case now. … .There is no escape from our going back to the Mahatma’s dictum 
that politics and morality are inseparable and that end and means are one and the 
same thing. 
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Good governance cannot be achieved by the efforts of individual states alone but 
demands international and regional cooperation. The laws on banking secrecy 
combined with increasingly integrated financial markets have inadvertently 
created a safe haven for many people to launder their swindled wealth without 
fear of prosecution. Even in highly publicized instances, such as that of Mobutu or 
of Marcos, the countries have been unable to recover their looted wealth.270 The 
importance of protection for those who collaborate to wipe out corruption in the 
domestic context is underscored by the death of 30-year-old engineer Satyendra 
Kumar Dubey, in Bihar, India in November 2005, which has been linked to 
exposure of corruption in the construction of the giant Golden Quadrilateral road 
project. His death emphasizes the urgent need to enact whistle-blowers laws 
similar to those of the UK, New Zealand and South Africa.271   
 
 
3.10.4  UN Convention Against Corruption  
 
The fight against corruption in the region received another boost with the 
adoption of the UN Convention Against Corruption by the General Assembly on 
31 October, 2003.272 Article 13(1) of the Convention states that each: 
 
State Party shall take appropriate measures, within its means and in 
accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote 
the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, 
such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-
based organizations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption 
and to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity 
of and the threat posed by corruption. 
                                                 
270 “A recent report by the US Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee charged that 
foreigners, with Citibank’s help, used deliberately opaque networks of shell corporations, offshore 
trusts and other instruments to shield their identities as they secretly transferred money out of their 
own countries. The cases reviewed by the Congressional investigations involving Citibank, 
included: tens of millions of dollars transferred by Raul Salinas de Gortari out of Mexico and into 
overseas accounts in 1993 and 1994 during the presidency of his brother, Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari; more than $40 million moved through accounts controlled by Asif Ali . Zardari, husband 
of Benazir Bhutto, late Prime Minister of Pakistan; more than $130 million moved through 
accounts controlled by El Hadj Omar Bongo, President of Gabon since 1967; more than $110 
million moved through accounts connected to Mohammed, Ibrahim and Abba Abacha, sons of the 
late General Sani Abacha, former military leader of Nigeria.” Governance-related Conditionalities 
of the International Financial Institutions UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/6 (United Nations 
Publication, 2000). 
271 Rashmeez Ahmed “Dubey Gets Whistleblower Award” Times of India (Monday 22 March 
2004).  
272 GA Res. 58/4 (31 Oct, 2003). 
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Chapter 3 of the Convention calls upon parties to “consider adopting” laws to 
establish other actions as criminal offences, including trading in influence, abuse 
of functions, illicit enrichment, and bribery in the private sector. The chapter 
contains a series of articles on measures for promoting adherence to such criminal 
laws — for example, measures for freezing and confiscating the proceeds of a 
crime, overcoming bank secrecy laws, and cooperation among law enforcement 
authorities of the parties.273 The swift adoption of the Convention indicates the 
great enthusiasm with which the community of states are subscribing to a regime 
against corruption, bribery and money laundering by both state and private 
sectors.274     
 
Governance related conditionalities initiated by the World Bank and the IMF 
ensuring transparency and accountability within the structures of governance were 
aimed at further consolidating the chain of accountability running upwards from 
national governments to the IFIs. However, the positive ramification of the GRCs 
was that civil societal activism and the media seized the opportunity to create a 
dialogue between national governments and civil society on issues relating to 
GRCs. The insistence by the IFIs on honouring the GRCs provided the necessary 
impetus for the media to expose incidents of corruption and misuse of power by 
the national governments and contributed to the consolidation of investigative 
journalism in the region.  
 
 
3.11 Conclusion  
 
This chapter traced the impetus to generate a culture of development assistance to 
the inaugural speech of Truman in 1949. The genesis of the international financial 
institutions was rooted in the economic downturn of the 1930s and the need to 
create a vibrant yet systematic financial regulatory framework in the aftermath of 
the World War II. The chapter analysed the ideological affiliations of the IFIs 
                                                 
273 Sean D Murphy “Adoption of UN Convention Against Corruption” (2004) 98 The American 
Journal of International Law 182. 
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based on neo-liberalism upon which multilateral financial policies are determined. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.3.1 of this chapter elaborated the symbiotic relationship 
between the key public and private agents of neo-liberal globalization, the IFIs 
and the TNCs respectively; whose operations have a fundamental impact on the 
economies of the developing world.     
 
The analysis also focussed on the historical antecedents of the 1970s debt crisis 
and the circumstances that compelled the IFIs to advocate policy changes in 
relation to global financial markets. In this context section 3.6 of this chapter 
discussed the national economic policies of South Asia until the period of 
economic liberalisation and their particular strengths and weaknesses. The reasons 
for the embracing IFI-propelled economic restructuring programmes through the 
SAPs were discussed. The ideological leanings of the IFIs which emphasize 
economic growth with particular disregard for the human dimension of 
development werew analysed. The social and human costs of these policy 
changes, in relation to South Asia, discussed. The study highlighted the parallel 
existence of the human rights regime and the development regime and the 
reluctance of the IFIs to seek an amalgamation of the two.   
 
A significant observation of this chapter is that the neo-liberal market-based 
globalization process aggravates conditions of poverty and intensifies democratic 
dysfunction within the structures of government. The implementation of the SAPs 
and the PRSPs, which this study identifies as the instruments of contemporary 
globalization, diminishes the significance of the concept of state sovereignty and 
creates a structure of accountability that places the IFIs at the apex. 
 
The role of the TNCs in the economic activities of the developing world, 
particularly South Asia, was analysed in section 3.9 of this chapter. The study 
discussed the exploitative tendencies of the TNCs which were abetted by the 
conducive fiscal and regulatory regime created by the host countries competing 
with each other for the much-craved FDI. The need for stronger international 
regime monitoring of transnational corporations was emphasized in this chapter.    
 
Further analysis of the ramifications of the IFI policy overhauls in this chapter 
identified the mobilization of civil society and the articulation of “good 
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governance” as positive outcomes of that process. Civil society mobilization and 
good governance are both concepts which have great potential and have not been 
explored sufficiently in the South Asia context. This chapter concludes with two 
general observations: the first, that developmental and economic growth concepts 
must be extricated from their contemporary ideological base in neo-liberalism. 
Secondly, there must be a tangible rationalization between the human rights 
regime and the developmental regime so that the benefits of development are 
shared equitably between all people. 
 
The following chapter is presented in two distinct sections. The chapter first 
considers the impact of neo-liberal policy formulation on democratic governance 
in South Asia. As reiterated in the Introduction to this thesis, human rights, 
development and democracy form a symbiotic relationship which mutually 
supports the success of each other in their sphere of operations.  The neo-liberal 
economic policies that compelled fundamental alterations in the operation of 
national economies had the effect of refocusing the centre of accountability of the 
national governments from the people to the IFIs. The need to placate the IFIs 
resulted in creating situations of civic dissent, undermining the functioning of 
democracy,  will be analysed in Chapter 4 of this study. 
 
Secondly, Chapter 4 explores the South Asian Association of Regional 
Coorpeation (SAARC) that has been established as a mechanism to coordinate the 
regional effort to secure human rights and social development. The discussion 
will focus of the goals of the SAARC and its inherent limitations that is reflective 
of the regional political insecurities.  It will analyse the efficacy and viability of 
existing regional mechanisms in the context of contemporary globalization and 
whether the SAARC has fulfilled the expectations since its inauguration two 
decades ago. 
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CHAPTER 4   
 
 
A POVERTY OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE 
INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE REGION’S NEEDS  
THAT IS THE SAARC 
 
 
“While generating a proliferation of electoral regimes and celebrating “democracy” in 
the abstract, neo-liberal globalization has undermined the possibility of  
democratic control over state policies and insulated the most fundamental policy 
decisions from even the fiction of democratic control. It has had pervasively  
corrosive effects on any sense of self-worth that is based on local culture, difference and 
identity. Finally, it is now associated with a return to military adventurism whose 
potential future destructive effects are frightening to contemplate.”1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As Chapter 3 indicated, globalization has demanded transformations in areas such 
as trade, investment, technology, communication and state sovereignty. It has 
offered opportunities to re-evaluate the global relationships between states, 
international organizations, transnational corporations and individuals. The 
contemporary wave of globalization has also compelled a rethinking about several 
issues: about the capacities and the obligations of the agents of globalization; 
about the meaning of poverty (or poverties); and also about the relationship 
between material poverty, economic development and the full panoply of human 
rights. It has also created opportunities for discussion relating to regionalization as 
a crucial means of both insulating states and individuals from the adverse effects 
of globalization and harnessing and channelling its positive effects: in short, 
better, conscious, active regional governance of globalization.  
 
As reiterated at the conclusion of Chapter 3, formulation of effective strategies to 
combat all species of poverty required firstly the identification of the primary 
perpetrators. Chapter 3 identified the first source of problems as lying at the 
supranational level. At that level the “perpetrators” were shown to be the IFIs and 
TNCs, being the key public and private agents, respectively, of neo-liberal 
economic globalization. Chapter 3 illustrated how inopportune and imprudent 
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422. 
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policy formulation by IFIs in the last 30 years, through the instrument of the SAPs 
in particular but also PRSPs, added to the endemic material poverty that denied 
the people their economic, social and cultural rights within the region. It also 
illustrated how the TNCs exploited the weak economic climate and poor 
governance of the region for profit, further exacerbating conditions of poverty and 
social exclusion. That discussion in Chapter 3 also touched on a second source of 
problems, namely the inadequate responses of individual states in both to rampant 
neo-liberal economic globalization and their mismanagement or abdication of 
management of their own economies and domestic affairs.  
 
It is natural that thinkers have drawn the link between, on the one hand, the 
policies and actions of the global actors; and, on the other hand, the domestic 
responses to those policies and actions. These responses could be viewed as non-
management, successful management and mismanagement. In this respect, 
Chapter 3 recognized the single most significant positive outcome of the IFI 
policy formulation was the Governance Related Conditionalities (GRCs). Though 
the GRCs are a furtive mechanism to ensure that the IFI policies have a conducive 
environment in which to flourish, they created opportunities in South Asia for 
public debate and discussion on issues such as corruption, democratic deficits and 
public accountability. Chapter 3 concluded with the observation that need-based 
policy formulation, democratic governance and control of the IFIs’ and TNCs’ 
activities should be the foundation of an effective mechanism that would eradicate 
poverty and foster human-centred development in South Asia. 
 
In this transition between Chapters 3 and 4, it is timely to tie together several 
threads of argument that have now been individually teased out, just as the 
introduction to Chapter 3 wove together explicitly two threads of globalization: 
essentially economic globalization from Chapter 2 and the internationalization — 
one might equally say “globalization” — of human rights from Chapter 1. Taking 
this further, the three threads to be woven together in this chapter are human 
rights, development, and democracy. It has been adumbrated that there exists a 
nexus between these and indeed, effectively, they plait into a single cable, each 
gaining strength from the others. That cable will now be analysed.  
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Human rights are in many ways the most basic element of the cable. Not 
surprisingly, Chapter 1 identified them as the dominant and most powerful 
response to the universal quest to promote human dignity and solve the problem 
of poverty in its widest senses. Yet development, too, aims to remedy poverty and 
bring prosperity, and it, too, is surely a necessary condition for overall progress. 
Development connotes not only such spontaneous economic progress as simply 
happens to occurs via market mechanisms, but also the deliberate and wise 
management, channeling, stimulating, checking and co-ordination of economic 
interactions specifically aimed at fostering such economic progress, in particular 
by poorer states. This thesis observes that the ideal paradigm of development that 
should be strived for is not just the somewhat miserly and resigned hope of a 
(possibly non-existent) trickle-down to the poor that (allegedly) happens as a 
beneficial by-product of market forces, but the rosier picture and altogether bolder 
aspiration of the rising tide that lifts all boats. As such, development can be seen 
as a necessary means for, and a complement to, satisfying human rights. For 
development both answers basic material needs and offers new opportunities for 
ways to flourish and to express freedoms.2  
 
Development is nevertheless not a sufficient condition for progress, because crude 
aggregates such as GDP growth risk mistaking greater expenditure or higher 
technology for ends in themselves, rather than means. They also risk ignoring 
both the issue of damaging and unsustainable growth (consider unsustainable 
environmental degradation) and the problem of growth whose fruits are 
inequitably distributed. Respect for rights (such as rights to equality of process 
and to some extent of outcome, and rights of future generations) serve at once to 
curb, channel and define development which otherwise might well become 
indiscriminate or inequitable, and which might all too easily leave the poor 
behind. Another way of saying this is that development must be “human-centred”. 
In short, economic growth must serve people, not vice versa. 
 
The third strand of this trio, intertwining with human rights and development, will 
be shown in the present chapter to be democracy. That word will be shorthand for, 
                                                           
2 Kofi Annan famously described the joint aspiration as that towards “larger freedom” and added 
another value, that of peaceful security. See Report of the Secretary-General  In larger freedom: 
towards development, security and human rights for all. 
<http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm> (accessed 12 Feb 2008). 
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more specifically, a plural, tolerant, welfarist democracy, with regular elections 
from a universal franchise. In addition, it must operate under a thoroughly 
internalized and honoured rule of law, and be equipped with a strong, independent 
judiciary. Such specifications are necessary to distinguish the ideal conception of 
the term from usages of it that are really mis-usages. For instance, Pakistan’s use 
of the term democracy is in reality a militarized executive, despite the existence of 
multiple political parties.3 Sri Lanka and Bangladesh allow opposition parties to 
function in principle but in practice disable them by intimidation and accusations 
of corruption.4 For instance after the Fourth Constitutional Amendment to extend 
the life of the Parliament, the President of Sri Lanka stated blatantly his aim to 
“demolish and completely destroy the opposition politically. After that I say to 
you, roll up the electoral map of Sri Lanka. You will not need it for another ten 
years.”5 
 
Once again, the three strands — human rights, development and democracy —
reinforce and depend on each other. Democracy that disregards civil and political 
rights negates the very fundamental role of the concept, as much as democracy 
that ignores economic rights is of little benefit to the materially marginalized; and 
that which would deny social and cultural rights will ill adapt to groups’ 
idiosyncratic needs and will stifle cultural expression. The right to self-
determination is an implicit premise of a democratic state, as well as being a force 
in tension with splintering into smaller units that the state must negotiate and 
manage. As to the relationship between democracy and development, a 
democratic state benefits from development insofar as development multiplies the 
realizable freedoms and the well-being of people.  
 
Three other strands of another whole category also need to be woven together at 
this pivotal point in the study. These strands are the national, regional and 
international/global responses to the problems of how to achieve the three aims 
just described: human rights, development and democracy. The “top” or global 
tier, includes attempts to render the structures, powers and actions of both IFIs 
                                                           
3 Aqil Shah “Democracy on Hold in Pakistan” (2002) 13 Journal of Democracy 67–75. 
4 Douglas Allen Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 
(Greenwood Publishing, Westport, USA, 1992). 
5 Priya Samarakone “The Conduct of the Referendum,” in James Manor (ed.) Sri Lanka in Change 
and Crisis (Croom Helm, London, 1984) 86. 
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and TNCs answerable for violations of widely defined human rights. In the case 
of IFIs at least, the top tier also includes further infusing sincere rights 
consciousness into their mission and their policy formulation.  
 
Considering the “bottom” tier next, this study reiterates the significance of the 
states themselves, who will remain key actors in creating, constituting, voting on 
and opting into both regional and global mechanisms. It will further be argued 
that states will remain the first — though not the only — repository of duties 
corresponding to human rights. Despite being weakened by the supranational and 
subnational forces mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, and despite the redefinition of 
abridging of Westphalian sovereignty, it is only all the more necessary for states 
to effectuate plural, rights-based democracy and development inside their own 
borders through setting their own terms of engagement with globalizing forces.   
 
Finally, the “middle” tier remains to be discussed — that of the region. The 
present study argues that regional integration of organizations to supervise human 
rights, democracy and development offers much unrealized potential. Too often 
overlooked, regionalism can rightly be seen as the pivot and potentially the place 
of most purchase over human rights and functional democracy. Regional 
organizations are more responsive to particular needs of culture and stage of 
development than are the global power bases. For the same reason, albeit put 
more pragmatically, the guidance, supervision and greater interventions by a 
regional body of states that come together in free association and on their own 
terms, are less easily rejected as inappropriate, ignorant or imperialist. 
Regionalism mediates between impossible and suffocating isolationism on one 
side (consider North Korea), implosion on another (consider the former 
Yugoslavia) and total submergence and defeatism in the face of global brute 
forces on another, as neo-liberalism, at its worst, claims is not only inevitable but 
desirable.  
 
Chapter 4 thus picks up strands from above and focuses on two distinct but related 
aspects of the predicament of South Asia today. Firstly, picking up the strand of 
democracy from the trio of values discussed above (along with human rights and 
development), the chapter assesses the current health and functioning of the 
democratic apparatus in each of South Asia’s states. The author discusses the 
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democratic deficit and poor governance in South Asia that exacerbates 
marginalization and endemic poverty in the region.6 This chapter will focus on the 
nature of the democratic deficit in South Asia and its impact on the legitimacy of 
governance. It will analyse the legitimacy challenges that are faced by national 
governments across the region as they fail to deliver on the minimum expectations 
of the people they seek to govern. It will discuss the civil dissatisfaction that has 
taken on militant overtones and analyze this as a natural corollary to the 
contemporary IFI policy formulation and the impact of policy formulation on 
human rights. The study will focus on the necessity to create a normative stand on 
democracy and governance at a regional level as accepted norms of democratic 
governance are subverted nationally in South Asia.   
 
Secondly, picking up on the third tier between globalism and nationalism, this 
chapter will also evaluate the efficacy of existing regional mechanisms in 
synthesizing the development efforts with strategies to realize human rights 
anddemocracy. In this context this chapter will analyse the inauguration, work and 
the impact of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
which is by far the most significant  regional mechanism in the subcontinent. This 
study argues that the SAARC is ineffective and cannot deal with contemporary 
global exigencies that have a negative impact on South Asia. The present chapter 
concludes with the observation that an effective regime of human rights protection 
is dependent on mechanisms that ensure democracy and on sagacious policy 
formulation that addresses issues of human development.  
 
 
4.2 Manifestations of democratic deficit in South Asia at the level of the 
state 
 
The impact of globalization on South Asian states and the issues relating to 
diminished sovereignty were discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. The discussion 
also mentioned issues relating to Governance Related Conditionalities (GRCs), 
                                                           
6 See Chapter 3 of this study. See also HL Root Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and 
the Rise of East Asia (Oxford University Press, 1996) and Peter Larmour “Making Sense of Good 
Governance” Discussion Paper No. 98/5 Paper presented to staff and students State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project, University of Papua New Guinea Council Room, Australian 
National University, Canberra, June 1998. 
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which were elaborated in Chapter 3 as a positive ramification of the globalization 
process. The relevance of good governance to development is highlighted by 
several international policy statements. These include the Millennium 
Declaration, which states, “Success in meeting these objectives [of poverty 
reduction] depends, inter alia, on good governance within each country.”7 
 
This section analyses the impact of globalization on democracy and democratic 
processes in South Asia. As Held et al. observed, “[g]lobalization is not an end 
state, or a single thing, any more than is democracy or industrialization. These are 
processes involving changing relations of human affairs.”8 In a similar vein this 
study observes that the role and function of democracy has changed in the face of 
neo-liberal globalization, creating a democratic deficit in South Asia at the level 
of the state. 
 
The democratic deficit9 challenges the legitimacy of the established governing 
structures and leads to civic dissent and militancy, which in turn create a sense of 
insecurity among political power holders. Ironically, in states which are currently 
in large part not receptive to the good ideas of the GRCs, that insecurity is simply 
compounded by the concepts of good governance imposed by the IFIs to enhance 
governments’ political legitimacy, responsible governance and social equity.10 
The concept of good governance demands transparency, accountability and 
responsibility in governance and policy formulation, aspects which are currently 
non-functional in South Asian regimes. This study observes that governance 
procedures of South Asia at the state level are dominated by “[u]nsophisticated 
political institutions and procedures, weak governmental capacity, a strict 
                                                           
7 <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm> (accessed 3 Mar 2006). 
8 David Held and Paul Hirst “Globalization after 11 September: The argument of our time” 
(2002) 22 Open Democracy (online) <www.globalenvision.org/library/66/528> (accessed 7 Nov 
2007). 
9 The term “Democratic Deficit” was first coined by Bill Newton Dunn to indicate the lack of 
democracy within the institutional mechanisms of the European Union. See MR Dimitris and N 
Chryssochoou Democracy in the European Union 2000 (IB Tauris and Company, London, New 
York, 2000) 22–172 for a discussion of democratic deficit in relation to the EU. Chryssochoou 
explores the origin and nature of democratic deficit and identifies two parallel explanatory theses. 
The first is the declining significance of the parliamentary legislatures in the national governing 
processes, whose functions were being transferred to the structures of government in the EU. 
Second is the thesis that argues that the democratic deficit of the EU is endogenous due to the 
absence of a constitutional mechanism that answers issues of human rights, legislative 
representation and political responsibility. See also Christophe Crombez “The Democratic Deficit 
in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing?” (2003) 4 European Union Politics 101–120. 
10 See Chapter 3 of this study and also Jean Grugel Democratization: A Critical Introduction 
(Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2001). 
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hierarchical relationship between the state and citizens/civil society, and 
especially the propensity of ruling parties in these countries to crave popular 
support without unsettling the status quo…” and that these are all impediments to 
effective implementation of good governance.11 The inability of the rulers to 
disassociate themselves from illiberal governing practices compounds the 
democratic deficit in the region and undermines development and the realization 
of human rights. The democratic deficit manifests itself in several ways and the 
following paragraphs trace some of its manifestations in South Asia. 
 
 
 
4.2.1  Disenchantment with the Offerings of Democracy in the Hunger for 
the Good Life 
 
The post-independence political leaders of South Asia had a clear vision of the 
core and the content of development. Their idea of development was to create a 
people-centred concept, which aimed at ending the many impediments people 
were compelled to endure as a consequence of colonial occupation. Nehru’s 
articulation of development at independence was a common aspiration of almost 
all the political leaders of the region:12  
 
“What is the Development of a Nation? You can use it in the limited but 
important sense of raising the standards of the people, better living conditions, 
the necessaries of life, etc., being provided for all the people … Obviously we 
want to develop on the material plane; we want to build up a society where it is 
open to every person to lead what might be called the Good Life.” 
 
As this study identifies, four decades later poor policy choices by national 
governments, reacting to global forces over which individual countries at least 
seemed to have little control, have exacerbated the pervasive poverty in South 
Asia and resulted in a denial of economic, social and cultural rights for people.13 
In fact, the search for Nehru’s “good life” has gone awry and as a result:14 
                                                           
11 Habib Zafarullah “Globalization, state and politics in Bangladesh: Implications for democratic 
governance” (2003) 26 Journal of South Asian Studies 283–296. 
12 Excerpts from a speech delivered by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, to the 
Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science, 15 Oct 1962 
<http://www.nsf.ac.lk/slaas/publications/Science June2001.pdf> (accessed 16 Sep 2005). 
13 “Poverty in South Asia 2006: Civil Society Concerns”   
<http://www.saape.org.np/resources/publications/poverty_report06/poverty_report06.htm> 
(accessed 5 Dec 2006). 
14 MN Venkatachaliah “There are some things of eternal verity”  (2000) 17 Frontline   
<http://www.flonnet.com/fl1704/17040300.htm> (accessed 10 Feb 2008). 
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Today we have the dismal situation of a social infrastructure where 670 million 
people in this country don't have basic sanitary facilities, and 260 million don't 
have potable water. Forty per cent of the world's tuberculosis patients are in 
India, 25 per cent of the world's blind are in India. Fifty per cent of the world's 
illiterates are in India. Fifty per cent of the world's leprosy afflicted are in India. 
…Then there is the issue of the enormous corruption in public life, electoral 
malpractices, the tyranny of wealth, and the insolence of authority. They have all 
made the life of the common man one of disenchantment with the institutions of 
democracy. 
 
These conditions are mirrored in other parts of the subcontinent as well. 
 
The inevitable corollary of neo-liberal globalization was the reduction in the role 
of the state in economic governance, creating a greater dependency on market 
forces to regulate the economy15 This development resulted in a system of 
economic discrimination particularly in respect of land, employment and capital, 
and aroused discontentment among the economically marginalized segments of 
society. As reiterated in Chapter 3, there is a steady decline of delivery of public 
services throughout the region. Poor resource allocation for health and education 
by the government accentuates social fragmentation. Incidents of violence against 
women and children, such as dowry deaths, female infanticide, foeticide and the 
selling of children have intensified and are largely caused by economic 
deprivation.16 The situation implies that the South Asian Parliaments and the 
executive organs have abdicated the constitutionally defined and allocated 
responsibilities of addressing issues of public welfare and at the same time 
overstepped constitutional limits on their proper powers. The result is not only the 
breakdown of constitutional governance but the denial of human rights often 
guaranteed through the Constitutions.  
 
The absence of proper fora and means to address governmental inaction 
contributes to the discontentment of the people, prompting them to resort to extra-
legal means to voice their concerns and challenge the governmental apathy and 
abuse. There is also a disturbing trend of people seeking redress through 
militancy, which creates enormous social and political repercussions including 
violent reaction by the governments, exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy of 
                                                           
15 This aspect has been elaborated in Chapter 3 of this study. 
16 V Shiva Water War: Privatization, Pollution, and Profit  (South End Press, 2002) and Jayanti 
Patel “India: Gujarat riots - communalization of state and civic society” <http://www.mukto-
mona.com/human_rights/gujarat/gujrat_riot_patel.htm> (accessed 25 Jun 2006). 
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governance in the region.17 South Asia has seen many conflicts arising through 
people’s sense of desperation and insecurity and these have expanded into 
conflicts of caste, religion, race and region, all of which are rooted in poverty and 
destitution.18 State response to civil dissent is often brutal, and legal measures— 
such as India’s Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) 2002,19 apparently 
inspired by the anti-terrorism laws of the USA and Britain;20 the much earlier Sri 
Lankan Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979; Bangladesh’s Suppression of Terrorist 
Offences Act 1992; Nepal's Terrorism Ordinance of November 2001; and 
Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 200221 — permit the 
concentration of power in the hands of the executive, rendering civil and political 
rights vulnerable to abuse by the state.22 Such legislation also curtails the 
transparency and the accountability of the government regarding issues relating to 
terrorism and national security, which are traditionally regarded as secretive. 
 
 
4.2.2 A History of Dysfunctional Organs and Failing States 
 
Colonization brought the Western structures of governance to South Asia 
replacing what were the feudal structures of monarchical rule. Despite South Asia 
being home to the world’s largest democracy (India) and having two of the 
developing world’s oldest democracies (India and Sri Lanka), the region’s general 
commitment to democratic governance is low.23 The governing structures of the 
South Asian countries are a curious blend of democracy founded on federalism, 
                                                           
17 See Richard Falk ”Responding to Severe Violations” in Jorge I. Dominguez et al. (eds) 
Enhancing Global Human Rights (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979) 205, 226.  
18 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah Levelling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence 
in South Asia (University of California Press, California, 1996); N Arunatilake, S Jayasuriya and S 
Kelegama “The Economic Cost of the War in Sri Lanka” (2001) 29 World Development 1483–
1500.  
19 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/POTA.htm (accessed 
9 Feb 2008). 
20 Bjorn Hettene “South Asia and the War against terrorism” in Ravinder Kaur (ed) Religion, 
Violence and Political Mobilisation in South Asia (Sage Publications, India, 2005). 
21<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/actsandordinance/prevention_of_t
errorism.htm> (accessed 9 Feb 2007). 
22 Radhika Coomaraswamy and Charmaine de los Reyes ”Rule by emergency: Sri Lanka's 
postcolonial constitutional experience” (2004) 2 International  Journal of Constitutional Law 272–
295. 
23 India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh have structures of formal democratic governance but 
with different degrees of political conflict. Nepal and Maldives have authoritarian regimes 
respectively where there is ongoing civil society agitation for democracy. Bhutan, a formal 
monarchy, is gradually absorbing features of democracy. Freedom in the World 2007. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007> (accessed 12 Feb 2008). 
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secularism and socialism, coupled with authoritarian rule, military dictatorships 
and monarchical rule that indicates strong leanings towards religious governance 
based on Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism.24 In a region where cultural, religious, 
caste and race specificities play a pivotal role in politics, Western democracy and 
its accompanying political institutions have been synthesized with the 
sociocultural idiosyncrasies with a peculiar sense of functionalism.  
 
Political rulers are traditionally regarded with awe and reverence in the 
subcontinent.25 The prevalent political culture seemingly bestows upon the leaders 
an undisputed authority to rule. The ideas of limited and responsible government 
have neither penetrated sufficiently into the political fabric of these societies nor 
have they been internalized by the people they govern. Therefore, abuse of power 
in whatever form is the norm rather than the exception. “People may grumble in 
private about autocratic leaders but they still defer to them and often vote them 
back into power or acquiesce in their perpetuity.”26 In this context, an attempt to 
apply a Lockian articulation of the role and the purpose of government that gains 
legitimacy through the consent of the people in order to protect the rights of the 
people and promote the public good is essentially inapplicable. 
 
The governments in South Asia are highly centralized, despite the federal 
structures within some states. Appurtenances of democracy — notably universal 
franchise and periodic elections, which were part and parcel of the colonial 
legacy, play a large yet empty part in civic life. Though principles of democracy 
and democratic institutions are enshrined prominently in the constitutions of all 
                                                           
24 Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh are Islamic states that tend to manipulate religious fervour 
for political advantage. Nepal is a Hindu state and Burma and Sri Lanka’s Buddhist majority wield 
political influence. Issues related to religious intolerance were discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. 
See also Ayesha Jalal Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge University, 1995). 
25 See Paul Harrison Inside the Third World: The Anatomy of Poverty (Viking Press, 1993). 
Political dynasties in the region are a common phenomenon. Successive members in the same 
family such as Pakistan’s Bhutto family, the Nehru-Gandhi family in India, and the 
Bandararanikes of Sri Lanka have been elected to power. Despite their political philosophies based 
on liberal democracy the members of the prominent political families appear to imagine that they 
have an inherited legitimate right in the governance process. Benazir Bhutto’s will appointing her 
son as Chairman of  Pakistan Peoples’ Party is a manifestation of that belief: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7164968.stm> (accessed 10 Feb 2008.) Similarly Rahul 
Gandhi is the fourth generation to enter into Indian politics. Rajiv Desai, the former Media 
Adviser of Indira Gandhi, commented, “There has been no [other] single family that has lived their 
lives for this abstract thing called the nation ……I think what they represent is sacrifice. That's 
their charisma and their enigma.”  
<http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2004/05/15/461134-ap.html> (accessed 2 Feb 2005). 
26  K Christie “Regime Security and Human Rights in South Asia” (1995) 43 Political Studies 
(Special Issue). 
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South Asian states, functional democracy is absent in the region. The facade of 
democracy is maintained through intervallic elections where people exercise their 
voting rights but have little influence on direction and formulation of policy, nor 
have any power to initiate proactive reforms. Despite claims of multiparty 
democracy, political parties rarely contest elections on genuine policy issues as 
votes are often cast on the basis of religion, caste and ethnicity. Elections are 
usually based on political rhetoric such as the creation of unattainable utopias like 
J.R. Jayawardene’s quest to create a dharmishta samajaya (“just society”) in 1977 
in Sri Lanka, Indira Gandhi’s gharibo hato (“remove poverty”) in the 1976 
general election, or Vijaypayee’s “India shining” campaign in 2003, rather than 
comprehensive policy formulation. 
 
The function and the role of the legislature as an organ of democratic government 
is also dysfunctional and perverted.27 There exists a disturbing culture of an 
absence of political party loyalty and a lack of conviction of principles within 
elected Members of Parliament, which create potential defectors who contribute 
adversely to the insecurity of the governments in South Asia. In many countries 
the Cabinet is oversized, as the Cabinet office is created not on a needs basis but 
as a reward for political support.28 This political culture, deriving from a lack of 
vision and commitment within political parties and the opportunistic way in which 
Members of Parliament design their agendas, undermines functional democracy. 
Kamal draws a realistic picture of the legislative incapacity of the Parliaments in 
South Asia when he says, “parliaments in reality are much less powerful than 
other organs of the government. People often take it as a ‘house of controversy 
and irrelevant speeches’.”29 There is little confidence in the elected organ of the 
government to influence policy decisions or represent civil society’s will. 
                                                           
27 Sumit Ganguly “India's Multiple Revolutions”, Aqil Shah “Democracy on Hold in Pakistan”, 
Howard B Schaffer “Back and Forth in Bangladesh” and Neil DeVotta “Illiberalism and Ethnic 
Conflict in Sri Lanka”, all in the study “South Asia Faces the Future” (2002) 13 Journal of 
Democracy; S Kamal “Democratization and poverty alleviation in South Asia” Paper Presented at 
South Asian Regional Workshop on Democracy and Poverty: A Missing Link? Kathmandu, 
Nepal, 10-11 April 2000. 
28 JC Weliamuna Position paper on mega Cabinets, Transparency International Sri Lanka. < 
http://www.tisrilanka.org/e-library/papers/position-paper-on-mega-cabinets-in-sri-lanka> (30 Jan 
2007). 
29 Ahmed Kamal Accountable Governance Democracy Forum 2000. South Asia Chapter 2 The 
Workshop was held in Kathmandu, Nepal 10, 11 April, 2000 (Centre for Studies on Democracy 
and Good Governance) see also Rehman Sobhan “South Asia’s crisis in governance: Avoiding 
false solutions” in Khadija Haq (ed) The South Asian Challenge (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002). 
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As Ghai observes, “[t]he inherent tendency of economic globalization is to 
diminish democracy and to privilege market-oriented rights, reducing the 
importance and feasibility of social and solidarity rights.”30 Therefore, with the 
consolidation of economic globalization in the region and the IFIs undermining 
internal sovereignty, representative institutions in South Asia have gradually 
transformed into empty shells that exist for political convenience rather than for 
responsible governance.31 The illiberal democracy, ineffectual representation, 
weak central governments and ineffective federalism which have dominated the 
political landscape since independence have succeeded in alienating the 
mechanisms of constitutional governance from the people.32 The adoption of 
elaborate constitutional structures, but the total rejection of “the classical notion 
of constitutionalism”, which Oketh-Ogendo describes in the African perspective, 
is also relevant in a South Asian context.33 
 
Internalization of democracy in the region is uneven. Bhutan’s historical isolation 
and the resulting lack of influence by Western liberal political ideology meant that 
political power was vested in the traditional monarchy, which has overwhelming 
public support within the kingdom. The governing structure in Bhutan consists of 
the Tshogdu National Assembly, which is regarded as the antecedent to an elected 
legislative body.34 The ruling monarch, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who is 
regarded as a political reformer, has completed a draft Constitution.35 However, 
political change is slow in a nation where Rutland, commenting on the efficacy of 
swift political changes, observes: “[t]he grass-roots rural society is profoundly 
traditional, and religion too is deep-seated in the minds of the people. It is not 
                                                           
30 Yash Ghai “Human Rights and Social Development Toward Democratization and Social 
Justice” UN Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 5 October 
2001; see also , Yash Ghai “Rights, social justice and globalization in East Asia” in J Bauer and D 
Bell (eds) The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1999). 
31 Rehman Sobhan “How Bad Governance Impedes Poverty Alleviation in Bangladesh” (OECD 
Development Centre Working Papers 143, OECD Development Centre, 1998). 
32 Neil DeVotta “Sri Lanka's political decay: Analysing the October 2000 and December 2001 
parliamentary elections” (2003) 41Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 115–142.  
33 HWO Oketh-Ogendo “Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African 
Political Paradox” in Issa G Shivji (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on 
democracy. South Africa Political Economy Series (Southern Africa Printing & Publ. House 1991) 
65–82. 
34 Thierry Mathou “Political Reform in Bhutan: Change in a Buddhist Monarchy” (1999) 39 Asian 
Survey 613–632. 
35 “Bhutan holds second 'fake' poll”<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6697309.stm> 
(accessed 7 Nov 2007). 
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surprising that development creates tensions between innovation and tradition 
…”.36 In this context, many analysts believe that the slow but steady 
transformation to democratic governance will be beneficial to Bhutan. If a 
consensus on democracy is reached within the regional association, as advocated 
in Chapter 6 of this study, it is unlikely that Bhutan will attempt to sabotage such 
a development.  
 
The political experience of Sri Lanka provides an excellent example of continued 
ostensible commitment to structures of democratic governance which does not 
ensure peace and stability. Apart from the Westminster-styled constitutional 
structure that Sri Lanka inherited as a colonial legacy, Sri Lanka experimented 
with two other Constitutions, the last being a Gaullist-styled Presidential 
Constitution in 197837 which was designed to consolidate executive power. 
Liberal constitutionalism, which supposedly was expressed through each of the 
Constitutions of Sri Lanka, is designed to safeguard the interests of the multi-
ethnic state. However, the actual manifestation of the Constitution is the 
consolidation of ethnic-based politics to the extent that the mainstream has 
criminalized the articulation of political rights based on ethnicity, which resulted 
in the further alienation of the ethnic minorities, who resorted to violence in order 
the obtain political power.38 Subsequent attempts to introduce federalism through 
the constitutional structure did not resolve the political and economic insecurities 
of the minorities but in fact accentuated them.39 Today, Sri Lanka has an elaborate 
constitutional mechanism that holds together a malfunctioning system of 
democratic governance. Unprecedented corruption is rampant in all spheres of 
political life and governance is increasingly violent.40 Despite the 
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dysfunctionalism that is inherent in the constitutional apparatus, Sri Lanka has, 
however, indicated an enduring commitment to the processes of democracy. 
 
Both Pakistan and Bangladesh41 have had a tenuous relationship with democracy 
since independence.42 Periodic intervention by the military in democratic 
governance has not assisted the consolidation of democratic values within the 
civil society. Ethnic violence, which negatively impacts on democratic 
governance, has become common in Bangladesh in recent years and most 
commentators agree that such violence is carried out with the tacit consent of the 
ruling party. During the 2001 communal riots against Hindus, “[t]he deliberate 
inaction of the state, and in some instances, active connivance with the attackers, 
also [made] it an instance of state sponsored violence”.43  
 
The sporadic interruptions of the democratic order by the military have 
contributed to the institutionalization of violence within the structures of the 
governments of both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The last military coup in Pakistan 
was justified as putting an end to the corrupt and non-effective government of 
Navaz Sharrif. As Mallik observes, “[t]his was rooted in a pervasive abhorrence 
for Sharif’s second administration itself established in February 1997 following a 
massive electoral mandate. The optimistic view of the military takeover was 
premised on the drifting nature of Sharif’s administration, lacking political 
stability, contrasted with unlimited desire to amass power and wealth”.44 When 
the Supreme Court validated the coup on the premise of “necessity”, it created a 
precedent whereby legitimately elected governments can be replaced through 
unconstitutional means if they subvert democracy and the rule of law. Though 
Musharaff’s promise to reintroduce legitimacy in governance and consolidate a 
constitutionally accepted system of government which is accountable and 
transparent appears to have provided sufficient legitimacy for the Supreme Court 
to uphold the legality of the coup, such precedents will undoubtedly create 
problems for democratic governance in the region, for they legitimize the 
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unconstitutional gain of political power. Moreover, despite parliamentary 
elections in 2002, which reinitiated the democratic process, the army still 
continues to be the dominant influence on Pakistan’s political sphere, an influence 
which, according to Ziring, will be an enduring feature of Pakistani politics 
despite the setback suffered by Musharaff  in the recent elections.45 
 
Furthermore, the situation in Pakistan has become more complex since 9/11/2001, 
where radical Islam has become a political force that challenges the fragile 
mainstream liberal ethos of South Asian governance. The overwhelming support 
of the USA towards Musharaff’s government as a means of quelling radical 
Islamic activism in the region is viewed with scepticism by many who opine that 
the USA should do the opposite and pressurize Musharaff to consolidate and 
expand democracy, as “[d]emocratic reform that allows secular politicians to 
compete freely for power is more likely to reduce the influence of radical 
Islamists.”46 
 
Nepal’s democratic structures of governance have been experiencing a legitimacy 
crisis for the past decade as the country grapples with the Maoist rebels, who are 
waging a “People’s War”;47 an array of ineffectual political parties; and a 
monarch who has become increasingly authoritarian as a result of his impotency 
to deal effectively with the crisis of governance.48 King Gyanendra has declared a 
state of emergency twice since he assumed the throne in 2001 and there have been 
severe restrictions placed on civil and political rights.49 The popular uprisings 
against the monarch in April 2006, in Kathmandu and in other main cities, 
resulted in his reinstating the House of Representatives in Nepal, who have 
drafted a constitution heralding the end of monarchical rule and control in 
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Nepal.50 
 
Against this background of political turmoil and democratic dysfunction, 2005 
saw a curious development with regard to India’s view on democracy. India, 
which by far has the most stable democracy, appears to be taking on a lead role to 
foster democracy in the region. It increasingly appears that India is conscious of 
the lack of democracy in South Asia and the political and security implications of 
being surrounded by failed states. It is with an ambitious agenda that India’s 
Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, declared that: 51  
 
India would like the whole of South Asia to emerge as a community of 
flourishing democracies. We believe that democracy would provide a more 
enduring and broad-based foundation for an edifice of peace and cooperation in 
our sub-continent,” but he added that democracy is “something that we may 
encourage and promote; it is not something that we can impose upon others.  
 
These sentiments of democratic consolidation were again reiterated by the Indian 
Prime Minister when he addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2004. 
He was disdainful of the US policy on South Asia, particularly the political 
alliance with Pakistan’s military government, and observed, “[w]e choose to 
overlook the absence of democracy in too many cases for reasons of political 
expediency.”52 India’s stance on regional democracy was further highlighted 
when India decided not to attend the SAARC summit scheduled for February 
2005, in Dhaka, due to the political situation in Nepal, and repeatedly requested 
the King of Nepal not to assume absolute powers, postpone elections nor sideline 
the political parties that demanded a return to democratic pluralism.53 It was 
deemed by the Indian government that India’s participation at the summit meeting 
with King Gyanendra would imply that India condoned the political situation in 
Nepal. The King, in turn, was keen to represent Nepal at the regional summit for 
it would have enhanced his legitimacy as the ruler of the mountain kingdom. 
While the media criticized India’s decision to withdraw from the summit, the 
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decision indicated that India was reluctant to be identified as a passive observer of 
the political situation in Nepal. India’s role as the democratic “watchdog” of 
South Asia was confirmed when the King assured Prime Minister Singh during 
during the SAARC Summit in November 2005, that he would hold elections in 
Nepal by April 2007.54 He repeated this undertaking to the plenary session.55 
As the above analysis indicates, the operation of democracy and its effects are not 
uniform in the region. The countries appear to be incapable of adhering to 
standards of democracy, yet the governing machinery continues to be manipulated 
for political expediency rather than being abandoned altogether. As much as the 
rapid phase of contemporary globalization has underlined the need for a viable 
mechanism to address and adjudicate violations or threatened violations of rights 
that occur as a direct consequence of the globalization process, a common 
standard of democratic governance and means to deal with democratic lapses on a 
regional scale is urgently required. The absence of such mechanisms has enabled 
national governments in the region to ignore the insecurities of the people, and by 
turns exploit the governing machinery for personal aggrandizement and/or cave in 
to global forces by imposing neo-liberal policy changes that intensify social and 
political discontent. 
 
 
4.2.3 Political Insecurity of a Heterogeneous People   
 
The contribution of the political map of South Asia — consisting of territorial 
units that were carved out of the British Raj in the middle of the last century — to 
the present political volatility of South Asia has been discussed before.56 Along 
with practical problems of state demarcation, the ideological barriers resulting 
from the colonization era and the elitist sociopolitical dynamics, South Asia also 
inherited an extreme sensitivity to issues such as “unity”, “security” and 
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“territorial integrity”.57 The extreme preoccupation with these concepts by 
majority and minority communities in South Asia is regarded as a natural 
corollary of colonization according to Rajan Phillips, who observes: “[i]deas of 
nationalism and nationalist ideologies implanted during the colonial encounter 
have sunk roots in South Asia … generating, if not ersatz, certainly hybrid 
versions of nationalism.”58 
 
It is claimed that “South Asia presents as different political order and power 
structures as one seldom finds in any other geo-political region of the world”. 59 
This uniqueness stems from the region’s religious, lingual, caste and ethnic 
heterogeneity, which was never formally accommodated within the governing 
structures of South Asia.60 The sense of dislocation and the alienation felt by 
different ethnic groups through the failure to accommodate the diverse identities 
within the state structures has contributed to violent uprisings against the state in 
India, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal.61 Saravanamuttu observes that the “problems 
of governance in South Asia stem in large measure from the failure to 
acknowledge the pluralism inherent in society through political and constitutional 
structures and the propagation of this value in the political culture. This gives rise 
to and sustains a crisis of legitimacy of the state.”62  Issues of ethnicity dominate 
the national political discourse in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but 
nowhere is the state presented as a neutral entity that addresses the grievances of 
the plural society it seeks to govern. Manipulation of the ethnic diversity for 
political gain is common.63 There is evidence of tacit complicity by the 
                                                           
57 P Sahadevan “Ethnic Conflict And Militarism In South Asia” Kroc Institute Occasional Paper 
#16:OP:4 (Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, June 
1999). 
58 Rajan Phillips “Nationalism, Self Determination and Sri Lankan Ethnic Groups in Sri Lanka: 
Global Challenges and National Crisis” Rajan Phillips (ed) (Ecumenical Institute for Study and 
Dialogue and Social Scientists Association of Sri Lanka, Colombo 2001).   
59 Rajan Mahan “The Nature of South Asian Region: Assonant Affinities, Dissonant Diversities” 
in 
Kaushik Mahan and Rampant (eds) India and South Asia (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 
1991) 24-25. 
60 Maya Chadda Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, London2000). 
61 See Chapter 2 above and also Stanley J. Tambiah “Presidential Address: Reflections on 
Communal Violence in South Asia” (1990) 49 The Journal of Asian Studies 741–760. 
62 Pakiyasothy Saravanamuttu “Pluralism, Democracy and Governance in South Asia: The case of 
Sri Lanka” in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (eds) South Asia in the World (UNU Press, 
Tokyo, 2004), see also Swarna Rajagopalan State and Nation in South Asia  (London, Lynne 
Rienner, Bolder, Colorado, 2001).  
63 SWRD Bandaranaike’s Sinhalese-only policy in 1956 and Indira Gandhi’s political stance in 
Punjab, Assam and Kashmir in the 1970s are examples. 
 232 
governments, in situations such as the incidents relating to ethnic genocide in Sri 
Lanka in 1983 and the Gujarati riots of 2003.64  
The result of this legacy of political cataclysm is a culture of loose constitutional 
governance often by the political elite with intermittent exceptions of military rule 
or civilian dictatorships.65 The political elite’s allegiance in the past to the colonial 
rulers and now to the neo-liberal ideology espoused by the West and the IFIs is 
evident through the region. The manifestation of such allegiance is the wariness of 
the politicians of civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, thought 
and assembly. The manipulation of national security laws to render the exercise of 
these rights meaningless, the detention of political dissidents without trial and the 
subversion of the rule of law are common in South Asia despite constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing human rights.66  
 
The essential character of a democratic state is that it represents the majority view 
of its people, though safeguards exist against the abuse of power from a 
majoritarian thrust. However, in the context of heterogeneous South Asia, often 
the exercise of democracy results precisely in a tyranny by an ethnic or religious-
based majority.67 Recent elections in the region give evidence of this dangerous 
development of a tyranny by a majority. With the new threats and insecurities 
created by economic globalization, the ethnic and religious-based majority in the 
electorate responds to the new threats through circumventing the existing 
traditional safeguards for the protection of human rights of the minorities.68 The 
enactment of legislation that circumscribes religious rights, the provision of state 
patronage to a particular religious/ethnic sector, the resolution of issues not 
through unbiased constitutional terms but through taking on board the concerns of 
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the majority, and policy formulation that is biased towards the majorities are the 
manifestation of these insecurities.69  
 
4.2.4 Challenges to the Legitimacy to Govern  
 
It is easy to draw a comparison between the sociopolitical repercussions of neo-
liberal globalization in South Asia today and Dani Rodrik’s analysis of the 
financial crisis encountered by the developing world in the 1970s. Rodrik argues 
that the 1970s crisis was precipitated by the weak abilities of the domestic 
structures to weather the cataclysms of the world markets in the era of import 
substitution industrialization. It is Rodrik’s diagnosis that the absence of 
“complementary institutions at home — in areas of governance, judiciary, civil 
and political liberties, social insurance, and … education” exacerbated the social 
cost of the economic downturn.70 
 
The inhabitants of every state have minimum expectations of their state and 
government. These are legitimate expectations, which constitute “the irreducible 
duties of any ruling apparatus to its subjects, such that a failure to discharge these 
duties vitiates the legitimacy of the regime's assertion of authority.”71 In South 
Asia globalization and its many demands have rendered the governmental 
apparatus dysfunctional by failing to realise the minimal expectations of its 
people. As Jack Donnelly observes, “[t]he link between a regime's ability to foster 
development (prosperity) and the public's perception of the regime's legitimacy is 
close to a universal, cross-cultural political law. Whatever a ruling regime's 
sociological and ideological bases, its sustained or severe inability to deliver 
prosperity, however that may be understood locally, typically leads to a serious 
political challenge.”72 Across South Asia governments have fallen victim to this 
dilemma.  
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In South Asia, the political processes, electoral mechanisms, adjudication 
procedures and the welfare systems have not matured with the speed of the 
liberalization of the economy, the repercussion being that the benefits of 
liberalization have not percolated to the people. Implementation of SAPs resulted 
in the creation of a chain of accountability extending upwards from government 
upwards towards the IFIs resulting in a dysfunctional relationship between the 
state and society. Policy formulation is based on the will of the IFIs and TNCs 
rather than on the needs of the people. The consequence of this dynamic was a 
breakdown of the democratic process and the alienation of the people from the 
government’s policy formulation, which contributed to a loss of legitimacy in the 
governing process. 
 
The inadequate structures of governance have also failed to locate an economic 
growth agenda within the desired human-centred context. A lack of a policy 
formulation capacity and the absence of public-conscious policies indicate that the 
national policy makers are hostages of the IFIs’ conditionalities. The result has 
been an “erosion of national sovereignty and [the contraction of] the ability of 
governments and people to make choices from options in economic, social and 
cultural policies.”73 For example, despite the obvious disadvantages and the 
financial hardships to the poor, the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation 
Programme South Asia is continuing its schemes of privatizing water provision to 
the region.74 “The proposal is to replace community rights and the common good 
with individual rights and the private interest. Under conditions of inequality, this 
implies that powerful individuals get exclusive access to the water commons 
through[the] water market. In effect, the Bank would like water monopolies 
instead of water democracy. In the case of irrigation, the World Bank report 
states, ‘Here an approach which begins with acknowledgement of and respect for 
the private interests of individual farmers will be far more successful than 
approaches which resort to command and control, or ones based on a 
communitarian ideal.’”75  
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A further example of the Indian government’s failure to formulate social policy to 
reflect grass-roots needs, which undermines the government’s legitimacy to 
govern, is their failure to allocate sufficient funds for elementary education.76 The 
result is that only 61 per cent of adults in India are literate compared with Sri 
Lanka’s 90.4 per cent.77 In line with Sen’s78 articulation of the capabilities 
approach to human development, Dreze and Sen identify education as a 
fundamental means of enhancing development, which has retarded in India due to 
injudicious policy formulation.79 A series of public interest litigation cases, mass 
protests and an eventual Constitutional amendment that spanned almost a decade 
finally saw Constitutional recognition of compulsory free education at primary 
level. 
 
The misplaced allegiance to the international donor community by South Asian 
governments and the reliance on IFIs for policy agendas has reduced the 
governments to stooges of the multilateral and bilateral donors. One commentator 
observes: 
 
 “[i]n Nepal, one of the poorest countries of the world, development policy 
making is thus governed by two contradictory processes, the democratic process 
and the imperatives of foreign aid. The first requires development policies to be 
mandated by the people of Nepal; this is what the constitution of the land says. 
The latter is governed by the demands of the aid system as it operates 
domestically and internationally. The two processes are in conflict, causing many 
other contradictions and incongruities to emerge in the host country and 
aggravating progress in development management. In short, policies and 
programs are not implemented in a sustained manner, resources are not used 
effectively and efficiently, and corruption spreads.”80  
 
As much as there is a dependency upon external intellectual inspiration, within the 
government structures there is a dearth of sociopolitical aspirations, as genuine 
democratic representation has been stifled by the prevailing political culture. 
 
According to the UNDP Human Development Report on South Asia for 2002, 
more than 515 million people, 40 per cent of South Asians, have experienced a 
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decline in their incomes over the last few years. The Report identifies that this 
decline is rooted in the “dislocation between Government and people.”81 The 
governments without exception have been unable to locate a development model 
that is both growth-oriented and human-centred. This scenario prompted 
commentators to dub the region “the most poorly governed region” in the world. 
82  
 
A manifestation of the democratic deficit in South Asia is the inability to 
formulate regional/country-specific economic development strategies that reflect 
the needs of the people. “This democratic deficit is widespread in local, national 
and global economic policy-making — reflected in slum clearances that wantonly 
deprive people of housing, dams that flood houses and farms, budget allocations 
that favour water for middle-class suburbs rather than slums, logging that destroys 
the environment, oil wells that pollute fields and rivers from which people draw 
livelihoods.”83  
 
That lacuna of inspiration and drive for policy formulation and implementation is 
provided by the IFIs compelling the South Asian governments to function through 
policy agendas that are created by the IFI officials who have little knowledge of, 
or sensitivity to, local issues. The dilemma created by this ignorance is elaborated 
by Panday: 84 
 
Ostensibly, governance agenda incorporates issues and programmes for enabling 
the state as well as selected civil society actors. However, the legitimacy of the 
state as an embodiment of representative institutions in charge of the country's 
constitutional mandate suffers on both counts. First, for the state, donors are now 
more than mere providers of aid. They are ‘partners’, who can autonomously take 
initiatives for reforming the host institutions within the recipient society. The 
institutions to be reformed may include anything from the parliament, the 
judiciary, and the political parties at the centre to the elected local bodies in the 
districts and villages. On policies, the tendency of major donors to promote 
homogenised thinking and standard practices, irrespective of the stage of 
development of a country, makes this situation more critical for the host 
institutions.  
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Historical reasons also play a vital role in the developing countries being 
subservient to the prescriptions of a dominant paradigm. As has been discussed in 
Chapter 1, the generation of politicians who took over political power from the 
colonial rulers were all educated in, and had close links to, colonial Britain. They 
were a generation of local elites who emulated the colonial political, economic 
and value systems. Kothari observes that these ruling political elites and their 
political and ideological links to the colonial rulers have also contributed largely 
to the failure to formulate a viable alternative paradigm of development.85 
 
As the above analysis indicates, South Asia’s political situation is at a critical 
juncture, which is exacerbated by the economic and social dilemmas that face the 
region. South Asia is unable to grapple with the challenges of population 
explosion, poverty and deprivation, social exclusion, rapid urbanization and 
environmental degradation caused by ill-conceived development ideology. With 
more than one fifth of the globe’s population concentrated in the subcontinent, the 
issue of effective governance is both a challenge and a necessity. The impact of 
abysmal governance is borne by the chronically poor, marginalized people who 
face hardships due to anti-poor policies, market-located priorities and inadequate 
institutions. In fact, the region can be characterized in terms of ineffective 
political parties, ineffectual national governments, alienated national parliaments 
with an impotent civil society who are unable to counteract the abhorrent policy 
formulation of the IFIs.   
 
 
4.2.5 Inadequate Public Consultation in Policy Formulation Resulting in a 
Mismatch of Expectations. 
 
The principle of public participation directly or through representative democracy 
is an integral aspect of the Western liberal democratic tradition. With the global 
expansion and consolidation of liberal democracy this principle has been accepted 
as a prerequisite of national policy formulation and the decision-making process, 
for it is a true indication of the efficiency of representative democracy.86 The 
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following analysis illustrates the stalling of the operation of this principle in South 
Asia.   
 
There was no formal consultation between the people of South Asia and the 
policy makers about the introduction of the neo-liberal economic policy replacing 
the previous political dogma of import substitution industrialization. Perhaps the 
nearest political consultation in the context of South Asia was the Sri Lankan 
Elections in 1977 where the United National Party (UNP) election manifesto, A 
Programme of Action to Create a Just and Free Society, included a pledge to end 
the economic stagnation of the previous rule.87 However, the post-election open 
economic policies failed to deliver the prosperity they promised and in turn 
contributed towards irresponsible governance. The dictates of the World Bank and 
the IMF were such that the government’s “own” policy choices undermined the 
government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. The SAPs also stole the 
bargaining power people had gained through the people-based movements, such 
as unions and cooperatives, while consolidating the corresponding power of 
foreign investors and international institutions.88 Dunham and Jayasuriya provide 
a succinct account of the transformation: 89 
 
In the 1970s, Sri Lanka was widely considered a peaceful and stable democracy 
with an impressive record of human development by developing country 
standards. Today, it is a country plagued by violent social and ethnic conflicts, 
massive and pervasive corruption, weak and ineffective government, and 
widespread civil and human rights abuses. Despite a promising start, even the 
economic performance has fallen well below expectations. Civil war and 
military expenditures have escalated. Public support for the government has 
waned; there is growing disillusionment with political leadership across the 
whole political spectrum and a perception of increasing social exclusion and 
inequality.  
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As a result, a vital part of national decision-making on social and economic 
policies had been transferred to multilateral aid organizations and foreign policy 
institutions, which created policy without taking into account the local reality or 
exigencies.90 Therefore the Washington Consensus had severe implications 
beyond the economic realm. In so far as that dynamic alienated the people within 
the state from the governing process, the effects of the policies that were 
implemented caused severe hardship to the common people. The government 
failed to realize that the requirement was for an effective state and not a 
minimalist state as the IFIs desired. Due to the minimalist approach to 
governance, democracy as a governing mechanism soon became dysfunctional 
and the survival strategies of the vulnerable began to include ethnic and religious 
mutinies and crime, which soon transformed into violent militancy against the 
state.91 As observed by Thede, “[w]e know that even in established democracies 
globalization is leading to the development and aggravation of a democratic 
deficit, characterised amongst other things by the erosion of legislative oversight 
of policy decisions at the national level … .”92 Therefore it is vital that public 
consultation processes remain active through the democratic process in the 
developing economies where fundamental policy changes that affect the social, 
political and cultural life of the people are initiated and implemented.  
 
Furthermore, the initiation of policy is often devoid of a sense of equity or 
fairness, which creates mistrust and resentment towards the democratic 
governance process. The power retained by governments for policy 
implementation is exercized arbitrarily and discriminatorily politicizing the 
liberalization measures as well as the free market ideology. In particular, policy 
development in relation to trade, privatization and tariffs often appeared to be 
arbitrary and, in the words of Cuthbertson and Athukorala, “[t]he greatest policy 
failure was not to apply a policy of gradual (even very gradual) overall reductions 
to this new set of tariff-only barriers. Instead, the government fine-tuned the 
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tariffs on a discriminatory basis. It would have been much better to have taken 
further across-the-board measures. This was apparently judged to be politically 
impossible.”93 The same authors also argue that, in the case of Sri Lanka: 94 
 
much of the fine tuning … was aimed at saving the monopoly position of certain 
public corporations, for example, tyres, chemicals, paper, and pharmaceuticals … 
Imports of grapes, chillies and onions grown in the Jaffna peninsular by Tamil 
farmers were liberalised, while paddy and potatoes grown predominantly by 
Sinhalese farmers remained protected. Favored state enterprises (that provided 
‘jobs for the boys’) were also kept outside the liberalisation effort, running 
bloated wage bills and attracting large fiscal transfers.”  
 
The diminishing of governmental responsibility in relation to economic policy 
formulation has also affected areas such as infrastructure development and 
ecological planning. These reform policies have worsened interregional 
disparities,95 eroded the ecological environment96 and created a situation where 
previously self-sufficient economic systems have collapsed and are now 
dependent on external aid or debt.97  
 
Similarly, privatization of state-owned enterprises and other publicly owned 
assets, such as land and housing, which has been an integral component of neo-
liberal economic reforms, has been done haphazardly. The justification for 
privatization has been that public ownership of assets is inefficient because it 
distorts incentives, hampers resource allocation and impedes innovation. In 
addition, it is alleged that state-owned enterprises are a drain on public resources 
and a source of rent-seeking and corruption. However, the evidence on the impact 
of privatization on efficiency has been generally unconvincing.98  In some cases, 
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efficiencies can be improved without changing ownership of assets.99 The 
exclusion of civil society from the decision-making process in such critical 
situations as disposal of public assets increases the alienation between 
governments and civil society, aggravating the dysfunctionality of the  
conventional democratic mechanisms. 
 
The above analysis highlights several manifestations of democratic deficit in 
South Asia. Individual countries have not been successful in overcoming the 
defects of the democratic processes or reinstating functional democracy. There are 
no swift methods of dealing with democratic lapses, as evidenced by Pakistan and 
Nepal. Restoration of democracy is always time-consuming and has a significant 
social cost. Concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are ardently 
defended by all countries in the region, and endorsed by Article 2.1 of the 
SAARC constituting document,100 have prevented ad hoc assistance in instances 
of interruptions to democracy by other countries in the region. It is in this context 
that this study reiterates the significance of creating a permanent mechanism that 
addresses issues of democratic lapses at a regional level. 
 
 
4.2.6 The Embryonic Civil Society  
 
Civil society is a term that is increasingly gaining significance in relation to 
human rights, development and democracy both nationally and at global level. Its 
historical roots are attributed to Hegel’s theorizations of the concept.101 The notion 
of civil society presupposes that the society is capable of organizing itself to 
promote its interests and aspirations through legitimate constitutional means. 
Varshney locates the definition of civil society “to that space which (1) exists 
between the family, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, (2) makes 
interconnections between individuals or families possible, and (3) is independent 
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of the state.”102 He further qualifies the notion with the observation that “the civic 
space be organized in associations that attend to the cultural, social, economic, 
and political needs of the citizens; and that the associations be modern and 
voluntaristic, not ascriptive.”103 The effectiveness of civil society is conditional 
upon the political environment, for “[c]ivil society means democratic culture, 
which is based on equality, justice, tolerance and pluralism and the willingness of 
the individual to accept divergent views. On the one hand, civil society stands for 
the established rule of law, on the other hand it means the broad development of 
autonomous institutions, i.e. institutions which are not run by the state, vested 
interests or by donors, but which act as agents of the will of the people.”104 
 
The civil activism of the people in South Asia, stemming from the desperate need 
to garner a better deal through governance, has a long history dating back to the 
British Raj when Gandhi mobilized civil society in his quest for swaraj (self 
rule).105 Since then peasant, tribal, Dalit, backward castes, women, students, 
workers’ movement and many others have mobilized themselves to express 
dissent against the status quo. These groups have entered the political arena 
transcending orthodox societal distinctions and influencing the political process. 
 
Opinion is divided on the success of civil societal activism. Some claim it appears 
vibrant and a potent force that harbours the potential to contribute positively to 
socioeconomic and political transformation. In the context of India, despite the 
high levels of illiteracy and poverty, Sarkar observes that “India still retains a 
capacity to surprise external observers: the enthusiastic participation in elections 
even (and often particularly) by many of the poorest, for instance, or the quality of 
roadside conversations about politics.”106 There is also evidence of sustained 
social activism in particular areas, such as public interest litigation, and local non-
governmental organizations, but South Asia is still behind the point at which such 
activism is likely to transform into a sustained force that impacts on political 
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outcomes, as the civil society in the classic sense is still at an embryonic stage in 
the region.107   
 
Others also observe that civil societal activism is still in varying embryonic stages 
and in itself is a privileged method of expressing concern and dissent in South 
Asia, for “civil society [is] bourgeois society … restricted to a small section of 
culturally equipped citizens [it] represents.”108 Chaterjee views India to be an 
“exclusive” state that does not regard all of its people as “citizens”, for; “Most of 
the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and 
contextually, rights-bearing citizens … They are not, therefore, proper members 
of civil society and are not regarded as such by the institutions of the state.”109 To 
the critics such as Chaterjee, therefore, the civil society in South Asia by 
definition is not an inclusive entity representing all of its people. 
 
Civil societal activism is not always directed against the governments alone, and 
South Asia has many examples of social mobilization against the discriminatory 
and inequitable features of the society as well as against specific ideologies.110 
Presently the civil societal involvement in influencing the process of governance 
or policy formulation in South Asia remains marginal largely due to the absence 
of specific fora to express civil societal concerns. In the context of contemporary 
globalization, where the strength and capacity of the state has diminished, civil 
society has the capacity to act as a critic especially in the context of challenging 
policy formulations relating to development. Mobilization of civil society to 
implement evidence-based advocacy in relation to developmental projects that 
have an impact on traditional livelihoods, ecology and rural agriculture will be a 
valuable force in transforming the trajectory of contemporary development drives.  
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Quadir traces the newly emerging trend of “regionalism from below” in South 
Asia which he describes as a coalescing of a plethora of civil societal 
organizations from the South Asian region on issues that have a particular 
relevance to the region, particularly alternative agendas for development and 
security. Quadir specifically explores the viability of establishing a “new social 
order” through  “regionalism from below”.111 However, he concedes that despite 
widespread support for the civil society groups in South Asia it is unlikely that 
they would emerge as the creators of an “alternative form of human society in the 
region”.112 
 
The regional praxis advocated in Chapter 6 of this study details specific means of 
harnessing civil societal concerns and views. The new regional praxis can be an 
effective forum to highlight regional civil societal concerns which would 
strengthen the “new concept of citizenship in South Asia that transcends existing 
ethnic, religious, political and cultural divides”.113 
 
This thesis maintains that human rights, democracy and development maintains a 
symbiotic relationship and the above analysis indicated that poor governance and 
absence of a culture of democracy has contributed significantly to the 
entrenchment of the structures of poverty in South Asia. The lack of legitimacy in 
the governments and the disillusionment of the people in the procedures of 
democracy have resulted in fostering militant tendencies within society. As much 
as there is a need for the creation of a normative supra national structure that 
honours the commitments towards human rights and equitable development 
strategies, there is also a call for the establishment of normative standards on 
democratic governance at regional level which will ensure the democratic 
functions are maintained nationally without jeopardizing the rights of the people. 
 
 
4.3 The Opportunity for a Regional Mechanism   
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As evidenced in the previous discussion, South Asian governments are largely 
ineffective and lack the capacity to make appropriate, viable development policy 
choices. There are no feasible mechanisms available either nationally or within 
the region to challenge poor, unviable policy decisions that are made by national 
governments, and very limited judicial fora are available to challenge such 
choices. There is no impetus nationally or regionally to promote economic policy 
that fosters social integration and that advocates emancipation for the millions 
who are trapped in the cycle of poverty.114 There is no demand for democratic 
structures to be reformulated so that they not only foster market integration and 
the promotion of the economy but create an environment that would integrate the 
marginalized segments of society into the mainstream developmental process. 
Experience has shown that none of the countries in the region can realistically 
advocate for a fundamental change to the contemporary trajectory of globalization 
in isolation, even though collective efforts to challenge the course of globalization 
have also been only partially successful elsewhere in the world.115   
 
Integration into global markets necessarily implies the end of isolationism for the 
countries in South Asia and it is this momentum that led to the creation of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Regionalization has 
provided effective means of promoting trade and economic cooperation between 
countries in Europe, Asia and in the Americas. Regional cooperation on issues 
such as security, peace and human rights is also increasing.116 The next few 
paragraphs will consider the efficacy of the SAARC as a regional mechanism and 
whether it can deal with the exigencies that have arisen as a corollary of economic 
globalization.  
 
 
4.3.1 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation — an Inopportune 
Response 
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Despite the civilizational similarities of the polities in the region, and in spite of 
being a geopolitical entity which shares many problems stemming both from a 
common colonial past and from adverse global economic conditions, South Asia’s 
constituent parts avoided moves towards regional integration until the beginning 
of the 1980s. The SAARC was established when its Charter was formally adopted 
on 8 December 1985 by the Heads of States or Government of Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.117  Although the 
organization was created two decades ago, if one makes a quick appraisal of the 
SAARC against the objectives listed in its Charter, the regional arrangement has 
been a resounding failure.118 Its most significant accomplishment is its nonchalant 
survival, for the mechanism united seven countries with apparent civilizational 
similarities yet deeply entrenched divisions in terms of religion, ethnicity, 
political affiliations and a variety of bilateral issues.119 Therefore, although the 
SAARC has failed in terms of achieving its Charter objectives, it has succeeded in 
creating an overarching institution that has brought together a diverse group of 
countries and fostered a common relationship that has endured for two decades, 
proving that there is at least some fertile ground for a more effective regional 
alliance as will be advocated later in this thesis.  
 
 
4.3.2 Historical evolution of SAARC  
 
The idea of a regional unit, especially in terms of economic and political 
concerns, is not a concept that is alien to the region of South Asia, which emerged 
from British colonial rule less than six decades ago.120 The effort to restore the 
economic union, which had functioned in the India-Pakistan subcontinent before 
it achieved independence in 1947, had been advocated by some at the time of 
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independence or soon thereafter.121 However, the bitter aftermath of the partition 
between India and Pakistan and the ensuing mutual distrust, the overt political 
domination of Nepal by India and other bilateral yet contentious issues between 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and India stalled any sort of a regional union for a long 
time.122 
 
The contemporary global economic climate that is dominated by balance of 
payments issues, protectionist measures, growing debt and stagnant development 
— issues that concern the poorer regions of the world — have in fact been 
accentuated by the creation of regional blocs elsewhere in the world.123 The 
impetus to integrate regionally is fuelled by the dominant paradigm’s 
preoccupation with the notion that “[e]conomic regionalisation is the key to 
economic success in the next century and beyond.”124 The tendency to “integrate”, 
a term that broadly encompasses a variety of sociopolitical, economic and cultural 
issues through the common bond of geographical proximity, is a growing 
phenomenon,125 and the success of regional organizations based on particularly 
economic considerations is self-evident, considering for instance the North 
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the composition and 
the degree of the regional unions can differ from organization to organization 
ranging from economic unions to customs unions or to a lesser degree of 
multilateral preferential trade agreements. 
 
The quest for regionalism is part emulative, part defensive, and it maybe also be 
pre-emptive of other areas forming their own blocs. The SAARC is only too 
aware of the significance of regional co-operation in the face of globalization. 
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Noting the primacy of poverty reduction/elimination in SAARC, the Secretary 
General has reiterated that:126   
 
“In this increasingly globalizing world, I believe the relevance of regional 
groupings is ever important. The challenges emanating from globalization can be 
overwhelming for smaller and less equipped countries. They are often unable to 
take advantage of the opportunities afforded by globalization.  Therefore, 
regional cooperation remains the mainstay of their response mechanism to 
globalization.  In this context, both SAARC and ASEAN are striving hard to face 
the new economic and political realities.”  
 
Globally the changes in political dynamics of the past 20 years, particularly the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany and the parallel 
democratization of other European states from the former communist Eastern 
Bloc, have obliterated the need to create sub-global unions based on political 
convictions, yet have highlighted the need for regional arrangements for the 
surveillance and reinforcement of democratic governance. The recent 
developments in Europe, the Americas and Africa support this position.127 
 
In the South Asian context, the idea of a regional mechanism was most ardently 
advocated in the early 1980s by the late President of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, 
who was a zealous believer in the value of regional cooperation in dealing with 
issues of international relations, economy and security. The regional political 
climate at that time, particularly the combination of personalities forming the 
heads of states in the region, the rather unstable security situation such as the 
aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the assurance of 
economic assistance for multilateral cooperative projects such as the sharing of 
waters of the Ganges and  Brahmaputra by both the USA and the UK, and the 
intellectual inclination to believe that regional corporation would enhance 
development in the region were some of the reasons for Rahman’s urging for a 
regional cooperation.128    
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Therefore, the evolution of the SAARC was primarily a response to the domestic 
political, security and economic exigencies of the South Asian countries.129 
Cheema in his analysis for the raison d'être of SAARC observes that: 130 
 
 [u]nlike North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Pact, South East 
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 
which were products of a desire for collective efforts against perceived threats, 
SAARC was born as a collective response to a desire for a regional organization 
that could facilitate cooperation and promote economic interaction among the 
regional countries. 
 
Rather than security concerns SAARC concentrated more on co-operation relating 
to socioeconomic and cultural development of the South Asian people.131 The 
SAARC creators also harboured long-term ideas of creating a tariff free region for 
the movement of capital, people, goods and services,132 emulating the EU.  
 
When the SAARC was formally established in 1985, the regional initiative was 
regarded as an opportune response to the common economic, social and political 
problems that were besetting the region at the time and a mechanism also for 
capturing positive synergies.133 This was acknowledged in the Dhaka inaugural 
summit 134 when the: 
 
… Heads of State or Governments acknowledged that the countries of South 
Asia, who constituted one-fifth of humanity, were faced with the formidable 
challenges posed by poverty, underdevelopment, low levels of production, 
unemployment and pressure of population compounded by exploitation of the 
past and other adverse legacies. They felt that, bound as their countries were by 
many common values rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural and historical 
traditions, regional cooperation provided a logical response to these problems. 
They were conscious of their individual and regional strengths, their potential as 
a huge market, their substantial human and natural resources and the 
complementarities of their economies. They were confident that with effective 
regional cooperation, they could make optimum use of these capacities for the 
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benefit of their peoples, accelerate the pace of their economic development and 
enhance their national and collective self-reliance. They were convinced that 
their countries, which had made important contributions to the enrichment of 
human civilization, could together play their due role in international relations 
and influence decisions which affected them. 
 
 
The structure and the ideological outlook of the SAARC were essentially based 
on the ASEAN. However, drawing inspiration from other regional mechanisms 
would have been more pertinent to the SAARC in terms of the issues that came 
within its purview. When tracing the history of the creation of the SAARC, Khatri 
observes that “[t]he propensity of South Asian bureaucrats to draw largely from 
the ASEAN example may be due partly to the convenience and partly to the 
failure to scrutinize the experiences of other third world regional organizations 
which may be more relevant for the subcontinent.”135 Khatri goes on to assert that 
functionalism was not a consideration at the stage of creation for multilateral 
political agendas played a more predominant role in the establishment of the 
SAARC. He acknowledges that there are limitations in following that path for 
even “ …ASEAN as a regional organization has yet to epitomize the success of 
regionalism worthy of emulation. ASEAN shows some lustre today not because it 
has succeeded in contributing to the development of its member countries, but 
because the growing prosperity of the South-East Asian region in general has 
sustained its image ...”. The preoccupation with the notions of achieving 
economic prosperity through regionalism convinced the SAARC to focus on the 
ASEAN as a model although it would have been more rewarding to emulate other 
regional institutions that focussed on human development and common problems 
of the region rather than aim for a “more grandiose goal of an economic or 
political union.”136 Two decades after the creation of the SAARC a successful 
economic union is as yet an unattainable utopia for South Asia as experience 
shows that economic prosperity forms a critical pre-condition for such success.137  
 
 
4.3.3 The SAARC and Democracy 
                                                           
135 Sridhar Khatri “A decade of South Asian regionalism: Retrospect and prospect” (1992) 1 
Contemporary South Asia  5–9.  
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. To Khathri this is the reason for the failure of some other regional experiments in the 
developing countries such as the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the East 
African Common Market (EACM). 
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The SAARC’s attitude towards democracy, which is apathetic, is symptomatic of 
the region’s dilemma in relation to democracy. The SAARC Charter, which 
highlights the principles of “sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national 
independence, non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs of other states 
and peaceful settlement of all disputes”, is resolutely silent on the issue of 
democracy.138 At the inception of the organization the inclusion of the above 
principles into the Charter defined the extent of the cooperation which was 
regarded as crucial to the viability of the organization. The formulators of the 
SAARC Charter stipulated that the member states were to adhere strictly to the 
notions of “non-interference in internal affairs of other states”, which precluded 
member states from making queries as to the state of human rights or democracy, 
which undermine the government’s legitimacy at national level.139 Yet the precise 
issues of human rights and democracy have been identified earlier in the present 
chapter as two of three central strands (along with development) which this study 
aims to plait into a strong metaphorical cable for their mutually beneficial and 
necessary achievement. The exclusion of democracy from the SAARC Charter 
indicates the lack of significance attached to the concept regionally and the 
reluctance of the member states to take a collective stance on an issue which is 
relegated into the realm of “internal affairs” of individual states.  
 
Crucially, within the last two decades, the global perception of democracy has 
changed, altering the principle of non-intervention according to the former 
Secretary General of the UN:140  
 
 [t]he principle of democracy is now universally recognized. The right of all 
people to take part in the government of their country through free and regular 
elections, enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
is not peculiar to any culture … . Certainly, the record shows that democratically 
governed states rarely if ever make war on one another. But even more important, 
in this era of intra-state wars, is the fact that democratic governance — by 
protecting minorities, encouraging political pluralism, and upholding the rule of 
law — can channel internal dissent peacefully, and thus help avert civil wars … . 
Thus democracy offers us a double promise — as an agent of peace as well as 
liberation. 
                                                           
138 SAARC Charter <http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/docs/charter.pdf> (accessed 2 Feb 2006.) 
139 Padmaja Murthy “Role of Smaller Members in the SAARC Forum” (1998) 22 Strategic 
Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 8. 
140 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Untitled speech to the Community of Democracies, 
Warsaw, 27 June 2000) 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/sgsm7467.htm> (accessed 3 Nov 2005). 
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The discussion of the interdependence of plural, tolerant democracy, human rights 
and development preceding the body of the present chapter sketched the same 
capacity of plural democracy under the rule of law as a force of both liberation 
and facilitation of human rights. Kofi Annan’s words just quoted add a fourth 
virtue to the trio of democracy, human rights and development: namely, peace, 
both intra-nationally and internationally. Peace synergizes with the other three 
qualities, and is often invoked as a parallel aspiration.141 Elsewhere Annan 
himself has also described how human rights as encapsulated in the UDHR have 
been linked to democracy, when he reiterated the UN position on democracy and 
the evolving global norm of democratic governance, asserting that:142 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly 
in 1948, enunciated the essentials of democracy. Ever since its adoption, it has 
inspired constitution-making in every corner of the world, and it has contributed 
greatly to the eventual global acceptance of democracy as a universal value. The 
right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules them, must be the birthright of 
all people, and its universal achievement must be a central objective of an 
Organization devoted to the cause of larger freedom.  
 
As foreshadowed by that earlier discussion in this study, democracy as a form of 
governance indeed has a universal appeal for its inherent capacity for the 
promotion of rights and freedoms, human development — and peace.143 Taking 
the link between human rights and democracy one step further, there are many 
authoritative assertions of a “right to democracy”144 and through sustained state 
practice and universal acceptance it is fast becoming a “normative rule of the 
international system”.145 Although, from the stand-point of Sen, the universal 
legal norm asserting a right to democracy is unclear, he nevertheless argues that 
during the twentieth century, “democracy became established as the ‘normal’ 
                                                           
141 One is reminded that essentially the same authors of the UDHR also expressed at the very 
opening of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations their determination to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war”; a pledge followed in the immediate next breath 
by their equal determination to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” 
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed 10 Feb 2008). 
142 Kofi Annan “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” 
(Report of the Secretary-Genera,l United Nations General Assembly Fifty-ninth Session, 
A/59/2005, 21 Mar 2005) <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm> (accessed 8 Feb 2006) 
38. 
143 Robert Dahl On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn, 1999). 
144 James Crawford “Democracy and International Law” (1993) 64 Brit YB Int’l L 113; Larry 
Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, Md., 1999); Roland Rich “Bringing Democracy Into International Law” (2001) 12 
Journal of Democracy 20–34. 
145 Thomas M. Franck “The Emerging Right To Democratic Governance” (1992) 86 The 
American Journal of International Law  46–91 (Franck). 
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form of government to which any nation is entitled — whether in Europe, 
America, Asia or Africa … in the general climate of world opinion, democratic 
governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right.” 146 
According to Frank, democracy has also become a rule of legitimacy in two 
respects, in that “governments recognise that their legitimacy depends on meeting 
the normative expectation of the community of states”, and that the international 
community’s expectation is that “those who seek validation of their empowerment 
patently govern with the consent of the governed.”147  
 
Michael McFaul is more confident in acknowledging the existence of a 
democratic norm in international law but is less sure about the norm of promoting 
democracy, though he concedes that there is widespread support for such practice, 
which is spearheaded by the USA. “The legitimacy and practice of external actors 
promoting democracy has grown … The community of democratic states has 
accepted the legitimacy of [democracy] promotion. In fact, within this 
community, the normative burden has shifted to those not interested in advocating 
democracy promotion; they are the state leaders who must explain why they are 
not doing more to advance democracy’s cause worldwide.”148  
 
It is by drawing strength from this international political climate that there is 
increased emphasis placed on democracy by the other regional mechanisms 
whose positions on democracy will be elaborated in Chapter 5 of this study. For 
instance, the European Union is “founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.”149 Entry into the European 
Union is conditional upon establishing democratic governing structures at national 
level.150 Therefore, both the old established states and the new states of Eastern 
Europe have attempted to consolidate both constitutional and institutional 
                                                           
146 Amartya Sen “Democracy as a Universal Value” (1990) 10 Journal of Democracy  3. 
<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org> (accessed 17 Oct 2007). 
147 Franck, above n 145. For the articulation of the contractarian theory of government starting in 
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148 Michael McFaul “Democracy Promotion as a World Value” (2004) 28 The Washington 
Quarterly 147–163 <http://pages.zdnet.com/plm/id154.html> (accessed 5 Mar 2006). 
149 Article 6 of the EU Treaty <www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtable.pdf> (accessed 8 Feb 
2007). 
150 Article 49 of the EU Treaty; see also Frank Schimmelfenning “The Community Trap: Liberal 
Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU” (2001) 55 International 
Organization 47–80. 
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structures to strengthen democracy in order to gain membership of the EU. 
Traditionally, states seeking membership of the EU gain admission to the Council 
of Europe (CoE), which is an intergovernmental organization distinct from the 
EU. As will be elaborated in Chapter 5, the entry into the Council of Europe is 
dependent on establishing democratic governance at national level.  
 
As the discussion in Chapter 5 will also elaborate, the Organization of American 
States (OAS) has been remarkable in asserting the obligation to promote 
democratic governance in that region.151 In fact, the OAS has played a pivotal role 
in persuading authoritarian governments in the region to adopt a democratic 
approach to governance. The OAS Charter was the first of its kind to proclaim a 
right and duty of the following type: “the people of the Americas have a right to 
democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.” 
The OAS Charter further states in its preamble that “representative democracy is 
indispensable for the stability, peace and development of the region” and that one 
of the essential purposes of the OAS is to “promote and consolidate representative 
democracy, with due respect for the principle of non intervention.”152 The 
Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter stipulates that a state’s membership of 
the OAS is conditional upon its democratic governance. Further, Article 9 of the 
Protocol enables the OAS to suspend the membership of a state which has 
reverted back to authoritarian rule and thus violated the principles of 
democracy.153 Fostering of democratic governance and the protection of 
internalized democratic ethos in emerging democracies is now regarded as an 
obligation of the OAS.154 Therefore in the Americas the principle of “non 
intervention” has been modified to impose democracy, albeit overtly. 
 
                                                           
151 See Chapter 5 of this study. 
152 Charter of the Organization of American States Article 2(b). 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html> (accessed 8 Feb 2007).  
153 Washington Protocol Article 9 “A Member of the Organization whose democratically 
constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the 
right to participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the 
Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the commissions, 
working groups and any other bodies established. The power to suspend shall be exercised only 
when such diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Organization for the purpose of promoting the 
restoration of representative democracy in the affected Member State have been unsuccessful.” 
<www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-46.html> (accessed 5 Mar 2006). 
154 Juan Mendez “The Inter-American System of Protection: Its Contributions to the International 
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As detailed in Chapter 5, the (British) Commonwealth Association, of which five 
members of the SAARC are also members, has a strong commitment to 
democracy and good governance. During the past decade the Commonwealth has 
devised unique mechanisms to maintain democracy within the member states and 
any violation of the Harare Declaration of Democracy is met with strong 
disapproval of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Hararer 
Declaration (CMAG), as General Musharaff of Pakistan has realized several times 
in recent years.155  
 
Despite the acclaimed positive nexus between democracy and development156 and 
the developing international normative standards regarding democracy, the 
SAARC Charter, unlike the constituting documents of the EU, OAS or the 
African Union (AU), is silent on the issue of democracy. The SAARC’s collective 
position on democratic governance is dubious despite individual assertions of 
commitment by Heads of States or through state practice.157 Of the SAARC 
member states, India and Sri Lanka have had a continued history of constitutional 
governance since independence. Pakistan158 and Bangladesh both have had 
sporadic interruptions of military governments with Bangladesh presently ruled 
by a “democratically” elected government in name only. Nepal’s political 
landscape is dominated by an authoritarian monarch, a Maoist guerrilla 
movement, ineffective political parties and a helpless yet deeply disgruntled civil 
society. Bhutan’s government, which is a traditional Buddhist monarchy, has been 
making tentative overtures towards constitutional democracy only in the past 
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three years.159 The Maldives’ facade of democratic political governance conceals 
an authoritarian regime that severely curtails the civil and political rights of the 
people.160 
 
While internal and bilateral issues have been strictly outside the agenda of 
SAARC meetings, Nepal’s unilateral assurance of a commitment to democracy 
has added a new dimension to the role and purpose of the SAARC in the 
region.161 As a prelude to this development both Pakistan and India were not 
opposed to engaging in informal bilateral discussions outside SAARC meetings at 
the 12th SAARC Summit at Pakistan in 2004. These developments, though minor, 
are significant for they indicate the way the SAARC is heading. Despite General 
Musharaff’s questionable democratic credentials, he has reiterated the need for an 
amendment of the SAARC Charter, for “[w]ithout desirable peace there could be 
little progress in the region. Bilateral differences must be resolved in the SAARC 
on the basis of justice and fair play.”162 He repeated at the 12th SAARC Meeting 
that “we must expand the SAARC Charter to discuss bilateral issues at regional 
level. If we fail, cynicism will take over.”163 
 
The SAARC Charter envisions the goals of the organization to be the acceleration 
of economic growth and the promotion of social and cultural development 
through collaborative efforts in various fields of activity across the region and 
through collective self-reliance of the region,164 while reiterating South Asia’s 
commitment to respect “the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes.”165  
 
As successive Summit Declarations have reiterated, the enhancement and 
consolidation of socioeconomic development is the fundamental purpose of the 
                                                           
159 Harald Nestroy “Bhutan: The Himalayan Buddhist Kingdom” (2004)  38 Asian Affairs 338–
352.   
160 Freedomhouse Country Report Maldives. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2007> (accessed 5 Jan 2008). 
161 See text at note 55. 
162 Sultan Shahin “… As Well As Something Concrete” Asia Times (Hong Kong, 8 Jan 2002) 
<http://atimes.com/ind-pak/DA08Df02.html> (accessed 5 Oct 2005) 
163 “Stage set for better relations” The Tribune (Chandigarh, India, Monday, 5 Jan 2004) 
<http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040105/main2.htm> (accessed 5 Oct 2005). 
164 Appendix F  
165 Appendix F 
 257 
SAARC. It is with this view that the inaugural summit at Dhaka in 1985 approved 
the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) that was formulated during the first 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the SAARC in August 1983, two years before the 
formal establishment of the body. The IPA created Technical Committees in nine 
areas, which were intended to coordinate activities of the specific areas within the 
region in the spirit of regional cooperation.166 
 
4.3.4 SAARC and Human Rights  
 
In relation to the commitment towards human development, the SAARC has 
identified several areas for cooperation and initiated several treaties related to the 
areas above.167 Member countries have already signed several conventions on 
narcotics,168 combating trafficking in women and children for prostitution, and the 
promotion of child welfare and poverty alleviation. Several agreements have also 
been signed on Food Security.169 In this sense the SAARC has reached a general 
consensus on a variety of issues that has enormous potential to evolve into an 
effective scheme for human development. However, these schemes are yet to 
move on from a norm-creating stage to the next stage of binding obligations and 
implementation.  
 
As regards poverty, the SAARC created the independent South Asian 
Commission on Poverty Alleviation, which is mandated to evolve policies and 
strategies of implementation on poverty eradication, social mobilization, rural 
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agriculture and human development.170 The Commission on Poverty Alleviation 
is also entrusted with the responsibility of evaluating the impact of the open 
economy and structural adjustment strategies pursued by the SAARC member 
countries. Unfortunately, like most initiatives of the SAARC, the work of the 
Commission has failed to have a positive impact on reducing regional poverty.171 
South Asian human rights activists are increasingly realizing the great truth in 
Falk’s assertion that “[available] research strongly suggests that most Third World 
countries possess the resources to eliminate poverty and satisfy basic human 
needs if their policy makers were so inclined.”172 This sits well with Kothari’s 
analysis of the poverty in India that it is a “poverty among plenty”,173 and 
therefore implicitly remediable by wiser and fairer stewarding of available 
resources. There is also a general consciousness and growing resentment that 
avenues available for meaningful regional collaboration on human development 
are disabled by poor and unaccountable governance at national level.174 Individual 
governments are increasingly pressurized by activists to put aside bilateral 
resentments and insecurities and to move forward towards a regional initiative for 
the protection of human rights.175   
 
The impetus and the need for a regional mechanism on human rights has been 
expressed in the various human rights fora in South Asia for the past twenty years. 
Despite the existence of the capacity to create a regional human rights mechanism 
through the SAARC, the lack of political consensus and regional insecurities that 
hampered the successful implementation of the SAARC manifesto have also 
hampered a regional initiative on human rights. The SAARC has not adopted a 
human rights charter, nor has it envisaged, let alone realized, the creation of an 
institution or mechanism to monitor effectively the adherence to and the 
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implementation of various international human rights conventions, charters and 
treaties to which the member states are parties.  
 
Nonetheless, against this background the SAARC Social Charter was adopted in 
the 12th Summit in Islamabad in 2004.176 Despite the assertion in the SAARC 
Charter that the organization’s objective is to promote the welfare of the people in 
the region, an initiative towards a Rights Charter was not contemplated until the 
1998 SAARC Summit in Colombo. Formulated by an Inter-Governmental Group 
of Experts, the Social Charter was a tentative attempt at creating a set of 
principles relating to ESC rights at regional level. There was little preparation in 
terms of public consultations from stakeholders, such as NGOs, human rights 
activists or civil society, prior to the creation of the Charter. Such consultations 
would have perhaps avoided its obvious shortcomings. In many respects the 
member states were ignorant of the colossal commitment they had undertaken 
when signing the SAARC Social Charter in January 2004. By no means is it an 
exhaustive enumeration of social and economic rights. In fact, there are many 
shortcomings and inadequacies in terms of both the rights contained in the Social 
Charter and implementation mechanisms.  However, the Charter has contributed 
immensely to the establishment of normative standards on ESC rights in the 
region,177 revitalized the stagnant collaborative/regional initiative and provided a 
valuable and a necessary impetus to challenge the mainstream development 
ideology at a time when the region is in dire need of such an initiative.  
 
Theoretical assertions of the core and content of poverty eradication have been 
elaborated from global policy to national initiatives but pragmatic implementation 
mechanisms are slow to evolve within the developing world. The best working 
mechanism that addresses issues of social and economic rights as well as poverty 
issues on a regional basis is the European Social Charter.178 The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981179 and the American Convention on Human 
                                                           
176 <http://www.infopak.gov.pk/saarc/charter.htm> (accessed 3 Mar 2006). 
177 This is a significant achievement in light of the fact that only five countries of the seven 
SAARC members have signed the ICESCR (Pakistan only in Nov 2004). Bhutan and Maldives are 
not parties to the ICESCR. 
178 <http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/libe/elsj/charter/chapter_4_en.htm> (accessed 5 Dec 
2006). 
179 <www.unicri.it/.../legal_framework/docs/african_charter_on_human_and_people_s_rights_27_  
june_1981.pdf - > (accessed 5 Dec 2006). 
 260 
Rights of 1969, and its Protocols of 1988 and 1990180, also offer valuable insights 
into the formulation of social and economic rights and to the processes of 
implementing those rights. At national levels, both the Indian Constitution and the 
South African Constitution provide valuable insights into innovative judicial 
methodologies of implementing social and economic rights.181 The South Asian 
Social Charter needs to draw on the experiences of these mechanisms to create a 
viable structure to implement the rights enshrined in the Charter.  
 
 
4.3.5 The Strategic Significance of the South Asian Social Charter   
 
Despite its weak structure, especially in relation to the implementation process, 
the Social Charter is a document with enormous potential not only in the context 
of human rights but as an effective weapon in the fight against poverty. However, 
the Charter’s intrinsic worth lies in its potential to form the foundation of the 
bulwark against the neo-liberal global order.  
 
In theoretical terms the South Asian Social Charter182 appears to be an assertion of 
the classical ESC rights, although it does not directly refer to the rights that are 
the subject matter of the ICESCR. In contrast, it takes on a pragmatic approach 
regarding the burning issues of the region such as poverty alleviation, health, 
education. human resource development and youth mobilization, promotion of the 
status of women, promotion of the rights and well-being of the child, population 
stabilization and drug addiction rehabilitation and reintegration, which essentially 
come within the purview of the rights enshrined in the international covenant .    
 
The development goals articulated in the Social Charter reflect the region’s desire 
to approach economic development taking into account the human dimension, 
especially the task of eradicating poverty. The Charter focuses on several 
significant aspects of social development, which almost transforms it from the 
realms of a social charter into a rather vaguely worded human rights instrument, 
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albeit with a bias towards ESC rights. Examining it munificently one could say 
that in spirit the Charter is all encompassing, enshrining several principles of 
human wellbeing, which Maskay asserts to be: 
 
(a) enlightenment (access to education);  
(b) enablement (capacity building);  
(c) enfranchisement (embracing all sectors of the society) 
(d) empowerment (promotion of participation opportunities to people to make 
decisions that affect them); and  
(e) entitlement (observance and protection of human rights and all fundamental 
freedoms).183  
 
Analysing the content of the Charter against the backdrop of contemporary 
economic and social dilemmas faced by the region, Maskay considers that the 
Charter reflects the “deep concern” that the SAARC leaders share about poverty 
and human development and is an attempt to infuse a “spirit of humanness” into 
the development drive within the region. 
 
A perusal of the content of the Social Charter indicates that it takes into 
cognizance the need for the social development of the people to be a prime 
national responsibility, and that there should be an integrated approach towards 
policy formulation in the areas of economy, culture and social issues so that they 
reinforce each other. Containing a general Preamble and 12 Articles, the Charter 
calls upon all parties to maintain a social policy and strategy that ensures a 
balanced social development of their people. The Charter recognizes the 
interdependence of the public and private sectors in relation to development 
activities and reiterates the significance of the concepts of participatory 
governance, social equity, tolerance, non-violence, pluralism, non-discrimination 
and respect of diversity within and among societies. The Charter seeks to promote 
environmental security by ensuring inter-generational equity and sustainable use 
of the environment and natural resources. 
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The Charter appears to encompass the most significant issues concerning the lives 
of the people in the region. The access to basic education, primary healthcare, 
sanitation and safe drinking water; gender equality; an adequate standard of living 
including adequate shelter, food and clothing, had never been articulated at 
regional level until the adoption of the Social Charter. However, the Charter falls 
short of addressing the major sociopolitical issues in the region, such as 
dysfunctional governance, limited political accountability and issues relating to 
violation of rights as a corollary of corruption —  issues which directly impact on 
the wellbeing of the people.  
 
In terms of its contents it has been described as “a mixed bag of tall statements, 
important doable national actions, significant omissions, ambiguous sections and 
incoherent provisions”.184 Though the incoherent approach to the rights enshrined 
in the Charter can be regarded as an attempt to locate the Charter within the 
socioeconomic concerns of the region, this tends to dilute its normative 
significance.   
In South Asia, following the mainstream structures of human rights, relief for 
victims of rights violations is provided through judicial or quasi-judicial fora. The 
jurisdiction to provide relief is highly restricted generally to conventional civil 
and political rights, which are enumerated in special legislation or in the 
Constitution. There are stringent procedural limitations in relation to rights 
applications, in that jurisdiction can only be invoked by the aggrieved party within 
limited time-frames and the grant of relief is critically dependent upon the quality 
of evidence in each case. Except India, which can boast of a highly evolved 
concept of public interest litigation or representative action,185 countries in the 
region actively discourage collective or representative actions for human rights 
violations, or limit them to specific interest areas. In most instances rights 
applications are entertained by the superior courts, to which access is restricted 
due to legal costs, lack of legal advice and long delays. The Social Charter did 
provide an opportunity, which South Asia failed to grasp, of creating a regional 
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mechanism to address these issues, by providing an effective implementation 
mechanism.   
The fundamental weakness of the Charter lies in its implementation strategy. It is 
at the implementation stage that the historical inhibitions, insecurities and 
reticence of the region re-emerge. Despite the numerous similar mechanisms 
available elsewhere in the world, the South Asian Social Charter failed to follow 
them and provide an effective mechanism to realize the rights enshrined in the 
Charter. SAARC’s own proposed implementation scheme, which is to be 
determined by national governments in consultation with the SAARC Secretariat, 
is rather vague and dilutes the efficacy of the Charter.   
Article 10, which spells out the implementation process of the Charter, provides 
for the appointment of a National Co-ordinating Committee, the formulation of a 
national plan of action through a broad-based participatory process, and the 
participation of stakeholders to implement objectives of the Charter.186 In this 
respect the Charter acknowledges that the rights enshrined in it impose a positive 
obligation for national governments to formulate policies and put in place 
programmes of action to realize the rights, not only an obligation to compensate 
once a violation of a right occurs.  
 
The Charter envisaged that the national governments would initiate legislation 
that would give effect to the rights stipulated by the Charter, but in reality national 
governments lack not only the impetus but the capacity and the resources to 
implement it at national level. Effective implementation of the Charter at national 
level would necessitate not only fundamentally overhauling existing laws but 
initiating new legislation through Parliament possibly including Constitutional 
amendments.  
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The Charter also provides for the implementation process at national level to be 
reviewed by “appropriate bodies” at regional level. However, there is no 
elaboration on the nature and composition of the review bodies, their terms of 
reference and how the process is to be implemented. The Charter also justifies the 
position that ESC rights are rights that can be achieved only “progressively” and 
are therefore eligible to be enshrined within the Directive Principles of State 
Policy to be realized at an undefined future date when sufficient economic growth 
is achieved through neo-liberal economic globalization.   
 
As reiterated above, this is a reinforcement of the essential weakness of the 
mainstream ESC rights paradigm, which promotes the concept of progressive 
realization of ESC rights through the political rather than the legal domain. The 
current non-radical framework envisaged by the SAARC Social Charter is an 
acknowledgement of the traditional mainstream paradigm’s paradoxical position 
on ESC rights, also endorsed by the Constitutions of the South Asian states which 
subscribe to the theory that developing countries cannot reasonably be expected to 
fulfil their obligations on ESC rights in their current socioeconomic context. 
Therefore, the socioeconomic rights remain unrealized, consolidating the cycle of 
underdevelopment. 
 
4.4 Inherent limitations of the SAARC 
 
Twenty years and thirteen Summit Meetings later, the SAARC, its role in the 
region, and its present and potential success as an effective mechanism to address 
issues of regional concern such as the economy, poverty alleviation and 
development, all remain contentious.187 However, in a region which is diverse in 
terms of religion, ethnicity, political culture and economic strength, the 
establishment of a regional organization is in itself an achievement.188 
Nonetheless, when there is a need for aggressive lobbying for common interests, 
especially in the province of socioeconomic development, such as poverty 
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alleviation, equitable terms of trade, capital investment and rational strategies of 
aid and assistance, the SAARC has remained a passive body and left these issues 
to be resolved through bilateral and multilateral negotiations outside the purview 
of the SAARC. Even on conservative estimations, the two decade fallow period 
which regional leaders have labelled as the “confidence-building stage” intended 
“to create the basic infrastructure” and “a testing period for both the concept of 
regionalism and the member nations”,189 is an enormous squandering of time and 
resources especially considering the socioeconomic calamities the region has 
endured during this period.  
 
The 13th SAARC Summit in Dhaka, held in November 2005, was supposed to 
change now familiar ritualistic avowals into implementation, according to 
Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia, who claimed “For Bangladesh, the 13th 
summit of the seven-nation grouping marks the commencement of a third cycle of 
summits in which the focus will be on implementation rather than 
declarations.”190 But as the Summit concluded it followed a similar pattern to the 
previous dozen, where rhetoric dominated over action. The political euphoria with 
which the state leaders initiated regional cooperation 20 years ago did not equate 
to tangible operational schemes that fostered a spirit of regional unity in any field. 
What it created was essentially an empty structure that was founded on certain 
restricted modalities of cooperation.  
 
The lethargic performance of the SAARC is attributed to the inherent limitations 
imposed on the organization through its Charter.191 At evolutionary stages 
Pakistan and India were both reluctant participants in the regional cooperation 
initiative as the two states were apprehensive regarding the security and power 
relations between the countries in South Asia (especially each other). However, 
arduous diplomatic negotiations resulted in the establishment of the regional 
organization, but two principles were included when formulating the treaty, 
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mainly at India’s insistence.192 They were that the organization was precluded 
from discussing contentious bilateral issues; and that all decisions would be taken 
on the basis of unanimity.193  
 
Added to the above preconditions were the self-imposed limitations on the 
collective endeavours when the SAARC Charter proclaimed that cooperation 
within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for the 
principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit and  “that 
such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
but shall complement them and such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with 
bilateral and multilateral obligations.194 
 
Effective collaboration has been hindered by these clauses, for the SAARC is 
perceived as an organization that exists for political expediency and is rarely 
perceived by the member states as an effective forum for advocating common or 
bilateral interests. Unanimity in all decisions has been insisted on for reasons of 
underlying mistrust and political divisions, which is hardly a promising start for 
effective regional alliance. As Thomas astutely prognosticates:195   
 
“failure is almost in-built in its conception — no organization can survive by 
proscribing bilateral issues. The purpose of every institution — starting from the 
family at the micro level to the United Nations on a macro scale — is to 
contribute towards conflict resolution, since conflict is an inevitable part of 
everyday life. Perhaps the meaningless forum was created because any other 
form of association was considered rather premature. If that is so, then it is the 
most powerful reason to ‘manufacture consent’ around South Asian-ness through 
a process of the production of culture.”  
 
This “functionalist approach” with clearly defined areas for cooperation, which 
were non-controversial, was regarded as a “maturing process” that would yield to 
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genuine cooperation in all spheres at a later stage.196 If, however, the member 
states were able to discuss contentious issues such as the Kashmir conflict,197 
General Musharraf's military coup in Pakistan,198 or the Gujarat riots in India,199 
the anti-Ahmadiya activities in Bangladesh,200 ethnic problem in Sri Lanka,201 
democratic crisis in Nepal,202 or the authoritarian rule in the Maldives,203 the 
SAARC’s role in the region would have been enhanced and it would have 
acquired credibility as an effective organization and contributed greatly to the 
atmosphere of mutual cooperation.  
 
The SAARC’s commitment to the doctrine of non-interference and the concept of 
state sovereignty is increasingly hindering the effective collaboration of the 
SAARC as a regional organization. 204  If at infancy and in the past two decades 
the SAARC has been unable to address deep-rooted and contentious bilateral 
issues and create a culture of cooperation within the framework of the existing 
Charter, it is now time for a more aggressive means of action through the 
amendment of Article 10. In retrospect, the present Charter has to be perceived as 
a transitional arrangement which helped create a framework of regional 
cooperation but which has now outlived its purpose. The SAARC as it stands now 
is a transient arrangement “which member nations have agreed upon [to] serve as 
a test of the way nations may be able to accrue benefits via means of cooperation, 
without actually sacrificing anything big or gaining anything substantial from the 
current conditions. As a test period, nations have also been conferred with special 
privileges to display their willingness for cooperation, without actually testing 
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their will to co-operate.”205 It is time that South Asia moved beyond the stage of 
creating a “culture of cooperation” to effective regionalism that yields concrete 
results. 
 
South Asia’s capacity for sustained civil societal agitation in relation to politics is 
highlighted by the struggles for independence. Feasible strategies to counteract 
the adverse impact of globalization demand active cooperation and the 
mobilization of both state and non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations, private commercial entities and civil society. However, the 
SAARC is an initiative that has been created without consultation with such 
stakeholders, and no attempts have been made to accommodate civil societal 
participation that would have contributed positively to, and derived benefit from, 
a regional alliance.  
 
Opportunities for NGO and civil society participation in the proceedings of the 
SAARC are absent in contrast with other regional bodies.206 Therefore, people 
have no real affinity to the regional alliance and remain alienated from its 
operations though ostensibly its purposes lie close to the everyday lives of the 
people of the region.207 This detachment from the people has also contributed to 
the lack of effective collaboration. There is a growing consensus amongst the 
regional NGOs that the people do not feel the real impact of a regional 
collaboration as SAARC activities are restricted to heads of Governments and 
Foreign Ministries of the member states.208 
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4.4.1 “SAARC fatigue”209  
 
In general, many analysts believe that “SAARC remains hostage to the deep 
undercurrents of political and strategic dissonance in the region.”210 This 
atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust has also affected the scheduling of SAARC 
Summits on several occasions. The failure to hold the 5th SAARC summit in 
1989, due to tensions between India and Sri Lanka, and the postponement of the 
11th Summit (from December 2000, when it was initially scheduled to be held, to 
January 2002, when it was finally convened) due to the eruption of hostilities 
between India and Pakistan, are indicative of apathy and the lack of willingness 
among SAARC nations to resolve bilateral issues. The 13th SAARC Summit 
scheduled in January 2005 was also postponed until November 2005.211 In 
contrast, ASEAN has maintained an uninterrupted practice of frequent regional 
consultations even when being threatened by the outbreak of bilateral tensions.212 
 
Despite the high expectations there is a growing consensus that the SAARC has 
not accomplished much in comparison with other regional alliances in its 20 year 
existence, and “[m]ost programmes and achievements of SAARC exist on 
paper.”213 Whether it is related to SAFTA, drug trafficking, or the environment, 
the creation of regulatory frameworks has always proved to be gruelling and time 
consuming and the unanimity clause has resulted in producing weak, ineffective 
regulatory frameworks in the treaties. This general lethargy, which contributes 
little to bringing tangible benefits to the people in the region, led to an expression 
of concern by many who are actively involved in the SAARC. The President of 
Sri Lanka voiced her disquiet by saying, “….what fruit has SAARC truly borne? 
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Do we need to prune those activities which do not bring significant yield and 
more carefully nurture others that do?”214 The discontent over the progress of the 
SAARC has also prompted countries to seek membership in other regional bodies 
such as the ASEAN by India and Sri Lanka and the NAFTA by India. India, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh have become members of the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association Regional Corporation formed in 1997. The others have attempted 
initiating bilateral ties with the countries in the region, effectively, albeit not 
formally, abandoning the SAARC framework. Such moves obviously do not 
augur well for the region as a whole, which needs the cooperation provided by the 
Association for the long term economic growth and human development of the 
region. 
 
There are several root causes for the malaise within the SAARC. The Charter, 
which can be regarded as the foundation of a regional collaboration, has now 
outlived its purpose, and the Secretariat’s mandate and structure is ineffectual in 
the face of the tasks it is compelled to deal with. The absence of dispute 
settlement machinery to settle inter-state conflicts on security, border and resource 
disputes has also proven to be a fundamental weakness of the SAARC.215 
Although greater economic benefits were one of the main objectives of the 
SAARC collaboration, success in that regard remained low.216 The region’s major 
trading partners such as Western Europe and America, remain outside the region 
making inter-regional trade approximately 5 per cent.217 The success of the newly 
formulated SAFTA discussed below can be seen only after the scheme has been in 
operation for a while.   
 
The South Asian region is home to many complex conflicts dating from the 
colonial era. The struggles for independence from the British and the ensuing 
battles of partition still remain fresh in the minds of the subcontinental people.218 
Some of the contentious issues have their roots in the ethnoreligious composition 
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of the region’s people, scarce resources and colonial demarcation of state 
boundaries, and over the years these contentions have been fuelled by antagonism 
and mistrust.219 The political acrimony between Sri Lanka and India over the 
Tamils220 and Pakistan and India over Kashmir221 provides examples of ongoing 
issues of contention that have the potential to evolve into full-scale warfare.222 A 
similar controversial issue is the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 
July 1950223 and the dispute relating to the border between the two states. 224 The 
sharing of waters and islands in the Ganges by India and Bangladesh is another 
fertile ground for intermittent political bickering that contributes to the situation 
of mistrust and antagonism.225 The oppressive policy of forcible repatriation of 
people in Bhutan of Nepalese origin has created friction between these two 
countries,226 for Bhutan appears to ignore the humanitarian crisis created by the 
Bhutanese refugees living in refugee camps in Nepal.227 The escalating arms race 
between Pakistan and India, especially on the nuclear front, is another example of 
the depth of the antagonism between the various countries that make up the 
region.228  
 
In its 20 year existence the SAARC has succeeded only in creating a forum that 
highlights contentious issues of the region, such as the inherent mistrust of 
neighbouring states, political domination by India, immature democratic 
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governance, political instability, and lack of security. In some quarters, however, 
the creation of that forum in itself is “being seen as no mean achievement given 
the acrimony between the states of this region.”229 However, this study endorses 
the view that it is time for the SAARC to move on from the so-called confidence 
building stage, where in reality it was at worst “merely a talking shop, which can 
provide nothing more than a lip service to the various issues of peace and 
development in the region” and at best a space “that provided an opportunity for 
the policy makers, administrators and experts to meet regularly and hold informal 
dialogues on important regional issues such as security, trade and transport, social 
development etc.”230 It is time that the Association progressed beyond rhetoric 
and considered actions regarding the region’s critical issues, commencing with a 
radical reformulation of the Charter. The need is for a regulatory structure that 
aggressively addresses issues of poverty eradication, democratic deficit, good 
governance of globalization, and human development, for the needs of the region 
can no longer be contained within the consensus-building mechanism that the 
SAARC essentially represents.   
 
A regional initiative should have the concerns and the problems of the region at 
its core, whether they be development, trade or security, and should fashion the 
structures of the alliance so that they best achieve its objectives. However, the 
SAARC reversed this operation and created the structure first, then sought to 
absorb issues that it was comfortable resolving. Therefore, issues of social and 
economic development that were non-controversial were the central focus of the 
Association, which never matured into strategies of implementation for fear of a 
mêlée amongst member states. If the SAARC aspires to evolve as a viable 
regional mechanism it would have to undergo a fundamental restructuring process 
in terms of its structure, core objectives and principles.231   
 
 
4.6 Glimpses of success — SAFTA 
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Amidst all the criticisms, and somewhat optimistically, Ananya Mukherjee Reed 
argues that there is an emerging “new” sense of regionalism based on economic 
considerations in South Asia, which is an inevitable corollary of “the 
contradiction of globalization, which increases competition on the one hand, and 
the need for collaboration on the other.” 232 Despite the apparent defunct nature of 
the SAARC, it harbours at least an embryonic potential to provide a 
comprehensive structural background to the mechanisms that are needed to 
address the adverse effects of globalization.  
 
In this respect, the 12th Summit was significant for it represented a sense of 
realism about the contemporary dilemmas of the region as well as infusing a sense 
of hope regarding its future trajectory.233 It finalized the South Asian Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA, launched January 2006) agreement with the aim of regional 
economic integration by year the 2015.234 These regional trade agreements appear 
to mushroom in the developing as well as the developed world as a reaction to the 
adverse global trading climate, and the South Asian initiative draws inspiration 
from the NAFTA and the custom union initiatives, such as the Mercosur235 and 
the obviously successful European Union.236 The previous attempt of SAARC 
Preferential Trade Agreement of 1993 (SAPTA) always appeared a non-starter. 
SAPTA’s failure is attributed to many causes237 and the new initiative appears to 
have rekindled the desire for economic union that is born out of ideological 
convictions as much as economic expediency.238 
 
                                                           
232 Ananya Mukherjee Reed “Rationalisation in South Asia: Theory and Praxis” (1997) 70 Pacific 
Affairs 235–239. 
233 Muchkund  Dubey “The Twelfth SAARC Summit: Deeper Integration in South Asia” (2005) 
12 South Asian Survey  21–34 ; Mohammed Mohsin “The Twelfth SAARC Summit: Quest for 
Durable South Asian Cooperation” (2005) 12 South Asian Survey 35–46.   
234 As an initial step the Agreement seeks to reduce tariff from the existing levels to 0–5 per cent 
between the years 2006 and 2015 in two phases. 
235 A Latin American regional integration mechanism with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay as full members, and Bolivia and Chile as associate members  
<http://www.redmercosur.org.uy/portal/mercosur.html> (accessed 5 Jan 2006). 
236 <http://europa.eu.int/> (accessed 5 Jan 2006). 
237 Editorial “Such charming simplicity” <http://www.himalmag.com/2004/january/editorial.htm> 
(accessed 17 May 2006). 
238 Saman Kelegama “South Asian Regionalism and Sri Lanka” in Rajan Phillips (ed) Sri Lanka : 
Global Challenges and National Crises (Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, 2001) 149–
160. 
 274 
Easing of foreign trade among members has generated a new enthusiasm 
regarding the relevance of the SAARC in promoting regional economic 
cooperation in South Asia.239  The process is perceived to be an umbrella 
framework of rules providing for gradual liberalization of intra-regional trade that 
would facilitate the moves towards eventual economic integration. Global 
economic development, particularly the impact of the WTO, has provided a new 
impetus for SAARC to pursue its agenda of economic integration with a new 
vigour. Secondly, the invigoration of the ASEAN following the South East Asian 
crisis also contributed to the urge to pursue other possible avenues of economic 
integration. Regional integration in the economic sphere undoubtedly strengthens 
the collective bargaining of the region240 However, considering past experience 
with SAARC, the scepticism that Alok Bansal expresses when he says, “[t]here is 
no doubt that SAFTA is in the interests of the region but the political environment 
in the region makes any forecast of its outcome extremely hazardous,”241 is 
entirely justified.  
 
If economic pragmatism was the fundamental driving force behind the successful 
implementation of SAFTA, other imperative issues common to the region must 
provide a similar impetus for more functional regional integration. Chief among 
these are the obvious concerns relating to poverty eradication, meaningful 
realization of human rights and equitable development. 
 
The incidents of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” should also be of special 
concern to the region. Until September 11, 2001, South Asia’s bickering centred 
on poverty, corruption, settling of ethnic, religious and caste issues and bilateral 
concerns relating to Kashmir or the Tamils in Sri Lanka. These were essentially 
intra-regional concerns that had no impact outside of South Asia. However, the 
events of 9/11 have challenged the security and the territorial integrity of the 
                                                           
239 Alok Bansal “Troubled Road to SAFTA” The Central Chronicle (8 Mar 2005). 
<http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/alokbansal100305.htm> (accessed 16 Feb 2008) 
(Bansal). 
240 Muchkund Dubey “The Twelfth SAARC Summit: Deeper Integration” (2005) 12 South Asian 
Survey  21–34. 
241 Bansal, above n 230.  
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region as the “war on terror” has a direct military impact on Pakistan and the new 
SAARC member, Afghanistan.242  
 
As the above analysis illustrated that the SAARC lacks the structural and 
normative capacity to deal with issues relating to human rights, development or 
governance. The latest security exigency which invites hegemonic intervention by 
the USA in the form of the “war on terror” is an opportunity for the region to re-
evaluate it’s measures of regional corporation and move towards a collaboration 
that places the interests of South Asia and its people first. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The title of this chapter set up two distinct but related topics for analysis: 
democracy, or rather the lack thereof; and the SAARC, or more precisely its 
inadequacy. The chapter has addressed the two topics in that order. It has also 
brought out several levels of relationship between them. Firstly, the majority of 
the seven countries under consideration have at least formally aspired to reinvent 
or consolidate themselves as independent democracies in the post-colonial period. 
The SAARC in turn represents the free association of those sovereign states (plus 
latterly Afghanistan) in a limited union of inter-reliance, assistance and respect. 
The members of the SAARC have thus essentially entered a form of social 
contract to yield a small measure of control and scrutiny to the whole for their 
greater good. This structure could itself be described as democratic; even, in ideal 
terms, a hoped-for democracy of democracies.  
 
More concretely, democracy and the SAARC are linked because the promotion of 
democracy is at least nominally honoured by the regional alliance. In the words of 
the chapter title, the “poverty of democracy” is one of the “region’s needs” to 
which SAARC purports to respond. In reality, failures of democracy within the 
member states have tended to overstrain and subvert the current structure and self-
imposed limits of the alliance, while the converse has also occurred with 
SAARC’s inadequacy deserting the promotion of democracy.  
                                                           
242 Farhana Ali “A Post-Musharraf Pakistan Policy” Washington Post March 7, 2008 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702732.html > 
(accessed 8 Mar 2008). 
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Finally, returning to the level of more abstract principle, constitutional democracy 
and regional co-operation are related because both represent attempts at 
deliberate, normative governance. Specifically, the governance being practised, or 
at least aspired to, here is the discipline, definition and management of intra-state 
and inter-state civic affairs respectively. The attempted means of governance in 
both these cases are political. 
 
The poverty of democracy was seen to mean failures of both democratic form and 
function. The introduction to the chapter clarified that the kind of democratic state 
being advocated by this thesis is a plural, tolerant, welfarist democracy, with 
regular elections from a universal franchise. In addition, to be declared functional 
rather than merely formal, it must operate under a thoroughly internalized and 
honoured rule of law and separation of powers, and must be fortified by a strong 
and independent judicial branch.  
 
The chapter identified democracy, as thus defined, to be one of three key 
desiderata in this thesis, alongside human rights and human-centred development. 
The synergies between these three values and their interdependence were 
analyzed. Civil and political rights were noted as being classically democratic 
rights, being at once required for democracy and protected by it. A measure of 
egalitarian redistribution of economic wealth though a welfare system goes 
towards vindicating economic rights, while the kind of active civil society and 
open media required for true pluralism promote social and cultural rights. 
Guarantees of the human rights of individual citizens as well as minority 
segments of the population in turn guard against majoritarian subversion of 
democracy or the seductive charms of abuses of utilitarianism. While democratic 
states rise on a tide of development that lifts all boats, development itself becomes 
at once more vigorous, more reflective of a people’s needs, and more fully 
“owned’ by the people in a functional democracy. In such a state, people 
participate not only as independent economic agents but also as citizens in 
debating and articulating the desired economic as well as social direction of the 
state, and actively help constitute, then elect, monitor and hold to account, 
governments chosen for their promise to deliver that vision.  
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Although the region was seen to boast the world’s largest democracy and two of 
the oldest democratic states in the developing world, by its very history South 
Asia lacked any deep well-spring of democratic tradition on which to draw. The 
actual record of democratic governance was marred both by overt failures of 
form, where countries have slid back into authoritarianism or never emerged from 
it in the first place, and by more insidious failures of functioning even within 
technically correct structures. Both types of failures were catalogued country-by-
country and region-wide.  
 
One leading cause of region-wide failures was identified as the effect of neo-
liberal economic reforms. In this regard, the World Bank seems to be aware of 
only part of the problem. It acknowledges: “market-oriented reforms […] can go 
awry, with painful consequences for poor people. Lack of supporting institutions, 
mistakes in sequencing reforms, or the capture of the reform process by powerful 
individuals or groups lie at the bottom of most failed reforms.”243 Yet, while all 
these faults can be laid at the doors of many South Asian governments, a deeper 
problem, to which this report seems blind, has lain in the more basic diverting of 
accountability inherent in the neo-liberal control of domestic policy. Instead of 
being answerable first and foremost to the real human needs of their respective 
electorates, governments whose (admittedly sometimes rubber) arms were being 
twisted by the conditionalities of SAPs and PRSPs, have in practical terms felt 
more answerable to the constituencies of the IFIs, major donors and, indirectly, 
the TNCs.In so doing they have also tended to buy into a ‘one size fits all” 
approach instead of reflecting idiosyncratic national needs. 
 
The foregoing paragraphs have encapsulated the governance crisis of South Asia 
and depicted how the dysfunctional democratic systems have a negative impact on 
the socioeconomic rights, as well as civil and political rights, of the people in the 
region. South Asian governments are weak and lack the capacity to make 
appropriate policy choices. There is no feasible mechanism available nationally or 
within the region to challenge poor, unviable policy decisions that are made by 
the national governments, and very limited judicial fora are available to challenge 
                                                           
243 World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (World Bank, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2001) 64. 
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such choices.244 There is a dearth of policy initiatives to promote a structure for 
economic development that also fosters social integration and advocates 
emancipation for the millions who are trapped in the cycles of poverty.245  
 
As highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, the previous analysis has 
focussed on the international and national mechanisms that attempt to deal with 
neo-liberal globalization and its ramifications. This chapter focussed on another 
available whole tier of mechanism that has huge potential to grapple with both 
inherent regional problems and the undesirable imported corollaries of neo-liberal 
globalization. This is the regional tier.  Executed in a non-aggressive and non-
protectionist way, the regional tier is not only compatible with the global but 
synergises with it as a means of pursuing human rights, democracy and 
development. It also builds on, and consists of, the nation state, since states are 
the members that form such alliances. 
 
With this aim in mind an analysis of the existing regional mechanism of the 
SAARC was undertaken. The discussion highlighted the absence of regional 
standards relating to democracy and the reluctance of the member states to 
involve themselves in norm-establishing exercizes relating to democracy or 
governance. The analysis indicated that SAARC, as a regional apparatus will 
remain impotent until the structural and jurisdictional failures of the system 
highlighted in the above discussion remained unaddressed. Since its inception, 
critics have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the SAARC as a regional 
organization for it failed to address the many poverties of the region, mainly 
human rights, development, democracy and intra-regional tensions. As Dash 
observes, without addressing these issues, and “[g]iven the low level of mutual 
trust, spill over effects of the ethnic and religious conflicts, and the magnitude of 
bilateral disputes in South Asia, it is unrealistic to believe that any substantial 
growth of regional cooperation is possible without easing political tensions.”246  
 
                                                           
244 See Chapter 2 above in relation to Social Action Litigation. 
245 Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the 
State in Modern India (Cambridge University Press, Cambrigde, 1998) 10 -12 details of all that of 
the multiple discriminations that the untouchables suffer the most debilitating effect is from 
poverty.  
246 Kishore C Dash “The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia” Summer 
(1996) 69 Pacific Affair <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dash.htm > (accessed 5 Jun 
2005). 
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One key failing of SAARC was thus seen to be its abdication of responsibility and 
authority for dealing with particular bilateral tensions, and also with internal strife 
that reaches the point of civil war. While these conflicts go diplomatically 
ignored, issues such as Kashmir remain the undiscussed but massively 
uncomfortable “elephant in the room”. In this respect it was notable that in Kofi 
Annan’s words and those of others, peace and security are also desiderata which a 
regional mechanism can and should aspire to deliver. Peace and security are not 
only compatible with democracy, development and human rights, but mutually 
necessary to them. A regional framework that prescribes fixed and enforceable 
normative standards in relation to human rights, democracy and governance, and 
establish procedures to prevent democratic backsliding within member states can 
be achieved. 
 
In the interests of the people of the region it is imperative that individual states 
institute and honour both the form and the function of democracy, as separate 
nations and together with each other. At the same time, a new and better regional 
response to the poverty of democracy and the other needs noted will be advocated 
in Chapter 6 of this study. In the meanwhile, inspiration and concrete models for 
structures and rules that will optimally suit South Asia will be sought in the 
Chapter 5. To that end, this next chapter distils the best and most relevant 
practices of several regional and cross-regional mechanisms from around the 
globe.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN 
REGIONAL AND CROSS-REGIONAL PARADIGMS  
 
“[i]n a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country’s self-
interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of larger freedom can 
only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among States … 
States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an active civil society and a  
dynamic private sector…We also need agile and effective regional and  
global intergovernmental institutions to mobilise and coordinate collective action … We  
therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability — the accountability of  
States to their citizens, of States to each other,  of international institutions to  
their members and of the present generation to future generations.”1 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the absence of a deep-rooted culture of 
‘functional’ democracy in South Asia and the impact of this lack on governance. 
The analysis concluded with the observation that it is impossible to inculcate 
responsible governance “from bottom up” through the individual states in the 
region and that the best means of achieving good governance is by an infusion of 
normative standards through a regional mechanism. Chapter 4 then discussed the 
effectiveness of the SAARC as a candidate for such a regional mechanism and 
identified its many weaknesses, particularly the structure which precludes it from 
addressing bilateral or national issues and the absence of legal obligations upon 
states to ensure human rights and norms of democracy within their own 
jurisdictions. Finally, Chapter 4 concluded with the observation that if a South 
Asian regional mechanism is to be effective it must address the specific critical 
issues of eradicating material poverty, closing democratic deficits and promoting 
equitable development which remain urgent region-wide.  
 
The present chapter acknowledges that the eradication of poverty and the 
promotion of equitable development requires a pragmatic and multidimensional 
effort centred on the promotion of universally accepted human rights. Few 
initiatives, whether regional, national, or international, do in fact specify an 
                                                           
1Kofi Annan “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” 
(A/59/2005) <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap1.htm> (accessed 5 Mar 2006). 
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integrated approach towards the eradication of poverty, promotion of democratic 
governance, just development and human rights. Chapter 1 at section 1.7 already 
noted the innovative procedures of Social Action Litigation (SAL) that have been 
created in South Asia at national levels to enhance human rights through Social 
Action Litigation. That section observed SAL’s proven ability to extend into an 
avenue for scrutinizing and even defining social policy, and the chapter noted the 
extra significance of this in South Asia as “a climate where other avenues of 
public and parliamentary debate are defunct or dysfunctional and results of 
elections are not a true reflection of public opinion.”  
 
While SAL will remain extremely valuable, it is neither safe nor sufficient to rely 
on the ability or willingness of an activist domestic judiciary within each state to 
promote human rights and democracy, especially given precisely those proven 
tendencies towards manipulation by the executive; nor is it necessary to plant the 
burden of such initiatives on bold judges. Chapter 1 itself stated rather that the 
best possible outcome of SAL would include wider repercussions in the form of 
“legislative or policy changes” as well as enhanced public debate.2 In fulfillment 
of that promise, the present chapter looks beyond even such legislative and policy 
changes to more radical, regional and cross-regional restructurings that have 
occurred around the globe. It will be argued in this chapter and Chapter 6 that 
SAL not only facilitates the introduction of such wider mechanisms in South Asia 
but is compatible with them and will in fact synergize with them — though they 
will also be strong enough to work without it if necessary. To this end, the present 
chapter specifically survey certain key aspects of the mechanisms established at 
regional levels in the Americas, Europe and Africa and at an inter-regional level 
through the Commonwealth Association to safeguard human rights, nurture 
democratic governance and foster development — the three broad aims discussed 
in the introduction to Chapter 4.  
 
The approaches to regional governance in Europe, the Americas and Africa have 
taken into consideration the history, socioeconomic and political exigencies of the 
states in each region and focused on specific issues that were regarded as 
significant concerns of the particular region. The normative content and 
                                                           
2 R Véron “Remaking urban environments: the political ecology of air pollution in Delhi” (2006) 
38/11 Environment and Planning A 2093–2109. 
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implementation strategies contained in each mechanism are aimed at resolving the 
region specific exigencies. Ghai observes that regional mechanisms also represent 
a general agreement “as to the standards of government behaviour acceptable in 
the region” and he adds that the absence of a regional mechanism in Asia and the 
Pacific is indicative of the absence of such a common consensus.3  
 
No mechanisms, however efficient, can be completely transported to another 
region, as they have to be synthesized into each economic, cultural and political 
milieu. However, these arrangements can be a valuable guide and an inspiration 
when creating a mechanism that is particular to South Asia. 
 
 
5.2 Drawing Inspiration from Alternative Regional and Cross-regional 
Paradigms 
 
As much as globalization entrenched structures that facilitated global economic 
integration, it has also created an impetus for entrenching systems of justice, law 
and human rights. These structures extend from systems incorporated under the 
United Nations, particularly in relation to environmental law regimes4 and 
international criminal law5, to rejuvenating and enhancing the existing regimes of 
regional solidarity founded in Europe, the Americas and Africa. These endeavours 
at global and regional level indicate an increased desire to create definitive legal 
regimes involving legal rights, responsibilities and obligations.  
 
Regionalism as a means of enhancing human rights and consolidating democracy 
is not a new idea. Several regional mechanisms that work towards protecting and 
enhancing human rights exist and they have evolved around the sociopolitical 
mores of the area concerned. Fawcett describes the advantages of regionalism as 
follows:6 
                                                           
3 Yash Ghai Human Rights and Social Development Toward Democratization and Social Justice  
(Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 5, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, October 2001)3. 
4 Climate control regime under the Kyoto Protocol see Mustafa Babikera, Henry D John M Reillyc 
and David M Reinerc The evolution of a climate regime: Kyoto to Marrakech and beyond (2002) 
5 Environmental Science and Policy 195-206. 
5 Marlies Glasius, The International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement 
(Routledge New York 2006). 
6 Louise Fawcett “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism” (2004) 80 
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[apart] from promoting economic, political and security cooperation and 
community, it can consolidate state-building and democratization, check heavy-
handed behaviour by strong states, create and lock in norms and values, increase 
transparency, make states and international institutions more accountable, and help 
to manage the negative effects of globalization. Recent examples from Europe, the 
Americas, Africa and parts of Asia support this assessment.  
 
Each of these systems is founded on the premise that rights are illusory unless the 
procedural means of enforcement is compatible with the political, cultural and 
social ethos of the region. The legal and institutional framework of each regional 
organization addresses the specific issues that have a special resonance within that 
region. None of the arrangements have proven to be instantly efficient for each 
took years to evolve into viable systems and they are still evolving and adjusting 
to the exigencies of the times.  
 
This chapter does not attempt to make an exhaustive study of all the regional 
mechanisms in place to promote human rights, democracy and equitable 
developmental policies. Rather it discusses the key aspects of the various regional 
mechanisms and their relevance to the new South Asian praxis that is advocated 
in Chapter 6 of this study. The proposed South Asian mechanism that is discussed 
in Chapter 6 will draw inspiration from other relevant regional mechanisms 
already established, but of necessity it differs from them in terms of the normative 
rights content and the mechanisms of realizing them. However, in terms of the 
scope and content, the South Asian mechanism will go beyond the traditional 
European, American and the African regional mechanisms because it has to face 
new dilemmas and challenges that have been brought to the forefront by 
globalization.  
 
 
5.3 EUROPE: Exemplary rights jurisprudence created from the most 
advanced initial conditions  
 
5.3.1 The European System: Council of Europe and Convention for 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
International Affairs 429–446, 429.  
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The post-war impetus to create regional instruments for the protection and 
enhancement of human rights was hailed as the most “radical development in the 
whole history of international law.”7 Among these, the European system (under 
the aegis of the Council of Europe) is widely regarded as the “most advanced and 
effective”8 international regime for formally enforcing human rights in the world 
today. The Council of Europe is a legal regime that caters to a like-minded group 
of countries that not only share a common political ideology but have joined 
together to defend the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
The states share similar established systems of democracies that endeavour to 
protect and promote human rights, an endeavour which has in turn facilitated and 
streamlined an efficient regional rights regime. The region also has the advantage 
of economic prosperity, which provides resources for procedural implementation 
of a human rights system effectively — phenomena that are absent in South Asia.    
 
The Council of Europe, which created the European human rights regime and is 
administered through the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), stipulates 
that, “[e]very member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the 
rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”9 and must contribute to the aims of the Council, 
which, among others, are the protection of the common heritage, facilitating 
economic and social progress and “the maintenance and further realization of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”10 It is after the preconditions of the rule 
of law and the respect for human rights are satisfied that the Committee of 
Ministers invites a state party to become a member of the Council of Europe. By 
2007, 47 states had become members of the Council of Europe;11 all of them had 
ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the European Convention) and had also accepted 
the right of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights 
                                                           
7 John P Humphrey “The Revolution in the International Law of Human Rights” (1974) 4 Human 
Rights 205, 208–209. 
8 Louis Henkin, Gerald L Neuman, Diane F Orentlicher, and David W Leebron Human Rights 
(Foundation Press, New York, 1999) 551. 
9 Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm> (accessed 16 Apr 2006). 
10 Article 1 B of the Statute of the Council of Europe 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm> (accessed 16 Apr 2006). 
11 See list of member states of Council of Europe 
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/default.asp> (accessed 12 Feb 2008). 
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(during its existence until 1998) and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.12 
The acceptance of the European Convention, the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court and of the binding nature of its judgments is a prerequisite for membership 
of the European Council.13 Therefore, a state’s respect for human rights and its 
domestic human rights record is assessed and ensured before it is accepted into 
the Council. For instance, Russia’s domestic human rights record was deemed 
inadequate for the country to be admitted to the Council in 1994.14  
 
The initial mechanism for the vindication of rights in operation from 1953 until 
1998 was the two-tiered structure of the European Commission of Human Rights 
and the Court. During the initial stages this process was deemed efficient as the 
Commission was designed to be a filtering mechanism for the cases before the 
Court. As with all regional instruments, which need to evolve with time to meet 
contemporary exigencies, the European system, too, was adjusted and underwent 
a major overhaul in 1998. The changes were designed to streamline and create 
efficiency in the processing of complaints of human rights abuse.15 The role of the 
Commission of Human Rights appeared increasingly redundant with many cases 
being brought to the Court and therefore the Commission was abandoned and the 
Court was restructured to be more administratively efficient under Protocol 11 of 
the European Convention in 1998.16  
 
The implementation mechanism of the European Convention is now the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg17 and the Committee of Ministers, which is 
                                                           
12 <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_COE/> (accessed 16 Apr 2006). 
13 Interim Resolution ResDH(2001)80 concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights of 28 July, 1998 in the case of Loizidou against Turkey 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=217701&Lang=en> (accessed 16 Apr 2006). 
14 Vico Morcote “Why the Council of Europe Should Put Conglomerate Russia on Hold” 
International Herald Tribune (Thursday 2 February 1995) 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/02/02/edpeter.php>; see also Diane Ethier “Is Democracy 
Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives” (2003) 10/1 Democratization  
99–120. 
15 Clements, Mole and Simmons European Human Rights: Taking a Case under The Convention 
(2nd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1999); Pieter van Dijk et al. Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed, Kluwer, The Hague, 1998); R Bernhardt “Reform 
of the Control Machinery under the European Convention on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11” 
(1995) 89 AJIL 145–154. 
16 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=155&CM=7&DF=2/20/200
8&CL=ENG > (accessed 10 Feb 2008). 
17 Richard Pierre Claude, Burns H Weston (eds) Human Rights in the World Community: Issues 
and Action  (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). 
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also the key political institution of the Council of Europe. The European 
Convention has entrusted the monitoring and the supervision of the Court’s 
judgments to this body. The Court’s jurisdiction is wide and offers redress to all 
persons whose rights, which have been guaranteed under the European 
Convention, have been violated. The Court entertains applications from 
individuals as well as states and though it is rare for a state to make an allegation 
of rights violations by another state, nevertheless the lingering memories of the 
Holocaust make such a provision essential to the legitimacy of the mechanism. 
The Court’s judgments are final and legally binding on respondent states.18 
However, as the judgments are declaratory in nature, while the Court can 
pronounce upon the violation of European Convention articles and award 
compensation, it cannot compel a state to amend the offending legislation or alter 
the practice to avoid similar future violations.19  
 
The requirement that all domestic remedies must be exhausted before an 
applicant20 petitions the Court reiterates the position that the regional judicial 
forum is a place of last resort and that the European Convention envisages that the 
national governments have appropriate fora to offer redress for human rights 
violations. The proceedings of the Court usually involve nine judges including a 
judge from the country in question, but have provision to seat a Grand Chamber 
of 21 judges in what is essentially an appellate process. Once the case is declared 
admissible the Court initially strives for an amicable settlement, which can range 
from the payment of compensation to the amending of offending legislation or 
administrative process.  
  
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is the implementing 
organ of the European Human Rights mechanism, is vested with the duty to 
ensure that the judgments are implemented by individual countries in terms of 
payment of compensation or the requisite amendments to the laws or 
                                                           
18 Articles 44 & 46 § 1 of the Convention as amended by Protocol No. 11 (formerly Article 53) 
provide: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in 
any case to which they are parties”.  
19 Sienho Yee International Law and the Post-Cold War World: Essays in Memory of Li Haopei 
(Routledge, London, UK, 2001) 409 (Yee). 
20 The applicants to the Court must not be anonymous and they must be seeking redress for a 
violation of a right that is enshrined in the Convention. It is also imperative that the petitioner 
invokes the jurisdiction of the European Court within six months of the final domestic hearing. 
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administrative proceedings being carried out. It can also assist with the reopening 
of proceedings if necessary.   
 
The European Convention on Human Rights, while prescribing a regional 
mechanism for the protection of human rights, places significant emphasis on the 
point that primary responsibility for securing human rights is vested with 
individual countries21 and that the implementation machinery at regional level is 
activated only once all domestic remedies are exhausted. This preference for 
national remedies through national rights legislation is efficacious in a region 
where there are effective and efficient judicial systems and monitoring bodies and 
where the spirit of human rights is deeply entrenched within the governing 
structures.22 In this sense the European system of human rights vindication is a 
system with sophistication and maturity and also a forum of last resort. In most 
instances the purpose of the European system has been the reinforcement of rights 
and procedures that can better safeguard human rights in a domestic context. The 
ECHR has inspired the legal systems of the member countries significantly in 
terms of altering legislation, policy stances and the legal perceptions regarding 
human rights within the system.23 In this context there is veracity in the Court’s 
pronouncement that the European Convention is “a constitutional document of 
European public order.”24  
 
The significance of the emergence of regional mechanisms on human rights lay in 
the fact that its evolution reflects a particular response to the dilemmas and the 
concerns of that region at a particular time. The impetus to create the European 
system of human rights was rooted in the horror of the Nazi atrocities, the deep 
scepticism towards the Soviet Bloc and the slow development of universal 
mechanisms to protect human rights under the aegis of the United Nations.25 In 
this sense, the European system, as any other regional mechanism, was a reaction 
to the needs and the concerns of an era and political demography, which is 
                                                           
21 ECHR Articles 1 & 13. 
22 Robert Blackburn The European Convention on Human Rights: The Impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the Legal and Political Systems of Member States (Cassel, 
London, 1998). 
23 Brice Dickson Human Rights and the European Convention: The Effects of the Convention on 
the United Kingdom and Ireland (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997). 
24 Loizidou v. Turkey 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. ser. A 1995 27. 
25 Henry Steiner and Phillip Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 
(Oxford University Press, 2000) 787. 
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reflected by the exclusion of social rights in the Convention except the Paris 
Protocol of 1952 to the Convention, Article 2, which decreed no-one is to be 
deprived of right to education.26 Pierre-Henry Teigen, one of the architects of the 
Convention, explained the reasons for this exclusion by saying that the primary 
duty of the Convention was to safeguard the “political democracy of Europe” and 
issues of social democracy were to be addressed later.27 Therefore, the issue of 
social and economic rights was shelved to emerge later as the European Social 
Charter in 1961.  
 
The European system was the first attempt at transforming the ideals enshrined in 
the UDHR into a working legal framework, and half a century later it has matured 
into an efficient system of implementing human rights and monitoring violations 
and has contributed immensely to the evolution of contemporary human rights 
jurisprudence particularly in the field of civil and political rights. 
 
At this moment it is also vital to highlight a fundamental distinction between the 
European system and the proposed South Asian praxis. The European human 
rights regime under the aegis of the Council of Europe is a mechanism that 
empowers individuals against their respective states. The regime ensures 
governmental accountability internally to a predetermined normative standard. 
The regime in this sense is a second line of defence, or a tool of reinforcement, for 
citizens of the participant states, because by definition their states will already 
have complied with the normative standards that are prerequisites for membership 
of the Council. The regime in this sense is a tool of empowerment for the people 
for European system at a regional level as it caters to human rights lapses at 
domestic level. A functional mechanism to safeguard human rights is presupposed 
at national level as democracy is a prerequisite to the membership of the European 
Council. As the discussions of Chapters 2 and 4 indicated, the luxury of efficient 
domestic human rights systems is unavailable in South Asia. In the South Asian 
context it would be the regional human rights mechanism’s responsibility to 
                                                           
26 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
as amended by Protocol No. 11, Paris, 20.III.1952 Headings of articles added and text amended 
according to the provisions of Protocol No. 11 (ETS No. 155) as of its entry into force on 1 
November 1998 <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm> (accessed 10 Feb 
2008). 
27 Quoted in Henry Steiner and Phillip Alston International Human rights in Context: Law, 
Politics, Morals (Oxford University Press, 2000) 794. 
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determine normative standards, foster them nationally and ensure the correct 
implementation of the human rights occurs at domestic level. 
 
 
5.3.2 The European Social Charter: Bringing ESC Rights in from the Cold 
 
The European Social Charter, adopted in 1961 and substantially revised in 1996,28 
is a specialized human rights mechanism that has evolved through the Council of 
Europe and is regarded as the natural counterpart in the ESC realm of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
latter being aimed at safeguarding civil and political rights.  
 
The primary concern of the Social Charter is the classic social and economic 
rights in the universal system, and the states parties to the Charter seek to honour 
the obligations of the Charter in spirit as well as implementing strategies 
nationally to realize the rights contained in the Charter.29 The Social Charter 
enshrines the right to work, education, the right to vocational guidance and 
training, non-discrimination, prohibition of forced labour, trade union rights and 
the right of women and men to equal pay for work of equal value, as well as 
elaborate measures on social protection, rights of children and young persons, 
right to healthcare protection, social, legal and economic protection and to social 
security.30 It is designed to address concerns including social welfare, and issues 
of social cohesion, which would enhance the quality of life of the people.  
 
The revised Social Charter (1996) has broad-based rights that encompass 
protection against poverty and social exclusion, the right to adequate 
accommodation and protection in instances of unjust termination of employment 
                                                           
28 The revised Social Charter of 1996, which came into effect in 1999, reflects the changing social 
circumstances in the member states. It consolidated in a single document the rights recognized in 
the original Charter of 1961, the rights recognized in the Additional Protocol of 1988 and certain 
new rights. See also Robin R Churchill and Urfan Khaliq “The Collective Complaints System of 
the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic 
and Social Rights?” (2004) 15 Eur Journal of Int Law 417–456.(Churchill and Khaliq). 
29 DJ Harris “The European Social Charter” July (1964) 13/3 The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1076–1087.  
30 For rights relating to housing, health, education, employment, legal and social protection, 
movement of persons, and non-discrimination, see Articles 1–31 European Social Charter 1996 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm> (accessed 23 Jun 2005); see also 
Nihal Jayawickrama Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and 
International Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, West Nyack, NY, USA, 2002) 74. 
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and rights related to the movement of people. The Additional Protocol to the 
Social Charter entered into force in 1998 and expanded the jurisdiction of the 
Charter and provided an opportunity for workers’ groups and NGOs to initiate 
collective complaints to the European Committee of Social Rights.31 The 
Explanatory Report on the Protocol justified the collective complaints mechanism 
on the basis that it is: 32 
 
 designed to increase the efficiency of supervisory machinery based 
solely on the submission of governmental reports. In particular, this system 
should increase participation by management and labour and non-
governmental organizations ... The way in which the machinery as a whole 
functions can only be enhanced by the greater interest that these bodies may 
be expected to show in the Charter. 
 
At the centre of the monitoring and the implementation system of the Social 
Charter is the European Committee of Social Rights,33 which scrutinizes the 
periodic governmental reports submitted to it on the implementation of the 
Charter. The Committee, quasi judicial in nature, comprises independent experts 
who evaluate the reports and submit their observations in the form of 
“Conclusions” to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, who in 
turn issue recommendations to governments asking them to change their national 
legislation or policies to ensure compliance.  
 
In addition to the above mechanisms, the European system also has a 
Commissioner for Human Rights,34 an office that was created in April 1999. The 
European Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) elects the 
Commissioner for a period of six years and the Commissioner is vested with the 
specific mandate “to promote education and awareness of human rights, to 
identify areas of laws that fail to recognize human rights to a full extent and 
                                                           
31 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints CETS No: 158; see also Churchill and Khaliq, above n 25. 
32 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Collective Complaints Protocol (1995) paras 1–8 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/HTML/158.htm.> (accessed 10 Feb 2008). 
33 “The European Committee of Social Rights ascertains whether countries have honoured the 
undertakings set out in the Charter. Its thirteen independent, impartial members are elected by the 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers for a period of six years, renewable once. The 
Committee determines whether or not national law and practice in the States Parties are in 
conformity with the Charter.” (Article 24 of the Charter, as amended by the 1991 Turin Protocol) 
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Esc/1_General_Presentation/Charter_glance.asp#TopOfP
age> 
(accessed 14 May 2006) 
34 <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Commissioner_H.R/Communication_Unit/> (accessed 14 May 2006). 
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human rights laws that are not fully implemented and to promote a respect for and 
enjoyment of human rights in COE member states.”35 The Commissioner does not 
have powers of investigation into individual complaints relating to rights that have 
been violated.  
 
The distinction that is maintained by the European states in relation to civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the 
other, has its roots in ideological convictions as much as administrative 
expediency. Economic, social and cultural rights being progressive in nature are 
traditionally considered to be lacking in justiciability, a quality that is regarded as 
an integral characteristic of civil and political rights  — but whose nature is now 
being questioned.36 In keeping with the ideological premises, the European states 
have adopted a dual-pronged mechanism for human rights protection. The 
implementation mechanism of the Social Charter is distinctly different from that 
of the ECHR. Issues such as prevention, education and the general supervision of 
national human rights legislation are vested in the Human Rights Commissioner, a 
role which is essentially administrative.  
 
The European Human Rights system is a fine blend of common political 
ideological convictions, social expediency and administrative functionalism. The 
human rights protection mechanism in Europe was created half a century ago; 
however, the system remained sensitive to the changing conceptual articulations 
of human rights, and the content and the scope of the Convention have been 
amended through subsequent Protocols. The European Human Rights 
Commission was disbanded when it was deemed dysfunctional in the 
contemporary context of human rights litigation. The scope and the reach of the 
Social Charter have been repeatedly enhanced to respond to the insecurities that 
were felt with the rapid expansion of the economic globalization process.37  The 
                                                           
35 Resolution (99)50 of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 7 May 1999. 
36 Michael Addo “Justiciability Re-examined” in D Hill & R Beddard (eds) Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights 1991 and Eide “Economic Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights” in A 
Eide, C Krause and A Rosas (eds) Economic Social and Cultural Rights A Text Book  (2nd ed, 
2001). 
37 Churchill and Khaliq, above n 25. 
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success of the European Court as an effective mechanism for human rights 
protection has been proved over the years. As Yee observes: 38 
 
The experience of and with the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates 
that, at least on the regional level, individual rights can be protected by an 
international court. States were, during a long period, reluctant to accept the 
jurisdiction of the European Court, but over the decades and in spite of decisions 
considerably restricting the sovereignty of States, at first the western European 
States and since 1990 nearly all other European States have accepted the 
international control and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
The implementation apparatus of the ECHR is the most sophisticated and best 
executed of all of the regional mechanisms considered in this chapter. This 
success is largely dependent on the mature and well established national 
adjudicatory systems and the functional democratic governance which is the norm 
in the region.  
 
Social rights, while traditionally sidelined especially within the Western European 
discourse of human rights, have been prominent on the agenda in Europe in recent 
years. The debate about providing equal status to both social and economic rights 
gathered a new impetus with the influx of post-communist states into the Council 
of Europe. Moreover there is increased academic observation that “to consider 
that all of the rights that are found in treaties which promote and protect economic 
and social rights are incapable of being judicially determined is an 
oversimplification.”39 The revision of the Council of Europe's European Social 
Charter to allow for a collective complaints procedure also appears to endorse this 
position.  
 
Today, the European human rights system that operates through the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European 
Social Charter is a fundamental facet of the European regionalization ethos 
despite the challenges that have emerged, particularly through the expansion of its 
membership to states that have not always shared a liberal democratic political 
history. “In the first few decades of its existence, the organs of the European 
Convention system, in contrast to those of other regional systems for the 
protection of human rights, were privileged in that their field of application 
                                                           
38 Yee, above n 16.  
39 Churchill and Khaliq, above n 25, 420. 
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extended, on the whole, to a relatively homogeneous region of Europe where 
democracy and the rule of law were well-established.”40 However, increasingly 
both the Council of Europe and, at a slower pace, the EU are embracing states that 
have evolved in the past with different political and social ideologies.41 These 
states have vastly different legal systems and the concept of rights embraced by 
them is vastly different from the familiar liberal rights theories of Western 
Europe. While democratic governance and acceptable human rights standards are 
deemed to be preconditions for acceptance into the Council of Europe, such 
values are not yet fully embedded in the sociopolitical and cultural mores of many 
of the states that are classified as “transitional democracies”.42 It is these new 
member states that will test the capacity of the European regional system and 
offer challenges in terms of the substantive rights enshrined in the Convention and 
the Social Charter and the adequacy of the mechanisms in place to vindicate these 
rights.  
 
Chapter 6 will illustrate how the proposed South Asian system can learn from the 
coherence and the systematic implementation of human rights within the Council 
of Europe’s States. It will also debate the efficacy of introducing a Social Rights 
Charter and whether in respect of monitoring and implementation South Asia 
should go further than its European counterpart, which has a restricted and clearly 
defined collective complaints system that the states have the prerogative to opt 
into and also operates a system of annual country reports to the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
 
5.4 The Americas and the Caribbean: A Powerful Mechanism for  
Democracy through a Turbulent History 
 
                                                           
40 Yee, above n 18.  
41 The Council of Europe has 47 members as of 2007 member states including 22 from the former 
Soviet Bloc. It has granted observer status to 5 more countries (the Holy See, the United States, 
Canada, Japan and Mexico). 
42  Shale Horowitz “Causes and consequences of variation in post communist human rights 
practices” in Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel (eds) Human Rights and Societies in 
Transition (UN University Press, 2004) 242. 
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5.4.1 The Organization of American States – The Organization of 
American States: Rebuilding democracies and breaking the non-
intervention mould  
  
The Inter-American system is a remarkable example of regional collaboration that 
not only promotes human rights but also contributes to the evolution of a new 
ethos of democratic governance, which is an essential pre-condition for the 
success of human rights. Latin America, notorious for its brutal political history,43 
authoritarianism and military dictatorships, has evolved a “well-established norm 
of civilian, constitutional government in the hemisphere.”44 Many observe that 
within the past three decades the American states have being a part of the global 
‘third wave’ transition to democracy.45 Diamond expands on Huntington’s 
classification of the period stemming from the mid 1970s as the “third wave” of 
global democratic expansion and explains that Huntington “defines ‘a group of 
transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a 
specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the 
opposite direction during that period”.46 He identifies two previous waves of 
democratization: a long, slow wave from 1828 to 1926 and a second wave from 
1943 to 1964. Significantly, each of these ended with what he calls a “reverse 
wave” of democratic breakdowns (the first lasting from 1922 to 1942, the second 
from 1961 to 1975), in which some of the newly established (or re-established) 
democracies failed.”47 This democratic transition in Latin America is remarkable 
as this was the era when stabilisation and privatisation policies introduced by the 
IFIs had devastating repercussions on the region’s political and social life,48 often 
                                                           
43 For a brief historical account see Juan E Mendez and Javier Mariezcurrena “Human Rights In 
Latin America And The Caribbean: A Regional Perspective” Paper submitted to the Human 
Development Report 2000 Human Rights and Human Development; and also Jorge I Domínguez 
and Michael Shifter (eds) Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003) (Mendez and Mariezcurrena). 
44The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks Frances Hagopian 
and Scott P Mainwaring (eds) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005); Michael Shifter 
“Tensions and Trade-Offs in Latin America” (1997) 8/2 Journal of Democracy 116. 
45 Michael Dodson and Donald Jackson “Horizontal Accountability in Transitional Democracies: 
The Human Rights Ombudsman in El Salvador and Guatemala” (2004) 46/4 Latin American 
Politics & Society  1–27.  
46 Samuel P Huntington The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1991) 15. 
47 Larry Diamond “Is the Third Wave Over?”(1996)7 Journal of Democracy 20–37, 20. 
48 Riordan Roett, Carol Wise (eds) Post-Stabilization Politics in Latin America: Competition, 
Transition, Collapse  (Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
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fuelling civil dissent and resentment against the governments, which in turn 
created opportunities for the governments to react with violence and brutality. 
 
The Americas and the Caribbean are a region that has a peculiar political history 
and culture which is heavily influenced by more than one nation’s colonialism as 
well as by indigenous traditions.49 The region’s relationship with democracy and 
human rights has been at best sporadic, with dictatorships, coups-d’état, 
autogolpes and military juntas dominating the political landscape of the region 
particularly in the 1970s and the 1980s.50 Referring to this period as the era of the 
“Doctrine of the Security of the State”,51 Gomez explains how the military carried 
out “disappearances” to eliminate subversive elements that sympathised (at least 
allegedly) with the theories of communism. Such a political climate, which 
disregarded the finer traditions of democracy and the rule of law, also contributed 
to massive human rights abuses that were perceived to be the price one paid for 
containing communism.52   
 
The end of the Cold War eradicated past insecurities53 and the region has emerged 
as one that has experienced a “democratic renaissance”.54 According to 
Ambassador Odeen Ishmael of Guyana, Caribbean countries played a crucial role 
in this revival: “The CARICOM nations have a long tradition of representative 
democracy and the respect and protection of human rights, and the fresh ideas 
they brought to the forum of the OAS encouraged this hemispheric body to adjust 
its perspective. Issues relating to democracy in the hemisphere became more 
important, and programs to encourage democratic development such as promoting 
                                                           
49 Maxwell A Cameron “Threats to Democracy in the Americas” (Policy document, Canadian 
Foundation for the Americas, Ottawa, May 2000) <http://www.focal.ca/pdf/threats.pdf> (accessed 
5 Mar 2005). 
50 EL Lutz and K Sikkink “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America” 
(2000) 54 International Organization 633–659.  
51 Veronica Gomez “The Inter American System for the Protection of Human Rights” Human 
Rights Law Centre Newsletter 20 June 1996 1, 
3.<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/hrnews/june96.htm> (accessed 16 Mar 2005). 
52 Connie Peck Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing 
Conflict (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York, 1998) 139. 
53 As Francisco Villagrán de León, Guatemala's former Ambassador to the United Nations and the 
OAS, points out, “The Cold War constrained the role that the OAS and other international 
organizations were able to play in many areas and precluded any effective efforts by the OAS to 
promote democratic development.” The OAS and Democratic Development (United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington, September 1992) 8.   
54 Tom Farer “Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: Introduction and 
Overview” in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996) 7. 
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and supporting programs to reduce poverty and to combat crime became more and 
more significant as the years progressed.”55 The Caribbean influence as a 
phenomenon in itself, apart from the exhaustion of the civil society from endless 
political strife and the changing ethos of world politics, indeed also contributed to 
the transformation. Today, other than Cuba and perhaps Haiti, all countries in the 
Caribbean and also the Americas enjoy some form of democracy although a 
majority of the regimes are classified by analysts as “semi democracies”, “near 
democracies” or “partially illiberal democracies”.56 Diamond also agrees with this 
point of view and concedes that the democratic governance in the Americas is yet 
to be internalized and to achieve a sense of legitimacy within both the elite 
political circles and the people.57  
 
Democratic consolidation is a long and arduous trajectory and the neo-liberal 
economic drive in the Americas have not aided in creating a conducive 
environment for democracy to thrive. In this context the achievements in relation 
to democratic transition within the member states of the OAS are laudable. The 
OAS asserts that one of its essential purposes is “[t]o promote and consolidate 
representative democracy.”58 The OAS, through both the creation of institutions 
and the adoption of several instruments, has created a unique framework to foster 
democratic governance in the region. Not only have the OAS Charter and 
supporting treaties emphasised the significance of democracy, they also reiterate59 
the natural nexus between democracy, human rights and development as 
discussed in the introduction to Chapter 4 of this study. To Spehar, the action of 
the OAS “reflects a long-term commitment to institutional strengthening and to 
the promotion of a democratic political culture in the Americas, which in itself 
                                                           
55 Statement by Ambassador Odeen Ishmael of Guyana in the Permanent Council of the OAS 
During Discussions on the Inter-American Democratic Charter Washington DC, 20 June 2001 
<http://www.guyana.org/Speeches/ishmael_oas062001.html> (accessed 7 Mar 2005). 
56 Guillermo O’Donnell “Delegative Democracy” (1994) 5/1 Journal of Democracy 55–69; 
Freedom House 2003b “Freedom in the World country ratings, 1972 through 2003” available on-
line at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls> (accessed 10 Mar 2005). 
57 Larry Diamond Consolidating Democracy in the Americas (1997) 550 The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 12–41. 
58 Article 2 B - Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of 
Buenos Aires signed on 27 February 1967; by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias  on 5 December 
1985; and by the Protocol of Washington, 14 December 1992; by the Protocol of Managua, 10 
June 1993 <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html> (accessed 10 Mar 2005). 
59 Ibid Article 3. 
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can be considered a form of prevention against future conflicts or ruptures in the 
democratic process in Member States.”60 
 
 
5.4.2 OAS  Mechanisms to enhance democracy   
 
The Unit for Promotion of Democracy (UPD)61 established in 1990 under 
Resolution 1080 is the principal body of the OAS responsible for activities in 
support of democratic consolidation within the member states of the OAS. It 
provides immediate and effective technical support and guidance to strengthen 
democratic institutions and procedures. Over the nearly two decades of its 
existence it has evolved into the fundamental source which the countries in the 
region can rely on to provide an impetus for national peace building and 
reconciliation processes, especially after emerging from often volatile and violent 
autocratic regimes. The UPD is also responsible for the provision of education 
and training and information about democratic practices for the region. It has 
furthermore played a pivotal role in providing modern technology to the countries 
so that they are able to effectively implement electoral processes.62  
 
The Electoral Observation Missions, undertaken by the UPD on behalf of the 
Secretary General of the OAS since 1990, have contributed to the fostering of 
democratic practices in the region. Although elections are not a sufficient 
guarantee of the health of a democracy they are certainly necessary and help to 
create or restore legitimacy and transparency to the process of governance.63  
 
The OAS mission of promoting and consolidating democracy in the region has 
also involved several amendments to the OAS Charter and other resolutions. The 
OAS Charter’s Preamble, which was amended through the Cartagena Protocol of 
1985, is in many ways the prelude to the Organization’s renewed commitment to 
democracy, for the amendment succinctly declared “representative democracy as 
                                                           
60 E Spehar “The Role of the Organization of American States in Conflict Prevention” (2001) 8/1 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 61–70. 
61 <http://www.upd.oas.org/lab/aboutupd.html> (accessed 10 Mar 2005). 
62 Presentation by Elizabeth Spehar, Executive Coordinator of the Unit for the Promotion of 
Democracy, GS/OAS, 18 February 2000 <http://www.summit-
americas.org/CEGCI%20Meetings/18-FEB-00- CEGCI/Presentation> (accessed 5 Mar 2005). 
63 Thomas Carothers “The Observer Observed” [1997] Journal of Democracy 8.  
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an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the 
region”, thereby elevating democracy into a core concern of the organization.64  
 
The commitment to democracy was further enhanced when the OAS General 
Assembly adopted the resolution “The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and 
the Renewal of the Inter-American System” in June 1991, which reiterated the 
member states’ stance on democratic governance and undertook to create 
“efficacious, timely and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and 
defence of democracy”.65 The Santiago Commitment, although devoid of legal 
strength or systematic procedures to implement the commitment to democratic 
governance, was nevertheless significant as it indicated the member states’ 
intolerance [dislike sounds weak]of undemocratic governance. The Santiago 
Commitment also reaffirmed the “inescapable commitment to the defense and 
promotion of representative democracy and human rights ... within the framework 
of respect for the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.” In this 
sense, the Santiago commitment was paradoxical. While it affirmed the members’ 
commitment to the “principle of non intervention” it also laid the foundation of 
the radical idea that a domestic political crisis can justify regional intervention. In 
a region where the notion of sovereignty appeared sacrosanct, such a step 
indicates the level of disenchantment with recurring military governance as well 
as the genuine desire of the member states to establish democracy in the region.66 
In fact, this was the point where Muñoz claims the right to democracy transmuted 
from being a mere “moral prescription” to “an international legal obligation”.67  
 
                                                           
64 Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States "Protocol of 
Cartagena de Indias", O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 66, entered into force 16 November 1988. 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-50.html> (accessed 5 Nov 2007). 
65 <www.oas.org/xxxiiiga/english/docs/agdoc4224_03rev3.pdf> (accessed 5 Nov 2007). 
66 Article 19, chapter 4 of the OAS Charter, “Fundamental Rights and Duties of States,” states 
these guidelines clearly: “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The 
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or 
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural 
elements.” 
67 Heraldo Muñoz “The right to democracy in the Americas” (1998) 40 (translated by Mary 
D’Leon) Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs 1–18.  
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The Santiago Commitment was a declaration and lacked legal force. By contrast, 
the subsequent Resolution on Representative Democracy (Resolution 1080)68 
provided for the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of the 
Permanent Council in the event of any sudden interruption to the democratic 
political institutional process or to the legitimate exercise of power by the 
democratically elected government in any of the Organization’s member states. In 
such an event the permanent Council could be convoked in order, within the 
framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, and to decide on and convene 
an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special session of the 
General Assembly, all of which must take place within ten days.69 Resolution 
1080 has been relied upon on several occasions as a means of responding 
politically to interruptions to democratic governance and has proven to be an 
effective tool to defuse volatile situations as well as instances of “democratic 
backsliding”70 in the region. The Santiago Declaration and Resolution 1080 
created the procedure for swift regional action in situations of democratic 
backsliding in the form of military coups and/or the assumption of power by 
dictators, such as those cases which occurred in Guatemala, Peru, Haiti, and 
Ecuador. This process placed the OAS in the forefront of efforts by international 
organizations to promote democracy in the central and southern American 
region.71  
 
The two documents discussed above initiated the evolution of a new principle of 
the multilateral defence of representative democracy in the region, which 
diminished the significance of the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle 
of non-intervention from intra- regional relationships. The essential spirit of the 
two documents succeeded in creating “a new, automatic procedure to follow for 
organizing an external response to democratic breakdown. Second, they issued a 
                                                           
68 AG/RES.1080(XXI-O/91) Representative Democracy (Resolution adopted at the fifth plenary 
session, held on 5 June, 1991) <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm> (accessed 10 
Mar 2005). 
69 Ibid Article 1. 
70 Munir Squires “Democracy Without Borders Cross-Regional Survey of Multilateral Pro-
Democracy Efforts” Prepared for presentation at the workshop Transnational Dimensions of 
Democratization in the Americas, Mount Allison University, New Brunswick, Canada, 14–26 June 
2005  
<http://www.mta.ca/faculty/socsci/international_relations/workshop/PDFs/_squires.pdf> (accessed 
17 Oct 2006). 
71 Ellen L Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin 
America” (2000) 54 International Organization 633–659.  
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license to the OAS to undertake a wide range of collective activity so long as such 
actions were approved by its member states’ foreign ministers or the General 
Assembly. Finally, they established the principle of rapid response.”72 
 
The drive for democratic consolidation achieved another milestone at the 22nd 
OAS General Assembly in Nassau, Bahamas, in May 1992, where the member 
states resolved to take specific action against the democratic delinquents in the 
region by suspending the governments of member states when a sudden or 
irregular interruption of the institutional democratic process takes place.73  
 
Furthermore, the creation of a new regional norm of democratic governance 
achieved another boost through the adoption of the Managua Declaration for the 
Promotion of Democracy and Development in June 1993.74 This declaration was 
significant in that it not only incorporated the need for democratic governance but 
also reiterated the essential nexus between democracy and broader issues such as 
freedom, social justice, human rights and peace. It also highlighted the need for an 
overall approach to resolve these issues if democratic governance is to succeed in 
the region.  
 
The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) of 200175 was the culmination of 
a long period of effort by the OAS in creating a multilateral response to 
interruptions of democracy in the region. It is significant that democracy was 
regarded as a condition for member states to participate in the proceeding’s 
summit process, which adopted the Democratic Charter.76 The Charter heralded in 
a new era for intra-regional relations as “[t]he normative purpose behind the 
charter centred on the collective right to democracy as opposed to the traditional 
                                                           
72 Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler “The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of 
Collective and National Leadership” (Spring 2001) 43 Latin American Politics and Society 106. 
73 Article 9 “[a] Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has 
been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the 
sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization 
and the Specialised Conferences as well as in the commissions, working groups and any other 
bodies established.” Amendment to the Charter through the Washington Protocol of 1993 which 
came into force in 1997 <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html> (accessed 5 Mar 
2005); see also Francisco Villagrán de León The OAS and Democratic Development (United 
States Institute of Peace, Washington, September, 1992) 10. 
74 [AG/DEC. 4 (XXIII-O/93)] <http://www.upd.oas.org/lab/history.html> (accessed 17 Mar 2005) 
75 http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm (accessed 7 Nov 2007). 
76 Andrew F Cooper “The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex 
Multilateralism” (2004) 5/1 International Studies Perspectives 92–113.  
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defence of sovereignty.”77 Article 1 of the Charter states that “[t]he peoples of the 
Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to 
promote and defend it”,78 thereby promoting democracy as a specific right as well 
as a hemispheric principle.  
 
The IADC is a special document in its genre because it has taken into account the 
political climate of the region and caters specifically to the exigencies that will 
arise during democratic governance, especially the prevention of the emergence of 
new authoritarian practices in the hemisphere. The Charter expanded the notion of 
democratic crisis beyond traditional coup-d’état or military rule to include an 
undefined “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an 
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the 
democratic order in a member state.”79 It created a response mechanism in the 
event of an intended threat to democracy.80 That mechanism can be invoked by a 
member state voluntarily if it deems that there is an imminent threat to democratic 
governance. In the event of a breach of the IADC the Permanent Council can be 
convened at the request of any member state or the Secretary General to undertake 
a collective assessment and appropriate “diplomatic initiatives”.81 The Permanent 
Council is empowered to recommend an immediate meeting of the General 
Assembly, and the General Assembly, with a two thirds majority, can suspend a 
member state for violations of the Charter through an unconstitutional interruption 
to the state’s democratic order .82 From this perspective the IADC contains a 
deterrent against any actions that disrupt democratic order within a state.  
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In many ways the IADC transformed democratic rhetoric into reality in the 
Americas. This is not to say that words themselves, alone, are meaningless. 
Indeed, as Munir Squires says, “[i]t is important to note however that words, even 
without action, play an important role of creating and sustaining norms that have 
an impact on state behaviour.”83 The IADC nevertheless goes the extra mile and 
as such is an action-backed reiteration of members’ commitments to democracy. 
It has proven that doctrines of “[t]erritorial inviolability, nonintervention, and 
self-determination”84 are luxuries that can only be afforded by states with 
democratic governance. The drive for a “collective defence of democracy”85 has 
made delinquent states’ boundaries porous to the regional organization as well as 
bilateral and multilateral intrusions.  
 
The OAS procedures that are in place to defend democracy have been invoked 
several times with varied degrees of success86 and with scepticism from various 
quarters.87 Democratic consolidation in the region has been only partially 
successful, resulting in a situation of “insufficient democracy” whereby even 
seemingly established democratic regimes encounter issues of legitimacy.88 There 
have been accusations made against the OAS that the organization has reacted 
haphazardly in instances of democratic disruptions and moreover that they appear 
satisfied with the “appearance” of democracy “with a nominal return to elections, 
as long as they are more or less defensible as expressions of majority opinion, 
though not fully free and fair by more rigorous standards.”89 Indeed, as has been 
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noted above,90 a majority of the regimes are classified by analysts as semi 
democracies, near democracies or partially illiberal democracies.91 
 
While there has been no automatic democratic transformation within the region, 
the OAS has certainly, through its multilateral effort, contributed to the creation 
of a “principle of collective intervention for democracy” which the member states 
are willing to support.92 In many instances, while the democratisation drive of the 
OAS did not entirely succeed through formal procedures, the informal presence of 
the OAS in the form of facilitators of democratic processes, conveners of mesas 
de diálogo (roundtable discussions), diplomatic missions and threats of economic 
embargos has contributed to avert the immediate political crisis.93 The OAS has, 
in principle, also not rejected options of “economic sanctions, including the 
interruption of aid from multilateral financial institutions” in instances of 
interruptions to democratic governance.94 Such informal multilateral scrutiny and 
action has also proven to be a deterrent against the consolidation of authoritarian 
rule.95
   
 
In the 1980s the OAS embarked on the arduous task of creating an enduring 
democratic norm in a region that was not only predominantly governed by 
assorted authoritarian regimes but also beleaguered with problems of extreme 
poverty, social exclusion, and corruption, and had a disastrous human rights 
record. While it seemed the earlier Declarations on commitments to democracy 
went little beyond rhetoric, they were in reality the catalysts of the democratic 
metamorphosis that subsequently occurred and contributed to the process of 
consensus-building within the region. Although democracy remains shallow, 
troubled and illiberal in much of the Americas, it at least still exists in most 
countries a decade or more after the transitions to it. This in itself is an 
achievement without precedent in hemispheric history. Any multilateral effort 
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takes time to evolve, to create and to fine-tune its capability, structures, modalities 
and priorities, and the democratic initiative of the OAS has proven this. As 
Mendez and Mariezcurrena emphasise “[i]t is a mistake to assume that democracy 
and human rights are in full effect only because elections are generally held. On 
the other hand, it would be an even more serious mistake to overlook the immense 
benefits and opportunities that the new democratic period offers.”96 
 
While some analysts hail the hemisphere as playing an active role in the global 
“third wave” towards democracy, replacing illiberal democracies and 
dictatorships, others remain sceptical about the region’s continued commitment to 
democracy. This scepticism prevails especially in the context of the many 
poverties that the region faces in terms of lack of respect for human rights and 
inequitable spread of economic growth, which in turn fuels social discontentment 
threatening the delicate democratic systems. For instance, Diamond and Jackson 
assert that the fledgling democracies in the region demonstrate a “fragile 
commitment” to the rule of law for there exists a “disturbing undertow” of 
“pervasive corruption and politicisation of justice sector institutions.”97 This 
observation supports the position that the establishing of democracy must take on 
a multidimensional approach that also addresses issues of human rights and 
equitable development. 
 
 
5.4.3 The Human rights protection system under the OAS  
 
The normative framework of the Inter-American system of human rights 
protection stems from two instruments: The American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man98 and the American Convention.99 The structure that is in place 
for the protection of human rights in the Americas consists of the Inter-American 
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Commission on Human Rights100 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
The Inter-American system of human rights protection is claimed to be more 
complex than its European counterpart especially as it is based on two 
complementary instruments.101 
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is the principal 
organ for the protection and promotion of human rights in the Americas.102 
Comprising seven independent experts who are elected to four-year terms by the 
OAS General Assembly, the main function of the IACHR is to entertain and 
scrutinise petitions relating to human rights abuses by member states of the OAS. 
The functions and the powers of the Commission are enshrined in the 
Commission’s Statute and Regulations. Individuals, groups or NGOs who have a 
legal link to a member state (or a state that has formally recognised the 
competence of the Commission) of the OAS can initiate a petition for human 
rights violations. A third party also has the capacity to submit a petition against 
individual violations of human rights with or without the knowledge of the 
victim.103 In each petition the information relating to the individual or individuals 
filing the petition, the issue and the procedural posture of the petition must be 
indicated. The Commission entertains both individual petitions and group 
petitions, and petitions may include several sequences of rights abuse.  
 
Similarly to the European system, the Commission will entertain petitions only if 
all available domestic remedies have been exhausted, access to local judicial fora 
to vindicate the rights abuse has been denied or prevented, or if avoidable delay in 
providing satisfactory remedy, a denial of sufficient legal advice or a legal lacuna 
in domestic legislation hinders due process to protect the rights violated. A 
petition must be filed within six months of exhausting all domestic remedies for 
the right violation.104  
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The Commission is empowered to entertain an oral hearing if it is deemed 
necessary and also to carry out in loco investigations in the country in question.105 
The Commission will carry out in loco investigations for allegations of 
widespread human rights violations within a country, and then investigate the 
individual cases in the course of a wider investigation. After concluding a 
decision on a petition the Commission issues a judgment, including 
recommendations to be adopted by the state concerned. If the state concerned is 
party to the American Convention, the Commission must attempt to formulate a 
“friendly settlement” as far as possible.106 The Commission, following this 
outcome, drafts a report for each party and for the OAS Secretary General.  
 
If a friendly settlement has not been achieved the Commission prepares a report 
with the facts of the case and the Commission's conclusions, recommendations 
and proposals. There is a period of three months within which the Commission 
and the state determine whether or not to submit the case to the Court of Human 
Rights or to negotiate a settlement. If the state is a party to the American 
Convention and has accepted the Court's optional jurisdiction, the Commission or 
the state has the capacity to refer the petition to the Court of Human Rights for a 
new evaluation which will result in a judgment that is binding on the state party.  
 
If a state is not a party to the Convention it will be beyond the purview of the 
friendly settlement clause. Therefore, the Commission will conclude examining 
the petition, determine the merits and adopt a final decision with 
recommendations and deadlines. The Commission may recommend compensation 
to the victims, but does not have the power to officially award such compensation. 
The decisions of the Committee are not legally binding. 
 
The Commission also has the capacity to investigate on its own initiative and to 
issue a report on the human rights situation in any OAS member state. The 
investigations of the Commission can be founded on independent research from 
reports from NGOs and individuals. The Commission also submits an annual 
report to the OAS General Assembly, with information on resolutions of 
particular cases, reports on human rights situations in various states, and 
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discussions of areas needing further action to promote and protect human rights. 
With a history of military dictatorships, violent suppression of political 
opposition, terrorism and incidents of gross human rights abuses in the region, the 
Commission’s capacity to investigate has been valuable in ameliorating the state 
of regional human rights situation. The power to undertake on-site visits have 
been critical to the reporting of gross human rights abuses by OAS countries.   
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which is a part of the 
American Convention, may hear cases only where the state involved has ratified 
the American Convention on Human Rights and has accepted the Court’s optional 
jurisdiction.107 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights first completes 
its investigation on a particular case and it is then referred to the Court by either 
the Commission or the state involved in the case within three months of the 
release of the Commission’s report. The Court lacks the capacity to entertain 
individual petitions independently without the cognizance of the Commission.  
 
Proceedings of the Court can be both written and oral. If there are complex legal 
issues involved, petitioners can request a supporting amicus curiae brief from an 
NGO. The Court’s deliberations are held in secret and are confidential; its 
judgments and opinions are published. If the Court determines that a right has 
been violated, it will order appropriate remedies. It may award compensation to 
the victim for actual damage, emotional harm and/or litigation costs, but it does 
not award punitive damages. 
The protection of human rights in the Americas has been a difficult task especially 
in the context of the political situations108 of the member countries where the 
abuse of political and civil rights were part and parcel of the process of 
safeguarding “national security”.109  
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The move towards economic liberalisation through Structural Adjustment Policies 
has also contributed to the deterioration of human rights standards in the region. 
Edwards, observing the complexity of the situation, writes that: 110 
 
[a] comprehensive view of the reasons behind the human rights explosion 
is difficult to gain, because the activity is new and growing. But one can 
point to four factors. First, Latin America has suffered major social 
breakdowns. These breakdowns greatly increase the incidence of human 
rights violations. Human rights advocates criticise governments for 
indiscriminate repression, torture, and denial of habeas corpus. They also 
oppose governments for not promoting wide participation of ordinary 
citizens in the countries’ political life. The socioeconomic woes of the 
classes at the bottom have meant, as Latin Americans were saying, that 
many poor went from being marginalised to being excluded. 
 
The situation was further complicated by a weak and often corrupt judiciary in 
most of the countries, which was not willing or able to do much to ameliorate the 
situation of human rights. The regional human rights mechanism played a 
fundamental role in critiquing poor governance and highlighting incidents of 
human rights violations in the region.111  
 
The Commission’s work essentially centres on addressing issues of endemic 
violations of the human rights norms, which have been exacerbated by the non-
existent or impotent domestic mechanisms available to deal with such violations. 
According to Medina, during the initial years of its existence: 112 
 
[t]he main objective of the Commission was not to investigate isolated 
violations but to document the existence of these gross, systematic 
violations and to exercise pressure to improve the general condition of 
human rights in the country concerned. For this purpose, and by means of 
its regulatory powers, the Commission created a procedure to ‘take 
cognizance’ of individual complaints and use them as a source of 
information about gross, systematic violations of human rights in the 
territories of the OAS member states. 
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The Commission systematically reported that the commonest violations of human 
rights in member countries were forced disappearances and torture.113 While the 
reports appeared to have had no immediate impact, the recording and publication 
of the reports over the years has led to an increasing international awareness of 
the situation. The natural corollary of that international awareness is international 
condemnation, which has helped to eradicate the culture of violence within 
member states.114 This has been a vital part of the Commission’s work and it has 
contributed to the general rising of human rights standards in the region. 
According to Donnelly, the “Inter American Commission has aggressively 
exploited its powers, to at least some effect in a number of countries”115 to 
achieve an amelioration of human rights in the region.  
 
In a region where inequality and poverty are high and “where many governments 
are not consistently successful at meeting the basic needs of the majority for food, 
shelter, employment, medical care, education, and physical security from private 
and official villains,”116 there appears little significance accorded to economic, 
social and cultural rights in the hemispheric rights protection system. This is 
despite the vehement assertion of an Additional Protocol that: 117 
 
[c]onsidering the close relationship that exists between economic, social 
and cultural rights, and civil and political rights, in that the different 
categories of rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the 
recognition of the dignity of the human person, for which reason both 
require permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully realised, 
and the violation of some rights in favour of the realization of others can 
never be justified. 
 
The OAS Charter and the two main documents on human rights in the American 
system — the Declaration and the Convention — acknowledge the existence of 
economic, social and cultural rights.118 The American system, following the 
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hierarchical presentation of the early universal model of human rights, does not 
accord justiciability to social, economic or social rights, but maintains that they 
are to be achieved progressively.119  
 
The “Additional Protocol To The American Convention On Human Rights In The 
Area of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights” (Protocol of San Salvador) of 
1988, which was intended to enhance the means of protection of ESC rights, seeks 
to do so through the submission of periodic reports to the IACHR.120  The 
exception is trade union rights and the right to education: where these are violated 
by action directly attributable to a state party, the Protocol makes them justiciable 
through an individual petition to the IACHR. 
 
The segregation of rights into those that are “justiciable” and those that must be 
“progressively achieved” in the Inter-American system is a huge drawback for a 
region that is beset with economic deprivation. Little effort has gone into 
changing the status quo, and Mendez and Mariezcurrena assert, “[t]o date, the 
division of rights into different categories, and the paradigm of the progressive 
development of rights, have served only one purpose: to provide those States that 
do not fulfil their obligations with a means of justifying their position.”121 
 
All in all the chief flaw of the OAS human rights structure is the opportunity for 
non-compliance with the human rights mechanism. Unless the OAS member 
states have specifically ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 
and have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, they will remain beyond its 
jurisdiction and will have obligations only under the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man. Even where states have ratified the Convention and 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has no authority to compel 
the states to abide by its decisions. The only recourse available to the Court is to 
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report the delinquency to the OAS General Assembly. This is quite different from 
its European counterpart, the ECHR, which makes both democratic governance 
and the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights preconditions 
for the membership of the Council of Europe.  
5.5 AFRICA: from the worst Starting conditions to assertively 
autochthonous rights and radical potential  
 
5.5.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights122  
 
The African continent has grappled with myriad socioeconomic and political 
issues such as illiberal governance and lackadaisical and muted development both 
in the economic and social spheres. It is a region that was combating colonialism 
until two decades ago and still struggles to distance itself from the legacies of 
colonialism which linger in the form of an ideological reliance on the West.123  
 
The creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was in many ways an 
initiative to let go of Africa’s colonial past, particularly the inhibitions and the 
insecurities that were part of that colonial legacy, and to create a common agenda 
for African development. At the inception of the OAU now replaced by the 
African Union (AU),124 human rights were not included in its list of priorities 
although the Charter did make overt reference to the Universal Declaration in 
relation to its aim of extending international co-operation.125 The OAU focussed 
its attention on colonialism and issues of racial domination, particularly in relation 
to the apartheid regime of South Africa. However, as Mathews observes, “the 
OAU Charter, for instance, does not contain any provision for the protection of 
the rights of the African masses….. it appears to be an institution of the African 
heads of states, by the heads of states for the heads of states”.126 The 
Organization’s own document on human rights — The African Charter of Human 
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and Peoples’ Rights (“the African Charter”) — was created fully two decades 
later and came into force in 1986.127 Today all of the AU’s 53 member states have 
ratified the African Charter and it is one of the most widely accepted regional 
conventions on human rights.128  
 
The uniqueness of the African mechanism for human rights protection lies in the 
normative content of the Charter, which ventures beyond the traditional first and 
second generational rights as represented in the universal model.129 The inclusion 
of social, economic and cultural rights in the Charter at inception rather than as an 
after-thought stemmed from the conviction that the Charter of Rights had to be 
located “in our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa.”130 Through the 
inclusion of social and economic rights the Charter highlights the economic and 
developmental inadequacies of the African subcontinent and seeks to establish 
mechanisms of resolving the issues from a rights perspective as well. 
 
Drawing inspiration from the African culture and way of life, the African Charter 
also accords a place to what is now classified as group rights. A further attempt at 
cultural location of the African Charter is the inclusion of the duties of the 
individual towards others (both groups and individuals). Zeleza, commenting on 
the efficacy of the inclusion of the third generation of rights into the African 
Convention, says: 131 
 
neither the North nor the South, the developed nor the developing worlds 
can claim to be on the side of angels where human rights are concerned. 
Yet, ethnocentrism continues in human rights discourse about 
conceptualisation, constitution and contextualisation of human rights. A 
more holistic global regime of human rights would have to encompass all 
the so-called three generations of [rights]. The growing list of rights [is] 
itself a reflection of [the] emergence of an increasingly universal human 
rights regime as more and more societies and social constituencies, 
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hitherto excluded from human rights claims, make their demands for 
inclusion. 
 
In fact, the outright rejection of the dominant paradigm of human rights is a 
significant normative feature of the African model that sets it apart from its 
counterparts in Europe and the Americas.132 The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights attempts to harness the potential of the “relativism” debate within 
human rights to highlight issues of socioeconomic development such as poverty 
and self-sufficiency in a human rights context. Agbakwa rationalises the departure 
of the African Charter from the conventional paradigm and justifies it in terms of 
the African social, cultural and economic exigencies:133   
 
Unless there is a committed rejection of the dominant Western paradigm 
that has historically viewed civil and political rights as the rights that are 
most worthy of enforcement, substantial progress towards the enforcement 
of ESCR in Africa may continue to elude African states. The West may be 
able to maintain such a model, because its attainment of an appreciable 
standard of living provides an environment that enables the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights. African states do not enjoy this luxury. They 
cannot afford this model without facing widespread civil and social strife. 
Already, by adopting a charter that departs markedly from the European 
Convention and Inter-American Convention, African states demonstrated 
an understanding of the inadequacies of the two systems for their 
purposes. A rejection of the Western model, therefore, merely requires a 
practical commitment to the noble intentions expressed in the African 
Charter.  
 
However, the content of the substantive rights has not been matched by an 
effective implementing mechanism, for many agree that, “[a]lthough the African 
Charter makes a significant contribution to the human rights corpus, it creates an 
ineffectual enforcement system.”134 
 
 
5.5.2 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights  
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The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, whose establishment 
was contemplated by Article 30 of the Charter, is the principal organ of the 
African human rights system, which will soon be relegated into a secondary role 
with the establishment of the Court in mid-2007.135 The Commission was 
established in July 1987, less than one year after the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights came into force.136 It is mandated with the broad goals of 
“promoting human and peoples’ rights, protecting human and peoples’ rights and 
interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”137 Article 45 of 
the Charter stipulates the specific functions of the Commission to be the 
following: to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African 
problems in the field of human and peoples’ rights, organise seminars, symposia 
and conferences, disseminate information, and encourage national and local 
institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights.  
 
The African Commission appears to have taken its role as the promoter and 
educator of African human rights seriously and has held ordinary sessions 
regularly in a number of countries around the continent. The regular sessions and 
its work relating to education about human rights have contributed considerably to 
the Commission’s “growing credibility”138 in terms of its promotional functions. 
However, the previous rather questionable individual backgrounds of the 
Commissioners, their relationships to the respective governments, the lack of 
professional expertise such as adequate Special Rapporteurs, and financial 
constrictions have all compromised the effective working of the Commission.139   
 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is also deemed to be a 
quasi-judicial body that resembles the UN Human Rights Committee with what 
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has been termed an “ambiguous”140 protective function. It is entrusted with the 
role of providing “protection of human and peoples’ rights under conditions laid 
down by the present Charter.”141 The Commission also examines the reports that 
are submitted by the state parties every two years, it considers communications 
regarding violations of the Charter, and it expounds the Charter at the request of a 
state party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organisation recognised by 
the OAU.142 The meagreness of the enforcement procedure accorded to the 
Commission can be excused as a reflection of the insecure political climate in the 
continent at the time of creating the Charter. At the point of adoption only three 
countries in the region could be classified as having governing structures that 
respected the rule of law.143  
 
Article 62 of the Charter requires the member states to submit periodic reports to 
the Commission on the “legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving 
effect to the rights and freedoms” within national jurisdictions. However, in the 
absence of further guidelines on the reporting system set out in the Charter,144 and 
with a characteristic lack of imagination and innovation by the Commission itself, 
the Commission simply borrowed its guidelines from other systems. The lack of 
interest in the actual reports made by the Commission and the state parties has 
reduced it to a hollow process with no consequence.145 With a more robust 
Commission the reporting system could have evolved into a valuable exercise 
where the Commission played an active role in the formulation of national rights 
protection schemes that were being created in the emerging democracies in the 
continent. However, the member states do not seem to take seriously the 
responsibility of submitting reports to the Commission. Many fail to submit 
entirely and although a few do submit, sporadically, the Commission does not 
provide comprehensive analysis in these cases of the reported success of the 
efforts to enhance the rights regime within the national jurisdiction. In this 
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respect, “[w]hether the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights will 
be perceived as an effective institution for the protection of human rights in Africa 
will largely depend on how far and how much the state parties to the African 
Charter take seriously, and respect, the Commission’s views and 
recommendations. So far, they have not.”146[emphasis in original]  
 
Although the Commission lacks the capacity to condemn states legally for human 
rights violations, or to compel them to make reparations, the Convention allows 
the Commission to consider complaints termed “communications” filed by 
individual victims as well as NGOs and state parties.147 This power has not been 
effectively utilised by the Commission to promote its quasi judicial role. The 
Commission in the past has made uninspiring evaluations of the rights violations 
and conveyed its findings to the African Union Assembly,148 which in practice has 
resulted in their gaining little publicity.149 The Assembly in turn has no capacity 
to act on the findings although it has the right of publication.150 Therefore, despite 
an elaborate catalogue of rights, the rights are meaningless in the context of the 
African Convention for they offer no real redress nor do they contribute to the 
creation of better national legal systems that would seek to protect rights in the 
future as in the case of the European system.151  
 
With respect to specific functions and to its performance in general, the African 
Commission has therefore been a disappointment. Critically evaluating the 
Commission’s performance, Mutua says that the “[h]opes by observers of the 
African Commission that its commissioners would robustly construe the Charter's 
powers to alleviate its weaknesses have largely gone unrealised.”152 In the role of 
a catalyst to protect, enhance and vindicate the rights enshrined in the Charter, the 
Commission has, according to this school of thought, been an abysmal failure. 
This can be partly attributed to the inherently impotent quasi-judicial role created 
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for it through the Charter; in other words, the Commission should never have 
been placed in this position where it needed to construe the Charter in a robust, or 
even an activist, way simply to overcome a handicap from birth. Under these 
circumstances, even a charitable assessment is that the Commission has so far 
“only been able to make a modest contribution to the protection of the rights 
enshrined in the Charter.”153  
 
There is, nonetheless, a school of thought that is more charitable and optimistic. 
According to this school, the poor articulation and the inadequacy of the 
contributions of the Commission can perhaps be forgiven as being symptomatic of 
an evolving regime. Certainly, Odinkalu and Christensen appeared to be more 
sympathetic to, and hopeful regarding, the Commission when they observed of the 
non-state communications jurisdiction that “the decisions of the Commission have 
been both more substantive and elaborate on the issues of law and fact that are 
raised in and considered by communications. This is a welcome development that 
now enables the Commission to contribute meaningfully to the creation of an 
international human rights jurisprudence that authoritatively reflects the 
experience of Africa. In addition, the judiciary and other national institutions for 
the protection of human rights, as well as NGOs in African states, can now 
increasingly look to the Commission for guidance in the interpretation and 
implementation of nationally-applicable human rights norms.”154 
 
5.5.3  African Court of Human Rights: A Late but Potentially Radical 
Addition 
 
Perhaps consonant with this sympathetic view of an evolving regime, the impetus 
for the creation of a more efficient mechanism to adjudicate human rights 
violations in the region is a reflection of the amelioration of the region’s political 
climate. The late inclusion of the Court into the African human rights system has 
been attributed to several causes. Among these are the political instability of the 
region emanating from the colonial period,155 the power relations of the Cold War 
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and the volatile national political systems, all of which augured badly for a 
systematic evolution of a human rights regime in the continent. Africa was 
inundated with enormous social, economic and political problems at the time of 
the creation of the African Human Rights system and, as has been mentioned, 
very few countries in Africa had functional democracies that respected the rule of 
law, let alone human rights. In this context the elaborate trappings of a formal 
court of human rights may have appeared ill-timed to the drafters of the African 
Charter. In many respects the African Charter was initially an affirmation and an 
acknowledgement of the general human rights culture rather than an attempt at 
formalizing a regional enforcement and compliance control mechanism. However, 
to Kunig, “[t]he real objection to a human rights court was much more practical in 
nature: in the early 1980s Africa’s leaders were simply still not willing to subject 
themselves to a supranational court.”156  
 
As the democratic governing culture of Africa has improved over the last decade 
or so, the inadequacy of the Human Rights Commission’s mandate and its limited 
sphere of operation have become the subject of discussion amongst activists157 as 
well as in the African regional fora.158 The idea of the creation of a Court to 
complement the Charter became increasingly attractive when “[i]t had become 
clear by the mid-1990s … that the African system was a disappointment, if not an 
embarrassment for the continent,”159 and that the Commission was incapable of 
catering to the growing exigencies of human rights in the region. It is against this 
background that in 1994, under the direction of the OAU Heads of State 
Assembly, a panel of experts was summoned to devise methods in collaboration 
with the African Commission “to enhance the efficiency of the Commission in 
considering particularly the establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.”160 The Court was thus a result of external agitation as much as a 
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process of self-realization. In terms of creating the Protocol, the Court now has 
enormous potential and in many areas it has included innovative features that are 
absent in both the European and the Inter-American systems.161  
 
The creation of the African Court of Human Rights as a result of the subsequent 
Protocol to the Rights Convention expanded the avenues available for the 
resolution of human and peoples’ rights considerably. The Court technically 
became operational in January 2004 and with this development the Commission is 
vested with the responsibility of the preparation of cases for submission to the 
Court's jurisdiction. In the African context a formal adjudicatory forum in the 
form of a court was very much a response to the needs and the expansion of 
capacity of the region to accommodate a judicial body dealing with human rights 
issues. This contrasts with the European and the Inter-American systems of 
human rights, where the judicial branch of the implementation mechanism was an 
integral component of the regime’s operations from the outset.  
 
The Protocol does not define the exact relationship between the Court and the 
Commission, although Article 2 of the Protocol stipulates that the Court should 
“complement the protective mandate of the African Commission”. This “notion of 
complementarity, prescribed by the Protocol, would seem to require a prior 
Commission procedure. Vague as it may be, the notion of complementarity does 
make it clear that the Commission will continue to play an important role in the 
future African human rights protection system.”162 Still in an embryonic stage, the 
Court and the Commission’s relationship is yet to be established. 
 
In normative terms the jurisdiction of the African Court reaches beyond both the 
European and the Inter-American human rights system. Through a ground-
breaking initiative, the Protocol to the African Court stipulates that it has the 
capacity to entertain actions that are brought to its cognizance on the basis of any 
instruments, including international human rights treaties, which have been 
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ratified by the state party in question.163 The Protocol also proclaims that the 
Court can take into consideration such instruments as a source of law.164   
 
Thus in theoretical terms the Protocol of the African Court has mandated that all 
human rights instruments created under the aegis of the United Nations and other 
relevant legal instruments codifying human rights, such as treaties dealing with 
issues of humanitarian law and treaties adopted through the ILO, are justiciable in 
the African Court provided that the state in question has ratified those 
instruments. Therefore, in theory at least, the African human rights system 
provides a forum for dispute resolution and implementation of several 
international treaties relating to human rights law, which the individual treaty 
itself may not have envisaged. However, some argue that Article 3(1) of the 
Protocol refers only to other relevant human rights instruments. According to 
Heyns, only treaties that explicitly confer jurisdiction on the Court would or 
should be perceived to come within the ambit of Article 3(1).165 A broader 
interpretation would result in infringing upon the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory 
institutions created by other treaties, leading to inconsistent interpretations and 
undermining the effectiveness of those treaty regimes. Further, Heynes asserts 
that African states would prefer a restrictive interpretation of Article 3(1), for the 
states may have ratified other human rights treaties with the knowledge that the 
rights guaranteed under them were not enforceable in a court of law.166 
 
The contentious jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked by the Commission, a 
state party that has brought a complaint before the Commission, a state party 
whose citizen is a victim of a violation, or an African intergovernmental 
organization.167 In fact, the African Commission, state parties, and African 
intergovernmental organizations enjoy unfettered or “automatic” access to the 
Court once a state ratifies the Protocol. 
 
An individual’s capacity to invoke the jurisdiction is severely restricted by the 
stipulation that such a complaint can be made by an individual (or an NGO) only 
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if, at the point of ratification of the Protocol or thereafter, the state under scrutiny 
has made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to hear such 
cases.168 This position was reached when it was made clear at the drafting stages 
of the Protocol that states were not eager to be in a position where their human 
rights record was challenged by individuals or NGOs. This limitation is certainly 
an anomaly considering the other innovative features of the Protocol. If individual 
petitions were allowed without this barrier it would contribute significantly to the 
advancement of international procedural law. 
 
However, after a state has made a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction in 
cases brought by individuals and NGOs, individuals and NGOs do not have to 
show any other particular interest. “More specifically, unlike the European 
Convention (Article 34), the Protocol does not require individuals to show that 
they themselves are victims of a human rights violation.”169  However, according 
to Anne Pieter Van Der Mei, “[t]his compromise may have been necessary to get 
enough states on board, but it is, especially from the perspective of ‘recourse to 
judicial process on command’, a disappointment.”170 So far only Burkina Faso has 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction relating to individual and NGO petitions despite 
the fact that 24 African states have ratified the Protocol.171 Though Pieter Van Der 
Mei has lamented that “[m]ore than 40 years after ‘Lagos’ it thus appears that 
African states are still not willing to subject themselves to a court that is 
accessible to victims of human rights violations,”172 it is indicative of the extent of 
the sense of insecurity that the African states harbour even after many of the states 
have emerged from dictatorships and undemocratic systems of governance and 
implemented democratic rule. In fact, such conservatism reiterates that in the 
African system the concerns of the states still outweigh the interests of the 
people.173  
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The evolving stakeholders of the human rights discourse are also acknowledged 
by the Protocol to the African Charter, as it enables the NGOs with consultative 
status with the AU to seek advisory opinions by the Court. This measure is an 
affirmation of the valuable role that NGOs perform in the region through their 
activism relating to the promotion and education of human rights throughout 
Africa, as much as the NGO contribution to the formulating of the Protocol that 
created the Court. According to Pieter Van Der Mei, “[i]ndeed, it is no 
exaggeration to state that the Protocol is above all the product of the NGOs’ 
work.”174 
 
The Protocol provides that the Court’s judgment will be final and without 
appeal175 and that the states will be bound by its judgments.176 In its annual report 
to the AU, the Court can list the states that are in violation and those that have not 
complied with the Court’s judgments.177 The AU Council of Ministers is entrusted 
with the duty of monitoring the execution of the judgments.  
 
Another issue of contention regarding the effectiveness of the mechanism 
provided by the Charter is the “clawback” clauses that pervade the African 
Charter and allow the states to restrict basic human rights to the maximum extent 
allowed by domestic law.178 Such clauses are especially regressive considering the 
immature legal systems that prevail, as a colonial legacy, in many African states, 
which do little to enhance human rights in the domestic sphere. Many states still 
cherish the draconian laws that curtail freedom of expression, association and 
assembly, movement, and conscience. The “clawback” provision of the Charter, 
which was perhaps included as an inducement for wider participation in the 
regime, in fact does little to ameliorate national human rights conditions. 
However, these provisions are of only academic relevance at this stage as the 
Court is yet to be fully functional. 
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The African human rights regime with all its imperfections is a remarkable 
achievement. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was formulated 
at a time when illiberalism was the norm rather than the exception in African 
governance. It was no exaggeration to describe the then political climate and 
rulers as follows:179  
 
As dictators in single-party or military states — and in some cases of both hues 
— hardly any of the African leaders who participated in the negotiation and 
adoption of the Charter in Nairobi in 1981 could claim a democratic mandate. 
With a few exceptions such as the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and former 
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who did not enrich themselves through 
high political office, most of these rulers were also widely suspected of 
impoverishing their own peoples through a combination of wrong-headed 
policies and brazen corruption at a time when the priority of the leadership of the 
continent was not the protection of the individual but the preservation of their 
own personal power and influence in the territories inherited from the then 
recently departed metropolitan colonial powers.  
 
The global context in which Africa operates has changed significantly since the 
1980s.180 The rule of law, good governance, transparency and respect for human 
rights are pre-conditions to maintaining good relations with international 
organizations and other states. The cultivation and maintenance of relations is 
essential to the existence and the development of Africa. It is in this context that 
the African states have been eager to establish more pluralistic political systems 
and to hold free elections. In such a political climate violations of democracy are 
swiftly challenged by national and international media and civil society 
organizations that have become more competent and confident in scrutinizing 
violations of rights and liberties.  
 
Most countries in the continent have some sort of democratic governance in place 
and the natural corollary of democracy is the increased accountability for rights 
abuses. The proliferation of Truth Commissions181 and the increase of human 
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rights mechanisms in the domestic constitutional systems are examples of this 
trend.  The unfolding scenario is similar to the wave of decolonization processes: 
182  
 
There is already a “Second War of Liberation” in Africa, an “explosion of anger 
against the abuse of power, violations of human rights, economic failure, and 
hardship, and a deep longing for peace and order.” There is an optimism now 
pervading the continent, similar to that at the wave of independence in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. The change, of course, will not occur suddenly, because 
the rot is deep and continuous. It will come gradually.   
 
The change from the OAU to the AU, the adoption of the Protocol to the Human 
Rights Convention, the democracy clauses in the NEPAD framework, the 
Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair 
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa adopted by the African Commission in 2003 
are all indications of that trend towards sociopolitical transformation, which is 
both widespread and sustained. There is a need for yet greater expansion of the 
rights regime as well as more creative ways of interpreting the existing rights of 
the Charter.  
 
 
5.6 THE (BRITISH) COMMONWEALTH: going beyond regionalism by 
redeeming a unique shared heritage 
 
The Commonwealth, which is an association of states that were part of the British 
commonwealth of which India, Maldives, Bangladesh, Pakistan (with 
qualifications discussed below) and Sri Lanka are members as a result of their 
common colonial history. The member sates of the Commonwealth co-orperates 
on issues of common interest and work towards the “promotion of world peace” 
and “international understanding”.183 Operating without a formal constituting 
Charter the principles, objectives and the scope of the Commonwealth is 
enshrined in several Declarations and Statements issued at the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meetings. Stemming from the 1971 Singapore Declaration 
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the Commonwealth has commenced an ambitious project of creating a rule- based 
regime to foster and maintain democracy and good governance within its member 
states.184 The 1971 Declaration on Commonwealth Principles states that the 
Commonwealth believes in the “inalienable right to participate by means of free 
and democratic political processes in framing the society in which they live. We 
therefore strive to promote in each of our countries those representative 
institutions and guarantees for personal freedom under the law that are our 
common heritage.”185 The Singapore Declaration laid the foundation for the 
creation of a norm of good governance and democracy within the member states. 
 
Two decades later the Harare Declaration186 was a significant step in the new role 
that the Commonwealth had acquired for itself, for in 1991 the Heads of 
Government Meeting in Zimbabwe commenced the “global norm creating” 
mission of the Commonwealth. The Harare Declaration reasserted the 
“fundamental political values of the Commonwealth to be: democracy, 
democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the 
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government,”187 
and further stated that the Commonwealth was willing to collaborate with NGOs 
and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association for the promotion of these 
values. 
 
As Alison Duxbury188 elaborates, “standard-setting, supervision and the 
enforcement of values” are all significant elements of an international 
organization and the Harare Declaration was one such significant exercise of 
standard-setting for the Secretary-General, Emeka Anyaoku, addressing CHOGM, 
described the Harare Declaration to be a “our guiding compass”189 which implied 
that the Declaration was not intended to create binding legal obligations on 
democracy or good governance. Duxbury also appears to agree with this position 
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in that the Harare Declaration was essentially a recapitulation of generally 
accepted principles of state conduct rather than a creation of a series of legally 
binding obligations.190 However, Srinivasan appears to perceive the Harare 
Declaration as a prelude to the evolution of a rule-based regime for democracy 
monitoring throughout the Commonwealth.191 
  
The character of the Harare Declaration changed with the adoption of the 
Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration 1995.192 
The Millbrook Action Programme laid the foundation for the evolution of a 
normative commitment to democratic governance through the Harare Declaration, 
for it was decided that if a government is perceived to be clearly in violation of 
the Harare Declaration by an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically 
elected government, action “should be taken to express the collective concern of 
Commonwealth countries and to encourage the restoration of democracy within a 
reasonable time frame.”193  
 
The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), created pursuant to the 
Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme in 1995, established the 
institutional mechanisms to deal with interruptions to democracy within member 
states. The CMAG assesses the nature of the violation and formulates a collective 
action to restore democracy and the rule of law. The CMAG is also empowered to 
take certain punitive action in the form of bilateral and multilateral sanctions by 
all member states ranging from restrictions on governmental contacts and trade, 
and if the errant member persists in violating the Declaration the ultimate result is 
the suspension and expulsion of a member state from the Association.194 A 
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finally suspension of participation at all Commonwealth meetings and of Commonwealth technical 
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significant feature of the Commonwealth mechanism for democracy monitoring is 
that the Commonwealth Secretary General is empowered to alert the CMAG on 
his/her own initiative or at the request of a member of government on any 
disruptions to democratic governance within a member state.195 As Cghau 
observes, “the CMAG was a protection mechanism set up for the Commonwealth 
to monitor member states’ compliance with the organization’s principles, and this 
transformed the Commonwealth into a rules-bound institution,”196 a quality that 
was not a part of the Commonwealth before. “This “democracy watchdog”, 
empowered to suspend member countries when they are in breach of fundamental 
Commonwealth principles, has given a great deal of influence and moral authority 
to the organization globally. On its 10th anniversary CMAG is still the only 
international mechanism of its kind.”197 
 
The Commonwealth Democracy clause was soon put into action in 1995 when the 
Commonwealth reacted strongly against Sani Abacha’s regime in Nigeria,198 
issuing sanctions and then suspending its membership for executing political 
dissidents. It was considered that the severity of the actions against Nigeria by the 
Commonwealth prompted a positive response from the undemocratic regime. The 
democracy watchdog CMAG has since brought The Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Zimbabwe, and Solomon Islands under its scrutiny for the violation of democratic 
principles under the Harare Declaration. This definitive and often punitive action 
for the violation of democratic principles “marked a major transformation from 
the former, rather easy-going, permissive, fudging Commonwealth towards a 
more rules- or norms-based Commonwealth.”199  
 
The CMAG enforcement mechanism was activated by the Commonwealth against 
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Fiji in 2000,200 when its membership was suspended and economic sanctions 
imposed after the coup. Fiji’s membership was restored in December 2001 
pursuant to the elections in 2001 where the Commonwealth Elections Observer 
Team declared that the elections in general were free and fair and George Speight 
was arrested for treason. However the 2006 coup-d’état saw Fiji being suspended 
from the Commonwealth once again.201 
  
Ironically, the spirit of the Harare Declaration does not seem to have an effect on 
President Mugabe’s authoritarian regime with which the Commonwealth has been 
waging a battle on behalf of democracy and the rule of law.202 The authoritarian 
rule of Mugabe during the elections of 2002 was vehemently criticized by the 
Commonwealth Observer Team and Parliamentary Forum of the Southern African 
Development Community for creating “a climate of violence and fear that had 
impeded Zimbabweans in the exercise of their democratic rights.”203 The 
Commonwealth Association reacted to the breach of the Harare Declaration with 
a gamut of offensives, which included the suspension of Mugabe from Council 
meetings despite the opposition by both South Africa and Nigeria. The 
Commonwealth’s suspension and the subsequent deliberations at CHOGM 2003 
regarding Zimbabwe’s political climate resulted in Mugabe withdrawing from the 
Commonwealth in 2003.204 The current political situation in Zimbabwe persuades 
one that the Commonwealth’s efforts in restoring democracy to the country have 
not been successful. 
 
Pakistan, despite its close affinity for constitutional governance which it regards 
as a legacy of British colonial rule, has had numerous encounters with military 
governance,205 the latest being the overthrow of the democratically elected 
government of Nawaz Sharif in a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in 
1999. In an era where authoritarianism and military governance is looked upon 
with disdain, paradoxically in May 2000 the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld 
                                                           
200 R Robertson and W Sutherland Government by the Gun: the unfinished business of Fiji’s 2000 
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Musharraf’s coup as “legitimate under ‘the doctrine of state necessity’ provided 
that elections were held within three years of the takeover.”206 As Pakistan was in 
clear violation of the democracy principles promoted by the Commonwealth, the 
CMAG suspended Pakistan from the Councils of the Commonwealth in October 
1999. However, the ensuing global political developments in the wake of the 
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA and a promise from Pakistan to 
return to civilian rule within three years resulted in the lifting of the suspension of 
Pakistan in May 2004. The continued political crisis in Pakistan emanating from 
the military rule of Pervez Musharraf troubled the Commonwealth Organization 
that issued an ultimatum to restore the suspended Pakistani Constitution and 
suspend the emergency rule on the 12 November 2007. Non-compliance with 
these terms resulted in the suspension of Pakistan from the Commonwealth 
Organization on 22 November 2007.207 
 
Within the last decade the Commonwealth has distanced itself from its previous 
“political culture” of not mentioning “the internal problems of and disputes 
between other member countries.”208 The new impetus to promote democracy and 
good governance is perceived by some analysts rather cynically as a means of 
creating a raison d’être for its own survival. Evaluating the disappearing political 
significance of the Commonwealth, Akinrinade observes that “[t]he continued 
existence of any institution has to be for a purpose. If the Commonwealth is to 
continue to function it has to be relevant in terms of meeting the needs of its 
members. Indeed, a test of the relevance of any institution, be it political, 
economic, social or whatever, is the extent to which it addresses the problems of 
its members.”209 
 
The transformation also reflects the concerns of Commonwealth leaders regarding 
the Association’s political standing, its role and significance within member states 
and its general international profile. The emergence of the Association as a 
watchdog of democracy fulfils a lacuna in the global arena that was present since 
the conclusion of the Cold War. The decline of the sovereignty of nation-states 
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and the increasing involvement of international organizations has been justified as 
a corollary to economic globalization and integration into global markets and not 
so much in terms of democracy and the rule of law. The democracy standard 
setting and evaluation machinery in the form of the CMAG, as McIntyre 
elaborates, is “a demonstration that the Commonwealth aspires to having some 
teeth”210 to deal with problems within its own membership.  
 
From the perspective of South Asia, where the rhetoric of constitutional 
governance is ingrained into the sociopolitical fabric of society, the standard 
setting mechanism of the Commonwealth does serve an invaluable function. In 
this context, the drive to promote and protect fundamental political values in the 
Commonwealth and the implication that in future any interruption to democratic 
governance within a member state may result in the intervention in the domestic 
affairs of a member state, with validity in international law, is a welcome 
development. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This study advocates a new praxis of regional co-operation for South Asia that 
would determine its own terms of engagement with contemporary globalization, 
and defines the normative content of governance to contribute meaningfully 
towards the eradication of poverty, the enhancement of equitable development 
and the realization of human rights. It is not the task of the present study 
somehow to rank the four systems discussed with respect to any one variable or 
using some overall weighted aggregate, in a form of league table, then adopt this 
wholesale. For one thing, there is no need to do so: inspiration for the South Asian 
praxis can and should borrow as eclectically as necessary.  
 
As the above regional mechanisms of Europe, the Americas and Africa indicate, 
each system has adopted particular groups of rights in a manner and to a degree 
that is best suited to the sociopolitical exigencies of the region. The European 
system operates against a quintessential atmosphere of regulated democracies that 
                                                           
210 W D McIntyre A Guide to the Contemporary Commonwealth (Palgrave, Basingstoke, UK, 
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take pride in independent judiciaries and governing structures that value the rule 
of law.211 With its economic prosperity and established welfare states, civil and 
political rights take more significance than the second-generation rights but 
balance has been partly restored by the Social Charter. The European system has, 
after five decades of existence, moved beyond both the norm creating and 
procedural establishment stages to a stage of procedural fine tuning. The abolition 
of the Human Rights Commission and the expansion of the capacity of the Human 
Rights Court and the amendments to the Social Charter are milestones of that 
procedural fine tuning. 
 
The political circumstances of the American continent are vastly different, as 
many of the countries were governed by military dictatorships. It is a region 
where rights declarations predate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
However, the violent and repressive governing structures of the region resulted in 
mass scale denial of rights and freedoms. As much as reviving the dormant human 
rights system, the establishment of democratic governance was a regional priority. 
Therefore, the OAS was compelled to devote similar energies to the revival of 
democracy as well as to the establishment of an effective human rights regime.   
 
The African continent, emerging from years of colonial rule, faced not only issues 
in relation to the nation state and governing structures but also massive problems 
of under-development and poverty. Coming out from a repressive and violent 
colonial past the African nations were sceptical about the adoption of rights 
treaties that appeared to reduce their national sovereignty. The sense of 
individualism that is pervasive in the established human rights treaties also 
appeared to sit uncomfortably with the African social and cultural values that 
emphasize the family and the community over the individual. Therefore, the 
human rights regime that Africans created for themselves places an emphasis on 
group rights as well as those of the individual. Taking into cognizance the 
endemic poverty and under-development of the region it accords equal emphasis 
to both civil and political rights and social and economic rights. 
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 332 
This chapter evaluated the cross-regional mechanism of the Commonwealth that 
have evolved to deal with similar social, political and economic issues. Each 
system has identified the pertinent issues of the region ranging from democratic 
governance to enforcement of socioeconomic issues and has devised mechanisms 
to address them. As reiterated before, each system is a product of its own 
socioeconomic and political circumstances and no system can be transplanted 
unchanged to another region to address its unique concerns. However, successful 
regimes in other regions remain an example and an inspiration to South Asia as it 
grapples with the task of formulating its regime. 
 
The new regional system that is advocated for South Asia is a harnessing of 
resources from the South Asian region. There is great expertise and a wide 
knowledge base that would prove to be an effective bulwark against the 
contemporary neo-liberal forces of globalization. A regional coalition would not 
only counteract the adverse impact of neo-liberal globalization; it would help 
reinforce the capacity of national governments in developing countries to act in 
the interests of their people in the context of formulating development policies. As 
Kofi Annan observes in his report In Larger Freedom: 212 
 
[i]n a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each 
country’s self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, 
the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and 
sustained global cooperation among States … States, however, cannot do 
the job alone. We need an active civil society and a dynamic private sector 
….We also need agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental 
institutions to mobilise and coordinate collective action … We therefore 
need new mechanisms to ensure accountability — the accountability of 
States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions 
to their members and of the present generation to future generations. 
 
The regional praxis advocated in Chapter 6 is founded on the postulates that 
democratic governance and effective realization of ESC rights contribute to the 
amelioration of endemic poverty (in all its senses, starting with material poverty), 
which is the single most debilitative feature of the socioeconomic and political 
landscape of South Asia. Effective regional co-operation can be the basis for 
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creating an effective mechanism that addresses the issue of poverty from a 
normative stand-point.  
 
The new praxis will contain procedural mechanisms executed at regional level to 
enhance democratic governance at national level. Issues of equitable development 
and the promotion of economic and social rights will be addressed through a 
policy filtering mechanism that would encourage accountability and transparency 
at national policy formulation. The need for good governance of globalization will 
be addressed at regional level to extract the benefits of global integration.  
 
The new regional initiative will also emphasize norm-creation and consolidation 
relating to democratic governance. The new scheme will devise a mechanism for 
education, promotion and consolidation of democratic governance in the region. 
The regional praxis will encourage empowerment of people through providing 
avenues for expression of public opinion in relation to public policy formulation 
nationally. As Amartya Sen explains, “democracy has an important instrumental 
value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their 
claims to political attention (including claims to economic needs).”213 
 
The remedy mechanism would go beyond the conventional systems of seeking 
remedies for rights violated and incorporate measures to negotiate aid and loan 
conditionalities of the IFIs and trade-based policy formulations from the WTO. 
Procedural mechanisms to challenge policy formulation of member states and IFIs 
on the basis of rights violations will be incorporated into the new praxis. In 
essence the new praxis advocated for South Asia in Chapter 6 envisages a 
pragmatic expansion of the concepts of a rights-based approach to development 
and inclusive democratic governance which enhances and consolidates the 
universal paradigm of human rights. The mechanisms advocated in the new praxis 
aim to shift the concepts from their normative premise to a stage of viable 
implementation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE WAY FORWARD: A NEW, AUTOCHTHONOUS REGIONAL PRAXIS 
IN SOUTH ASIA FOR PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND 
EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT  
 
“Still, though not radically ameliorative of here-and-now suffering, international human 
rights standards and norms empower people’s movements and conscientious policy-makers 
everywhere to question political practices. That to my mind is an inestimable potential of 
human rights language, not available in previous centuries. Human Rights languages are all 
that we have to interrogate the barbarian power, even when these remain inadequate to 
humanize fully the barbaric practices of politics.”1 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 traced the evolution of the universal paradigm of human rights, which 
shared resonances with the South Asian ethos of compassion, humanism and the 
notion of tolerance. South Asia, through the influence of colonialism, embraced the 
conceptual developments of human rights and utilized the rights idiom not only in the 
struggles against colonialism but also against the its own “social evils” and 
“culturally sanctioned indigenous human rights violations”.2 The Western articulation 
of human rights therefore had affinity and relevance to the South Asian context and 
was incorporated into the governing mechanisms of the states in the region. 
 
Chapter 1 also analysed the inadequacy and the failure of contemporary national 
regimes that were put in place to protect human rights and achieve social justice in 
the region. These dysfunctional human rights mechanisms exacerbated the 
marginalization of the poor and the vulnerable segments of society, contributing to 
both disenfranchisement and disenchantment, fertile grounds for civil dissension and 
militarism — aspects that were further elaborated in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                           
1 Upendra Baxi “Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights” Fall (1998) Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems 126–175, 126–127. 
2 Stig Toft Madsen State, Society, and Human Rights in South Asia (Manohar, New Delhi, 1996) 46. 
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Against this background, Chapter 1 nevertheless gave credit to one peculiarly creative 
and expansive response to this dysfunctionality: Social Action Litigation. The chapter 
discussed how SAL has been accepted and expressly facilitated by a sympathetic and 
activist judiciary, largely in India. If human rights were being “more honoured in the 
breach than the observance”, then the courts’ adoption of SAL had represented a step 
into this breach. The study nevertheless stressed that SAL and judicial activism alone 
are not a sufficient response to dysfunction, which still needed to be addressed 
systematically, although public interest litigation and judicial activism on a broad 
range of justiciable rights could remain very valuable adjuncts to any overhaul of the 
system. 
 
Chapter 2 began the analysis of globalization, and specifically its economic drivers. It 
started by identifying that economic globalization is not new but has had historical 
antecedents. The chapter traced the geo-historical evolution of those antecedents by 
reference particularly to the apt chronology used by Hopkins, who delineated archaic, 
proto, modern and post-colonial phases respectively. What Hopkins termed post-
colonial globalization, the present study included under a slightly broader period that 
the author called “contemporary”, dating essentially from the end of the Second 
World War. Broadly speaking, “contemporary” globalization remains so in the sense 
of that word as meaning current and topical. For, even today, the overarching 
institutions of the global economic system remain those founded at Bretton Woods in 
the 1940s, above all the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but also 
the World Trade Organization. In a parallel that was made more explicit in the 
introduction to Chapter 3, contemporary globalization has also been 
contemporaneous with the internationalization of human rights discourse and regimes, 
which again rose out of the ashes of World War II.  
 
Chapter 2 signalled that out of the phases of globalization, the prime interest of this 
study is in contemporary globalization, to which the other phases serve mainly as 
antecedents or historical context. For the reasons just given, the post-war or 
contemporary era was seen to be coherent enough to warrant being considered a 
discrete entity. This, even though on a different scale one could sensibly recalibrate it 
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more finely into, for instance, the Cold War and post-Cold War stages, or more 
recently the acceleration and magnification of the phenomenon since the rise of the 
internet, and so on. Crucially though, Chapter 2 began to focus in on the subset of the 
contemporary form that this thesis argues is the most powerful, pervasive, insidious 
and the most destructive to the vulnerable in South Asia as elsewhere. That subset is 
the contemporary phenomenon’s neo-liberal form, which has enjoyed ascendancy 
since the late 1970s on the back of what later came to be known as the Washington 
Consensus.  
 
Neo-liberal globalization has trumpeted itself as, so to speak, the one, true 
contemporary globalization: not only inevitable and inexorable, but also, as if by 
market magic, ideal and optimal “for the whole globe”. It is equally crucial to the 
argument of this thesis, however, that neo-liberalism is in fact none of those things, 
but rather only one possible version of globalization. To have successfully sold itself 
as being generic and synonymous with globalization is simply the greatest, most 
insidious marketing achievement of the neo-liberal brand. Specifically, the neo-
liberal brand is a form of globalization which allows the owners and other 
beneficiaries of economic wealth — predominantly Western capital — to perpetuate, 
redouble and spuriously justify their own economic privilege and associated 
ideological hegemony. That reinforcement of privilege rides on the back of the 
already exploited “margins” of society that in truth represent an enormous chunk of 
the globe: more than two-thirds of the world. Forty per cent of that number are in turn 
clustered in South Asia and therefore of particular relevance to this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how individual states, particularly the developing states, have 
proven to be too weak to resist the neo-liberal onslaught of contemporary 
globalization. Yet, because neo-liberalism is only one possible content of globalized 
structures, and because the rules of the economic game can in fact be rewritten, 
Chapter 2 concluded on the optimistic note that better governance of the globalization 
process and new rule-setting could potentially ameliorate this situation. In particular, 
given that individual states in South Asia, as elsewhere, lacked the capacity 
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individually to determine the terms of engagement with globalization, in principle a 
collective initiative in the form of a regional alliance would have better success.  
Chapter 3 opened by drawing together the two strands teased out in the first two 
chapters, both pivotal to the discussion on the poverties of South Asia. It thus 
compared and contrasted the internationalization (or effectively globalization) of 
human rights traced by Chapter 1 with economic globalization, and specifically its 
still-prevailing neo-liberal form, as tracked by Chapter 2. These opening comments 
identified the key public and private agents of specifically neo-liberal globalization 
— the IFIs and TNCs respectively — and its main instruments: the SAPs and PRSPs. 
The analysis illustrated in more detail than that of Chapter 2 the way in which neo-
liberal globalization with its false inevitability (“There is No Alternative”) has in turn 
mutated the concept of sovereignty3 and transferred much of the traditional power 
base from the nation state to international financial institutions, bilateral donors and 
transnational corporations, creating a fissure of accountability and rendering 
individual national governments in many ways impotent. It illustrated the specific 
manner in which the phenomenon has rendered states ineffective in terms of 
negotiating new terms of conduct for global trade, defining aid conditionalities or 
prioritizing issues such as social expenditure and other critical policy decisions that 
affect the people above debt repayment. On the positive side, Chapter 3 identified the 
Governance-Related Conditionalities, which at their best recognize that plural 
democracy both is required for and itself requires the vindication of human rights. As 
Sen observes “[d]evelopment consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms 
that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned 
agency. The removal of substantial unfreedoms, it is argued here, is constitutive of 
development.” 4 This study regards the GRCs as a weapon of empowerment in the 
development discourse which assists the elimination of “unfreedoms” in society, even 
though the GRCs were not deliberately conceived to achieve this. 
 
                                                           
3 DL Sheth “Democracy and Globalisation in India: the post cold war discourse”  (1995); 540 The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 24-39; Ponna Wignaraja and 
Akmal Hussein The Challenge in South Asia: Development, Democracy, and Regional Cooperation 
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4 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (Anchor Books, New York, 1999) xii. 
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The focus of Chapter 4 was upon the third strand of discussion of the many poverties 
of South Asia: a poverty of democracy. The chapter reiterated that human rights, 
development and democracy draw sustenance from each other and that human rights 
and equitable development cannot be sustained in the absence of democracy. Chapter 
4 narrated this poverty of democracy in terms of the national circumstances of South 
Asian states, describing how governing institutions lack accountability to their people 
in policy formulation, avoid transparency in executing these policies, and reject 
public participation in evaluating critical policy decisions. This chapter illustrated 
increasing public frustration regarding corruption, autocratic governance, and the 
absence of an effective means of influencing policy formulation. The chapter showed 
how these developments have resulted in civic strife and insurgency, and the 
deterioration of the relations between the government and civil society, in turn 
culminating in massive violations of human rights.  
 
Chapter 4 also discussed the regional response to the resolution of the poverties of 
human rights, development and democracy in South Asia. Identified as the “middle 
tier” between national and global levels, regionalism holds great potential as a means 
of addressing all the poverties of South Asia. In this context the existing regional 
attempt at integration through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) was analysed in detail. The analysis showed that SAARC has failed to 
answer not only the need for the vindication of human rights, but also the needs for 
equitable, human-centred development, and for the flourishing of reliable democracy 
— all of these aspects being bound up together and mutually reinforcing. This study 
therefore advocated an urgent replacement of the existing regional mechanisms to 
improve governance, the conditions of human deprivation and the state of human 
rights in the region.  
 
Chapter 5 focused on selected supranational mechanisms and their legal or treaty 
instruments that have been used within or among regions around the globe to ensure 
the protection of human rights, democratic governance and the advancement of social 
justice among other particular purposes such as breaking the ties of various 
colonialisms or buffering against Communism.  
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Chapter 5 noted the regional disparities in terms of the institutionalization of human 
rights and the general effectiveness of the normative standards relating to human 
rights. The protection regimes appeared most legalized in a European and an 
American context, while in Africa the regime is at a stage of establishing norms and 
evolving mechanisms to protect and promote human rights through a functional 
Human Rights Commission. An examination of these various mechanisms in 
operation to ensure the establishment of democracy and prevent democratic 
backsliding in Europe and the Americas was also undertaken in Chapter 5. The 
efforts of the Commonwealth Association to create a normative framework for 
democratic governance were discussed. The discussion throughout Chapter 5 
highlighted the need to create mechanisms that responded to the particular exigencies 
of each region, and observed the corresponding futility of trying to transplant root and 
branch any normative regime that had evolved in an incompatible different 
socioeconomic and historical context to the soil of the South Asian subcontinent, 
which has its own civilizational history and its own distinct blight of afflictions — as 
well as its own landscape of resources to be tapped in curing them.  
 
The present chapter proposes a new regional praxis that is designed for South Asia, 
taking into consideration the issues that were discussed in all the preceding chapters. 
The underlying quest of the new praxis is to formulate an efficient autochthonous 
mechanism that responds to the exigencies and poverties of the region, in that it 
would close the material poverty gap, vindicate rights and enhance human-centred, 
equitable development and democratic governance — all synergistic aims, as has 
been shown. The proposed new praxis of regional governance, to be called the South 
Asian Union for Development, Democracy and Human Rights (SAU), is put forward 
to replace the dysfunctional SAARC. It is envisaged that the contemporary members 
of the SAARC — India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, the 
Maldives and Afghanistan5 —will be the constituting members of the SAU. In 
formulating the regional mechanism this study reiterates the significance of the 
Vienna Declaration of 1993 as a restatement of the international law relating to 
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human rights.6 This study also adapts and applies the Paris Principles, which were 
formulated to provide guidance for the creation of national mechanisms for the 
protection of human rights, as a loose framework for a regional structure. 
 
 
6.2 The Search for a New Paradigm of Regional Standard-setting and Co-
operation. 
   
Regionalism as a means of maintaining regional co-operation and preserving and 
advancing the common interests of states within the geographical proximity has been 
in “vogue”7 since the end of World War II but has far deeper validity than any 
passing fad and instead rightly remains a “central concept for organising world 
politics”.8 As highlighted in Chapter 5, human rights  both civil and political rights 
and economic, social and cultural rights — have been incorporated in principle into 
the regional mechanisms in Europe, the Americas and in Africa for many decades. 
But the analysis indicated that the success with which rights are vindicated is 
determined to a large extent by the mechanisms that are in place within each regional 
mechanism to realize the rights. Moreover, massive buffeting forces impinge from 
without, and it is to a large extent these forces with which the regional mechanism 
must deal. This study reiterates that the existing mechanisms in place to vindicate 
human rights particularly in the context of the Americas and Africa are compromised 
by the forces of neo-liberal globalization especially through the dictates of the IFIs.  
 
The underlying presumption of the universal regime of human rights is that national 
governments are the ultimate repository and determinant of obligations relating to 
human rights. The reason for presuming this is partly the further assumption that 
states have the power to fulfil those rights and partly the parallel assumption that they 
                                                           
6 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14–25 
June 1993 UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 12 July 1993 
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8 Peter Katzenstein “Regional States: Japan and Asia, Germany and Europe” in Kozo Yamamura and 
Wolfgang Streeck (eds) The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003) 89. 
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are the most likely to violate them: if both assumptions were true, there would be no 
need either to protect or to empower citizens against anything other than their own 
state. Clearly, this is not the case. Yet, governments do continue to be the organs 
which deliberate and vote on the content and sphere of human rights obligations they 
undertake through the various treaties on human rights before they accept those treaty 
obligations (either by ratification after signing or by accession) and take any further 
necessary steps to implement them into domestic law. The success of the treaties is 
measured by the extent to which they are implemented and are adhered to within each 
state.  
 
Previous chapters indicated how globalization has strongly induced developing states 
to compromise the obligations they had thus accepted under the universal human 
rights regime. This occurred because, despite the declared obligations of the states to 
promote the rights, including ESC rights, of their own peoples, in reality priority was 
instead required (as a condition of assistance) to be given to policies that facilitated 
the states’ integration into the global market economy on the terms stipulated by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and by bilateral donors. Direct, 
legal control over policy formulation, which has traditionally been the exclusive 
domain of national governments, may thus have remained in the hands of the states. 
However, de facto leverage over the scope and content of that policy has instead been 
gained by IFIs and bilateral donors. This has resulted in a fundamental restructuring 
of the domestic sphere to reflect (currently, though this need not continue to be the 
case) neo-liberal values.9  
 
Although conditionalities may technically be agreed to rather than simply imposed, 
the bargaining power of a monolithic — and, in the case of the unique IFIs, 
monopolistic — holder or controller of desperately needed funds has thus far been so 
much greater than that of the individual decision-“taking” state that the latter’s input 
has been nugatory. These changes, particularly in the constitutional and legal realms, 
are impacting negatively on social, economic and cultural rights of citizens in the 
                                                           
9 See Chapter 3 of this study. 
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recipient states.10 At the same time, however, states, by giving effect nationally to 
human rights obligations undertaken at international level through treaties, will to 
some extent try to counteract the fall-out from policy prescriptions of the IFIs upon 
whom the developing world is economically reliant. This paradoxical situation can be 
resolved only by effecting a change to the terms of engagement in the globalization 
process and more specifically demanding a change of its neo-liberal hue. 
 
As reiterated in previous chapters, this change cannot be achieved through individual 
state efforts alone. Instead it has to come through the collective action of states. This 
can occur at both the global level or tier, under the auspices of the United Nations and 
associated agencies, and at the regional level. Regional mechanisms bring together 
states which have geographical, cultural and historical affinity, and which, more 
significantly, are affected in a common way by the common predicaments that 
globalization has precipitated. It is in this context that the following section of this 
study emphasizes the justification for negotiating a regional initiative for South Asia 
that deals with issues relating to human rights, democracy and poverty eradication in 
the context of globalization.  
 
Two prerequisites before even entertaining the setting up of a (new) regional 
organization stand out. Firstly, this study has accepted as a foundation since Chapter 
1 the norms and structures of the universal human rights regime as established under 
the auspices of the UN. In endeavouring to treat the ills of rights violations, 
democratic deficit and mutated development, any proposal must be legitimate within, 
and compatible with, the global human rights regime. Secondly, lest time and effort 
be misdirected and wasted, there must be at least some reason to believe that such a 
mechanism would also be efficacious at treating those ailments.  
 
The following section therefore demonstrates both the legitimacy of a regional 
mechanism within global rights organizations  — in other words, compatibility 
between them — and the potential efficacy of such a mechanism. Indeed, it shows 
                                                           
10 Impacts on ESC rights due to the changes relating to taxation, labour laws, subsidies of basic needs 
and  food , water and housing and services such as education and healthcare have been discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this study. 
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that regional arrangements are not only compatible with UN structures and norms, 
but expressly contemplated by them, and it recalls the incomplete yet considerable 
success of other regional and cross-regional structures. Other regional structures have 
evolved systems that address these sociopolitical and economic issues faced by the 
regions. The praxis advocated in this study aims to establish regional monitoring 
systems of policy formulation for its compatibility with and promotion of equitable 
and human-centred development human rights protection and democratic governance. 
Collective responsibility in initiating and executing strategies for development, 
human rights protection and effective democratic governance will strengthen the 
South Asian regional capacity to manage the process of globalization more 
effectively.   
 
 
6.3. The Legitimacy and Efficacy of a Regional Praxis and the Need for a 
Law-based Regime 
 
The praxis takes the form of a legal regime, for this thesis acknowledges the unique 
capacity of law to achieve social transformation, govern the process of globalization 
and instil democratic governance in the region. This capacity was summed up 
elegantly by the Dominican Republic envoy to the United Nations in 1966 during the 
UN General Assembly proceedings relating to the ICCPR. In a quotation to which 
this chapter will return, the envoy said: “we, the unarmed, the economically under 
developed, the technologically under privileged, have no strength except the strength 
of law… .[and so] we are pleased to vote for the draft Covenants on Human Rights”. 
The thesis has also stressed since Chapter 1 the primacy — as well as the sheer 
ubiquity — of the language of human rights. The unique value of rights talk is 
repeated in the opening quotation of this chapter from Upendra Baxi, and will be 
taken up again. For these reasons, this chapter will focus on a synthesized proposal to 
achieve a common legal standard in relation to human rights, democratic governance 
in the context of globalization and to equitable, human-centred development in South 
Asia. In doing so it takes into consideration the historical and cultural affinity of the 
South Asian region, the common obstacles that prevent effective realization of 
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development, and the norms required to inculcate democratic governance in the 
region, including the tying together of both democracy and development as rights in 
themselves. 
The impetus for a regional coalition for the promotion of human rights, democracy 
and human development is supported by international legal jurisprudence and other 
regional collaborations. The United Nations envisages cooperation among states for 
human development, and such an intention is included in major documents of the UN. 
The UN Charter requires member states to take “joint and separate action” to promote 
the following UN purposes stipulated in Article 55:11  
a.  higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development; 
b.  solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c.  universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.12  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that “[e]veryone, as a member 
of society . . . is entitled to [the] realization, through national effort and international 
cooperation . . . of economic, social and cultural rights.”13 The ICESCR also 
presupposes that the realistic realization of ESC rights is through “international 
assistance and co-operation".14 This position was reiterated by the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights when it stated: “The Committee wishes to 
emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with the provisions 
                                                           
11 Charter of the United Nations, Article 56, signed 26 June 1945 (entered into force 24 Oct 1945). 
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>  (accessed 17 Oct 2006) (UN Charter). 
12 N Charter, above n  9, Article 55 (A)-(C). 
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 Article 19 <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (accessed 17 
May 2006).  
14 Article 2, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966 entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with Article 27 
 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2006) (ICESCR). 
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of the Covenant itself, international co-operation for development and thus for the 
realizations of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States.”15  
The legitimacy, compatibility, and potential efficacy of a regional effort for human 
development is further reinforced by the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development, which encourages collaborative efforts in realizing goals of 
development: “[a]ll human beings have a responsibility for development, individually 
and collectively, taking into account the need for full respect for their human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can 
ensure the free and complete fulfilment of the human being, and they should therefore 
promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for 
development.”16 More significantly, the UN Declaration on the Right to Development 
also stipulates that “[s]tates have the primary responsibility for the creation of 
national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to 
development.”17  
Of most direct relevance to this study is a resolution on regional arrangements for the 
promotion and protection of human rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
3 March 1997. This resolution expressly “[i]nvites States in areas where regional 
arrangements in the field of human rights do not yet exist to consider concluding 
agreements with a view to the establishment within their respective regions of 
suitable regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights.”18 The 
subsequent UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on Regional Arrangements 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights endorsed the UN General 
Assembly Resolution.19    
 
                                                           
15 The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, General Comment No. 3 adopted 13–14 Dec 1990 UN 
ESCOR, Comm on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., 49th and 50th meetings, 14 UN 
Doc E/C12/1990/8 (1990). 
16 Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted 4 Dec 1986 GA Res 41/128, UN GAOR, 41st 
Sess. Supp No 53 Agenda Item 101 at 186 UN Doc A/41/53 (1987). 
17 Ibid, Art 2(2).  
18 <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-102.htm> (accessed 5 Nov 2006). 
19 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/75 62nd meeting, 25 April 2003 [Adopted without a 
vote. See chap. XVIII. - E/CN.4/2003/L.11/Add.6] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Geneva, Switzerland <http://www.ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-
CN_4-RES-2003-75.doc> (accessed 5 Nov 2006). 
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Nowhere in the international framework for the protection of human rights does it 
specify one procedural mechanism for the protection of human rights. Historical 
factors such as the Westphalian state system and British colonialism, which 
established Westminster-styled constitutional systems in former British colonies, 
contributed to a general acceptance of international legal norms such as the concept 
of sovereignty and the notion that the primary duty bearers regarding human rights 
are the states. The same jurisprudential ethos has propagated the mainstream 
paradigm of human rights with justiciable rights and the judiciary as the primary 
forum for the resolution of issues relating to rights violations. However, the preceding 
chapters have noted the unreality, given globalization, of the conventional paradigm 
that posited states as being sovereign and equal and each powerful enough to craft its 
own destiny and supply all the needs of its citizens. This realization necessitates 
exploring beyond the conventional paradigm for the resolution of the current 
afflictions and real limitations of the developing world in general and South Asia in 
particular.  
 
One can also properly recall the need for human rights to be contextualized, which is 
the grain of truth in the often overdone, easily abused and potentially divisive, even 
anarchic, assertions of cultural relativism.20 This need is articulated for instance in the 
Bangkok Declaration. This document recognizes that, “while human rights are 
universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving 
process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and 
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”21 
This further legitimizes the exploration of other avenues to safeguard human rights. 
 
 
6.3.1  Creating a Legal Regime of Human Rights in South Asia 
 
                                                           
20 See Chapter 1 of this study, subsection 1.9. 
21 Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of The World Conference on Human Rights 
The Ministers and Representatives of Asian States, Meeting At Bangkok From 29 March To 2 April 
1993, Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 46/116 Of 17 December 1991 In the Context of 
Preparations for The World Conference on Human Rights UN Doc A/Conf.157/Pc/59 
<http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=101629> (accessed 10 Nov 2006). 
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There is an enormous capacity within the human rights paradigm to use it creatively 
and to make human rights both relevant and inclusive.22 The rights paradigm has 
distinguished itself as the vehicle of choice for articulating notions of human dignity 
and well-being and for granting these notions legal and constitutional validity.23 The 
legitimacy of the rights paradigm was consolidated in the developing world, as Mutua 
observes, through the “popular mass struggles by marginalized groups and colonized 
peoples …Examples of these struggles are the anti-colonial and anti-racist 
movements by the peoples of Africa, Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and Latin 
America. These struggles for self-determination and independence have left an 
indelible mark on human civilization.”24 The right to self-determination as a legal 
right is a result of such struggles25 proving that diverse manifestations of dissent 
against oppression and marginalization can contribute to the evolution and expansion 
of the rights paradigm. 
 
As the previous chapters of this thesis illustrated, the current crisis within the human 
rights paradigm, which includes the gross violation of ESC rights and the resulting 
poverty, is an inevitable consequence of policy decisions based on neo-liberal 
economic principles. Neo-liberal globalization has created a new base of 
unaccountability and established new structures of systematic rights violations. 
Echoing the popular mass struggles against colonial rule and apartheid, people have 
come together against the inequitable manifestations of neo-liberal globalization.26 
The mass dissent against the contemporary trajectory of globalization reflects the 
need for the evolution of a normative regime to govern globalization and regulate its 
negative impact on people. 
 
                                                           
22 Makau Mutua ‘Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis’ (2007) 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly 547–630, 552 (Mutua). 
23 See Chapter 1 of this study and also K Sikkink and SC Ropp The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Richard Pierre 
Claude and H Burns Weston Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992). 
24 Mutua, above n 22. 
25 Article 1.1 All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development of 
both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
26 Chapter 2 of this study and also see John Clark Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for 
Ethical Globalization (Earthscan, UK, 2003). 
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The rights paradigm has demonstrated the ability to recreate innovatively its duty-
bearers, identify new violators and evolve new mechanisms to protect and enhance 
human rights.27 Such new standard-setting through the rights paradigm has been 
successful in instances of overwhelming global support. The ICCPR,28 the ICECSR,29 
and the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights30 are instances where such universal 
standard setting efforts have had global support and empathy. On the other hand, the 
Declaration on the Right to Development is an instance where support has been 
divided. The UN Human Rights Commission initiated the idea of a right to 
development in 1977 and a decade later the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration.31 Sengupta’s observation is that “[i]n effect the right to development 
emerged as a human right which integrated economic, social, and cultural rights with 
civil and political rights in the manner that was envisaged at the beginning of the 
post-World War II human rights movement. The world got back, so to speak, to the 
mainstream of the human rights movement, from which it was deflected for several 
years by Cold War international politics.”32 Despite the ardent support extended by 
Sengupta for the Declaration there has not been a consensus on the legitimacy of the 
right to development, particularly due to its incompatibility with neo-liberal ideology, 
“which see[s] the global redistributive justice discourse of the right to development as 
incompatible with free market and capitalist structures of the global economy.”33  
 
The lack of consensus regarding the normative validity of the right to development 
and the academic debate surrounding it have highlighted the uncertain capacity of the 
rights paradigm to contextualize issues in economic, sociopolitical and cultural terms, 
                                                           
27 Tony Evans The politics of human rights: a global perspective (Pluto Press, London, 2005); David 
Kinley and Rachel Chambers “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law” (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 447–497. 
28 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm> (accessed 16 Feb 2007). 
29 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm > (accessed 16 Feb 2007). 
30 <http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En> (accessed 16 Feb 
2007). 
31 . CHR Res. 4 (XXXIII), UN ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum Rts (21 Feb 1977). The Declaration on the 
Right to Development was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 4/128 on 4 
December 1986 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm> (accessed 16 Feb 2007). 
32 Arjun Sengupta The Right to Development as a Human Right 
<http://hsphsun3.harvard.edu/fxbcenter/FXBC_WP7--Sengupta.pdf.> (accessed 8 Mar 2008); see also 
Arjun Sengupta, Archna Negi and Moushumi Basu Reflections on the Right to Development (Sage 
Publication, London, 2005); Arjun Sengupta “Realizing the Right to Development” (2000) 31 
Development and Change 553–578. 
33 Mutua, above n 22. 
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and to promote normative standards in situations where there is a lack of universal 
consensus against neo-liberalism. While the developed states view the right to 
development with great trepidation the developing countries have been quick to see 
its potential, particularly the prescription that declares: “States have the duty to take 
steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies 
with a view to facilitating the full realisation of the right.”34 Despite uncertainty of its 
legality as a human right, the right to development provides means of channelling the 
concerns of the anti-globalization movement, such as the demand for global 
distributive justice, equitable terms of trade, debt relief and better governance of 
globalization. 
 
The preceding chapter highlighted how regional mechanisms strive to cater to the 
new exigencies that underpin globalization within various sociopolitical and cultural 
contexts. In the South Asian context too, it is vital that there is regional collaboration 
to circumvent the gross violation of human rights that poor management of 
globalization produces. The crisis requires the formulation of new strategies and new 
structures not only to vindicate the rights that are violated but to create filtering 
mechanisms, which will avert potential future violations.     
 
Claiming evolution from a vastly different ideological base, the ESC rights, unlike 
the “first generational” civil and political rights, are not consistent with the demands 
of the neo-liberal economic agenda.35 The UN Special Rapporteur on ESCR’s warns 
“[t]he flurry of many States romantically to embrace the market as the ultimate 
solution to all of society's ills, and the corresponding rush to denationalize and leave 
economics, politics and social matters to the whims of the private sector, although the 
theme of the day, will inevitably have an impact upon the full realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights. History has adequately shown that many aspects of social 
                                                           
34 Article 4 Declaration on the Right to Development Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 
41/128 of 4 December 1986 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm> (accessed 16 Feb 2007). 
35 For a discussion see Chapter 2 of this study and also Michael J Dennis and David P Stewart 
“Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints 
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?” (2004) 98 American 
Journal of International Law 462–515. 
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policy cannot be attained through blind reliance on market forces.”36 Indeed, such 
reliance has created mass social, economic and cultural devastation. Therefore the 
regional praxis that is advocated here is premised on the endeavour to discard the 
strong neo-liberal bias of contemporary globalization and create a normative standard 
regionally in relation to human rights, development policy formulation and 
democratic governance. 
 
 
6.3.2 Sociopolitically and Culturally Contextualized Development  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this study raised the issue of the homogenizing thrust of 
contemporary development and its negative impact on South Asia. Observing the 
trajectory of the mainstream developmental ideology, Ashis Nandy comments, “I 
think that the drive for homogenization is written into the birth certificate of 
development. Despite what many like to believe, development presumes that, in the 
long run, you will have only one particular kind of society all over the world.”37 The 
mainstream paradigm of development therefore ignores the intricacies of 
multiculturalism and the diversity of South Asia and of traditional knowledge 
systems. 
 
The proposed South Asian Union Charter (SAU) will strive to incorporate the notion 
of sociopolitically and culturally contextualized development into its regional 
mechanism. This notion is significant from the perspective of what are currently the 
marginalized and the disenfranchised segments under the mainstream paradigm of 
development. As a conceptual notion it acknowledges the mainstream human rights 
discourse and the consensus on human dignity which this represents, but it rejects the 
pervasive neo-liberal ethos and the homogenizing thrust that has been articulated 
through the last three decades of contemporary globalization. Regional assertion of 
                                                           
36 Danilo Türk, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Final report) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16, 3 July 
1992.<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.1992.16.En?Opendocu
ment> (accessed 6 Mar 2006). 
37 Smithu Kothari “Revisiting the Violence of Development: An Interview with Ashis Nandy” (2004) 
47 Development 8–14, 10.  
  351 
the notion of contextualized development will focus on the unique requirements of 
the region with its sociopolitical and cultural exigencies, rather than formulating 
policies that cater to the self-interest of Western capital but which are then passed off 
as being both inevitable and optimal for all.  
 
Any assertion of cultural relativism in human rights often invokes violent outbursts 
that such claims are an attempt to dilute the validity of the “universal” quality of 
human rights.38 But in an era where homogeneity has assumed the central place in 
every conceivable aspect of human life, cultural and regional identities offer a real 
alternative, a genuine sense of security and belonging for both communities and 
individuals who are pressurized to adjust to economic and social change precipitated 
by neo-liberal globalization.39 Sociopolitical and cultural contextualization is not an 
attempt to reinforce or speciously justify socially debilitating practices, such as 
ethnoreligious, caste and gender discrimination or the marginalization of the 
vulnerable segments of society. Rather, it is an attempt to locate development within 
the socioeconomic context of a particular community. It is a means of identifying the 
vulnerable segments of society — aspects of culture and sections of the national 
economy that are threatened by the expansion of the neo-liberal globalization process. 
Contextualized development creates a safety mechanism to deal with the insecurities 
and the vulnerabilities of the marginalized segments of society who end up as the 
victims of the globalization process, such as communities displaced by macro 
development or urbanization schemes, marginalized small-scale farmers, and the 
urban poor.  
 
The new regional mechanism proposed by this thesis is premised upon the conceptual 
foundation articulated above and will take into account the key recommendations of 
the Paris Principles on human rights mechanisms.  
 
                                                           
38 Yash Ghai “Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate” (Occasional Paper Series No. 1, 
The Asian Foundation’s Centre for Asian Pacific Affairs, November 1994); Michael C Davis 
“Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian Values” (1998) 11  
Harvard Human Rights Journal 109, and also see the assertions of the universalism of human rights in 
Jack Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1989). 
39 See Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
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6.4 UN Policy Guidelines on Possible National and Regional Institutional 
Frameworks 
 
The following section discusses the recent policy statements regarding national and 
human rights endeavours to establish mechanisms that foster and promote human 
rights. The Vienna Declaration is regarded by this study as a restatement of 
international human rights law. It provides the conceptual basis for the initiation of a 
regional mechanism to protect human rights in South Asia. The Paris Principles 
prescribe the framework and the essential requirements to establish a national human 
rights enforcement mechanism. However, the guidelines can be a foundation for a 
regional framework. 
 
 
6.4.1 The Vienna Declaration 
 
Significant among several policy statements relating to the creation of regional 
arrangements for human rights protection under the auspices of the United Nations is 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993, which declares that:40 
 
Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human 
rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in 
international human rights instruments, and their protection. The World Conference 
on Human Rights endorses efforts under way to strengthen these arrangements and to 
increase their effectiveness, while at the same time stressing the importance of 
cooperation with the United Nations human rights activities. 
 
The World Conference on Human Rights reiterates the need to consider the 
possibility of establishing regional and subregional arrangements for the promotion 
and protection of human rights where they do not already exist . 
 
                                                           
40 Vienna Declaration, above n 6. 
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Inherent in the Declaration is the presumption that a regional normative framework 
can be more effective in reinforcing universal human rights values, can expand their 
scope and can re-contextualize rights in the light of the cultural, political and 
economic peculiarities of the region. A regional mechanism, often focussing on a 
specialized set of issues, has the capacity to evolve conceptually adding new ideas 
into the rights paradigm. 
 
The overwhelming endorsement of the Vienna Declaration by 171 states clearly 
supports the view that the Declaration is a restatement of the international law on 
human rights. Donnelly observes that such approval is also indicative of the 
“dramatic change in dominant international attitudes” in relation to the contemporary 
paradigm of human rights. For he says, “[w]hatever the gap between theory and 
practice, most states today prominently feature appeals to human rights, democracy, 
and development in their efforts to establish national and international legitimacy.”41 
The Vienna Declaration therefore has remained a significant milestone in the 
trajectory of incorporating human rights standards into national policy formulation.  
 
The Vienna Declaration asserts that “the universal nature of these rights and freedoms 
is beyond question” and “reaffirms the importance of ensuring the universality, 
objectivity and non-selectivity of the consideration of human rights issues.”42 The 
Declaration also reinforces the notion that human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent and rejects the perception of generational human rights.43 
 
 
6.4.2    The Paris Principles 
 
The significance of effective national level structures for implementing human rights 
has been reiterated by the UN Human Rights Commission several times. The UN 
General Assembly in December 1978 adopted a resolution which created the 
                                                           
41 Jack Donnelly “Human Rights, Democracy, and Development” (1999) 21/3 Human Rights 
Quarterly 608–632, 611. 
42 Vienna Declaration, above n 6, Article 1. 
43 K Boyle “Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993” 
(1995) 43 Political Studies 79–95. 
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guidelines on the structure and functioning of national institutions for the promotion 
and protection of human rights.44 The resolution specified methods of effective 
implementation of international human rights standards and created basic ground 
rules for such national mechanisms at a meeting in Paris in 1991.45 This meeting 
culminated in the in-depth guidelines commonly known as The Paris Principles46 that 
established structures for the protection of human rights on a national basis.47 The 
present study asserts that these principles can also be the foundation for a South 
Asian regional mechanism of human rights, since the underlying purpose of the Paris 
Principles is the promotion of decentralized/localized effective human rights 
protection mechanisms.  
The Paris Principles of 1991 stipulate the following basic parameters for a general 
human rights mechanism:   
 
Competence and Responsibilities:48 
The Paris Principles do not envisage empty structures that are unable to yield 
sufficient power to make an effective difference in the human rights sphere within a 
defined geographical area. The Principles encourage the scrutiny of legislation and 
procedures for compatibility with established human rights norms and encourage 
conformity through amendments to existing laws or adoption of new legislation. They 
encourage human rights treaty ratification and the harmonization of domestic regimes 
                                                           
44 National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights A/RES/33/46 14 December 
1978  <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/33/ares33.htm> (accessed 12 June 2007). 
45 Julie Mertus The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era (Routledge, London, 
2005). 
46 National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights Adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm > 
(accessed 12 Jun 2007) (Paris Principles). 
47 These principles were subsequently endorsed by the UN Commission on Human Rights (Resolution 
1992/54 of 3 March 1992) and the UN General Assembly (Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993). 
The same content was reiterated in a number of UN-sponsored conferences on human rights issues, 
including the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Tunis in 
1992; the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean, held in San Jose in 1993; the 
Regional Meeting for Asia, held in Bangkok in 1993; the Commonwealth Workshop on National 
Human Rights Institutions, held in Ottawa in 1992; and the workshop for the Asia and Pacific Region 
on Human Rights Issues, held in Jakarta in 1993.  
48 Paris Principles, above n 45, Article A. 
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to reflect the universal human rights norms. Expansion of avenues available for 
human rights protection and education is recommended. 
 
Composition, Guarantees of Independence and Pluralism:49  
The principles envisage that devoid of “Autonomy/independence and pluralism” 
guaranteed through a legally binding mechanism, any institution designed to protect 
human rights would be unable to carry out the tasks mandated to it. Taking into 
consideration the complex power relations, the institution should include 
representation of various sections of civil society actively involved in the promotion 
and protection of human rights. Pluralism ought to be reflective of the society 
represented.  
 
Methods of Functioning:50  
The Paris Principles envisage that the institution would have the freedom to consider 
any question within its competence and would enjoy free access to the people, 
directly or through media; free access also to information from any department or 
authority; complete freedom to promote and propagate awareness among the people 
about human rights and basic rights, remedies and entitlements of the people; 
adequate powers to conduct enquiries, to undertake investigations, or intervene in any 
proceedings, make mandatory recommendations and conduct the trial and hearing of 
specific cases; and adequate powers also to submit to the government or Parliament 
and other competent bodies, reports, requests and proposals on any matter concerning 
the promotion and protection of human rights. 
 
Quasi--judicial competence:51 
 The national apparatus will have the competence to receive, hear and decide 
complaints and petitions of any individual or group of persons or any NGO 
concerning human rights issues or violations; to seek an amicable settlement through 
conciliation or to decide disputes in accordance with the law. This fourth principle 
                                                           
49 Paris Principles, above n 45, Article B. 
50 Paris Principles, above n 45, Article C. 
51 Paris Principles, above n 45, Article D. 
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envisages an expansion of the conventional rules relating to standing before judicial 
bodies. 
 
If the Paris Principles are applied, SAARC falls down seriously as a regional 
mechanism to ensure human rights. Abdul Ahsan, the first Secretary General of the 
SAARC, acknowledges that there are inherent weaknesses in the SAARC secretariat; 
tellingly, he asserts that it is only an institutional structure and that it is impotent to 
make a meaningful contribution towards the realization of the Association’s 
objectives.52 Ahsan’s assertion is particularly significant in terms of the Social 
Charter. The Charter in its current form does not contain a regional institutional 
framework for the implementation of its objectives, which renders it effectively 
meaningless. 
 
While there are inherent weaknesses in the SAARC Social Charter it is undoubtedly a 
major breakthrough in relation to creating a regional consensus for the protection and 
advancement of social and economic rights within the region. The Social Charter can 
be the foundation upon which the strategy for a regional mechanism for 
implementing universal human rights and equitable development policies can be 
founded. The new praxis advocated in this thesis needs to expand through the space 
provided by the Social Charter to initiate and implement fundamental changes in the 
spheres of development, human rights and governance in the region. The new praxis 
must, on the basis of social, political and cultural contexualization of development, 
do the following:  
 
a) Address concerns related to poor governance, especially corruption on 
a regional or sub-regional level; 
b) Create a mechanism to realize human rights in the region and promote 
national policies for poverty alleviation and equitable development; 
and 
                                                           
52 Abul Ahsan “SAARC Secretariat: A Critique” (2004) 6 South Asian Journal. 
<http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/journal/6_saarc_secretariat.htm> (accessed 16 Aug 2007). 
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c) Be a medium for effecting a fundamental change in the mainstream 
development ideology and renegotiate the terms of engagement in 
relation to globalization. 
 
The South Asian mechanism can draw inspiration from other regional mechanisms 
already established in Europe, Africa and the Americas as discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, it must go further in the normative scope of rights and the mechanisms for 
realizing them. Taking into account the critical problems encountered by South Asia 
in relation to neo-liberal globalization, poor governance and ineffective human rights 
mechanisms,53 this study reiterates that the regional praxis advocated for South Asia 
would be compelled to extend beyond the conventional systems of seeking remedies 
for rights violated. It will incorporate measures to negotiate aid and loan 
conditionalities from the IFIs and trade-based policy formulations from the WTO, 
and to challenge developmental policy formulation of states, all of which has the 
potential to violate human rights contained in the SAU Charter. 
 
 
6.5 The New Praxis: The South Asian Union for Human Rights Development 
and Democracy (SAU)  
 
The South Asian Union on Development and Human Rights (SAU) will be a 
syncretic effort that reflects the collective identity and the sociopolitical and 
economic challenges of the region. Its specific objective is the creation, through law, 
of a structure and a culture of sociopolitical and economic governance in the region 
that respects the rule of law, fundamental tenets of plural, representative democracy 
and universal human rights norms. To achieve these fundamental objectives the SAU 
charter will create a legal regime with specific obligations and responsibilities of and 
to member states. Therefore, it will move away from the previous aspirational and 
rather toothless premise that was created under the aegis of the SAARC. As the 
Dominican Republic envoy to the UN General Assembly, Ornes-Caiscou, observed in 
1966 during the General Assembly proceedings relating to the ICCPR, “we, the 
                                                           
53 As highlighted in section 6.2 of this chapter and also Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this study. 
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unarmed, the economically under developed, the technologically under privileged, 
have no strength except the strength of law… .[and so] we are pleased to vote for the 
draft Covenants on Human Rights.”54 Similarly, this thesis endorses the intrinsic 
value and the potential benefits of a legal regime to a region such as South Asia that 
is economically weak and politically unstable.55 The creation of a legally binding 
normative framework will contribute positively to the enhancement of human rights; 
functional, plural democracy; equitable development; and the governance of 
globalisation in the region.  
 
However, the political reality is that the regional praxis will be compelled to strive for 
a regime that is acceptable to all states in the region. The new praxis will therefore 
necessarily deal with issues of sovereignty and self-determination and strive for an 
achievable compromise that would not affect the viability of the regime and would 
reflect the growing world consensus regarding these concepts. The consensus is that 
“the emergence of a serious human rights process at regional and global levels would 
seem to be the most impressive ethical achievement of the past century” and that the 
emerging human rights standards and their implementation are “definitely 
challenging the idea that sovereignty provides governments with insulation against 
accountability provided that their actions are confined to territorial limits, and that 
their leaders have an immunity respected throughout the world.”56 Against this 
background, and given embarrassment at the track record of poor governance, 
corruption and human rights violations, no state in South Asia would want to be seen 
to reject a regional venture that strives for such laudable and credibility-enhancing 
aims as democratic governance, human rights and the regulation of globalisation. 
 
The South Asian states will also be compelled to reflect the growing global consensus 
on the adverse impact of neo-liberal gobalization and accept the articulation of the 
                                                           
54 Ornes-Caiscou speaking at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting, paras 137–138,  UN GAOR, 21st 
sess, 1495th mtg,16 Dec 1966 quoted in A Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 3. 
55 See Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. 
56 Richard Falk “Sovereignty and Human Rights: The Search for Reconciliation” May (2000) Issues 
of Democracy <http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/future/0312falk.htm> (accessed 23 Nov 2006) 
(Falk). 
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concept of sovereignty from another perspective that has gained global currency in 
the past few years.  
 
Kofi Annan elaborates this alternative articulation of sovereignty: 57  
 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined — not least by the forces 
of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to 
be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time 
individual sovereignty — by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each 
individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties — 
has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. 
When we read  the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to 
protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. 
 
This conceptual enunciation that sovereignty is held by the people is not new and has 
been expressed in several constitutions that emerged from colonial rule.58 As Falk 
observes:59  
 
[I]f sovereignty is understood as inhering in the people, the idea of popular 
sovereignty that has been historically associated with the French Revolution, then in 
many situations the realization of human rights is precisely the political project being 
espoused by "the sovereign" (i.e., the people). Even if sovereignty is associated with 
the state as a representative of the people, particularly a democratic state, then it is 
still possible to conceive of sovereignty as a bundle of rights and duties that can be 
modified by the lawmaking powers of the state, thereby creating the possibility that 
the acceptance of human rights, even with the prospect of some external 
accountability, is a fulfilment of sovereignty under contemporary conditions. 
 
From this perspective the proposed regime is an exercise of empowering the people 
of South Asia to hold their countries accountable at a regional level for violations of 
democracy and human rights including in their policy choices. The regional apparatus 
containing a commission and an ombudsman will enable the people to challenge 
national governments at a regional level for the violations of their regional 
commitments. 
                                                           
57 Kofi Annan “Two concepts of sovereignty” The Economist (The Economist Newspaper Ltd, 
London, 18 September 1999). 
58 The Preamble of the 2nd Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka states: “WHEREAS it is the will of 
the People of Sri Lanka to establish a stable legal order based on a Supreme Law in the form of a 
Constitution which – Strengthens institutions of governance; assures a wider sharing of power; 
enshrines democratic values, social justice and human rights; facilitates economic, social and cultural 
advancement; and promotes peace, ethnic harmony and good governance; NOW THEREFORE, WE 
THE PEOPLE OF SRI LANKA in the exercise of our sovereign legislative power, do hereby give 
unto ourselves this CONSTITUTION.” In a similar vein Article 2. (1) stipulates: “In the Republic, 
Sovereignty is in the People and is inalienable.”  
59 Falk, above n 57.  
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Therefore, the legal regime espoused by the SAU will be premised on two parallel 
foundations, which are an expression of the sovereignty of the people of South Asia 
represented by their collective wishes and aspirations, and the universal validity of 
the human rights paradigm. Article 8 of the Bangkok Declaration observes that 
“while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of 
a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds.”60 This thesis acknowledges that diversity, and the new 
praxis will both take cognizance of intra-regional disparities in terms of economic 
strength, democratic maturity, and legal structures, and work towards common 
human development goals in the region. It will focus on the collective efforts and as 
well as each member state making a commitment to redesign the structures of 
governance, and reformulate, or create, legal regimes so as to enhance the objectives 
of the regional organisation particularly in relation to democratic governance, human 
rights and eradication of corruption.  
 
The common socioeconomic reality of the region is one of abject poverty and a lack 
of legal and political sophistication amongst the people, which the new praxis will 
take into consideration. The SAU will encourage the participation of civic 
organisations to litigate and make representation at a quasi-judicial forum that will 
promote the rights of the people. It will formulate new policies to foster avenues for 
meaningful participation of civil society in policy formulation, provide educational 
opportunities that increase the peoples’ consciousness on issues that affect their 
livelihoods, and end the culture of elite governance that has made the structures of 
democratic political processes all too often a meaningless mockery.  
 
 
6.6  The Charter of the South Asian Union for Human Rights, Development 
and Democracy (SAU Charter) 
                                                           
60 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the 
World Conference On Human Rights, Bangkok, 7 April 1993 (Pursuant To General Assembly 
Resolution 46/116 of 17 December 1991) UN Doc A/Conf.157/Pc/59 (1993) 
<http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=101629> (accessed 5 Dec 2006). 
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The constituting document of the South Asian Union on Development and Human 
Rights (SAU) will be the SAU Charter to promote regional solidarity, peace and 
social justice for all people in the region. Similar to Article 3(d) of the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, the SAU will promote and defend “common positions on 
issues of interest to the continent and its peoples”,61 particularly in relation to 
development, global trade and human rights. While the normative content of the SAU 
Charter will be based on universally accepted values of human rights it will also 
reflect regional exigencies, such as the need for democratic governance and equitable 
development. Therefore, the SAU Charter, while incorporating the rights that are 
contained in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, will also include the right to development 
and the right to democratic governance.  
 
The SAU Charter will also delineate the rules and the procedures of the regime, 
prescribe the specific organs of the SAU and their functions, and detail the methods 
of implementing the objectives of the Charter. 
 
 
6.7 The Objectives of the SAU Charter 
 
The objectives of the SAU Charter are to create a normative schema to resolve the 
sociopolitical and economic afflictions that prevail in contemporary South Asia. 
Therefore, the primary objective of the SAU Charter is the establishment of the rule 
of law that fosters functional democracy and respect for human rights. The collective 
identity of the regional coalition of states will also be able to create and establish 
practices to govern the contemporary globalisation process. More specifically, the 
objectives will be as follows:   
a) Good governance of globalisation and development in the region 
This study observed that the devastating human cost of globalisation could have been 
avoided with prudent policy choices that did not place economic growth and profit 
over social justice. The SAU will facilitate the member states to negotiate policy 
                                                           
61 Constitutive Act of the African Union Article 3(d) <http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article3> (accessed 16 Oct 2007). 
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selection with IFIs that is human-centred and promotes principles of social justice. To 
this end the SAU Charter will create the Commission on Good Governance of 
Globalisation, which will assist member states to negotiate aid and loan 
conditionalities.62   
 
b) Promotion of regional solidarity and territorial integrity and intra-regional 
conflict resolution 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the colonial legacy of regional conflicts still hinders 
cordial inter-state relations in the region. The SAARC adopted a myopic attitude 
regards regional conflicts by excluding bilateral issues from the mandate of the 
regional association. This study is of the view that bilateral conflicts hinder the 
overall progress and the prosperity of the region, and that the best avenue for bilateral 
conflict resolution is a regional forum. Therefore, echoing the Charter of the 
Organisation of the American States, all disputes between two or more states will be 
resolved amicably through good offices or negotiation and mediation.63 The SAU 
Charter, however, will go beyond Article 2764 of its OAS counterpart and will 
determine that all bilateral or multilateral conflicts will be resolved within three years 
though the assistance of the Governing Council of the SAU.65 When creating a legal 
regime to resolve issues this region has to take into consideration regional 
circumstances. The African continent, with a large number of states with long-
standing bilateral and multilateral disputes, had to consider a strategy based on a set 
of principles attempting to promote and consolidate peace and security in the region. 
                                                           
62 See section 6.13 of this chapter.  
63 Pacific Settlement of Disputes – Charter of the Organization of American States 
“Article 24 - International disputes between Member States shall be submitted to the peaceful 
procedures set forth in this Charter. This provision shall not be interpreted as an impairment of the 
rights and obligations of the Member States under Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.” “Article 25 - The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good offices, 
mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to 
the dispute may especially agree upon at any time.” 
“Article 26 - In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American States which, in the 
opinion of one of them, cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels, the parties shall agree 
on some other peaceful procedure that will enable them to reach a solution.” 
“Article 27 - A special treaty will establish adequate means for the settlement of disputes and will 
determine pertinent procedures for each peaceful means such that no dispute between American States 
may remain without definitive settlement within a reasonable period of time.” 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
64 Ibid Article 27. 
65 See section 6.10.1 below. 
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Therefore, with the objective of preventing and resolving inter-state conflicts the 
African Union adopted the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence 
Pact.66 This is an extensive document that deals with wide-ranging issues including 
situations of armed conflict. The present initiative is in fact one of several such 
attempts to deal with the “security challenges” that Africa faces.67 In South Asia, with 
far fewer states, though mutual distrust and bilateral tensions are rampant, the legal 
obligation to resolve bilateral and multilateral issues within a prescribed time frame 
on a peaceful basis will augur well for peace and security in the region. 
 
 
c) Consolidation of democratic governance based on transparency, 
accountability  and promotion of popular participation in governance  
Issues relating to the democratic deficit in South Asia were discussed in Chapter 4 of 
this study. This study endorses the caution expressed by Alston regarding the creation 
and recognition of “new rights”68 in the context of democracy. This study maintains 
that if the key conventional safeguards enshrined in representative democracy, such 
as parliamentary responsibility to the electorate, Cabinet responsibility to Parliament,  
separation of powers and judicial independence, are operational at optimum levels in 
South Asia the search for new paradigms to enhance democracy in the region is not 
required. There is a need for strict implementation of the familiar processes and 
values of representative democracy, which are already partially, but only partially, 
internalised in the South Asian psyche, as a means of rectifying the malfunctioning of 
the structures, and safeguards must be put in place for effective democratic 
governance. In this context the task of the SAU is to establish regional procedures 
that will implement the familiar safeguards just mentioned to enhance democratic 
governance and help citizens, politicians and public servants internalise the normative 
concepts of corruption-free representative democracy.  
 
                                                           
66 Assembly of the African Union, Fourth Ordinary Session 30-31 January 2005, African Union, 
documents Assembly/AU/Dec.55–72 (IV) and Assembly/AU/Dec.1–2 (IV). 
67 Omar A Touray “The Common African Defence and Security Policy” (2005) 104 African Affairs 
635–656. 
68 Philip Alston “Conjuring Up New Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control” (1984) 78 American 
Journal of International Law 607–621. 
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The SAU Charter will consider the promotion of democratic governance a 
fundamental tenet. Given the contemporary political climate of South Asia, it is 
unrealistic to demand functional democracy and respect for the rule of law as 
prerequisites from prospective member states to obtain membership in the SAU, 
unlike its European counterpart.69 Therefore, on a more pragmatic basis the SAU 
Charter, echoing Article 3 (f) of the OAS Charter, will consider that “The elimination 
of extreme poverty is an essential part of the promotion and consolidation of 
representative democracy and is the common and shared responsibility” of all 
member states of the SAU.70 The Charter of the SAU will mirror the mechanisms 
embodied in Resolution 1080 of the OAS and the Washington Protocol in situations 
of democratic lapses and will include provisions for the Council of Ministers of the 
SAU to convene and consider appropriate measures in situations of democratic 
disruptions.71 
 
d)  Consolidation of national mechanisms to combat corruption and foster a 
culture free from corruption 
The endemic corruption in the structures of governance and the limited success of 
national endeavours to combat it has been discussed previously in Chapter 3 of this 
study. The study identified a lack of common standards and effective complaints 
mechanisms that would curb corruption and provide information about corruption to 
independent investigative authorities, a lack which further aggravated corruption 
within South Asia.72  
 
The World Development Report’s empirical study of corruption and its devastating 
impact on poverty in 2000/2001 demands that corruption be viewed from a human 
rights perspective, since: 
 
“[t[he burden of petty corruption falls disproportionately on poor people … . For 
those without money and connections, petty corruption in public health or police 
                                                           
69 See Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 
<http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/> (accessed 5 Aug 2007). 
70 Article 3(f) <http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html> (accessed 5 Aug 2007). 
71 See Chapter 5 section 5.4.2 of this study. 
72 Transparency International Annual Report 2004 (Transparency International, Berlin, Germany, 
2004). 
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services can have debilitating consequences. Corruption affects the lives of poor 
people through many other channels as well. It biases government spending away 
from socially valuable goods, such as education. It diverts public resources from 
infrastructure investments that could benefit poor people, such as health clinics, and 
tends to increase public spending on capital-intensive investments that offer more 
opportunities for kickbacks, such as defence contracts. It lowers the quality of 
infrastructure, since kickbacks are more lucrative on equipment purchases. 
Corruption also undermines public service delivery.”73  
 
Rampant corruption as described in Chapter 3 subverts national initiatives to combat 
corruption through the creation of legislative mechanisms such as Bribery 
Commissions and Offices of Ombudsmen.74 
 
In this context, the SAU Charter proposes the establishment of an Ombudsman 
Against Corruption with quasi-judicial powers to investigate allegations of 
corruption.75 The office of the Ombudsman will liaise with national institutions to 
evolve strategies to combat corruption. 
 
 
e) Promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with universal 
human rights principles and eradication of poverty 
The SAU Charter’s provisions for human rights will echo universally acknowledged 
human rights but will also incorporate specifically the right to development. The 
SAU Charter, which will incorporate the rights enshrined in the ICESCR as well as 
the ICCPR, will follow the recommendation of the Limburg Principles:76 
 
[T]he obligation to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights requires 
State parties to move as expeditiously as possible towards the realization of the rights. 
Under no circumstances shall this be interpreted as implying for States the right to 
defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full realization. On the contrary all State parties 
                                                           
73 World Development Report for 2000/01: Attacking Poverty The World Bank 2001. 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:2019598
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74 Partha S Ghosh “Corruption in India” in Corruption in South Asia’ in KM De Silva, GH Peiris and 
SWR de A Samarasinghe (eds) ICES (Kandy Publication, 2002).  
75 See section 6.13 of this chapter. 
76 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights adopted 8 Jan 1987 UN ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum Rts 43rd Sess. Agenda Item 8 
UN Doc E/CN4/1987/17/Annex (1987), reprinted in “The Limburg Principles on the Implementation 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 122 available at <http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/instr/limburg.asp> (accessed 5 Oct 
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have the obligation to begin immediately to take steps to fulfil their obligations under 
the Covenant. 
 
As stated before, this thesis is of the view that it is no longer tenable to assert the 
progressive realisation of ESC rights on the basis of “available resources”. The SAU 
Charter instead, following the Limburg Principles, will expressly commit to and 
invite scrutiny of the “effective use of available resources” as described in the next 
paragraph, since any lack of systematic protection or apathy towards the 
implementation of obligations would render the ESC rights incorporated into the 
Charter meaningless. 
 
Therefore, the rights contained in the SAU Charter will go beyond the traditionally 
under-specified commitments to ESC rights and impose specific time-related targets 
of compliance in relation to ESC rights such as primary education, healthy 
environment and access to healthcare and shelter. These rights have been litigated 
with limited success in South Asia already, thanks only to champions of activism in 
the judiciary, and that aspect has been discussed in Chapter 1 of this study; the 
success expected under the new regime which actively commits to these rights and 
provides for their inspection will of course be much greater.77  
 
The significance of social, cultural and economic rights to the process of poverty 
eradication has been elaborated in Chapter 3 of this study. The concept of ESC rights 
that are justiciable through public interest litigation is familiar to the human rights 
jurisprudential culture of some of the South Asian countries.78 The evolution of the 
concept in South Asia is founded on the economic deprivation and sociopolitical 
marginalisation of vast segments of the community. In the context of abject poverty 
and social deprivation, “generational” rights which accord primacy to civil and 
political rights have little validity. The circumstance is best elucidated in Para 30 of 
the judgment in the case of C.E.S.C. Limited v. Subash Chandra Bose, by the 
Supreme Court of India: “To the tillers of the soil, wage earners, laborers, wood 
cutters, rickshaw pullers, scavengers and hut dwellers, the civil and political rights 
                                                           
77 See also S Gloppen “Public Interest Litigation, Social Rights and Social Policy” Paper presented at 
Arusha Conference New Frontiers of Social Policy 12–15 Dec 2005. 
78 See Chapter 1 subsection 1.7 of this study. 
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are mere cosmetic rights. Socio-economic rights and cultural rights are their means 
and relevant to them to realize the basic aspirations of meaningful right to life.”79  
 
In the above context this thesis reiterates that a disparate recognition of ESC rights is 
no longer tenable for it affects the enhancement and protection of all human rights. 
While the significance of having judicial mechanisms to enforce rights cannot be 
underestimated, in the particular sociocultural context of South Asia it is important to 
have concrete strategies to implement fundamental ESC rights, such as education, 
health care, shelter and minimum standards of living through quasi-judicial methods 
as envisaged by the SAU Charter. 
 
This study recommends that the South Asian Commission on Human Rights (SAC) 
should be the first step towards establishing a comprehensive human rights protection 
regime that would include a court at a later stage. As with the African regime of 
human rights protection a large amount of consolidation work has to be done at 
national level before a comprehensive regional legal mechanism can be instituted. 
The suggestion of a regional court at this point in time is premature in the context of 
member states that have yet to consolidate the national human rights protection 
regimes already nominally established. The quasi-judicial nature of the SAC has the 
attraction of a more broad-based reach that is not hampered by procedural 
requirements, affords easy access and is cost effective. 
 
 
f) Creation of avenues to challenge policy formulation by both national 
governments and global institutions, to ensure maintenance of sustainable 
environments, and to promote self-reliance, traditional knowledge systems 
and indigenous livelihoods 
This thesis acknowledges the significance of democracy and human rights for human 
development. Therefore, there is a need for positive synergy between economic 
development and investment in social welfare to see results of poverty eradication. It 
is at this point that pragmatic policy creation comes into play. There is no precise 
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means of scrutinising policy formulation for violation of universal human rights 
norms and this difficulty is acknowledged by Mary Robinson, who concedes that 
“[p]roblems of precision in how human rights standards can be applied in different 
policy making situations remain.”80 
 
The Human Development Report of 1990 observed that the “[d]eveloping countries 
are not too poor to pay for human development and take care of economic growth”,81 
intimating that choice of policy relating to development can remain in the exclusive 
domain of the developing world. However, as empirical evidence indicates, the 
freedom of policy choice is not always exercised wisely and poor prioritisation of the 
objectives by national governments results in large amounts of resources being 
diverted to military spending, ineffective parastatals, and a focus on global market 
integration at the cost of compromising the livelihoods of the rural peasantry, which 
in turn exacerbates poverty.  A topical example is the hosting of the Commonwealth 
Games of 2010 in India.82 In terms of the prioritisation of the concerns that need to be 
resolved by the Indian government, the Games must be regarded as secondary to the 
provision of education, healthcare and a long list of public expenditure.83 There is no 
effective forum in the present context for civil society to question such policy 
decisions of government, which frequently prioritises policy in an iniquitous manner. 
Non-prioritisation or poor prioritisation of issues and policies is a huge contributory 
factor to the mal-development of South Asia. 
 
Empirical examples cited in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study prove that the supposed 
existence of country-specific aid or conditionality is a currently a fiction in the 
context of South Asia as much as elsewhere in the global South. Policies are 
formulated with the uniform neo-liberal makeup, which prioritises the concerns of the 
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81 Human Development Report 1990 (UN Development Programme, Oxford University Press, New 
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IFIs, and individual countries are coerced into accepting them without protest.84 This 
thesis has also observed that the ideological leanings of the IFIs or the dominant 
development paradigm cannot be transformed through individual state resistance. It is 
in this context that a regional collaborative mechanism to negotiate the terms of 
engagement of development and globalisation with the IFIs and bilateral donors is 
envisaged.  
 
The SAU Charter, therefore, will provide for a mechanism of collective bargaining 
through the Commission of the SAU to provide assistance in negotiating policies and 
aid conditionalities. It is envisaged that collectively through the regional organisation 
the conditionalities attached to development assistance and loans that are not 
compatible with South Asia’s commitment to values of human rights, equity and 
social justice can be resisted. 
 
To achieve the specified objectives cited above the SAU will comprise a non-
politicized Governing Council that will be at the apex of the framework of the 
regional apparatus, sitting above a Secretariat that would service all the organs of the 
SAU, and in turn a SAU Commission on Human Rights, Development and 
Democracy and, at the same level, an Ombudsman Against Corruption. The 
Commission of the SAU will have three Sub-Commissions that will focus exclusively 
on development, democracy and human rights respectively, these being crucial goals 
of the region. As an embryonic regional mechanism it is envisaged to keep its 
structure and organs simple to garner state support and commitment to the objectives 
of the SAU Charter. To implement the mandate of the Charter these organs of the 
regional mechanism will have both quasi-judicial powers and administrative powers. 
The following sections of this study will elaborate on the composition, the mandate 
and functions of each organ of the SAU.  
 
 
6.8 The SAU Governing Council 
                                                           
84A Marshall, J Woodroffe and P Kjell ”Policies to roll-back the State and privatise? Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers investigated. Do PRSPs constitute progress?” WIDER Development 
Conference on Debt Relief, 2001. 
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The Governing Council of the SAU will reflect a fusion of the powers, and the 
mandate, of the following organs of the OAS: the General Assembly, the Governing 
Council and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.85 The 
Governing Council will comprise three members who are nominated from each 
member state and it will constitute the supreme governing body of the Organization. 
The members of the Governing Council will be nominated by the member states and 
will hold office for a period of five years serving in their personal capacity.86 The 
member states will have the power of nominating persons other than their own 
nationals to serve on the Council. In this sense the nature of the governing body of 
the SAU will be different from that of the African Union, where the Executive 
Council comprises the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for each member state.87 The 
SAU will depart from this position as such a membership would politicise the 
governing body of the regional union and subvert the overall objectives of the SAU. 
Such politicisation of the governing body would be detrimental to the viability of 
SAU in the context of the national political scenarios of member states such as 
Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, where democratic governance is not functional. 
 
The Head of the Governing Council will be the President of the SAU, who will be 
appointed to office for a five-year term by the members of the Governing Council of 
the SAU. The Charter of the SAU, reflecting the basic spirit of the Paris Principles, 
will define the powers and functions of the President. Each member state will have 
the right of nominating a President on a rotational basis.  
 
As the governing body of the SAU, the Council will have a mandate to oversee the 
functions of its organs. The Council will be entrusted with the formulation of policy 
                                                           
85 Articles 54 to 69 of the Charter of the OAS. 
<http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/overview.asp> (accessed 26 Oct 2007). 
86 Taking into account the political reality of the subcontinent, a certain flexibility regarding the 
method of the appointment of members to the Governing Council is required. The SAU Charter will 
specify that the three nominations from each member state should be made by the national legislatures 
of each state and be endorsed by the Head of State of each. In member states without functional 
democracy, and until democracy is established, the nominations to the Governing Council can be made 
by the Head of State. 
87 Article 10 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
<http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/organs/Executive_Council_en.htm> (accessed 4 Feb 2006). 
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based on the objectives of the SAU Charter, monitoring the progress of the SAU 
objectives, introducing new areas of collaboration and the general overview of the 
organisation.88 In this regard the Governing Council will be responsible for the 
scrutiny of initiatives that are undertaken by the SAU Secretariat and the Commission 
to achieve the objectives of the SAU Charter. 
 
As the preceding analysis indicates, intra-regional insecurities are a source of ongoing 
tension and bilateral conflict.89 Article X.2 of the SAARC Charter, which stipulated 
that “[b]ilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations” of 
the organization, will be abandoned and instead a clause to the effect that “bilateral 
disputes shall be resolved by peaceful means under the aegis of the SAU Commission 
and the Governing Council” will be incorporated into the SAU Charter. A member 
state will be required to bring to the cognizance of the SAU Commission any bilateral 
or multilateral issues that need peaceful resolution. 90  Initial efforts at dispute 
resolution will be carried out in the SAU Commission and failure to settle will result 
in alerting the Governing Council of the SAU. The Governing Council will have the 
authority to compel the member states to resolve the issue amicably and, in the event 
of a failure to do so, to urge the disputing states to refer the dispute to international 
arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. Such a process is necessary 
because it provides an opportunity for member states to resolve their disputes 
promptly and through peaceful means, which is essential for the enduring legitimacy 
of the regional organization.91  
 
Mirroring the requirements of Article 42 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights,92 the Charter of the SAU will require the member states to submit reports on 
                                                           
88 Largely similar to Article IV of the SAARC Charter <http://www.saarc-
sec.org/data/docs/charter.pdf> (accessed 4 Feb 2006). 
89 See Chapter 4 of this study; see also Rob Johnson A Region in Turmoil: South Asian Conflicts Since 
1947 (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2005). 
90 See section 6.10 of this chapter. 
91 Beth V Yarbrough and Robert M Yarbrough “Dispute Settlement in International Trade: 
Regionalism and Procedural Coordination” in Edward D Mansfield and Helen V Milner (eds) The 
Political Economy of Regionalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1997) 134–135. 
92 “Article 42 -The States Parties shall transmit to the Commission a copy of each of the reports and 
studies that they submit annually to the Executive Committees of the Inter American Economic and 
Social Council and the Inter American Council for Education, Science, and Culture, in their respective 
fields, so that the Commission can watch over the promotion of the rights implicit in the economic, 
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the status of human rights within each member state to the SAU Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights.93 The Sub-Commission will review the Annual Reports on the status 
of human rights and will make recommendations to the Governing Council in relation 
to measures in place to promote and protect human rights. In situations of gross 
violations of human rights, or the establishment of inadequate or dysfunctional 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights within member states, the Governing 
Council will have the mandate  under the SAU Charter to create an ad hoc committee 
of “eminent persons” to visit individual member states to evaluate human rights 
conditions.  
 
The Governing Council will determine the means and methods of coordinating the 
activities of the SAU, its interactions with the United Nations and other regional and 
international bodies. The SAU Charter will abandon one of the fundamental 
debilitating features of the SAARC Charter, namely that it demanded unanimity in 
decision-making.94 In terms of the decisions of the Governing Council the SAU will 
instead align itself with Article 11 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union95 and 
state that the decision of the Governing Council will be by unanimous consensus but 
in the absence of unanimity it will be by a simple majority.   
 
 
6.9 SAU Secretariat 
 
As stated earlier, the greatest significance of the SAU will lie in its implementation 
mechanisms. As with the OAS Secretariat96 and the African Union Commission,97 so 
the SAU Secretariat, which is the administrative organ of the regional mechanism, 
will facilitate the implementation of the objectives of the SAU Charter. The SAU 
                                                                                                                                                                     
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of 
American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.” 
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm> (accessed 7 Nov 
2007). 
93 See section 6.10.1 of this chapter.    
94 “Article X.1. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.” <http://www.saarc-
sec.org/data/docs/charter.pdf> (accessed 4 Feb 2006). 
95 <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm> (accessed 4 Feb 2006). 
96 Article 112 of the OAS Charter. 
97 Article 20 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union <http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article10> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
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Secretariat, similarly to its counterpart in the OAS, will be entrusted with the 
functions relating to issuing notices to member states convening the Permanent 
Council, the preparation of rules of procedure, the functions relating to the budget, to 
being the custodian of documentation relating to the Governing Council proceedings, 
to being the depository of the SAU treaties and conventions, the preparation of the 
annual reports of the SAU and the establishment and the maintenance of relations 
with national and international organisations.  
 
The SAU Secretariat will be headed by a Secretary General who will be appointed for 
a fixed term of office of four years by the Governing Council on the nomination of 
member states. Six Deputy Secretaries General will be appointed by the governing 
Council to assist the Secretary General with the functions of the Secretariat. 
 
The functions of the Deputy Secretaries General will take the form of the Specialised 
Technical Committees of the African Union.98 The scope of the functions of the 
Deputy Secretaries General will essentially be administrative and to provide technical 
assistance to coordinate policy formulation in the specific areas cited below. Taking 
into consideration the socioeconomic exigencies of the region, the core areas that 
would need such technical and administrative coordination would be:   
 
a) Agriculture, Environment Healthcare, Education, Women and Children; 
Poverty Eradication 
b) Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Information and 
Communications Technology, Transport, Infrastructure Development, 
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment , Intellectual Property Rights, Tourism 
c) Multilateral and Bilateral Aid, Developmental Loans, Aid and Loan 
Conditionalities, IFI Policy Negotiation  
d) Democracy Consolidation  and Intra-Regional Conflict Resolution 
e) National Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms and Assistance with 
International Human Rights Treaty Ratification 
 
                                                           
98 Article 14 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union <http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm#Article10> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
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The Deputy Secretaries General will coordinate and enhance the work undertaken in 
each of these areas in consultation with the specialised Sub-Commissions of the 
regional mechanism. This thesis acknowledges that a certain amount of regional 
consensus and norm creation has been achieved in areas such as food security, the 
suppression of terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking of children, women and 
prostitution, intra-regional tariff reduction and regional trading by SAARC.99 The 
SAU will consolidate these areas of cooperation and make these regimes more 
efficient. 
 
 
6.10 South Asian Commission on Human Rights, Development and 
Democracy (SAU Commission)  
 
The South Asian Commission on Human Rights, Development and Democracy will 
essentially reflect the mandate and powers of the OAS Permanent Council.100  
 
The SAU Commission will also include three Sub-Commissions in the following 
areas: human rights, democratic governance and developmental policy formulation. It 
is to be noted that the latter will also be referred to as the Sub-Commission on Good 
Governance of Globalization. The Commission and the Sub-Commissions will be 
headed by a Commissioner who will be appointed by the Governing Council of the 
SAU from a list of candidates nominated by the member states. Following Article 34 
of the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, the Commissioners appointed 
“shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the fields” of 
                                                           
99 Agreement on establishing SAARC Food Security Reserve (signed in Kathmandu 4 November 
1987); Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) (signed in Dhaka on 11 April 
1993); SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (signed in Kathmandu on 4 
November 1987); and Additional Protocol (signed in Islamabad on 6 January 2004); SAARC 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (signed in Malé on 3 November 1990); 
SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating the Trafficking in Women and Children for 
Prostitution (signed in Kathmandu on 5 January  2002); SAARC Convention on Regional 
Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia (signed in Kathmandu on 5 January 
2002); and the SAARC Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation. The Plan of Action on Poverty 
Alleviation was recommended by the Third Meeting of the SAARC Finance/Planning Ministers on 
Poverty Alleviation (Islamabad, 8-9 April 2002) and was approved by the Twelfth SAARC Summit 
(Islamabad, 4-6 January 2004) <http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?t=3.2> (accessed 4 Feb 2006). 
100 Articles 80–90 of the OAS Charter. 
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human rights, constitutional law and development.101 The Commissioners will hold 
office for a period of five years in their personal capacity.  
 
The main function of the SAU Commission will be the maintenance of friendly 
relations between state parties within SAU. It will also carry out the decisions and the 
recommendations of the Governing Council unless the implementation of the 
recommendations is assigned to another specific organ of the SAU. It will facilitate 
the relations between the SAU and other regional organisations, the UN and affiliated 
bodies, and the IFIs. In this respect the SAU Commission will be responsible for 
drafting agreements and memoranda of understanding between the SAU, the UN 
agencies and the IFIs. Such documents will then be submitted to the Governing 
Council for approval. The SAU Commission will collate and study the reports 
submitted by the Sub-Commissions and the Ombudsman Against Corruption and 
make necessary recommendations to the Governing Council of the SAU. 
 
The Commission will be entrusted with the execution and monitoring of common 
regional policies and the formulation of regional treaties. While policy initiation will 
be the responsibility of the Governing Council, the Commission will conduct 
feasibility studies on the necessity, advantages and disadvantages and the likely 
repercussions of the proposed policies. The Commission will consult the Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) or NGOs and individual stakeholders and assess the 
economic, social and political implication of regional policies and advise the 
Governing Council of the SAU. It will be the responsibility of the Commission to 
facilitate discussion on the proposed policies and regional treaties at grass-roots level 
within the member states. With the rejection of Article X.2102 of the SAARC Charter, 
the SAU will incorporate the principle of subsidiarity as it operates in the European 
Union.103 The adoption of the principle of subsidiarity will enhance the promotion of 
the regional concerns while it will also safeguard notions of individual sovereignty, 
the latter having been a concern of member states at the inception of the SAARC. The 
                                                           
101 Article 34 of the Inter American Convention on Human Rights. 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2007). 
102 “X.2 Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations” <http://www.saarc-
sec.org/main.php?id=10&t=4> (accessed  Mar 2006). 
103 <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/european_convention/subsidiarity_en.htm> (accessed 5 Mar 2006). 
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justification for the inclusion of a mirror of Article X.2 is mainly to alleviate the 
insecurities of the smaller member states that feared intimidation by India and to an 
extent Pakistan given that the SAU will have jurisdiction  over bilateral issues.104  
 
The two main functions of the SAU Commission will be regional conflict resolution 
and the monitoring of the activities of the transnational corporations. 
 
 
6.10.1 Regional Conflict Resolution 
 
The Council will have a specific mandate to resolve issues relating to intra-regional 
conflicts and the promotion of democracy. The Council’s mandate to resolve disputes 
will largely reflect the mandate of the Permanent Council of the OAS.105 The Charter 
of the OAS stipulates that the Permanent Council shall encourage member states to 
maintain friendly relations. In the event of a dispute between member states the 
Commission shall “recommend procedures” for the peaceful settlement of the dispute 
including the setting up of ad hoc committees with the consent of the disputing 
parties. In the event of a failure to resolve a dispute between member states within a 
three-year time period, the Commission shall alert the Governing Council for 
resolution. 
 
After the Commission has referred the dispute to the cognizance of the Governing 
Council, the Governing Council will urge its resolution by peaceful means. If the 
endeavours of the Governing Council fail, the dispute will be in the first instance 
submitted to a Panel of Eminent Persons who shall be drawn from relevant fields and 
not be restricted to persons from the region.106 The Panel will determine the course of 
action to resolve the dispute, whether it is the use of good offices, investigation, 
                                                           
104 Padmaja Murthy “Role of Smaller Members in the SAARC Forum” Nov (1998) 22/8 Strategic 
Analysis November <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_98mup01.html> (accessed 12 Nov 2007). 
105 Article 84 to Article 90 of the Charter of the OAS. 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html#ch12> (accessed 5 Oct 2006). 
106 The idea of consulting groups of eminent people on sociopolitical issues is not new to the region. 
See Independent Commission on Dams <http://dams.org/news_events/press291.htm> (accessed 15 Sep 
2007). 
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direct negotiation, mediation, or conciliation. In the event that the dispute is not 
resolved the option of arbitration or judicial settlement will be made available.  
 
 
6.10.2  SAU Monitoring Panel on TNC Activity  
 
There is an urgent need for regulation of the activities of TNCs as elaborated in 
Chapter 4 of this study, for they can intimidate smaller or economically weak 
countries. As discussed, TNCs exercise an enormous influence over local laws and 
policies that directly affect human rights, which range from unfair treatment of 
employees in breach of labour regulations, exploitation of natural resources and the 
pressuring of governments to quell labour unrests. The conduct of TNCs can also 
have a dramatic impact on poverty, either by directly undermining human welfare 
(for instance, limiting a community's access to land or food) or influencing relevant 
government policies and laws.  
 
As the previous discussion indicated there cannot be a meaningful realisation of ESC 
rights if TNCs are allowed to operate with impunity to national laws. The SAU 
Commission has a significant role to play in this aspect by formulating guidelines and 
helping initiate national laws to control the activities of TNCs. The SAU Commission 
will function as an auditing body to evaluate TNC operations in the region and to 
monitor whether their activities are within the spirit of the SAU objectives. Violations 
of SAU objectives by TNCs can be queried by the Commission and disputes will be 
referred to a Panel of Independent Experts for resolution. 
 
 
6.11  SAU Sub-Commission for Human Rights  
 
Echoing the Statute of the Council of Europe at Article 3, the SAU Charter will 
require every member state to accept the “principles of the rule of law and of the 
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms…”107  However, unlike the Council of Europe, the SAU does not have the 
luxury of stipulating preconditions relating to the rule of law or human rights with 
regard to prospective member states. In order to prevent backsliding, however, the SAU 
charter will stipulate that once democracy and the rule of law is established it is a legal 
obligation to maintain democratic governance and respect for human rights and that no 
member can derogate from this legal obligation. 
 
The SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights will be the conventional human rights 
advocacy and implementation unit of the regional mechanism. It will reflect the role 
and the function of the OAS Commission on Human Rights, “whose principal 
function shall be to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to 
serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters.”108 The SAU 
Charter shall be explicit in terms of the mandate of the Human Rights Commissions 
at both regional and national level. The functions of the Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights will be an amalgamation of that of the Human Rights Commission under the 
OAS and the European Commissioner for Human Rights, which was introduced to 
the Council of Europe human rights protection mechanism in 1998, replacing the 
Human Rights Commission.109  
 
Similarly to Article 46 of the Inter American Convention on Human Rights, the SAU 
Sub-Commission for Human Rights will be empowered to disseminate information 
on human rights among the people in the region, to promote legislation and 
constitutional measures to promote human rights among member states, and to 
monitor human rights implementation in the region.110 As with the mandate of the 
Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner, the SAU Sub-Commission for 
Human Rights will identify shortcomings in the legislation and practice of member 
states.  
                                                           
107 Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=001&CM=1&CL=ENG> 
(accessed 12 May 2007). 
108 Article 10 of OAS Charter <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html#ch15> (accessed 20 
Oct 2007). 
109 Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights <www.coe.int> (accessed 20 Nov 2007). 
110 Article 41 - American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36 1144 UNTS 123 
entered into force 18 July 1978 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm> (accessed 20 
Oct 2007). 
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Despite the widespread knowledge and acceptance of international human rights few 
of the South Asian countries under consideration have constitutional guarantees of 
human rights.111 Only India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives have independent 
functional institutions to receive complaints and offer redress on human rights 
issues.112 Pakistan has presented a Bill in Parliament to create a National Human 
Rights Commission in 2005 which is yet to materialise.113 The restrictive mandate 
and the implementation of the recommendations of the Commissions are inherent 
problems in these institutions. The SAU Charter will stipulate that the existing human 
rights commissions will come within the purview of the SAU Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights. The national human rights commissions can seek assistance and 
guidance for effective functioning from the SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights. 
The SAU Sub-Commission will draw strength from the existing national 
commissions, taking advantage of their established legitimacy in cases where they 
enjoy this (at other times their legitimacy has been contested and functioning 
threatened), 114  and will initiate processes to establish national human rights 
commissions in member states that do not yet possess them. As the task of 
establishing national human rights commissions falls within the purview of the 
Secretariat, the Sub-Commission for Human Rights will supervise the time-related 
framework for establishing new commissions and enhancing the competence of the 
existing commissions.  
 
The initiative for the establishment of a national human rights commission and the 
administration of the existing human rights commissions will be allocated to the Sub-
Commission on Human Rights, a measure that will enhance the legitimacy of the 
                                                           
111 See Chapter 2 of this study. 
112 National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Court 
were established in India in pursuance to the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. The National 
Human Rights Commission in Nepal was established under the Act of 1997, as an independent 
autonomous statutory body.  Similarly the Human Rights Commission in Sri Lanka was established in 
March 1997 under the Human Rights Commission Act of 1996. Maldives’ Human Rights Commission 
is the latest addition, created in 2003. 
113 Amnesty International Document - Pakistan: Recommendations for an effective National Human 
Rights Commission. Recommendations for an effective National Human Rights Commission 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/019/2005/en/339bfc7d-a2f5-11dc-8d74-
6f45f39984e5/asa330192005en.html> (accessed 8 Mar 2008). 
114 See n 116 below. 
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national commissions. Any issues or disputes related to the functions and operations 
of national human rights commissions and the appointment of commissioners would 
be resolved by the Sub-Commissioner for Human Rights in consultation with the 
relevant member state. This is especially relevant in an environment when the 
national human rights commissions are failing to garner credibility both 
internationally and nationally.115  
 
 The SAU Charter will maintain the spirit of the advancements made through judicial 
activism in the region through public interest litigation. Therefore, affected 
individuals and interested parties in the form of both individuals and CSOs will have 
the right to petition the national commission initially and the regional Sub-
Commission in an appellate capacity against the violations of human rights enshrined 
in the SAU Charter.116 Taking into consideration the nascent procedures relating to 
advocacy regarding human rights violations within the member states, the SAU 
Charter will not be as restrictive as Article 46 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.117 The Charter will stipulate that any violation must be brought into the 
cognizance of the respective national human rights commission irrespective of 
whether other avenues for rights having been explored or exhausted. Time restrictions 
in relation to submitting violation petitions will be set aside until the Sub-
Commission for Human Rights is satisfied that the people in the region are 
sufficiently familiarised with rights complaints procedures. The Sub-Commission for 
Human Rights shall supervise the implementation of the recommendations of the 
national commissions through a mechanism of biennial reporting. There shall be a 
right of appeal from the national commissions to the SAU Sub Commission on 
Human Rights which includes a request for intervention when the recommendation of 
the national commission is not implemented. 
 
                                                           
115 “Sri Lanka: Human Rights Commission Downgraded” Human Rights Watch  (no author given) 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/18/slanka17581.htm> (accessed 10 Dec 2007). 
116 Similar to Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights OAS Treaty Series No 36, 
1144 UNTS 123, entered into force 18 July 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human 
Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). 
117 Ibid, Article 46. 
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The SAU Charter will echo Article 62 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, and require state parties to submit every two years a report on the legislative 
or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the SAU Charter. The Sub-Commission on Human Rights will 
scrutinise the reports and make recommendations to member states for implementing 
the Charter rights. Failure to implement these recommendations shall result in the 
member states being reported to the Governing Council of SAU, who shall call for 
explanation from the member state. Continuous non-compliance will result in a series 
of repercussions ranging from a “naming and shaming” campaign to economic 
sanctions against offending states. 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has created several 
mechanisms termed “human dimension” to ensure that member states adhere to the 
human rights and democracy commitments they have undertaken under the Charter of 
the OSCE. The SAU Charter will also provide a mechanism based on the Vienna 
Mechanism of the “human dimension” mechanisms of the OSCE in Europe, which 
enables participating states, through an established set of procedures, to raise 
questions relating to the human dimension situation in other OSCE States.118 Such 
queries by a member state will be first communicated to the Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights, which will raise the issue with the member state concerned. Such a 
provision will assist in the establishment of a normative standard of human rights in 
the region. 
 
 
 
6.11.1 Ratification of, or Accession to, International Treaties 
 
One of the fundamental duties of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights will be to 
formulate guidelines and policies relating to ratification and the implementation of 
international human rights treaties. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, apart 
from India, Sri Lanka and Nepal few member states have ratified the core 
                                                           
118 <http://www.osce.org/odihr/13497.html> (accessed 19 Oct 2007). 
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international treaties on human rights119 or initiated legislation to give effect to these 
core instruments. Therefore, it is imperative that the Sub-Commission for Human 
Rights implements strategies that facilitate the ratification of, or accession to, treaties, 
without which it is impossible to build an enduring culture of human rights within 
member countries. 
 
As encouraged by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Sub-
Commission will be entrusted with the task of promoting and encouraging member 
states to ratify or accede to the international treaties on human rights.120  The 
Secretariat, in conjunction with the Sub-Commission for Human Rights, will initiate 
a programme and a database to monitor the ratification of, or accession to, the human 
rights treaties and will provide the necessary administrative backing to the member 
states for such ratification or accession. The Sub-Commission can facilitate the 
implementation of international human rights treaties at national level by providing 
expert guidance on establishing mechanisms to give effect to the international treaties.  
 
 
6.12  SAU Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance  
 
With South Asia’s notorious reputation as “one of the most poorly governed regions 
in the world, with exclusion of the voiceless majority, [and] unstable political 
regimes”,121 the second Sub-Commission of the SAU will be assigned the role of a 
democracy watchdog and will be responsible for the implementation of strategies to 
foster democratic governance in the region. Again, the luxury of stipulating 
democracy as a precondition to entry is not available to the SAU unlike its European 
                                                           
119 “SAARC’s Benchmarks Human Rights still a no go area” Human Rights Features HRF/162/07 31 
Mar 2007 < http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF162.htm > (accessed 19 Oct 2007). See also 
Appendix C. 
120 “Article 37. Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human 
rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in international human 
rights instruments, and their protection. The World Conference on Human Rights endorses efforts 
under way to strengthen these arrangements and to increase their effectiveness, while at the same time 
stressing the importance of cooperation with the United Nations human rights activities” 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument > 
(accessed 19 Oct 2007). 
121 The 1999 Human Development Report for South Asia The Crisis of Governance (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999); Maya Chadda Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, 
Pakistan (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2000). 
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counterpart. The OAS Charter 122  also requires adherence to principles of 
representative democracy as a requirement of membership and indicates 
repercussions for interruptions of democracy.123 As explained before, the erratic 
democratic culture of South Asia makes it impossible for the SAU creating document 
to stipulate such stringent preconditions. However, it can provide strategies to 
consolidate the normative quality of the right to democratic governance. In this 
context, the Sub-Commission will regard the tenets of good governance, as 
elaborated by Reif to be “a basket of many practices: a professional civil service, 
elimination of corruption in government, a predictable, transparent and accountable 
administration, democratic decision-making, the supremacy of the rule of law, 
effective protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a fair economic 
system, appropriate devolution and decentralization of government, appropriate levels 
of military spending”, to be the fundamental manifestations of democratic 
governance.124  
 
It is also important to move beyond the premise that democracy must be a mere 
aspirational goal and instead initiate time-bound conditions to achieve democratic 
governance within member states. Stipulations for democratic elections and the 
creation of legislation related to free and fair election procedures are especially vital 
in the context of the Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan, where the authenticity of 
democratic governance is questionable. In the case of Bhutan, which has taken 
tentative steps towards establishing democratic rule with a constitutional monarchy, 
the role of the SAU should be one of a facilitator.125   
                                                           
122 “Chapter II Article 3 of  the OAS Charter d) The solidarity of the American States and the high 
aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the 
effective exercise of representative democracy” <http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html> 
(accessed 4 Aug 2005). 
123 Chapter III Article 9 <http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html> (accessed 4 Aug 2005). 
124 LC Reif “Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
Good Governance and Human Rights Protection” Spring (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 17. 
125Bhutan's first national election produces a young crop of lawmakers Reuters Published: January 2, 
2008, International Herald Tribune, 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/02/asia/bhutan.php>(accessed 1 March 2008); “Democratic 
Bhutan: Sincere promise or a ploy?” Asian Centre for Human Rights Review (no author given, 4 Jan 
2006) <http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2006/106-06.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2007); Somini Sengupta 
Line Up and Pick a Dragon: Bhutan Learns to Vote  New York Times April 24, 2007 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/world/asia/24bhutan.html?_r=1&oref=slogin > (accessed 1 
March 2008); Bhutan votes in first elections Al Jazeera net. 
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In this regard, the SAU Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance can seek 
guidance from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 126  The Election and 
Democratization Section of the OSCE aims to strengthen democratic institutions and 
civil society under the Moscow Mechanism (1991, amended 1993). The Moscow 
mechanism enables missions of experts to assist in the resolution of a particular 
problem relating to democracy, elections or human rights within the member states. 
The underlying purpose of the Moscow Mission is the creation of a standard whereby 
the OSCE strives to assist member states dealing with issues of democracy, rather 
than isolating them and thus precipitating democracy backsliding. The Sub-
Commission on Democratic Governance will have the responsibility of assisting 
governments with the drafting of constitutional documents that enshrine the 
principles of democracy and the relevant legislation to regulate election procedures. It 
can locate the necessary expertise in the field by recommending panels of experts in 
the field of constitutional law to provide assistance to individual governments.127 
 
Each member state will submit a mandatory report on the state of democracy within 
each country every three years. Reporting systems have the benefit of attracting 
global attention regardingthe status of democracy128 and will create avenues for 
public debate. The report will include an evaluation of the progress and consolidation 
of democratic governance through constitutional and legislative means. The reporting 
system will be an opportunity to discuss issues such as the reasons for the 
postponement of elections, dissolution of Parliaments against the constitutional 
stipulations, amendments to constitutional provisions without following the required 
procedures and unconstitutional measures such as dismissal of judges or dissolutions 
                                                                                                                                                                     
<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9D86BF7E-CA89-44E8-B2D8-43A7AE5BD731.htm 
>(accessed 1 March 2008) 
126 <http://www.osce.org/> (accessed 17 Jun 2006). 
127 Panels of independent experts to assist in the drafting of constitutions have been used before, for 
instance in Iraq, Nepal, Zimbabwe and Fiji. 
128 The advantages of a reporting system have been questioned in the context of the AU regional 
mechanism where states fail to submit reports: see Makau Mutua “The African Human Rights Court: 
A Two-Legged Stool?” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 342–363.  Such procedural defects can be 
overcome with stipulations of mandatory submission and through the supervision of the submissions 
via the Council of Ministers.  
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of commissions appointed for the inquiry into bribery and corruption, which are all 
common occurrences in the region.129  In an era where concepts of good governance 
and democracy have gained global currency intentional deficit in these aspects will 
affect the country’s image in the global arena — something which many countries 
would wish to avoid.  
 
The Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance will also have a responsibility at 
grass-roots level for the education and promotion of democracy and its intrinsic worth, 
which will contribute to the consolidation of the normative value of democratic 
governance. Commenting on the consolidation of democracy in the developing world, 
Pinkney concedes that “[t]he justification for democracy has never been simply that it 
offers a better means of material advancement, but unless it can give voters 
something in return for their votes, no amount of philosophical argument about 
liberty, human rights, or political choice will ensure its survival. That is the challenge 
facing both third world governments and Western governments that proclaim a belief 
in democratic values.” 130  Therefore, public education and dissemination of 
information regarding governance, electoral rights, and election processes are 
implemented, there is an urgent need to initiate a norm-creating process on 
democratic governance in the region.  
 
 
6.12.1 Early Warning System for Democracy Breaches  
 
As reiterated above, consolidation of democracy will form a large part of the SAU’s 
work. As the culture of democracy is weak in the region, the SAU will first embark 
on an initiative that will encourage the member states to establish democratic 
governance nationally. Initially for a period of five years democracy backsliding 
within a state will not result in negative consequences implemented by the regional 
community. During this initial phase the negative repercussions, which would take 
                                                           
129 See Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. 
130 Robert Pinkney Democracy in the Third World (Lynne Reiner Publishers, Colorado, 2004) 6. 
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the form of excluding the delinquent state from agreements and organizations,131 the 
denial of visas to high-ranking officials or the withholding of aid and commercial 
restrictions, will not be resorted to by the SAU until a culture of democracy is 
initiated and inculcated. Such measures are regarded as unwarranted by this study as 
international reaction to democracy backsliding has proven to be fickle based on 
larger political agendas, as proven by the circumstances surrounding Pakistan. The 
mandate of the Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance will focus on creating a 
common culture of democracy in the region. 
 
After the democracy consolidation period, the SAU Covenant will stipulate stringent 
conditions including the above for deterring democratic backslides, as in the OAS 
Charter and as stipulated by the Commonwealth Organization.132 The monitoring of 
democratic backsliding and the responsibility of alerting the Governing Council will 
be one of the functions of the Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance. It will 
act as an independent unit with a mandate to monitor the democratic performance of 
member states and determine if breaches of democracy have taken place. Impartial 
monitoring of democracy breaches or backsliding in this manner will enhance the 
legitimacy of the commitment to democratic governance in the region. With regard to 
monitoring the democracy situation, the SAU Charter will contain articles similar to 
that of the OAS.133  
 
Imitating the Inter American Democratic Charter if a member state is situated in a 
predicament as stipulated by Article 17, where “the government of a member state 
considers that its democratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of 
power is at risk,” it can alert the SAU Sub-Commission for Democratic Governance 
for assistance. Similarly, if the Sub-Commission or the Governing Council is 
informed of an imminent democracy breach by a member state the Sub-Commission 
can offer necessary assistance to the affected member state. 
                                                           
131  Article 21 of the Inter American Democratic Charter. 
<http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm> (accessed 12 Nov 2007). 
132 See Chapter 5 of this study.  
133 Articles 17 to 22 of the Inter American Democratic Charter (Adopted by the General Assembly at 
its special session held in Lima, Peru, on 11 September 2001) 
<http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2007). 
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6.12.2 Election Monitoring 
 
Election rigging, corruption and violence at elections are all manifestations of 
dysfunctional democracy134 and they are an integral part of the current reality of 
South Asian politics. The recent election in Pakistan of 18th February 2008 is 
evidence of this predicament135 where the Human Rights Watch has claimed “[t]here 
have been numerous complaints of improper government assistance to the ruling 
party and illegal interference with opposition activities. But the election commission 
has done nothing significant to address these problems, raising serious questions 
about its impartiality.”136 
 
Despite periodic elections many have little faith in the legitimacy of the electoral 
process.137 There is an urgent need to create and monitor standards in relation to the 
whole electoral process commencing with the misuse of governmental resources and 
funds to finance elections, the abuse of the state apparatus for the benefit of the ruling 
parties, bribery of governmental officers who handle elections, bribery and voter 
intimidation, stuffing of ballot boxes and fraud in election results. International 
NGOs, such as the International Republican Institute,138 the National Democratic 
Institute,139 the OSCE140 and the Commonwealth Organisation regularly send teams 
of election observers to countries that request them. The Electoral Observer Missions 
under the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy undertake such observer missions 
within the OAS member countries.141 The SAU Sub-Commission on Democratic 
                                                           
134 Neil DeVotta “Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka” January (2002 ) 13 Journal of 
Democracy 84–98; Larry Jay Diamond “Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?” (2000) 11 
Journal of Democracy 91–106.  
135 Tariq Ali “Pakistan's plight” The Nation (11 Jan 2008) 
.<http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=17789&print_format=Y> (accessed 10 Feb 2008);  
136 Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. Pakistan: Election Commission Not Impartial 
Electoral Machinery Controlled by Musharraf Appointees, Human Rights Watch  
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/02/11/pakist18034.htm> (accessed 1 Mar 2008). 
137 David Dunham and Sisira Jayasuriya Liberalisation and Political Decay: Sri Lanka’s Journey from 
Welfare State to Brutalised Society (ORPAS, Institute of Social Studies, October 2001). 
138< http://www.iri.org/> (accessed 6 May 2007). 
139 <www.ndi.org > (accessed 6 May 2007). 
140< www.osce.org> (accessed 6 May 2007). 
141 See Chapter 5 of this study. 
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Governance can be the focal point which co-ordinates international observer missions 
for election monitoring. Election monitoring missions of the SAU can follow the 
process of Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Inter American Democratic Charter.142 
 
 
6.13 SAU Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation  
 
Pursuant to the need to contextualise development, the SAU will incorporate a policy 
filtering mechanism, which is envisaged to challenge policy proposals and 
formulation before they reach the implementation stage. It will echo the World Bank 
inspection panel but the emphasis will be to encourage only encourage challenges 
regarding policy formulation before implementation.143  In this context the mandate 
of the SAU Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation (which has also 
been referred to as  Sub-Commission on Development) is to scrutinise policy creation 
and implementation extending upwards towards monitoring the policy formulation of 
the international organisations and downwards towards the national governmental 
policy choices and implementation that affect ESC rights and human development. 
 
Many of the smaller South Asian states do not have the capacity or adequate 
resources for policy formulation which is truly representative of the needs of the 
country, or to resist development policies and conditionalities that are imposed on 
them. The Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation in this context is 
designed to be a filtering mechanism for policy formulation enabling stakeholders to 
evaluate the efficacy of policy. The stakeholders may include national governmental 
officials and segments of civil society, including individuals and NGOs. The lack of 
legitimacy in policy formulation due to the absence of public consultation can be 
avoided if the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation has the role of 
facilitator in the process. The co-ordinating role of the Sub-Commission on Good 
                                                           
142 Inter American Democratic Charter (Adopted by the General Assembly at its special session held in 
Lima, Peru, on 11 September 2001). 
<http://www.oas.org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm> (accessed 17 Oct 2007). 
143 < http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0 
menuPK:64129249~pagePK:64132081~piPK:64132052~theSitePK:380794,00.html> (accessed 26 
Oct 2006). 
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Governance of Globalisation will reduce allegations of civil society exclusion from 
participation in policy formulation, particularly the drafting of PRSPs, where public 
consultation is often reduced to an empty ritual 144  by both IFIs and national 
governments. Public debate on aid conditionalities and their inclusion into aid 
packages can help consolidate accountability and transparency in governance and 
minimise the sense of disenfranchisement experienced by the poor in the region. 
 
The SAU Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation would be vested with 
quasi-judicial functions to determine disputes in terms of implementing the spirit of 
the Charter between IFIs, bilateral donors and individual states. Specifically, it would 
take the form of a “pre-emptive arbitral panel” that would scrutinise the feasibility of 
specific developmental initiatives, such as the Narmada Dam project or fundamental 
policy changes like the water privatisation schemes or the health system overhauls 
that seek private-public partnerships, and which fundamentally affect the wellbeing 
of millions of people. Such a scrutinising process would enable policies to be 
evaluated in terms of feasibility at the blueprint stage rather than at the execution 
stage as often happens presently. Protests and resistance to major developmental 
projects at implementation stage contribute to an enormous wastage of resources, 
which could have been utilised elsewhere and prevented both human and 
environmental catastrophes. 145  The lack of prior public consultation, prior 
environmental impact assessments and long or short term schemes to address the 
socioeconomic consequences of massive developmental schemes, is an issue that 
South Asia needs to address urgently.146 However, most individual states in the 
region lack the institutional capacity and the expertise to address these issues 
nationally. 
 
                                                           
144 See Chapter 4 of this study. 
145 Jayantha Sri Nissanka “Litigation delays development” Sunday Observer (Sri Lanka, Sunday 22 
May 2005); Bobby Ramakant “Women Farmers Protest Reliance” SEZ 23 July 2007. 
<http://www.thesouthasian.org/archives/2007/women_farmers_protest_reliance.html > (accessed 10 
Feb 2008); Amnesty International Public Statement “India: Deaths in West Bengal during protest 
against new industrial project” 
<http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200042007?open&of=ENG-2S4> (accessed 10 
Feb 2008). 
146 A Aggarwal “Special Economic Zones: Revisiting the Policy Debate” (2006) 41 Economic and 
Political Weekly 4533–4536. 
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Similarly, within multilateral institutions the member states of the SAU can seek  
assistance from the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation of the 
regional union to make decisions and avoid situations where weak states can be 
coerced into decision-making.147 A strong regional body that carries the mandate of 
representing the region’s concerns would be able to resist such intimidation. The 
failed WTO meeting in Cancun in September 2003 where the ad hoc G20 coalition of 
states was able to unite on the issue of agriculture and resist the outcome favoured by 
the EU and the USA is an example where strong coalitions can resist policy decisions 
that adversely affect the developing world.148 
 
The justification for a regional mechanism which makes policy formulators 
answerable will have the following effect elaborated by Etienne Mureinik: 149 
 
[A]ny decision-maker who is aware in advance of the risk of being required to justify 
a decision will always consider it more closely than if there were no risk. A decision-
maker alive to that risk is under pressure consciously to consider and meet all the 
objections, consciously to consider and thoughtfully to discard all the alternatives, to 
the decision contemplated. And if in court the government could not offer a plausible 
justification for the programme that it had chosen … then the programme would have 
to be struck down … The knowledge that any government programme could be 
summoned into court for searching scrutiny would force its authors closely to 
articulate their reasons for dismissing the objections and the alternatives to the 
programme, and precisely to articulate the reasons that link evidence to decisions, 
premises to conclusion. The need to articulate those reasons during decision-making 
would expose weaknesses in the programme that might force reconsideration long 
before the need arose for judicial challenge.  
 
                                                           
147 Chossudovsky provides a typical example of intimidation at the time of formulating policy for the 
adoption of the WTO – the Marrakesh meeting in which the governments were literally coerced into 
accepting the creation of the WTO without any deliberation at national level. “In other words, the 
process of actual creation of the WTO following the Final Act of Uruguay Round is blatantly ‘illegal’. 
Namely a ‘totalitarian’ intergovernmental body has been casually installed in Geneva, empowered 
under international law with the mandate to ‘police’ country level economic and social policies, 
derogating the sovereign rights of national governments… . Moreover, the articles of WTO are not 
only in contradiction with pre-existing national and international laws, they are also at variance with 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Acceptance of the WTO as a legitimate organisation is 
tantamount to an ‘indefinite moratorium’ or repeal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 
Michel Chossudovsky “World Trade Organisation (WTO): An illegal organisation that violates the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 
<http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/doc/articulos/chossudovskye.html > (accessed 16 Feb 2005) 
148 Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie “The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and 
Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO” (2004) 27 The World Economy 947–966. 
149 Etienne Mureinik “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution” (1992) 
African Journal of Human Rights 464–474, 471. 
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Therefore, the scrutiny of policy prior to implementation will help in the creation of a 
culture of accountability within the governments of member states that would require 
the governments to justify their socioeconomic policies and priorities. Such a culture 
will provide the impetus to develop consistent policy that encourages wise 
investments and conserves resources necessary for sustainable development, and will 
also enhance transparency and accountability in governance.  
 
 
6.13.1 Pre-empting Human Rights Violations 
 
Mary Robinson reiterates the versatility of human rights commissions at national 
level and comments that they are a vital part of the “preventive strategies” that could 
be utilised to consolidate ESC rights regime, for:150     
 
[i]n the context of ESC rights I have become increasingly convinced of the 
necessity to focus on preventive strategies. This has convinced me of the 
importance of creating strong, independent national human rights institutions 
to provide accessible remedies, particularly for those who are most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged. Frequently these institutions are ‘human rights 
commissions’, … It is precisely their capacity to contribute substantially to 
the realization of individual human rights which makes independent 
institutions so significant.  
 
As the South Asian regime will focus on preventive strategies for human rights 
violations, the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation will have the 
mandate to appoint inspection panels to inquire into potential human rights 
violations.151 Such a situation may arise as a result of commencing developmental 
projects or policy changes that affect ESC rights, for instance the World Bank-funded 
                                                           
150 Mary Robinson “Human Rights: Challenges for the 21st Century” First Annual Dag Hammarskjöld 
Lecture (1 Oct 1998) (emphasis added), quoted in LC Reif “Building Democratic Institutions: The 
Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection” 
Spring (2000) Harvard Human Rights Journal 13. 
151 See Inspection Panels of World Bank 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL> (accessed 19 Jan 2007) 
and a discussion on its viability in the contemporary form in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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Sardar Sarovar dam project in India or the the Arun III Hydroelectric Dam Project in 
Nepal.152  
 
As elaborated in Chapter 4 of this study the success of the World Bank’s Inspection 
Panel has only been in “raising the internal profile and legitimacy of the broader 
package of minimum safeguard policies but it has not led to more targeted or 
institutionalised pro accountability reforms, such as credible sanctions for non 
compliant managers or staff.”153 Under anticipatory breach of human rights interested 
parties shall have the capacity to alert the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of 
Globalisation of potential occurrences of rights violations as a result of development 
policy implementation. This mechanism is aimed at preventing governments from 
embarking on action programmes that have the potential to violate human rights 
without conducting impact assessments. 
 
The mandate of the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation to 
investigate anticipatory breaches of human rights violations is to report on the 
anticipatory breaches to the SAU Governing Council. The Governing Council will 
have the mandate to act on the recommendations of the Sub-Commission and require 
policy changes or demand alterations of the proposed development schemes on the 
basis of potential human rights violations. 
 
 
6.14 SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption 
  
The SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption will be a separate organ of 
the SAU and will be on a par with the SAU Commission. The SAU Charter articles 
relating to corruption will reflect the regimes created by the 1996 Inter American 
                                                           
152 Lori Udall, World Bank Inspection Panel Independent Expert, USA. Prepared for Thematic Review 
V 4: 
Regulation, Compliance and Implementation Options. For further information see 
<<http://www.dams.org/> 
153 Jonathan A Fox “The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five Years” 1 July 2000 
Center for Global, International and Regional Studies Reprint Series Paper CGIRS-Reprint-2005-7. 
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Convention against Corruption,154 the 1997 EU Convention on the Fight Against 
Corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member 
States of the European Union 155 and the European Council Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption.156  
 
However, taking into consideration the social and political reality of the subcontinent 
and the need to create a regional normative framework against corruption, the SAU 
will create the post of a Regional Ombudsman Against Corruption157  with an 
overarching mandate to deal with national governments directly regarding allegations 
of bribery, corruption and administrative irregularities. The purview of this office 
shall be determined by a SAU Covenant while the office of the Ombudsman will 
have great flexibility and a considerable amount of independence to determine the 
procedures and the means of executing this mandate. The Ombudsman will be 
appointed for a five-year term by the SAU Council of Ministers and will have the 
capacity to entertain petitions alleging corruption from both individuals and interested 
parties from within member states. 
 
The Office of Ombudsman is a familiar concept to South Asia in the form of 
Lokayukta and the lok pal and the office has a long history pre-dating the colonial 
period.158 As opposed to the creation of a judicial body to combat corruption the 
Ombudsman will have several advantages. A quasi-judicial body in the form of an 
ombudsman is more suited to a region where the people of several member countries 
are unfamiliar with, and lack the resources for, lengthy and complex judicial 
proceedings, especially at regional level. Prosecution for corruption in South Asia is 
often cumbersome, expensive and detrimental to the person making the complaint.  
 
In his traditional role the Ombudsman is the repository of grievances against the 
malfunctioning of governance, of which corruption is one significant aspect.  The 
                                                           
154 <http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/treaties/b-58.html> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
155 <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33027.htm> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
156 <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
157 A comparable office exists under the South African Constitution. 
158 India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have varied versions of the classical ombudsman with 
varied mandates.  
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SAU Ombudsman Against Corruption will accept allegations of corruption and 
malpractice of government officials from both individuals and interested parties. The 
Ombudsman will carry out independent investigations into allegations of corruption 
and inform the national governments of the outcome. The SAU Office of the 
Ombudsman Against Corruption will be mandated to coordinate the national 
institutions initiated to combat corruption in the region. While national institutions 
dealing with allegations of corruption exist in most of the member states, 159 
mechanisms to ensure protection for persons exposing corruption (legal protection for 
whistle blowers) is very much an alien concept in South Asia.160 It will be the 
responsibility of the SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption, in 
conjunction with the SAU Commission on Development, Democracy and Human 
Rights to initiate programmes to encourage legislation to combat corruption and 
consolidate, and ensure the functioning of, the existing mechanisms to combat 
corruption in the region.  
 
 
6.15 Role of the Non-Governmental Organisations in the New Regional 
Mechanism. 
 
A wide range of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) both indigenous and 
transnational operate in a majority of the South Asian countries. Chapter 4 observed 
that civil society activism is still at embryonic stages in the region but the NGOs that 
are active perform a valuable role as observers and critics of public policy and are 
seeking an equitable developmental ideology.161 As Breen observes, “within the 
liberal paradigm of international law, international NGOs have been described as 
                                                           
159 Central Vigilance Commission of India <http://cvc.nic.in/cvc_back.htm>; Anti Corruption 
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helping to bridge the gap between law and policy, thereby becoming useful citizens 
of the global community.”162 This observation is especially relevant in the South 
Asian context where the civil society role in policy formulation is dysfunctional. The 
NGOs perform a useful function of evaluating the viability of policy and 
developmental schemes and of disseminating information to the public, including 
public education on the negative impacts of policy and developmental schemes.  
 
Many of the NGOs have a strong involvement in human rights and developmental 
issues. Therefore, the endorsement of NGOs often contributes to the legitimacy of 
policy changes and developmental projects. The United Nations recognises the 
valuable function the NGOs play in creating standards relating to human rights and 
has stipulated that:163 
 
Article 71 The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations 
concerned. 
 
It is on this basis that the UN Charter allocates a special consultative role to NGOs in 
relation to human rights issues, which is exercised through the Economic and the 
Social Council (ECOSOC).164 The consultative relationship with the NGOs is to 
“secure expert information or advice from organisations having special competence, 
and…. To enable international, regional, sub regional and national organisations that 
represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.”165 
 
Taking into consideration the valuable role the NGOs play in relation to both policy 
formulation and human rights standard setting, the SAU will enable the NGOs 
operating in the region to contribute towards achieving the objectives of the regional 
mechanism. It will be the responsibility of the SAU Secretariat to accord observer 
                                                           
162 Claire Breen “Rationalising the Work of the UN Human Rights Bodies or Reducing the Input of 
NGOs? The Changing Role of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations” (2005) 5 Non State Actors 
and International Law 101–126 (Breen). 
163 <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ > (accessed 20 Nov 2007). 
164 Breen, above n 161.  
165 ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, 49 UN.ESCOR Supp.(No1) UN DOC E/1996/31(1996) quoted in 
Breen, above n 161. 
  396 
status to the regional NGOs and CSOs on the basis of established criteria determined 
by the Secretariat, which will follow the guidelines formulated by the African Union 
on the same issue.166 South Asian Regional NGOs will have the opportunity to submit 
an application to be granted observer status in regional organisation. In making the 
application for observer status the NGOs will be required to abide by the “Guidelines 
for the Participation of NGOs in the SAU Process”, which will be drafted along 
similar lines to the Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society Organizations in 
OAS Activities.167  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5 of this study the innovative procedures relating to Social 
Action Litigation are recognised by this study as a creative  means of expanding the 
avenues available for the vindication of human rights. Using the conceptual 
innovations of Social Action Litigation, the SAU Charter will enable the NGOs who 
have been granted observer status to alert the national human rights commissions and 
the SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights about violations of rights protected 
under the SAU Charter. This process will be analogous to the American Convention 
on Human Rights Article 44,168 The European Convention on Human Rights Article 
25,169 and Article 55 of the African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights.170 A 
similar process is also available in the European Social Charter’s collective 
complaints process as observed by Wouters: “The 1995 Additional Protocol to the 
European Social Charter Providing a System of Collective Complaints includes as 
sources of such complaints those international NGOs in consultative status with the 
Council of Europe listed for this purpose, as well as national NGOs if the State in 
                                                           
166 “Criteria for Granting Observer Status and for a System of Accreditation Within the AU” July 2005 
<http://www.africa-
union.org/summit/JULY%202005/Observer%20Status%20Criteria%20as%20adopted%20-
%20July%202005.doc> (accessed 23 Jan 2007). 
167 <http://www.civil-society.oas.org/Pages/Registration_1_ENG.htm>(accessed 16 Oct 2006). 
168 < http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/charter.html> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
169 <http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
170 Article 55 ACHPR does not place any restrictions on who can submit cases to the Commission. 
This provision simply notes: “Before each session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list 
of the communications other than those of States Parties to the present Charter”. The Commission has 
interpreted this provision as giving locus standi to the victims themselves and to the victims’ families 
as well as NGOs and others acting on their behalf 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
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question has made a declaration to this effect when becoming a party to the 
Additional Protocol.”171  
 
Though the SAU Charter proposed in this thesis does not have a justiciable human 
rights mechanism comprising a Regional Court, the status of the amici curiae 
accorded to the NGOs in Court proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights 
under the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights will be operative in 
relation to the NGOs who support the complainants of human rights violations 
through the Sub-Commission on Human Rights as well as complainants of bribery 
and corruption to the SAU office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption.172 
 
 
6.16  Conclusion 
 
This introduction to this chapter summarized the argument from the first five chapters 
of the thesis. For a more condensed distillation of all six chapters, with meta 
comments as to themes, the reader is also referred to the separate Conclusion that 
follows this chapter. The task of the present section is to encapsulate the main points 
of the current chapter, albeit in the greater context of those chapters that preceded it.  
 
Following the introduction, in the next sections this study illustrated that a regional 
mechanism even in principle was legitimate within the terms of the United Nations 
and the global human rights regime. Numerous citations from UN documents showed 
that a regional mechanism was not only compatible with the rights regime but in 
places expressly contemplated by it. This legitimised the initiative of creating a 
regional mechanism for South Asia  the SAU, on lines proposed in the preceding 
sections. The specifics were derived partly from the models used in the Council of 
                                                           
171 Jan Wouters and Ingrid Rossi “Human Rights NGOs: Role, Structure and Legal Status” 2001 
Working Paper No. 14, Institute for International Law, KU Louven 9 November 2001; see also 
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints   
Strasbourg <9.XI.1995 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/158.htm> (accessed 26 Oct 
2006). 
172 See Articles 34 and 36 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
<http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html> (accessed 26 Oct 2006). 
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Europe, the African Union, the Commonwealth, and the Organization of American 
States, but were devised with special sensitivity to the needs of South Asia. 
 
The SAU was to be constituted by a Charter with the following objectives: (a) Good 
governance of globalisation and development in the region; (b) Promotion of regional 
solidarity and territorial integrity and intra-regional conflict resolution; (c) 
Consolidation of democratic governance based on transparency, accountability and 
promotion of popular participation in governance; (d) Consolidation of national 
mechanisms to combat corruption and foster a culture free from corruption; (e) 
Promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with universal human rights 
principles, and eradication of poverty; and (f) Creation of avenues to challenge policy 
formulation by both national governments and global institutions; maintenance of 
sustainable environments, and promotion of  self-reliance, traditional knowledge 
systems and indigenous livelihoods.  
 
Notably as regards (e) above, the human rights to be implemented and made 
justiciable were to incorporate ESC rights in accordance with the Limburg principles. 
The continuation and expansion of Social Action Litigation would also be 
encouraged with relaxation of rules as to standing, for instance, using a quasi-judicial 
jurisdiction. 
 
These Charter objectives were to be achieved by a structure derived partly from the 
best and most relevant practices identified from the other models in Chapter 5, 
particularly the OAS, and outlined as follows, “from top down”: at the apex, a non-
politicized Governing Council under a rotating Presidency; beneath that, a Secretariat; 
and beneath the Secretariat, at equal status with each other, the SAU Commission and 
the Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption. The Commission would have three 
Sub-Commissions as described below, but the recapitulation, for the purposes of this 
concluding section, begins with the Council. 
 
The Council would have the mandate to oversee the other organs, to formulate policy 
based on the Charter and to monitor the SAU’s progress towards the Charter 
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objectives. The Governing Council would also be alerted if the Commission failed to 
resolve disputes between members, whereupon it would have authority to compel 
member states to resolve the issue amicably on “pain” of referral to international 
arbitration or the International Court of Justice. So as to avoid paralysis, decision-
making of the Council would not require unanimity (as under the SAARC), though it 
would naturally seek it in the first instance. The Governing Council would 
additionally have the mandate under the SAU Charter to create an ad hoc committee 
of eminent persons to visit individual member states to evaluate human rights 
conditions. The SAU Secretariat would service the other organs and would also, 
among other things, accord observer status to the regional NGOs and CSOs on the 
basis of criteria of its own devising. 
 
The SAU Commission would have its own existence separate from its three Sub-
Commissions to be outlined below. In its own capacity it would, inter alia, be 
responsible for drafting agreements and memoranda of understanding between the 
SAU, UN agencies and the IFIs, before those documents went to the Council for 
approval. The Commission would also have the power to query violations of SAU 
objectives (including the protection and promotion of widely defined human rights) 
by TNCs, with disputes to be referred to a Panel of Independent Experts. 
 
The three Sub-Commissions would be (with equal status and here listed in no order) 
those on Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance of Globalization. The 
latter objective has also been described as the promotion of (equitable, human-centred) 
development. 
 
The Sub-Commission on Human Rights would be empowered to disseminate 
information on human rights among the people in the region, to promote legislation 
and constitutional measures to promote human rights among member states, and to 
monitor human rights implementation in the region.173 This Sub-Commission would 
both encourage the creation of national human rights commissions where none 
                                                           
173 Article 41 - American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36 1144 UNTS 123 
entered into force 18 July 1978 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm> (accessed 20 
Oct 2007). 
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existed and monitor the operation of such mechanisms in countries which had them. 
A right of appeal would lie from national commissions to the Sub-Commission. The 
Sub-Commissioner on Human Rights would be mandated to settle disputes with the 
national commissions. The implementation of the human rights mechanism was to be 
gradual and realistically staged. Eventually a comprehensive court would be created, 
but this was considered premature at present. 
 
Salient points of the Sub-Commission on Democracy were its early warning 
mechanism for breaches, its role in receiving three-yearly reports on the state of 
democracy in each country, and its additional function of monitoring elections. The 
Charter would, relevantly, build in the condition of a legal obligation to prevent back-
sliding in regard to democracy. 
 
Meanwhile, the mandate of the SAU Sub-Commission on Good Governance of 
Globalisation would be to scrutinise policy creation and implementation extending 
upwards towards monitoring the policy formulation of the international organisations 
and downwards towards the national governmental policy choices and 
implementation that affect ESC rights and human development. It would thus act as a 
policy filtering mechanism. This Sub-Commission would also have the mandate to 
monitor and report on apparent and potential breaches of human rights, most 
relevantly ESC rights. 
 
The Ombudsman Against Corruption was seen to have precedents not only in the 
European and Inter-American systems but also in traditional offices in South Asia 
itself. It was to have an overarching mandate to deal with national governments 
directly regarding allegations of bribery, corruption and administrative irregularities. 
The purview of this office was to be determined by a SAU Covenant but would the 
Ombudsman would have great flexibility and a considerable amount of independence 
to determine the procedures and the means of executing this mandate. The 
Ombudsman would be appointed for a five-year term by the SAU Council of 
Ministers and will have the capacity to entertain petitions alleging corruption from 
both individuals and interested parties from within member states. 
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After this summary of the proposed regional praxis, several points should now be 
noted so as to locate Chapter 6 in the wider context of the thesis. Chapter 6 sets out 
one, vital but not exclusive, level of “prescription” to the ills besetting the seven 
countries studied in South Asia. It does so on the basis of a “diagnosis”, as it were, 
made in the first four chapters and applying the evidence collected in Chapter 5 as to 
the best and most appropriate approaches used elsewhere. The mechanisms of the 
new autochthonous regional praxis thus represent one creative response that applies 
the critical thinking that has gone before. The scope of this critical thinking was 
necessary in order to analyze the multiple, complex causes and dynamics of the 
present problems facing these seven countries of South Asia with the necessary 
understanding of their civilizational backgrounds and traditions, and their modern 
history. These backgrounds and histories have included idiosyncrasies of the 
individual states, their regional commonalities, and their place in the larger South-
North context, all of which have been shown to be relevant context.  
 
More broadly, contextualization has been a key theme overarching the whole thesis, 
which balances general but relevant principle with specific but important detail. Most 
obviously the study has recognized the need to contextualize rights. It has also noted 
that one flaw of the neo-liberal approach taken by the IFIs has been its assumption 
that “one size fits all”, ignoring the significant differences of context.   
 
The place of the present chapter in context is thus as follows. It sets out what can be 
seen as a multi-pronged response to the seven countries’ problems at the regional 
level. Both the prongs and the level of operation are consonant with the context of the 
rest of the thesis, as follows. To start with the “prongs”, three of these are most 
conveniently represented by the three Sub-Commissions of the SAU, on human rights, 
democracy and development (or good governance of globalization) respectively. 
These promote three key values that the thesis has expressly espoused elsewhere. The 
governance of globalization is also ensured by the steps as spelt out above which 
were to be taken to confront the IFIs, as well as South Asia’s bilateral or multilateral 
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partners and the TNCs. Moreover, the need to actively govern globalization has been 
a recurring theme of the thesis, heralded by the opening words of its title.  
 
The fourth main prong of the SAU can be represented by the Ombudsman Against 
Corruption. This thrust, too, is consonant with the rest of the thesis. It can properly be 
seen as shoring up the rule of law which is necessary for functional democracy, as 
well as preventing the diversion of resources from development and the erosion of 
human rights. The other key prong can be seen as being the promotion of pacific 
settlements to bilateral and national conflicts. This fits with the espousal by the thesis 
of the need for both peace and security, as evoked by the words earlier quoted from 
Kofi Annan. 
 
Finally, the place of regionalism needs to be recalled. Like the multiple prongs of this 
regional mechanism, the mechanism’s very nature as a regional entity is compatible 
with the rest of the study. Regionalism was seen to be both compatible with, and 
complementary to, the global tier of the universal human rights regime, with the 
mixed status of the latter as so-called hard and soft international law. The mechanism 
of the SAU has sought to give that regime, where dismissed as soft or purely political 
and aspirational, more and harder bite, thus notably making rights of all kinds 
justiciable and holding IFIs and TNCs accountable to them, for instance. The regional 
mechanism has in the same breath indicated its relationship to the malign neo-liberal 
influences of the global economic regime (so far more powerful than the rights 
regime), which consists precisely of the IFIs as prime public agents but feeds directly 
into the operation of their private epiphytes, the TNCs.  
 
Finally, regionalism fits with the ability and responsibility of governments to act at a 
national level, for their own peoples, rather than in obsequious deference to 
stakeholders in global neo-liberalism. National commissions of human rights are thus 
encouraged, for instance, as are other domestic legislative mechanisms to implement 
treaties and to regulate the operations of TNCs. Thus, in a post-Westphalian world of 
abridged sovereignty, the states nevertheless retain more capacity than they might 
have realized to resist hegemony and to craft their own destinies, especially by 
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forming alliances along the lines of the SAU proposed. As such, a regional 
mechanism does not do away with states’ authority, but allows them strength in 
numbers. The enshrining of that regime in law rather than relying on market 
economics or pure politics maximizes its strength. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“And what is the argument for the other side? Only this that no case has been found in which 
it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do 
anything, which has not been done before we, shall never get anywhere. The law will  
stand still while the rest of the world goes on and that will be bad for both”1 
 
This study was a journey in search of a pragmatic but just solution, through law, to 
the empirical and theoretical poverties of human rights, democracy and development 
— poverties that disenfranchise, dehumanise and segment the people of South Asia. 
Guided thus by the quest for justice, but mindful also of the vital need for efficacy as 
well as legitimacy, the study has applied a broad range of tools to deal with the 
study’s widely varying intellectual tasks. These tasks have consisted of the following: 
documenting the material and other poverties of South Asia; analyzing their geo-
historical origins and their interrelationship, their causes and dynamics; interrogating 
greed and the neglectful, dysfunctional or exploitative use of power in all its 
manifestations, indigenous as well as imperialist; dissecting the failed regional 
response that is the SAARC; analysing and evaluating alternative regional and cross-
regional paradigms along with the overarching global mechanism of universal human 
rights; and, finally, formulating a new, specific, legitimate and effective regional 
mechanism ready to use alongside the global rights regime to address this 
multidimensional poverty.  
 
From the traditional legal toolkit the study has drawn particularly on human rights 
jurisprudence, legal history, constitutional law, public international law, comparative 
law and law and economics. However, where necessary it has also relied on other 
disciplines such as history, philosophy, political economy, and cultural and religious 
studies. An interdisciplinary approach was regarded as necessary to formulate an 
intellectually integrated and pragmatic legal praxis for South Asia in the high-speed 
swirling together of many sociopolitical, legal and economic currents irrespective of 
national borders that is the reality of the globalised world. 
 
                                                           
1 Lord Denning in Packer v Packer [1953] 2 AER 127, 129. 
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As the world’s most populous region with its greatest wealth being the people, the 
seven South Asian countries examined in this study have, for decades, exploited their 
most valuable resource and deprived them of their basic material necessities, 
responsible governance and human rights, rendering them impoverished. Sen’s 
observation that poverty is multidimensional has been crucial to this thesis; it relates 
to any severe, inequitable and avoidable limitation of human capability. Material 
impoverishment is nevertheless the most pervasive form, and brings with it many 
other dimensions. It is in this spirit that the thesis has framed wider denials of 
capability as “poverties”. Hence, the study has focussed on the poverty of functional 
democracy, the poverty of equitable development, and the poverty of justice itself. 
 
In examining the process of entrenching the structures of poverty, Chapter 1 of this 
study traced the evolution of the universal paradigm of human rights from the ancient 
Greco-Roman times through its Western trajectory to its contemporary (post-World 
War II) character, which is based originally on individualism and a right against the 
state. This chapter also reiterated that notions of human dignity and obligations of the 
rulers towards the ruled were present in the South Asian subcontinent’s own political 
and religious culture. The South Asian rights culture in fact received a boost through 
the exposure to the Western human rights discourse, particularly through the quest for 
self-rule independent from colonial rule, and social reformers in the early twentieth 
century relied on the egalitarian articulations of the Western rights discourse to 
discourage the repressive features and rights violations of the subcontinent’s own 
societies. The chapter concluded with the observation that, despite the elaborate 
constitutional proclamations and several mechanisms to institute national human 
rights, adherence to values of human rights is extremely low in South Asia. Social 
Action Litigation, which has emanated from a pro-active judiciary, primarily in India, 
has expanded the methods of addressing injustice in society. However, the very need 
for such action is symptomatic of the dysfunctional mainstream methods that are in 
place to safeguard the rights of the people, and it can only partially compensate for 
the dysfunctionality of such methods. This study observes the assertions of cultural 
relativism which dismisses the universal legitimacy of the mainstream paradigm of 
human rights but does so motivated more often by sociopolitical reasons rather than 
 406 
an altruistic desire to substitute with an alternative relevant vision of human rights. 
However, such critique has created a space within the mainstream paradigm to 
explore alternative means of vindicating the developing world’s concerns in relation 
to human rights against the backdrop of neo-liberal globalization.  
 
Solow, a Nobel prize winner for Economics, is said to have exclaimed that 
globalization is a marvellous excuse for many things2 and Chapter 2 explored the 
theoretical enunciations of the phenomenon and its manifestations. This chapter 
traced the historical stages of globalization and the manner in which the phenomenon 
contributed, during the colonial era, to the exploitation of previously self-sustaining 
people, particularly the destruction of their livelihoods and the integration of these 
communities to the global trading system and its capital markets, but at only the 
lowest rung.  
 
Though this study maintains that globalization is a content-neutral phenomenon, 
Chapter 2 highlighted how a particular version of it — the neo-liberal version — was 
promoted by the IFIs, especially under the Washington Consensus from the late 
1970s, as a panacea for the woes of the developing world. This version or brand was 
also sold as being both its best and its only viable form, through the assertion that 
“There Is No Alternative”. The iniquitous operation of this particular version of 
globalisation has exacerbated conditions of social marginalisation and material 
poverties, diminishing the orthodox role of the state under the inherited Westphalian 
model. The conditions of exploitation created by neo-liberal version of globalisation 
have provided an impetus for consolidated global activism, resulting in “globalization 
of the movement against globalization”.3 Chapter 2 stressed the need to build upon 
this resistance even further and to advocate alternative terms of engagement for South 
Asia if the benefits of globalisation are to be enjoyed by its people. 
 
                                                           
2 Quoted in Tomy Joseph “Human Rights and Poverty – The case of Musahars” in SN Chaudry (ed) 
Human Rights and Poverty in India Vol 4 (Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 2005) 289. 
3 John Powll United States Globalization as the Newest Expression of Racial Subordination: 
International and Intranational Evidence (International Council on Human Rights Policy, Geneva, 
2001) 8. 
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The poverty of development, particularly the inequitable manifestation of 
globalization that created effectively a global apartheid system, was the focus of 
Chapter 3. That is, the inherent inequity of neo-liberal globalization has contributed 
to the emergence of “new kinds of ethnic and racial minorities, and the persistent and 
growing inequalities between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ in a global economy”.4 
The chief public agents of the new version of the global apartheid were identified as 
the IFIs, and their policy instruments identified as SAPs and PRSPs. These policies 
mainly benefited the developed world and the TNCs, which were described as neo-
liberalism’s private agents and as the epiphytes of the IFIs. The concomitant 
withdrawal of the state from economic activities and its assumption of the role of a 
mere facilitator of the liberalisation process, was accompanied by cuts in the welfare 
system, and the elimination of subsidies, on the strength of the policy prescriptions of 
the IFIs. This, in turn, avoidably weakened the capacity of the states identified in this 
study, and many other developing states, to create policies that would not only benefit 
their own populations, but, perhaps more importantly, would not result in the 
complete abandonment of the already marginalised. The result of the IFI’s policies 
was to entrench the structures of poverty within the state whilst TNCs benefited from 
the newly globalised environment, which welcomed their presence in South Asia 
through relaxed taxation, labour law and intellectual property law regimes.5  
 
The impact of neo-liberal globalisation on governance was the focus of Chapter 4. 
This chapter discussed how the process of recipient states’ re-addressing of 
accountability to IFIs in terms of creation and implementation of policy has resulted 
in the abdication of the traditional, and proper, accountability of governments in 
South Asia to their own peoples. Images of “legislatures failing to legislate, 
governments rules by ordinance and the need for consensus and bargaining that was 
ignored in Parliament”6 were invoked to reiterate the democratic deficit in the region. 
The accompanying political dysfunctionality has prompted militant reactions by 
                                                           
4 Rodolfo Stavenhagens Structural Racisms and Trends in the Global Economy (International Council 
on Human Rights Policy, Geneva, 1999) 2. 
5 Vandana Shiva “Food Rights, Free Trade and Fascism” in Matthew J Gibney (ed) Globalizing Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 91. 
6 Samina Ahmed “The Fragile Base of Democracy in Pakistan” in Amita Shastri and AJ Wilson (eds) 
The post Colonial States of South Asia Democracy Development and Identity (Palgrave, New York, 
2001) 64. 
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various groups within South Asia, which has in turn led to cycles of violence 
compromising the very human rights that were in many cases legally “guaranteed” by 
states’ constitutions. Chapter 4 also explored the efficacy of the existing regional 
mechanism, the SAARC, to deal with the many poverties of South Asia. The chapter 
concluded that in many ways the SAARC has outlived its purpose, and that a new 
regional arrangement to deal with the contemporary exigencies of South Asia was 
urgently needed. 
 
It was with this purpose in mind that Chapter 5 sought “best practice” aspects of other 
regional mechanisms that have emerged to deal with issues that afflict other specific 
regions. This chapter examined firstly the Council of Europe which has created a 
regime of last resort in protecting the human rights of the people of the European 
member states. In the Americas, the study concentrated on the efficacy of the 
mechanisms which the OAS has established to consolidate and promote democratic 
governance. The subsequent analysis of the African system was aimed at evaluating 
the efficacy of a regional mechanism that operated against the backdrop of neo-liberal 
globalisation, pervasive poverty, poor governance and ineffective developmental 
endeavours. Finally, the Commonwealth initiative of consolidating democracy was 
discussed as an attempt at creating a normative standard of democratic governance 
within member states, which shared a common colonial history rather than 
geographic proximity. 
 
This thesis has reiterated that, unless there is a challenge to how the dominant 
paradigm perceives development, democracy and poverty, there will be no 
opportunities for alternative and more effective paradigms of poverty eradication and 
human development to emerge. The praxis that was advocated in Chapter 6 harnessed 
the pressures from the marginalised and the exploited to reformulate the mainstream 
development discourse. It attempted to build an alternative paradigm that locates the 
endeavours of development within a human, social and political context that is 
relevant to South Asia. The proposed praxis addressed the development discourse to 
the needs of the marginalised and disenfranchised segments of society in South Asia 
and aimed to formulate policies that will be specific and sensitive to the needs of each 
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state. These policies were contrasted against-the neo-liberal “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, which is supposed to be optimal for all sectors of all countries at all times, 
and yet in fact favours overwhelmingly the interests of the already economically 
privileged West. The praxis soughtto resurrect democratic governance on a national 
basis with such governance being based upon principles of responsible and 
responsive administration under the rule of law and which would realise the 
constitutional guarantees of human rights. 
 
Stiglitz highlights that the neo-liberal version of globalization has inherent traits 
which advantage the developed world, when he makes the observation that: 
“Globalization has enhanced the opportunities for success, but it has also posed new 
risks to developing countries. The rules of the game have been designed for the most 
part by the advanced industrial countries, or more accurately, by special interests in 
those countries, for their own interests, and often do not serve well the interests of the 
developing world, and especially the poor.”7 Yet the rules of globalization, as Stiglitz 
himself implies, and as Vandana Shiva explicitly observes elsewhere,8 are not “god-
given”, nor is it true that there is no alternative; rather, the rules can be challenged 
and to a large extent rewritten. The praxis advocated in Chapter 6 is in many respects 
a challenge to the neo-liberal articulations of globalisation by rewriting rules.  
Broadly speaking, the tools identified by this study as being the best to eradicate the 
poverties of South Asia have been a plural, tolerant democracy under the rule of law; 
equitable development; and the universal human rights paradigm. These features have 
been shown to reinforce each other. The mechanism of instituting all of them is wise 
use of law, given the insufficiency of bare economics and the fact that politics is both 
too easily manipulated and not sufficiently enforceable. Continuing to speak broadly, 
human rights as a legally enforceable minimum also guards against both majoritarian 
abuse of democracy, and the beguiling charms of utilitarianism, in that rights draw a 
line underneath both; rights mark a point beyond which neither a tyrannous 
                                                           
7 Joseph E  Stiglitz “Development Policies In A World Of Globalization”  Paper presented at the 
seminar New International Trends for Economic Development on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES), Rio de Janeiro, 12–
13 September 2002. http://www.gsb.columbia.edu (accessed 26 May 2006). 
8 See n 1 of Chapter 2. 
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democratic majority nor a seductive argument in favour of net social utility gains is 
allowed to go. 
 
A further overarching or meta theme to emerge from the study is that the role of the 
state remains crucial. The study holds the governments of South Asia accountable for 
bowing to the will of the IFIs. It argues that they have abdicated responsibility and 
power, which, with better guidance and greater courage, they could have utilised to 
challenge the dictates of the IFIs. However, this thesis continues to hold states to 
account even though the extent of sovereignty in a globalized world has been 
abridged in ways that the Westphalian system did not envisage. It is still the state that 
formulates laws, structures its own government, and in free association with other 
states jointly forms the global and regional architecture that has been discussed in 
order to buttress all those values. At the same time, civil society including NGOs, 
will also partake in and enrich dialogue within such states in the manner that a plural 
democracy inherently relies on, fosters, and thrives on. The new regional mechanism 
proposed in Chapter 6 envisages the creation of a collective power base, the resolve, 
the confidence and the accountability of these eight states to redefine their terms of 
engagement with neo-liberal hegemony.  
 
This thesis attempted to address the “vast gap between theories of socio-political 
change and the realities on the ground; between the developments in international law 
and the realization of those rights where people live and work; between the formal 
institutions of democracy and the deeper realization of democratic rights; between the 
commitments and pronouncements of our political and developmental leaders and the 
achievement of dignity and justice” through a legal praxis that advocated a regional 
collaborative endeavour.9 Nevertheless, such remedial measures, however well 
designed and instituted, will be futile if the states and the peoples of the region are 
unwilling to take control of the future trajectory of South Asia. 
  
 
                                                           
9 Smitu Kothari “Reflections on 50 years of Development” (2007) 50 Development 4–32, 18.  
 
 
 412 
Appendix B 
 
The Mahabharata, Book 12: Santi Parva: Section LXV  
 
“Indra said, 'Kshatriya duties, O king, which are possessed of such energy, which 
include in their exercise all other duties, and which are the foremost of all duties, 
should be observed by persons that are, like thee, so high-souled and so employed in 
seeking the good of the world. If those duties are not properly discharged, all creatures 
would be overtaken by ruin. The kings possessed of compassion for all creatures, 
should regard these to be the foremost of his duties, reclaiming the land for cultivation 
and fertilizing it, performance of great sacrifices for cleansing himself, a disregard for 
begging, and protection of subjects. Abandonment (gift) is said by the sages to be the 
foremost of virtues. Of all kinds of abandonment, again, that of the body in battle, is 
the foremost. Thou hast seen with thy eyes how the rulers of the earth, ever observant 
of Kshatriya duties, having duly waited upon their preceptors and acquired great 
learning, at last cast off their bodies, engaged in battle with one another. The 
Kshatriya, desirous of acquiring religious merit, should, after having gone through the 
Brahmacharya mode, should lead a life of domesticity which is always meritorious. In 
adjudicating upon ordinary questions of right (between his subjects), he should be 
thoroughly impartial. For causing all the orders to be observant of their respective 
duties, for the protection they afford to all, for the diverse contrivances and means and 
the prowess and exertion (with which they seek the accomplishment of their objects).  
 
Bhishma said, 'The protection of all creatures is regarded as the highest duty of the 
Kshatriya. Listen now to me, O king, as to how the duty of protection is to be 
exercised. A king conversant with his duties should assume many forms even as the 
peacock puts forth plumes of diverse hues. Keenness, crookedness, truth, and 
sincerity, are the qualities that should be present in him. With thorough impartiality, he 
should practise the qualities of goodness if he is to earn felicity. He must assume that 
particular hue or form which is beneficial in view of the particular object which he 
seeks to accomplish. 2 A king who can assume diverse forms succeeds in 
accomplishing even the most subtle objects. Dumb like the peacock in autumn, he 
should conceal his counsel. He should speak little, and the little he speaks should be 
sweet. He should be of good features and well versed in the scriptures. He should 
always be heedful in respect of those gates through which dangers may come and 
overtake him, like men taking care of breaks in embankments through which the 
waters of large tanks may rush and flood their fields and houses. He should seek the 
refuge of Brahmanas crowned with ascetic success even as men seek the refuge or 
loudly rivers generated by the rain-water collected within mountain lakes. That king 
who desires to amass wealth should act like religious hypocrites in the matter of 
keeping a coronal lock. 3 The king should always have the rod of chastisement 
uplifted in his hands. He should always act heedfully (in the matter of levying his 
taxes) after examining the incomes and expenses of his subjects like men repairing to a 
full-grown palmyra for drawing its juice. 4 He should act equitably towards his own 
subjects; cause the crops of his enemies to be crushed by the tread of his cavalry, 
march against foes when his own wings have become strong; and observe all the 
sources of his own weakness. He should proclaim the faults of his foes; crush those 
that are their partisans; and collect wealth from outside like a person plucking flowers 
from the woods.  
 
The Mahabharata Kisari Mohan Ganguli, tr.[1883-1896] http://www.sacred-
texts.com/hin/m01/index.htm  (accessed 28  May 2006).  
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Appendix C 
 
Ratifications of UN Human Rights Treaties by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka  
 
 
Country Convention Status  
 
  
Signature 
Date 
EIF Date Rec. of 
Instr. 
Afghanistan 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Ratification 04/02/85 26/06/87 01/04/87 
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  24/04/83 24/01/83 
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
No Action    
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Ratification 14/08/80 04/04/2003 05/03/2003 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 
No Action    
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Accession  05/08/83 06/07/83 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Accession  24/04/83 24/01/83 
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
No Action    
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 27/09/90 27/04/94 28/03/94 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Accession  24/10/2003 24/09/2003 
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Accession  19/10/2002 19/09/2002 
 
Bangladesh 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Accession  04/11/98 05/10/98 
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 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  06/12/2000 06/09/2000 
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
No Action    
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Accession  06/12/84 06/11/84 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 
Ratification 06/09/2000 22/12/2000 06/09/2000 
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Accession  11/07/79 11/06/79 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Accession  05/01/99 05/10/98 
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
Signature 
only 
07/10/98   
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
Signature 
only 
09/05/2007   
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 26/01/90 02/09/90 03/08/90 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Ratification 06/09/2000 12/02/2002 06/09/2000 
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Ratification 06/09/2000 06/10/2000 06/09/2000 
 
Bhutan 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
No Action    
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
No Action    
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Ratification 17/07/80 30/09/81 31/08/81 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the No Action    
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Signature 
only 
26/03/73   
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
No Action    
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
No Action    
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 04/06/90 02/09/90 01/08/90 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Signature 
only 
15/09/2005   
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Signature 
only 
15/09/2005   
 
India 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Signature 
only 
14/10/97   
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  10/07/79 10/04/79 
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
Signature 
only 
06/02/2007   
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Ratification 30/07/80 08/08/93 09/07/93 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
No Action    
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Ratification 02/03/67 04/01/69 03/12/68 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Accession  10/07/79 10/04/79 
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
No Action    
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
Signature 
only 
30/03/2007   
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Accession  11/01/93 11/12/92 
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 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Ratification 15/11/2004 30/12/2005 30/11/2005 
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Ratification 15/11/2004 16/09/2005 16/08/2005 
 
Maldives 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Accession  20/05/2004 20/04/2004 
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
Ratification 14/09/2005 22/06/2006 15/02/2006 
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  19/12/2006 19/09/2006 
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
Accession  19/12/2006 19/09/2006 
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
Signature 
only 
06/02/2007   
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Accession  31/07/93 01/07/93 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
Accession  13/06/2006 13/03/2006 
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Accession  24/05/84 24/04/84 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Accession  19/12/2006 19/09/2006 
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
No Action    
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 21/08/90 13/03/91 11/02/91 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Ratification 10/05/2002 29/01/2005 29/12/2004 
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Ratification 10/05/2002 10/06/2002 10/05/2002 
 
Nepal 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Accession  13/06/91 14/05/91 
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
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 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  14/08/91 14/05/91 
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
Accession  14/08/91 14/05/91 
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  04/06/98 04/03/98 
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
No Action    
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Ratification 05/02/91 22/05/91 22/04/91 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
Signature 
only 
18/12/2001   
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Accession  01/03/71 30/01/71 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Accession  14/08/91 14/05/91 
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
No Action    
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 26/01/90 14/10/90 14/09/90 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Signature 
only 
08/09/2000   
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Ratification 08/09/2000 20/02/2006 20/01/2006 
 
Pakistan 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
No Action    
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
No Action    
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
No Action    
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Accession  11/04/96 12/03/96 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
No Action    
 CERD-International Convention on the Ratification 19/09/66 04/01/69 21/09/66 
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
No Action    
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
No Action    
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 20/09/90 12/12/90 12/11/90 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Signature 
only 
26/09/2001   
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Signature 
only 
26/09/2001   
 
Sri Lanka 
 
 CAT-Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Accession  02/02/94 03/01/94 
 CAT-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture and Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
No Action    
 CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
Accession  11/09/80 11/06/80 
 CCPR-OP1-Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
Accession  03/01/98 03/10/97 
 CCPR-OP2-DP-Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
No Action    
 CED-Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
No Action    
 CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women 
Ratification 17/07/80 04/11/81 05/10/81 
 CEDAW-OP-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
Accession  15/01/2003 15/10/2002 
 CERD-International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Accession  20/03/82 18/02/82 
 CESCR-International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Accession  11/09/80 11/06/80 
 CMW-International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
Accession  01/07/2003 11/03/96 
 CPD-Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 
Signature 
only 
30/03/2007   
 CPD-OP-Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
No Action    
 CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child Ratification 26/01/90 11/08/91 12/07/91 
 CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict 
Ratification 21/08/2000 08/10/2000 08/09/2000 
 CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the Signature 08/05/2002   
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Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children child prostitution and child 
pornography 
only 
 
 
 
Source United Nations Human Rights 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatbytreaty?OpenView (accessed 8 March 2008) 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Organizational Structure and the functions of the IFIs. 
 
The World Bank  
 
The World Bank is an affiliated specialised agency of the United Nations, situated 
in Washington, D.C, which currently has 183 state members1. All members of the 
World Bank are automatically members of the International Monetary Fund. The 
Bank was created for the purpose of facilitating economic, industrial and 
infrastructure growth by providing loan assistance to the countries that were 
affected by World War II.2  
 
Although the rebuilding of post-war economies was the primary mandate of the 
Bank's work, the Bank’s focus has expanded beyond post-conflict rehabilitation 
and infrastructure development to include the provision of both short and long-
term funding for natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies and Third World 
development.3 The creditors of the World Bank are not restricted to sovereign 
states but under government guarantees and assurances the Bank has the mandate 
to extend its loan facilities to private investors as well.  The operation of the loan 
schemes to both the public and private sector are aimed at facilitating productive 
investment, encouraging foreign trade, and streamlining and easing of 
international debt repayment.  
 
The Bank’s operations are similar to those of a commercial bank in that it is self-
sustaining and has managed to maintain a profit on its lending activities. Its other 
area of operation includes the Economic Development Institute, which is 
entrusted with the training of officials of the member countries in relation to 
issues of economic development. An affiliated agency of the Bank is the 
International Finance Corporation, which was established in 1956. The IFC’s 
main function is to invest in private enterprises without governmental assurances 
or guarantees. The International Development Association, another affiliated 
agency of the Bank established in 1960, also extends credit on less stringent terms 
to developing countries. The late 1980s saw harsh criticism of the Bank’s lending 
policies particularly to developing countries to finance development projects with 
scant regards to environmental issues.4 The environmental fund created in 1990 
that provides low interest loans for developing countries is a result of that 
criticism. The World Bank Group also includes the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes.5  
                                                 
1 http://www.worldbank.org/ (accessed 17th July 2007) 
2 World Bank Reports 1947 - 1969  see also  Jessica Einhorn, “The World Bank's Mission Creep 
From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faessay5567/jessica-einhorn/the-world-Bank-s-mission-
creep.html (accessed 16th June 2006). 
3 http://web.worldbank.org (accessed 16th June 2006). 
4 Cheryl Payer The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York, London, Monthly Review Press, 
1982) 15-52. 
5 See the World Bank's publication, World Bank Operations: Sectoral Programs and Policies 
(1972); E. S. Mason and R. E. Asher The World Bank since Bretton Woods (1973); C. Payer The 
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
The Bretton Woods Conference also included discussion of the need to create 
mechanisms to stabilise foreign currency exchange rates, regulate the international 
monetary system and to eliminate currency restrictions relating to trade in goods 
and services, which in turn would promote global trade.6 The result of these 
concerns was the creation of the IMF, which was originally envisaged to foster 
steady economic growth and full employment by offering unconditional loans to 
states that were in dire financial crisis.7 The IMF's statutory purposes included 
promoting the balanced expansion of world trade, the stability of exchange rates, 
the avoidance of competitive currency devaluations, and the orderly correction of 
a country's balance of payments problems. To serve these purposes, the IMF 
monitors economic and financial developments and policies, in member countries 
and at the global level, provides policy advice to its members and makes short-
term loans available to member countries with balance of payments problems. It is 
also a resource provider for governments and central banks in terms of technical 
assistance and training in its areas of expertise.8  
 
The articles of agreement of the IMF also provide a supervisory role9 to the IMF 
over its members. This in effect means that the IMF monitors the exchange rate 
policies in order to guide the international monetary system and to ensure its 
smooth operation. The economic policies of a country are scrutinised to see 
whether they would enhance sustainable economic growth and financial stability. 
The effectiveness of these surveillance schemes was severely tested in the 
Mexican debt crisis of 1994 and again in the South East Asian financial crisis in 
1996/97.10  The preventive mechanisms that the IMF is said to wield in the event 
of an impending crisis proved impotent on both occasions.11  
 
The governing structure of the IMF is similar to that of the World Bank.12 The 
Executive Directors are responsible for the conduct of the general operations of 
                                                 
World Bank: A Critical Analysis (1982); S. Please The Hobbled Giant: Essays on the World Bank 
(1984). 
6 Leland B. Yeager International Monetary Relations: Theory, History, and Policy (New York, 
Harper & Row, 1966). 
7 Article I of the  Articles of Agreement sets out the IMF's main responsibilities: promoting 
international monetary cooperation; facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of international 
trade; promoting exchange stability; assisting in the establishment of a multilateral system of 
payments; and making its resources available (under adequate safeguards) to members 
experiencing balance of payments difficulties. 
8 Articles of agreement IMF. 
9 Surveillance operations of the IMF see Articles of Agreement of the IMF. 
10 Graham Bird ‘The IMF and Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and Policy 
Options’ 1996 International Organization 50 3 477-513. 
11 This aspect is elaborated further in the section relating to the South Asian economic dilemma 
created by SAPs. 
12 A Board of Governors is at the helm, which usually constitutes the Finance Ministers of the 
member countries. Of the Executive Directors, “five Executive Directors are appointed by the 
members with the five largest numbers of shares (currently the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom).  The other Executive Directors are elected by the other 
members.  In IFC and IDA, Executive Directors and Alternates of the Bank serve ex-officio as 
Executive Directors and Alternates of IFC and IDA (as long as the country that appoints them, or 
any one of the countries that have elected them, is also a member of IFC and IDA).  Members of 
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the Bank and the Fund and exercise all the powers delegated to them by the Board 
of Governors under the Articles of Agreement. The eight countries that make the 
most contributions to the funds of the Bank and the Fund are able to nominate 
their own directors on to the Boards with other countries being represented on the 
Board on a ‘block’ basis.13 The power of the Board of Directors is exercised 
through a unique voting system in both institutions. Unlike the UN voting system 
of one member one vote, this voting system is determined on the basis of the 
financial contributions made by each country to each institution.14  
 
With almost identical governing structures, the management and control of both 
the IMF and World Bank is securely vested with the developed world.15 
Therefore, the philosophy and operations of these institutions reflect the 
ideological leanings of the western world.16  
 
 
2.1.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO)  
 
The WTO is the global institution that was created to facilitate trade between 
diverse trading partners, from producers to ultimate consumers. Though the idea 
of an institutional mechanism to regulate global trade was discussed during the 
Bretton Woods Conference, the lack of enthusiasm for a third international 
organisation resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 
1947.17 The GATT treaty served as the regulatory framework for international 
trade among the 23 member countries in the ensuing years. However, with the 
complexity of global trade the absence of an institutional structure and formal 
dispute resolution mechanisms were felt acutely amongst the members of the 
GATT treaty. Formal discussions to resolve issues were recommenced in 1984 
through the Uruguay Round negotiations, which ultimately resulted in the 
                                                 
the MIGA Board of Directors are elected separately.  Elections for Executive Directors are held 
every two years, normally in connection with the Bank’s Annual Meetings.  Over the years, it has 
been customary for election rules to ensure that wide geographical and balanced representation be 
maintained on the Board of Executive Directors.  An increase to the number of elected Executive 
Directors requires a decision of the Board of Governors by an 80% majority of the total voting 
power.  Before November 1, 1992, there were 22 Executive Directors, 17 of whom were elected.  
In 1992, in view of the large number of new members that had joined the Bank, the number of 
elected Executive Directors was increased to 19.  The two new seats, Russia and a new group 
around Switzerland, brought the total number of Executive Directors to its present level of 24,” 
http://web.worldbank.org/. The IMF also has a similar governing structure. 
13 The ridiculousness of the governing structure of both the Fund and the Bank are revealed by the 
fact that the director appointed by the USA can individually wield a vote of 17%,  where as the 2 
directors representing sub-Saharan Africa on the IMF board wields 4.43% of votes between them. 
14 Since the United States is the largest donor country, it wields roughly 17% of the vote of the 
IMF. In fact the world’s seven largest industrialised countries make up 45% of the vote at the IMF. 
15 The voting power in both organizations is synonymous with economic power with the 30 odd 
OECD states controlling 63.55% of the IMF votes and 61.58% of the World Bank votes. The G8 
states alone can claim ownership to 48.18% and 45.71% of the IMF and Bank votes respectively. 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/IMF_WB/IMF_WB_Facts.html  (at 17th August 2006) 
16 Ute Pieper and Lance Taylor The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF, the World Bank, and 
Inequality in a Globalized Economy Working Paper No. 4 January 1998 (Center for Economic 
Policy Analysis, New School for Social Research  http://www.newschool.edu/cepa (at 17th August 
2006) 
17The Bretton Woods Conference discussed the idea of creating the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) under the aegis of the UN. Its mandate was to deal with issues of trade, tariffs, 
international investments and commodity agreements. But several signatories to the treaty 
including the USA did not ratify it.    
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establishment of the WTO in January 1995. The creation of the WTO was 
essentially an implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which focussed on the trade of goods. However, as a result of the 
Uruguay Round intellectual property rights, government procurement, and 
investment measures also came within the scope and purview of the WTO, 
vesting the institution with immense powers to influence and control the global 
finance and trade.18  
 
The decision-making organ of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference comprising 
trade ministers of member countries, which meets every two years. The decision-
making of the WTO is by the consensus of the general membership, which stands 
at 150 states19 and therefore 95% of the world trade comes under the auspices of 
the WTO. The daily operations are in the hands of the General Council that 
comprises national representatives of member states. The General Council is 
entrusted with the management of the dispute resolution process of the WTO. In 
its capacity as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) it encourages the consultation 
between member states when a dispute arises. If direct consultation fails, the DSB 
appoints a dispute panel to resolve the issues and the panel is vested with the 
mandate to report back to the DSB. If the dispute is not resolved and the 
complaint is upheld, the DSB may be requested by the complainant to suspend its 
obligations and allow retaliation. 
 
The General Council is also in charge of the scrutiny and evaluation of national 
trade policies.20 The budget of the WTO is funded by the contributions of member 
countries who contribute according to the share of world trade based on trade in 
goods, services and intellectual property rights. The General Council also 
overseas the work of the Council for Trade in Goods, which monitors policy 
trading practices including anti- dumping and unfair trade practices, the Council 
for Trade in Services, which monitors the Uruguay Round agreement on trade in 
services, and the The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS Council monitors the agreement on intellectual 
property rights that were reached during the Uruguay Round and supervises 
members’ compliance. The other functions of the WTO includes 
the administration of WTO trade agreements, the provision of a forum for trade 
negotiations, provision of technical assistance and training for developing 
countries and cooperation with other international organisations.21  
  
The operations of the WTO are based on principles of reciprocity and non-
                                                 
18 John H. Jackson ‘Fragmentation or Unification among International Institutions: The World 
Trade Organization’ 1999 New York University International Journal of Law and Politics 31 4 
826-827. 
19 At present there are 31observer governments and seven international organisation observers 
http://www.wto.org/. 
20 Scrutiny of the national trade policies is termed Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). The 
TPRM process was created under the Uruguay Round agreements to enable the scrutiny of 
national trade policies. The TPRM examines the trading policies of the four countries with the 
largest shares of world trade which are reviewed every two years, the next 16 largest traders are 
reviewed every four years. Countries with a lesser share in world trade are scrutinized every six 
years and the others as and when it is warranted by the WTO. TPRM acts as a watch dog to 
evaluate whether a country is pursuing market friendly trade policies that would enhance global 
trade. 
21 http://www.wto.org/ (at 16th June 2006). 
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discrimination.22 The principle of reciprocity comes into operation when trade 
barriers between countries are mutually reduced to foster intra-state trade. Non-
discrimination, in principle, refers to the policy between member states that 
benefit from tariff reductions on goods and services that are made available to all 
member states. In this sense, the principle of non-discrimination is an extension of 
the principle of reciprocity which spreads the benefits of the reduction of trade 
barriers to all the members of the WTO.23 Deviation from the two fundamental 
policies of the WTO is permitted in the circumstance where a country allows 
preferential treatment for the developing countries. The WTO working culture 
also encourages open information on all rules and regulations, pre-negotiated 
limitations on trading barriers and an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism.  
 
 
                                                 
22 Article I of the GATT. 
23 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (at 26th June 2006). 
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Appendix E   
 
 
 
Comparative Growth Rates of Developing Economies Average Annual Rates 1960-
88 
 
Country Industrial Production                                         GDP 
  1960-1980 1980-1988 1960-1980 1980-
1988 
South Korea 15.2                       12.6                   8.8                 10.1 
Taiwan 12.8                         7.2                   9.6                   7.4 
Singapore 12.1                         4.5                   9.2                   6.9 
Hong Kong 10.3                         7.5                   9.9                   7.4 
Thailand 10.3                         6.6                   7.4                   6.5 
Indonesia 8.9                         5.1                   5.9                   5.7 
Pakistan 8.0                         7.2                   4.4                   6.3 
Malaysia 9.6*                         6.1                   7.9*       4.6 
India 4.6                         7.6                   3.5                   5.4 
Bangladesh 6.1                         4.9                   5.8*       3.5 
Sri Lanka 5.3                         4.4                   5.2                   3.9 
Mayanmar 4.2                         7.3*                   3.5                   
3.3* 
* - 1970-1980  
Source: The Economist May 4, 1991, Survey page 7 
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